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Corporations: Majority Power and Shareholder
Arrangements for Control
ROBERT A. KESSLER*
The old story, so often told, of a prominent Eastern newspaperman's
reply to the question of what the shares in his company were worth is
very apt:
"There are 51 shares," said he, "that are worth $250,000. There are
49 shares that are not worth a - -. "
The lot of the minority shareholder in a close corporation is not always
happy. Where the corporation utilizes simple form articles of incorpo-
ration containing only the mandatory provisions 2 and the predominant
contributor is given a majority of the voting shares, without restriction
by any shareholder or voting trust agreement, the predominant contrib-
utor will have virtually total control. It is axiomatic that a majority
elects the entire board no matter how many or few members it has.
Thus, that majority controls all corporate decisions including the distri-
bution or withholding of dividends, the election of all officers, and the
hiring and firing of all other personnel. It is important that all partici-
pants in the corporate venture recognize, at its inception, the ramifica-
tions of this majority control.
Typically when a corporation is formed each of the participants
desiring an active role will be given one. Thus, in a corporation of three
equal shareholders each will frequently be given a directorship and an
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law. A.B. Yale, 1949; J.D. Colum-
bia, 1952; LL.M New York Univ., 1959.
1. Humphrys v. Winous, 165 Ohio St. 45, 133 NE 2d 780 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
2. The mandatory provisions are set forth in FLA. STAT. § 607.164(1). It should
be noted that, as will be discussed below, majority power may also result from a coali-
tion, even an informal or inadvertent coalition. For example, a husband and wife or
two relatives together may hold a majority of the voting shares, although each techni-
cally has a minority interest; or, two equal shareholders may each sell or give an equal
number of shares to a third person and whichever of the two the new shareholder sides
with will then have majority power.
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office. The lack of power of any one of the participants will not imme-
diately be apparent. It will become so only when the real nature of
majority power is understood. This lack of power of the minority be-
comes apparent when, as is typical, a dispute occurs in a corporation in
which the minority has previously been allowed some participation in
management.
As directors, the minority participants will have legal powers.
However, the well established caselaw rule of directorial autonomy, 3 in
the face of majority shareholder dictation, is largely a myth. In fact,
while direct interference in management may not be possible,, a major-
ity shareholder, albeit by more devious means, can generally achieve
the absolute operating control theoretically denied him by the law.
AN EXAMINATION OF MAJORITY POWER
The following example illustrates the control that the majority
shareholder might wield. Let us assume that a corporation has three
shareholders, A, B, and C. A owns a majority of the corporation's
shares, and B and C own the rest. Assume further that all three are
represented on the board and split the offices of president, secretary,
and treasurer. Obviously, this is a typical close corporation arrange-
ment where the relations of the parties are amicable, initially.
If A wants the corporation to take a certain action such as enter-
ing into a long-term employment contract with A's son, D, this is a
matter for the board of directors. A can obviously be outvoted by B
and C, but can A, nonetheless, get his way? He could, of course, offer
to buy B's and C's shares. Possibly overassessing their power and the
value of their interest, B and C might try to blackmail A into a higher
3. The leading case is Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co., Ltd. v.
Cunninghame, [19061 2 Ch. 34 (Ct. of Appeal). See also Finn Bondholders, Inc. v.
Dukes, 157 Fla. 642, 646, 26 So. 2d 802 (1946); M. GORDON, FLORIDA CORPORATIONS
MANUAL § 10.03 (1974). See, generally, as to agreements affecting directors, H. HENN,
LAW OF CORPORATIONS 393 et seq. (2nd ed. 1970). Although FLA. STAT. § 607.111(1)
and FLA. STAT. § 607.107(2) allow incursions on board powers, they both indicate ad-
herance to the general rule in the absence of compliance with their special terms.
4. FLA. STAT. § 607.111(1) and FLA. STAT. § 607.107(2). Although FLA. STAT. §
607.111(1) technically only requires a provision in the articles to implement the excep-
tion to board power, no sensible attorney would insert such a provision without ap-
proval of at least all the initial participants.
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price than their shares are realistically worth. In any event, the pro-
tracted negotiations might make this an undesirable solution.
An obvious means of getting his way is for A to wait until the
annual shareholder meeting, and then vote in three directors of his own
choice that are "friendly" to his plan. Barring a contrary shareholder
agreement or high vote provision' in the articles of incorporation, A
can elect the entire board. Even if the corporation has cumulative vot-
ing,' he can still elect two out of the three directors and thus get his
way. 7 This, of course, has the disadvantage, from A's point of view, of
having to wait till the next meeting. However, this wait may not be as
long as one might assume since A may have the power to advance the
date of that next meeting.'
In addition to these two obvious methods of achieving his goal, A
ordinarily will have available at least one of the following methods for
guaranteeing that his demands will be met almost immediately: (1) re-
moval of the directors who oppose him; (2) increasing the number of
directors and "packing the board"; (3) decreasing the number of direc-
tors to get rid of the opposing members; (4) shortening the duration of
5. FLA. STAT. § 607.094(2). Assuming a quorum is present, the norm is that the
affirmative vote of the majority of the shares represented at the meeting and entitled to
vote shall constitute the act of the shareholders. However, the statute provides that a
number greater than a majority may be required if the articles of incorporation or
bylaws of the corporation so provide.
6. In cumulative voting each shareholder may take a number of votes equal to
the number of shares owned times the number of directorships to be filled and cast all
of them for one candiate or distribute them among several as he chooses. D.F. VAGTS,
BASIC CORPORATION LAW, 825 (2nd ed. 1979).
7. Under the Williams formula for determining the effectiveness of cumulative
voting (WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRECTORS, 40-46 (1951)), one multiplies
the number of shares represented at the meeting times the number of directors desired
to be elected, divides by the number to be elected plus 1, and adds 1 to the result. This
gives the number of shares needed to elect the desired number of directors. Under the
formula, if 3 directors are to be elected, and A has 51% of the shares it becomes clear
that he can elect 2 directors. See also LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 376 (2nd ed. 1971).
8. FLA. STAT. § 607.084(2) provides for an annual meeting of shareholders to
elect directors "on such date and at such time as may be stated in, or fixed in accor-
dance with the bylaws." It also provides for a court-ordered election if the meeting is
not held within any 13-month period. It does not, however, require that a full year
elapse between annual meetings. A New York case held under a similar statutory pro-
vision that the date of the annual meeting could be advanced. Matter of Mansdorf v.
Unexcelled, Inc., 28 A.D. 2d 44, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 173 (1967).
1 4:98
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the corporation; or (5) increasing his power as an officer to enable him
to do what he wants without director approval. In some jurisdictions he
may even be able to abolish the board and retain management power
to himself as a shareholder? The success of any of these methods is, of
course, contingent upon A's power to call a special shareholders' meet-
ing or approve the changes without one. This is, however, a power
which he will frequently possess by virtue of his office or by virtue of
statute.10 The mere threat of its utilization will normally be sufficient to
coerce the oppositon to give the majority shareholder his way. A fur-
ther threat to the minority may be very effective. The majority share-
holder may under the by laws have been given the power to remove
non-consenting directors from their positions as officers." The votes of
directors subject to such action may well be controlled by this threat to
their compensation and status in other roles.
9. Florida may possibly be one of these. FLA. STAT. § 607.111(1) provides:
All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the
business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed under the direction of, a
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in the
articles of incorporation. If any such provision is made in the articles of incorpo-
ration, the powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the board of directors
by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent and by such per-
son or persons as shall be provided in the articles of incorporation.
An amendment of the articles might be able to accomplish this, since this is a provision
which could have originally been included (FLA. STAT. § 607.177(1)). Although the di-
rectors must usually authorize an amendment (FLA. STAT. § 607.181(l)(a)), the share-
holders may enact such an amendment without such director approval, at a meeting
for which notice of the changes is given (FLA. STAT. § 607.181(4)), by majority vote.
FLA. STAT. § 607.181(l)(c). A majority shareholder, even though not an officer, has
power to call a special meeting to adopt the amendment. FLA. STAT. § 607.084(3)(b).
Although this conflicts with the spirit of FLA. STAT. § 607.107(2) which only authorizes
director-infringing provisions where unanimous, it may be upheld, if Florida follows
the Delaware "independent validity" doctrine. (Even though an action would be im-
proper under one section of the statute, it is still permitted if it appears arguably
proper under another.) This, of course, represents a rejection of the "pari materia"
doctrine of statutory interpretation, and may not be followed in Florida.
10. See FLA. STAT. § 607.084(3)(b). See also FLA. STAT. § 607.394(1), infra note
15.
11. Under FLA. STAT. § 607.15 1(1) the bylaws may provide for election of of-
ficers by the shareholders. If so, they may be removed by the shareholders. FLA. STAT.
§ 607.154(2). After removal of an officer, the vacancy thus created will, however, ap-
parently be filled by the directors unless the power to fill such vacancies is also reserved
to the shareholders. FLA. STAT. § 607.154(3).
4:1980 1
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DEVICES-FOR MAJORITY CONTROL
A number of the devices for majority control delineated above
may be available in Florida. Some are not:
Removal of opposing directors.
Although removal of directors for cause is recognized at common
law, removal without cause is generally not permitted. 12 This represents
the Florida common law rule;13 however, the current Florida statute,
like Delaware's," provides: "At a meeting of shareholders called ex-
pressly for that purpose, directors may be removed in the manner pro-
vided in this section. Any director or the entire board of directors may
be removed, with or without cause, by a vote of the holders of a major-
ity of the shares then entitled to vote at an election of directors. '"'5
Unless cumulative voting is provided for in the articles of incorpora-
tion"6 or there are provisions in the articles for class directors," A can
remove the uncooperative directors whenever he wants18 and fill the va-
cancies thus created with his own "puppets.""
12. FLETCHER, CYC. CORP. § 352 (Perm. Ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited FLETCHER].
13. Frank v. Anthony, 107 So. 2d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
14. 8 DEL. CODE ANN. § 141(k).
15. FLA. STAT. § 607.117(1). It is not completely clear whether the requirement
of Florida Statute section 607.117(1) for a meeting "called expressly for that purpose"
was meant to override the provisions of Florida Statute section 607.394(1) which gov-
erns actions by shareholders without a meeting. If the latter section can be utilized A's
task will be more simple.
Since A has the power to call a meeting (FLA. STAT. § 607.084(3)(b)), and, in the
absence of special protective devices for the minority, his votes at the meeting will be
sufficient to remove the offending directors, it would seem safer to go through the
formality of holding such a meeting. See FLA. STAT. § 607.117(1). Removal without
cause is still restricted in many states. Petition of Singer, 189 Misc. 150, 70 N.Y.S. 2d
550 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Abberger v. Kulp, 156 Misc. 210, 281 N.Y.S. 373 (Sup. Ct. 1935);
Pilat v. Broach Systems, Inc., 108 N.J. Super. 88, 260 A. 2d 13 (Law Div. 1969);
FLETCHER §§ 352, 354.
16. FLA. STAT. § 607.097(4).
17. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.044(l), 607.164(1)(d).
18. See FLA. STAT. § 607.117(2), (3), for the limitations.
19. FLA. STAT. § 607.114(6).
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Increasing the number of directors-"packing the board."
Florida statutes provide that the number of directors be fixed in
the articles of incorporation, in the bylaws, or in a manner provided in
those documents."0 Although power to amend bylaws is in the direc-
tors, "unless reserved to the shareholders by the articles of incorpora-
tion,""1 the statute continues:
Bylaws adopted by the board of directors or by the shareholders may be
repealed or changed, new bylaws may be adopted by the shareholders,
and the shareholders may prescribe in any bylaw made by them that
such bylaw shall not be altered, amended or repealed by the board of
directors.22
Although the statute is not completely clear that the shareholders have
the right to increase the number of directors unless they have reserved
all power over the bylaws or the number of directors has been fixed by
the action of the directors, the language suggests that the grant of
power to the directors was not intended to deprive The shareholders of
their usual power over the bylaws. Accordingly, A should be able to
succeed here as well. The result should be the same even if the number
of directors is fixed in the articles of incorporation.21 A can, therefore,
add two new directors to counter the votes of the two who oppose him.
However, unlike some other states, where the statute expressly
gives permission to amend the bylaws to grant the power to the share-
holders to fill such vacancies, 24 or expressly provides that such vacan-
cies will be filled by them,2 the Florida statute simply provides:
Any vacancy occurring in the board of directors, including any vacancy
created by reason of an increase in the number of directors, may be
filled by the affirmative vote of a majority of the remaining directors
though less than a quorum of the board of directors. A director elected
to fill a vacancy shall hold office only until the next election of directors
20. FLA. STAT. § 607.114(1).
21. FLA. STAT. § 607.081.
22. Id.
23. See text at notes 32, 33 infra.
24. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 705(a) (consol.) (McKINNEY's CoNsoL. LAWS
OF N.Y.).
25. For example, N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A § 6-5(3) (1968).
9
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by the shareholders."
No express exception for a contrary article or bylaw provision ap-
pears, and, accordingly, the shareholders may not have the power to fill
such vacancies. Needless to say, if the directors fill them, A will be in a
worse position than beforeY
Decreasing the number of directors.
A might try to reduce the number of directors to one, that is, him-
self. Again, in some states this device might succeed.2 However, the
Florida statute expressly provides:
The board of directors of a corporation shall consist of one or more
members. The number of directors shall be fixed by, or in the manner
provided in, the articles of incorporation. The number of directors may
be increased or decreased from time to time by amendment to, or in the
manner provided in, the articles of incorporation or the bylaws, but no
decrease shall have the effect of shortening the term of any incumbent
director.?
While this method will not accomplish A's purpose immediately, he
may use it as a means of giving himself complete control in the future,
by fixing the number of directors at one.
Shortening the corporation's duration.
The practical effect of dissolution can be achieved by amending
the articles of incorporation to set as the corporation's duration a date
about to expire. Florida statutes expressly allow an amendment "to
26. FLA. STAT. § 607.114(6).
27. If the shareholders do have the power to fill the vacancies despite lack of
express statutory authority, it is clear that A has the power to call a shareholder meet-
ing to do so because he owns over one tenth of the shares. (FLA. STAT. § 607.084(3)(b))
In fact, it would appear that A will be able to act even without a meeting by virtue of
Florida Statute section 607.394(1).
28. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A § 6-5(1) (1968) which does not contain the express
restriction contained in FLA. STAT. § 607.114(1). See text at note 29.
29. FLA. STAT. § 607.114(1).
! 4:98
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change the [corporation's] period of duration. ' 3 In some states all
amendments of the articles of incorporation require prior board ap-
proval .3 In such jurisdictions this solution would be unavailable to A.
However, under Florida law "[t]he shareholders may amend the arti-
cles of incorporation without an act of the directors at a meeting for
which notice of the changes to be made is given." 32 Since A, as a ma-
jority holder has the power to call the necessary shareholder meeting,3
this method should succeed. Thus, the corporation's duration can be
fixed in the articles for a term about to expire immediately.
Increasing officer power.
If, as discussed above, A as a shareholder possesses the right to
amend the bylaws, he can increase his powers as an officer. The Florida
statute provide that "[aill officers . . . shall have such authority and
perform such duties in- the management of the corporation as may be
provided by the bylaws." 3 A bylaw amendment providing for election
of officers by the shareholders is also desirable3 since this will protect
A from removal by the board. If A is president of the corporation he
has the power, by virtue of his office, to enter into a number of transac-
tions, although possibly not the long-term employment contract hy-
pothesized.36 A may also have broad express powers if conferred on
him by the bylaws.37
Whether or not shareholders still retain the power to enact bylaws,
still in the absence of a provision in the articles reserving the right, 38 A
will have the power, as discussed above, to amend the articles to re-
serve that power to himself as a shareholder. He can then amend the
30. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.177(2)(b).
31. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A § 9-2(4)(a) (1974).
32. FLA. STAT. § 607.181(4).
33. FLA. STAT. § 607.084(3)(b). See also note 15, supra.
34. FLA. STAT. § 607.151(2).
35. FLA. STAT. § 607.151(1).
36. FLETCHER § 566.
37. FLA. STAT. § 607.151(2). "All officers and agents, as between themselves and
the corporation, shall have such authority and perform such duties in the management
of the corporation as may be provided in the bylaws or as may be determined by
resolution of the board of directors not inconsistent with the bylaws."
38. FLA. STAT. § 607.081.
4:980 1
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bylaws to broaden his powers as president. It could be argued that such
expansion of officer power is an improper interference with board pow-
ers. The counter-arguments which should succeed, provided the
amended bylaws do not attempt to supersede board management, are
that all powers granted to officers are to some extent an encroachment
on board powers and that the statute expressly validates the grant. This
device will not prevent the board from later firing A's son if B and C
are allowed to remain members. However, if the president has the
power to enter into the contract, this may be possible only on pain of
the corporation's paying damages. Even if B and C escape liability for
causing the corporation to breach the contract, they may be discour-
aged from repudiating the contract since doing so will mean an injury
to them through diminution in the value of their interest in the
corporation.
Although sterilization of the board is permitted in Florida, the
shareholder unanimity requirement for such action may make it un-
available to A as a practical matter.3 However, even in Florida, A
appears to have more than one device available to him, and only one is
necessary.
There is very little caselaw in Florida on the availability of these
control devices as a means for a majority shareholder to get his way. If
the corporation operates under Florida law, this uncertainty may well
work to A's advantage. The threat of their use, coupled with B's and
C's knowledge that A will ultimately win, at least at the next annual
meeting, will probably be effective to persuade them to accede to A's
demands.
Obviously, where the initial articles and bylaws are drawn up with
provisions favoring the majority holder the success of coercive methods
can probably be assured. For example, the articles of incorporation
may expressly reserve all power over the bylaws to the shareholders or
they may attempt to allow a majority shareholder to fill newly created
board vacancies. Majority shareholder control can also prevent any
change in the articles or bylaws seeking to delete these preferential pro-
39. FLA. STAT. § 607.107(2).
Except in [certain] cases . . . , no written agreement to which all shareholders
have actually assented. . . shall be invalid as between the parties thereto on the
ground that it is an attempt by the parties thereto to restrict the discretion of the
board of directors in its management of the business of the corporation ...
12
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visions. If the initial bylaws provide for election of all officers by the
shareholders, the majority shareholder can guarantee his election as
president and his continued status as such. Presumably, the board will
not even have power to suspend him.4" Even if it does, this can be coun-
tered by removal of the offending members. The initial bylaws can
also provide for broad presidential powers.
The deceptively innocuous appearance of many of these provisions
should be noted. An uninitiated minority shareholder might not realize
that the effect is to place him almost completely at the mercy of any
shareholder owning a mere 51% of the voting shares. Some provisions
are so facially unfavorable that even an unsophisticated minority par-
ticipant could hardly allow their insertion in the corporate documents
unless he was content to be voiceless." It is not inconceivable, however,
that a careless investor might buy into such a corporation without
knowledge of a limit on the number of directors.
Even if the provisions guaranteeing majority absolutism are not
included in the initial articles of incorporation and bylaws, all except
the sterilization provision (which apparently requires unanimous vote
for insertion by way of amendment to the articles)43 can be added after
any annual meeting at which directors favorable to their addition are
elected. This could be accomplished even where use of such power is to
be held in abeyance until a conflict between the majority and minority
participants actually develops.
LIMITING MAJORITY SHAREHOLDER CONTROL
A number of cases throughout the country recognize a fiduciary
duty on the part of the majority shareholder to the minority sharehold-
ers." In flagrant cases of unfairness judicial intervention may limit a
majority shareholder's absolute control over the corporation where he
attempts to destroy fundamental minority rights. As to ordinary man-
agement, however, there is little that the minority can actually do to
stop the majority. True, a derivative action for waste can be brought
40. Compare N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 716(a) (McKinney's Consol. Laws of
N.Y.).
41. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.151(2), 607.154(2).
42. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.114(1), 607.107(2), 607.111(1). At least where A is not the
sole initial shareholder.
43. FLA. STAT. § 607.107(2).
44. FLETCHER § 5811.
13
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against an improvident contract. 5 (For example, the contract hiring
A's son may amount to a kind of gift of the corporate assets.) The
minority can also bring an action based on majority oppression.46 The
derivative action for waste is sure to result in a pyrrhic victory since it
will not prevent reprisals by A when he immediately, or ultimately,
gains complete board control. His board can cut off all dividends, and
unless B and C are protected by employment contracts, they may be
ousted from officer and employee status. The second alternative, an
action for oppression, is almost equally sure to be futile to the minor-
ity. Even if allowed, it is likely to result in their complete ouster from
the business because dissolution will probably not produce an overly
generous financial return. It is clear, therefore, that one way or an-
other, majority voting share ownership means virtually absolute control
over corporate management notwithstanding any contrary legal rules.
Obviously, majority power need not repose in the hands of a single
shareholder. In fact, except in a corporation with only a sole share-
holder, or two equal shareholders, there will always be a majority and
a minority. Thus, in a three-person corporation in which each share-
holder owns an equal number of shares, any two together can wield the
autocratic powers described above. Where on particular decisions alle-
giances shift, with two voting one way and a different two voting to-
gether on another matter, the threat to the one who happens to be in
the minority at any particular time may not be too great. This shifting
of positions is probably what is envisioned by the participants when
they fail to enter into a unanimous shareholder agreement governing
their relations and omit minority-protective devices in the articles of
incorporation and bylaws.
During the era of goodwill when the corporation is. first formed,
the assumption that unbiased decisions will be made in the best interest
of all concerned may prove true. However, if over a period of time any
two combine regularly to form a bloc, the power of the coalition and
its consequent danger to the omitted member is obvious whether or not
the arrangement is formalized.
45. FLA. STAT. § 607.147.
46. Although not expressly authorized, as in some states (see, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. 14A § (12)(7)(c)), some jurisdictions have recognized a non-statutory right to
seek dissolution on this ground. (See Gaines v. Adler, 15 A.D. 2d 743, 223 N.Y.S. 2d
1011 (1962)).
1| :1 8
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Shareholder agreements are a means of consolidating power in a
corporation. Much like the formation of a political coalition, such
agreements may allow a combination of minorities to, in effect, control
the affairs of a corporation where the individual power of the partici-
pants, when combined under the agreement, constitutes a majority vot-
ing bloc. The effect of such agreements, therefore, may be the same as
where a single shareholder owns a majority of the corporation's shares.
Such agreements are expressly valid in Florida" and therefore clearly
enforceable. However, all shareholders who are not parties are perma-
nently relegated to a virtually powerless minority status.
THE LAWYER'S OBLIGATION
In setting up a corporation with more than a single shareholder,
the attorney must exercise special care. It is axiomatic that an attorney
cannot represent conflicting interests without full disclosure and the
consent of all parties.4 Where more than one person comes to an attor-
ney to set up a corporate business it would seem clearly improper, if
the attorney purports to act for the two or more parties involved, to set
up a typical corporate structure which allows majority control without
explaining the implications of such majority power to all involved. The
utilization of any of the additional provisions discussed above which
help to further solidify such control or enable two or more minority
participants to convert themselves, through an agreement, into a con-
trolling majority would seem to require further explanation and know-
ing acceptance of the potential dangers by all involved. Nor should an
attorney, purporting to act for all, set up a corporation and then draw
up a shareholder agreement among less than all of the people for
whom he formed that corporation without the knowledge and consent
of the excluded participants.
A majority shareholder agreement can properly be regarded as an
attack on minority interests because it consolidates almost absolute
power against them. The agreement in the famous Ringling case is typ-
47. FLA. STAT. § 607.107(1).
48. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(C). Courts are taking an
increasingly strict view on the impropriety of acting for more than one party in corpo-
rate transactions. See Matter of Evans, 113 Ariz. 458, 556 P. 2d 792 (1976); Sterman
v. Cotter, 410 N.Y.S.'2d 320 (1978).
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ical.1' It was obviously directed against one of the shareholders of the
corporation. In that leading Delaware case there were three sharehold-
ers; one owned 370 of the outstanding 1000 shares, while each of the
other two held 315 shares. Since the corporation had cumulative vot-
ing, the agreement between the two smaller participants, had it been
carried out, would have given the two minority shareholders not only
control on the shareholder level, but five out of the seven director slots,
thereby securing overwhelming management control as well. In a cor-
poration with ordinary (straight) voting" they would have elected the
entire board! The combined effect was a guarantee of continued, if not
excessive, financial participation in the venture.
Obviously, this arrangement will not be considered desirable by an
excluded shareholder who will naturally fear a "freeze-out." The result
will be acrimony, if not actual litigation. Accordingly, the lawyer who
drafts such an agreement should not be the one who has set up the
corporation nor should he have previously represented the individual
against whom such an agreement is directed.
ARRANGEMENTS FOR MAJORITY CONTROL
As indicated above, majority shareholder dominance can be
achieved by a single majority shareholder's control over the basic cor-
porate structure at the formation of the corporation. Thus, such a
shareholder can insist on the articles of incorporation providing for a
single director. As sole director he will then have complete control. He
may even be able to "lock in" the other shareholders by imposing re-
strictions on transfers of shares. Even if he transfers shares he can
probably insist that the transferee give him an irrevocable proxy.' Cer-
tainly he can insist that the transferred shares be placed in a voting
trust of which the majority shareholder is trustee5 2 although this may
result in undesirable estate tax consequences to the majority share-
49. Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 29 Del.
Ch. 318, 49 A. 2d 603 (1946), affid. 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A. 2d 441 (1947).
50. "In straight voting each share carries one vote for each matter, including one
vote for each director to be elected." H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 363 (2nd ed.
1970).
51. FLA. STAT. § 607.101(5)(e).
52. FLA. STAT. § 607.104.
13 1
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holder transferor. 53
Where, as in the Ringling situation, the exercise of majority power
depends on a combination of shareholders, the voting trust or irrevoca-
ble proxy device can also be used. However, an agreement such as the
one involved in the Ringling case is still probably the best model. That
agreement wisely includes share transfer restrictions to attempt to as-
sure that if one of the parties desires to sell his shares the other has the
opportunity to maintain the previous control power. The significant
parts of that agreement are as follows:
1. Neither party will sell any shares of stock or any voting trust
certificates in either of said corporations to any other person whatsoever,
without first making a written offer to the other party hereto of all of the
shares or voting trust certificates proposed to be sold, for the same price
and upon the same terms and conditions as in such proposed sale, and
allowing each other party a time of not less than 180 days from the date
of such written offer within which to accept same.
2. In exercising any voting rights to which either party may be
entitled by virtue of ownership of stock or voting trust certificates held
by them in either of said corporation, (sic) each party will consult and
confer with the other and the parties will act jointly in exercising such
voting rights in accordance with such agreement as they may reach with
respect to any matter calling for the exercise of such voting rights.
3. In the event the parties fail to agree with respect to any matter
covered by paragraph 2 above, the question in disagreement shall be sub-
mitted for arbitration to Karl D. Loos, of Washington, D.C. as arbitra-
tor and his decision thereon shall be binding upon the parties hereto.
Such arbitration shall be exercised to the end of assuring for the respec-
tive corporations good management and such participation therein by
the members of the Ringling family as .the experience, capacity, and
ability of each may warrant. The parties may at any time by written
agreement designate any other individual to act as arbitrator in lieu of
said Loos.
4. Each of the parties hereto will enter into and execute such vot-
ing trust agreement or agreements and such other instruments as from
time to time they deem advisable and as they may be advised by counsel
are appropriate to effectuate the purposes and objects of this agreement.
5. This agreement shall be in effect from the date hereof and shall
continue in effect for a period of ten years unless sooner terminated by
53. IRC § 2036 as amended by the Revenue Act of 1978, § 702(i).
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mutual agreement in writing by the parties hereto.
6. The agreement of April 1934 is hereby terminated.
7. This agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of
the heirs, executors, administrators and assigns of the parties hereto
respectively. 4
In addition to the sort of provisions provided above there would
seem to be no objection to the parties' agreeing to vote for themselves
as directors by name. Agreements with such provisions were held valid
even under the restrictive New York common law.5
The share transfer restrictions could perhaps even be strengthened.
A first refusal provision as in the Ringling case, or a first option provi-
sion, might be coupled with a provision that transfer to a non-party
shall not be made without the consent of all parties to the agreement
except where the transferee agrees to become a party to the agreement
and bound by its terms." On the other hand, a provision whereby the
parties agree to cause the corporation to repurchase their shares, or
impose a corporate first option for their benefit, may be invalid as an
attempt to control the directors, and, if not all shareholders are given
equal treatment, may result in a charge of corporate waste if
effectuated. 7
The provision such as is found in the Ringling case for consulta-
tion, joint voting, and arbitration when the parties are unable to agree
on how to cast their votes would seem to be valid under Florida Stat-
utes section 607.107(1) which provides:
An agreement between two or more shareholders, if in writing and
signed by the parties thereto, may provide that, in exercising any voting
54. 49 A. 2d 603, 605 (1946), affd. 53 A. 2d 441, 443 (1947).
55. Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918).
56. Although FLA. STAT. § 607.164(2) only expressly authorizes the articles of
incorporation to contain share transfer restrictions an agreement should at least be
binding on the parties. A legend should appear on the share certificates to make the
restrictions binding on transferees without knowledge. FLA. STAT. § 607.067(3). While
the corporation could be obligated to place the required legend on the shares an agree-
ment to cause it to do so might be held to bind the parties in their directorial capaci-
ties. Accordingly, they may have to assume the onus of insuring the proper legend
themselves.
57. See Borden v. Guthrie, 23 App. Div. 2d 313, 260 N.Y.S. 2d (1965), affd. 17
N.Y. 2d 571, 215 N.E. 2d 511 (1966).
! !
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rights, the shares held by them shall be voted as therein provided, as
they may agree, or as determined in accordance with a procedure agreed
upon by them. Nothing herein shall impair the right of the corporation
to treat the shareholders of record as entitled to vote the shares standing
in their names.
This would seem to be true because of the express statutory approval
of non-unanimous agreements despite the anti-minority nature of such
agreements.
Ballantine, writing in 1946, stated:
No doubt all agreements as to voting by a shareholder should be held
contrary to public policy if the tendency of the bargain is to induce the
voter to consider, in a decision affecting the rights of others, not the
advantage of the corporation but the obtaining of advantages to himself
or some other person, such as securing employment as an officer or as a
manager for a salary."
Ballentine's statement of the law would seem to be repudiated by the
above statute. 9 Certainly the agreement should avoid reciting as con-
sideration such items as securing employment or officer status. Where
the agreement clearly indicates that the other party's vote is being
bought by a promise of favors from the corporation, the agreement will
be hard pressed to withstand attack. But where the agreement demon-
strates a result in mutual benefits to all parties through their enhanced
control position it will likely survive.
A reference to voting on shareholder matters "in accordance with
a procedure agreed upon by them"'60 would also seem to be a clear
validation of the arbitration provision when the parties are unable to
agree themselves on how their shares should be voted.
It would also seem possible to have the parties expressly agree to
give the arbitrator an irrevocable proxy to vote the unwilling party's
shares to implement his decision. The Chancellor in the Ringling case
held that that was the effect of the agreement. However, he was over-
ruled on that point by the Delaware Supreme Court which, although
upholding the validity of the agreement, merely held that the non-con-
58. H. BALLENTINE, HANDBOOK OF LAW OF CORPORATIONs 421 (rev. ed. 1946).
59. FLA. STAT. § 607.107(1).
60. Id.
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senting shareholder's shares could not be voted. The Delaware statute
was subsequently amended to authorize an irrevocable proxy where it
was coupled with an interest. Professor Ernest Folk, Rapporteur for
the committee which drafted the Delaware amendments, commenting
on that provision, stated:
Irrevocable Proxy: The revised statute has a new provision specifically
recognizing the proxy as irrevocable if the instrument so states and the
requisite interest is present. An interest in the stock or generally in the
corporation will suffice. This should be sufficient to validate an irrevoca-
ble proxy held by a creditor during the term of the loan, or by a key
officer during his employment contract period, or by a shareholder as an
ancillary feature of a voting agreement."'
The Florida Statute section 607.101(5) is clear on this point: "A proxy
which states that it is irrevocable is irrevocable when it is held by any
of the following or a nominee of any of the following: . . . [and] (e) A
person designated by or under an agreement under subsection
607.107(l)."2 Accordingly it would seem possible to provide expressly
that the arbitrator has an irrevocable proxy to vote the non-consenting
shareholder's shares in accordance with the arbitrator's decision. Cases
in a number of jurisdictions have allowed enforcement of such agree-
ments without any irrevocable proxy, using specific performance or
mandatory injunction as the remedy. 3 The grant of an irrevocable
proxy with an express consent by the parties to enforcement of the
agreement by equitable remedies might be wise.
While, as in the Ringling agreement, the promise to vote in accor-
dance with its terms is prima facie valid as to matters where the parties
are voting in their capacity as shareholders, any attempt to bind them
in their director capacities may be invalid and could possibly void the
whole agreement. Unless the bylaws already allow election of officers
by the shareholders, a clause whereby the parties agree to elect them-
selves as officers, normally a director function, may be invalid. It
would seem permissible, however, for the parites to agree to enact such
a bylaw whereby they may elect themselves as officers. Further, it may
well be improper for them to agree to vote for dissolution when they
61. E. FOLK, THE NEW DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW 27 (1967).
62. See text at note 47 supra.
63. See, e.g., Weil v. Beresth, 154 Conn. 12, 220 A. 2d 456 (1966).
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decide that such is desirable. A prior director vote is required for such
action. 4
Provisions in the agreement as to declaration of dividends, hiring
of non-officer personnel, or any provision under which the parties di-
rectly bind themselves on how they will vote on matters confided to the
board may well be proscribed. The reason for this limitation is the gen-
eral rule that agreements by less than all shareholders as to how they
will vote as directors are invalid. The leading case is, of course, Mc-
Quade v. Stoneham. 5 In that New York decision a majority share-
holder agreement to keep a named person as an officer at a specified
salary was held invalid since it imporperly interfered with the parties'
discretion as directors. At the time, election of officers was an exclu-
sively directorial function. Such election could not be confided in the
shareholders as is presently possible by a bylaw provision in Florida."
There was Florida authority supporting the rule that "director-
agreements" were invalid." The adoption of Florida Statute section
607.107(2) (1975), which expressly validates such interference with the
board's normal prerogatives only where an agreement authorized by all
the shareholders permits it, is an implied acceptance of the rule.
It is unlikely that such a director-sterilizing or board abolition
provision will be included in the articles of a corporation where a ma-
jority-control agreement will be utilized. If the original participants are
unwise enough to include it without assurance that they will be pro-
tected under it, the parties to the majority-control agreement may,
however, be able to take advantage of the provision by binding them-
selves to vote on matters normally confided to the directors as well.
"Indirect" control over the board can be achieved by an agree-
ment to vote to remove any directors whenever the holders of a certain
percentage of the shares covered by the agreement demand it. Al-
though the vacancies thus created may have to be filled by the board, 8
this should enable the parties to the agreement to insure that the direc-
tors they have elected under the agreement remain loyal to their wishes
64. FLA. STAT. § 607.257.
65. McQuade v. Stoneham et al., 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
66. FLA. STAT. § 607.151(1).
67. See note 3. Compare, however, Glazer v. Glazer, 374 F. 2d 390 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. den. 389 U.S. 831.
68. FLA. STAT. § 607.114(6).
21
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1980
Majority Power and Shareholder Arrangements
since their people will constitute the remaining board members. Need-
less to say, this will produce the same alienation on the part of the
ousted party to the agreement as is felt by minority non-parties.
DANGERS TO THE ARRANGEMENT
As indicated above, an agreement to consolidate and secure ma-
jority power is probably valid despite the obvious personal benefits to
its parties provided: (1) it does not appear that the vote of a party is
being bought, and (2) that it does not purport to bind the parties in
their voting as directors. Both of these possible grounds of invalidity
can probably be guarded against by proper drafting. For example, the
consideration clause and recitals should be drafted in terms of the mu-
tual benefit of the parties and the corporation. Provisions directly im-
pinging on director functions can simply be avoided. Since the law is
not completely certain as to what matters are the exclusive province of
the directors a severability clause should also be used. Such a clause
may save the balance of an agreement containing provisions later held
to be improperly director-impinging.
As is also indicated above, if the effect of action taken under the
agreement results in serious injury to minority interests, the transac-
tion69 may be upset on the ground of breach of the majority's fiduciary
duty to the minority. This result, like liability for corporate waste or
breach of duty to the corporation by the directors elected under the
agreement, is independent of the validity of the agreement and a dan-
ger which the majority and its elected directors always face.
The greatest dangers to the arrangement will probably result from
a disagreement among the parties or from the acrimonious relations
vis-a-vis the non-parties to the agreement which they will quite reason-
ably regard as directed against them. It is impossible to specify in ad-
vance exactly how the shareholder parties will vote on all of the issues
submitted to them. There are bound to be disagreements as to specific
questions as they arise. The result will be that the arbitrator will make
the ultimate decision. If too many decisions must be submitted to him
the agreement may become unworkable. Also, since the parties, once
they are elected directors, will be autonomous in that capacity," con-
69. For example, dissolution or alteration of shareholder rights.
70. As indicated above, text at note 68, provision can be made for their removal
9 I11 4:1980
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trol of the corporation's management will only be effective as long as
the parties continue to agree. There can therefore be no guarantee that
the agreement will fully achieve its ends.
Factionalization is always dangerous to the successful operation of
a business. The excluded minority, the non-parties, may well be victim-
ized by the majority or at least feel that they are. Needless to say, this
will hardly inspire them to do their best for the venture. They may
resort to litigation. Whether or not such litigation is successful it is
bound to disrupt the business and, if continued, may cause its failure.
It is this potential for built-in acrimony which is the principal objection
to a majority agreement. A unanimous shareholder agreement, exe-
cuted prior to incorporation, will, on the other hand, fix the rights and
powers of all the participants in a manner freely consented to by all of
them.
ADVICE TO PERSONS ACQUIRING A MINORITY
INTEREST IN A CLOSE CORPORATION
Professor O'Neal gives a number of examples of minority share-
holder oppression.71 A poignant one is that of a trusted employee who
is rewarded by his bosses who allow him to buy an interest in the cor-
poration."2 Understandably, the employee feels flattered at being taken
into the business, but as an employee he is reluctant to press the bosses
too much about the internal affairs of the corporation. Only too late
will he discover what it really means to be a minority shareholder. The
majority "bosses" have him almost completely at their mercy. He may
be paid no dividends on his stock, and if he objects he may even lose
his employment with the corporation. In effect, his investment may be
completely lost to him since more sophisticated investors will be un-
willing to buy his shares, especially when they know that they carry no
return and give no power to compel it. The "favored" employee is in
an especially difficult position since if he does not accept the majority's
offer he may jeopardize his employment.
The ordinary prospective purchaser of a minority interest may not
from management positions. The ensuing acrimony will, however, probably lead ulti-
mately to disruption of the management plan.
71. F. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 3.02 (1975).
72. Id., at 41.
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be so unfortunate. He can more freely demand greater information
about the power dispersal in the corporation. Obviously, if the articles
of incorporation disclose provisions which will help to solidify majority
power the prospective purchaser should be especially cautious.
The best advice is not to buy a minority interest in a close corpo-
ration which allows absolute majority rule. This, of course, is the same
advice that would be given to an initial participant in a newly formed
close corporation. The desirability of a unanimous shareholder agree-
ment with implementing articles and bylaw provisions agreed to by all
parties must be emphasized. Where the original corporate setup does
not provide for adequate protection to minority interests the minority
investor should insist upon their adoption.
The extent of power conceded to the minority will, of course, de-
pend on the relative bargaining positions. In Florida the minority can
be given virtually absolute power through a provision in the articles of
incorporation if all shareholders agree.73 The equivalent of majority
shareholder control can be conferred on the minority through a care-
fully drafted voting trust agreement in which the minority shareholder
is made trustee and given broad discretion, and the majority sharehold-
ers deposit their shares in the trust.74 Although the trustee will be sub-
ject to fiduciary duties to the majority, the practical effect is to give
him the majority power discussed above. The trustee mninority share-
holder could also be given an irrevocable proxy to vote the shares of
the other parties to the agreement. 5 Unless the new minority holder is
indispensable, however the majority will not make such drastic
concessions.
Where the majority is unwilling to capitulate, the power of the
minority can nonetheless be augmented to a greater or lesser degree,
depending on the bargain struck. In consideration of the minority's in-
vestment, the majority can enter into an agreement including a promise
to amend the articles and bylaws where necessary: (1) To fix the num-
bers of directors at a number large enough to include a slot for the
minority;78 (2) to elect the minority shareholder, and as many of his
73. FLA. STAT. § 607.107(2).
74. FLA. STAT. § 607.104.
75. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.107(1), 607.101(5)(e).
76. FLA. STAT. § 607.114(1).
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designees as his bargaining position demands;7 (3) to grant him a veto
over all or selected fundamental shareholder decisions through a high
vote requirement;" (4) if he is not given a majority of the board, at
least to give him a veto power through a high vote requirement for all
or selected director decisions.79 These are the same provisions which
are advisable in a unanimous shareholder agreement in order to protect
the minority (or potential minority) when any close corporation is
formed.
Where all of the present participants agree, other devices to fur-
ther protect the minority shareholder's interest may be added, such as,
cumulative voting, 0 or a recapitalization"1 where shares are made a
separate class entitled to elect a specified number of directors, 2 or by
reclassifying some majority shares into non-voting shares83 to further
magnify the power of the voting shares.
IN SUMMARY
The archetypal corporate structure gives great potential for major-
ity imposition on the non-majority shareholder in a multi-shareholder
close corporation. This potential can be taken advantage of by an
agreement which coalesces a group of minority shareholders into an
effective majority.
Because an agreement by less than all of the initial shareholders is
bound to produce acrimony, it is inadvisable to proceed in such a fash-
ion at the corporation's inception. To do so poses dangers for the
drafting attorney who purports to act for all parties and to any corpo-
rate structure seeking to facilitate the agreement. Any shareholder buy-
ing into a close corporation which makes possible majority domination
77. Valid under FLA. STAT. § 607.107(1).
78. FLA. STAT. § 607.387.
79. FLA. STAT. § 607.121.
80. FLA. STAT. § 607.097(4).
81. FLA. STAT. § 607.177(2)(f), (i), ().
82. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.164(l)(e), 607.097(1), 607.117(3). This class voting for di-
rectors is not to be confused with "classification" or staggered terms, authorized by
FLA. STAT. § 607.114(4), which may used to lengthen the terms of some directors, but
is frequently not desirable in a close corporation because of the complexity involved,
and discriminatory treatment of directors whose terms expire earlier.
83. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.044(1), 607.177(1), (2)(f), (i), ().
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should insist on changes in the basic corporate documents as protection
from the minority oppression such a majority-oriented structure
permits.
The best approach is an initial arrangement encompassed in a
unanimous shareholder pre-incorporation agreement which promises
inclusion of the necessary protective provisions for all shareholders in
the original articles of incorporation and bylaws.
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Time to Abolish Parent-Child Tort Immunity: A Call
to Repudiate Mississippi's Gift to the American
Family'
JOEL BERMAN*
Your children are not your children..
They are the sons and daughters of Life's longing for itself.
They come through you but not from you,
And though they are with you yet they belong not to you.
You may give them your love but not your thoughts,
For they have their own thoughts.
You may house their bodies but not their souls,
For their souls dwell in the house of tomorrow, which you cannot
visit, not even in your dreams.
You may strive to be like them, but seek not to make them like
you.
For life goes not backward nor tarries with yesterday.'
-KAHLIL GIBRAN, THE PROPHET,
71st Printing (1964).
1. INTRODUCTION
The law, like life, must not go backward nor tarry with yesterday. Like
children, the law must grow and learn and, hopefully, become wiser as
it matures to reflect the ever-changing environment of our society. One
of the most important justifications for such change is the proper use
by thoughtful, progressive courts of the Latin maxim cessante ratione
* J.D. University of Florida, Assoc. Professor Nova University Center for the
Study of Law. The author is indebted to his capable research assistants Alan Ehrlich,
Gerald Cowan and Ellen Kracoff.
1. Parental Immunity: Mississippi's Gift to the American Family, 7 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 597 (1971).
2. KAHLIL GIBRAN, THE PROPHET (1964).
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legis cessant ipsa lex which means that whenever the reasons given to
justify a rule never really existed at all, the rule itself should never have
come into being. The idea of immunity in tort actions between parents
and children is such a rule. According to the view that the reasons for
such immunity never existed at all, or alternately that they have ceased
to exist, the time has come for abolishing the rule in Florida.
The parental immunity rule bars the right of an unemancipated
minor child to bring an action for a tort against a parent; the rule
similarly prevents a parent from bringing a tort action against an un-
emancipated minor child. Under this doctrine of parent-child tort im-
munity, like that of any status-based legal immunity, the opportunity
of the injured party for justice does not depend on the nature of his
injury or on the type of act which caused the wrong, but solely on the
status or relationship of the wrongdoer vis-a-vis the victim. Thus, pur-
suant to the general rule, a tortfeasor, by virtue merely of his status as
a parent or an unemancipated minor, will be immune from liability for
personal injuries suffered by his child or his parent. The legal confusion
caused by a multitude of objections to, and limitations on, such an
unqualified bar to suit between family members was mentioned in a
1972 annotation of this subject:
The law with respect to the liability of parents for the negligent injuries
of their children has been, and continues to be, in a highly unsatisfactory
state, as evidenced by the great variety or identifiably distinguishable
holdings, the differences in emphasis in decisions ostensibly following
similar rules, the shifting of positions; ...the proliferation of excep-
tions and limitations to varyingly defined general rules, and the appar-
ently completely irreconcilable basic premises invoked as the fundamen-
tal rationale.3
A major cause of the confusion that has developed is due to changing
economic realities, "particularly the advent of the automobile and the
prevalence of liability insurance."4 (Emphasis Added)
This article will review the background, origin, and development
of parent-child tort immunity and will analyze the basic premises and
3. Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 909 (1972). (Liability of Parent for Injury to Unemanci-
pated Child Caused by Parent's Negligence is the leading annotation on the subject.
This article has frequently been cited in both law review articles and cases.)
4. Id. at 910.
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rationales invoked and used by various courts to either justify, limit, or
abrogate the rule. The application of the immunity doctrine by Florida
courts will also be discussed, along with the conflict between such im-
munity and tort goals and policies enunciated by the Florida courts
and legislature in the 1970's. The inconsistencies in the immunity doc-
trine, and present public policy which is in conflict with such immunity
rule, give rise to the author's opinion that Florida should abrogate the
parental immunity rule and join the growing number of jurisdictions
which now allow tort actions between parents and children. Whatever
justification may have once existed for the immunity rule, if indeed any
true justification ever existed, no longer exists, and the doctrine's day
has long since passed.
2. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PARENT-
CHILD TORT IMMUNITY
A. Background
Immunity has never been a generally accepted rule in instances of
injury resulting from tortious behavior. The general rule is and has
been that liability should result for the infliction of injury from negli-
gent or other tortious conduct; immunity from such liability is the ex-
ception.' Indeed, even specifically with respect to parents and their chil-
dren, early legal scholars were of the nearly unanimous opinion that
liability of the parent was the rule for tortious behavior, especially for
actions resulting in personal injury to a child.'
While there is no record in early English law of any suit by an
unemancipated minor against a parent, there is also no record of any
holding that such a suit could not be maintained. To the contrary,
there are indications in several early English cases involving children
injured by teachers that tortious injuries inflicted by parents or those
persons in loco parentis were actionable, with civil liability an appro-
5. President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, ID F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1942); Muskopf v. Coming Hospital Dist., 11 Cal. Rptr. 211, 359 P.2d 457
(1961); Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W.Va. 1976). The principle enunciated in these
cases corresponds to the trend in modem tort law which stresses accident victim com-
pensation as will be discussed infra.
6. Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 584; 118 S.E. 12, 19 (1923).
27 1Parent-Child Tort Immunity4:1980
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priate remedy.' Years later when the parental immunity issue came
before a Scottish court, the judges agreed that although it was a case of
first impression under Scottish law, there was no common law immu-
nity rule, and unanimously held that an unemancipated minor could
sue his parent for parental injuries resulting from negligent conduct.8
Further support for the rule of liability for tortious behavior of
parents and those to whom parental authority has been delegated is
contained in several early American cases involving situations of exces-
sive or unreasonable punishment of a minor,9 gross neglect of a mi-
nor,10 or conduct which threatened a minor's life or health.1
Compounding the problem of the lack of early authority for par-
ent-child tort immunity was the vell-established common law principle,
adopted in most states, that unemancipated children could sue their
parents for damages caused to their prolerty, or over contracts, wills,
inheritances and the like." So, as the 19th Century drew to a close,
there was almost no legal authority supporting a doctrine of tort im-
munity between parents and children, and clear precedent existed
against similar immunity for causes of action sounding in other areas.
No strict rule had yet been formulated. The stage was set.
B. Origin
It was not until 1891 that any court in the United States had
placed any limitation whatsoever on the right of an unemancipated
child to recover in tort against a parent. In that year, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi decided the case of Hewlett v. George' 3 where a
7. Regina v. Hopley, 175 Eng. Rep. 1024 (1860); Fitzgerald v. Northcote, 176
Eng. Rep. 734 (1865).
8. Young v. Rankin, [1934] S.L.T. 445, Sess. Cas. 499.
9. Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859).
10. Nelson v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W. 730 (1885).
11. Patterson v. Nutter, 78 Me. 509, 7 A. 273 (1886).
12. Roberts v. Roberts, 145 Eng. Rep. 399 (1657); Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N.Y.
317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895); Hollingsworth v. Beaver, 59 S.W 464 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900);
Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 A. 292 (1925); King v. Sells, 193 Wash. 294, 75
P.2d 130 (1938); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960). It is also a well
established principle of law in Florida, that an unemancipated minor child may sue his
parents with respect to contracts, wills and other property rights. See 24 FLA. JUR.,
Parent and Child §22 (1959).
13. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
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minor daughter, who was married but living apart from her husband,
brought an action against the estate of her deceased mother for per-
sonal injuries inflicted as a result of being wrongfully imprisoned by the
mother in an insane asylum. In a short opinion completely devoid of
any citations of legal or case authority, the Mississippi court held that
solely because of the parent-child relationship, the child was not enti-
tled to maintain the action. In so holding, the justices created a legal
rule and precedent based purely on their own opinions of what public
policy was and should be. The often quoted reason for the establish-
ment of this rule was stated by the court as follows:
0
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound
public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the best
interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court
in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at
the hands of the parent.1
With no further analysis than this, and with no basis in the common
law or in statutes or prior cases, the doctrine of parent-child tort im-
munity was born. Its ramifications are still being felt today.
Twelve years later another jurisdiction followed Mississippi's lead
in McKelvey v. McKelvey." The Supreme Court of Tennessee in Mc-
Kelvey affirmed the dismissal of a suit by a minor child to recover
damages for cruel and unhuman treatment inflicted by her stepmother
at the instigation and with the consent of her natural father. After cit-
ing Hewlett as the only previous case authority forbidding a child's suit
against a parent, the court proceeded to create the myth of the exis-
tence of an entrenched common law basis for the parental immunity
rule," completely ignoring the fact that the Hewlett court had men-
tioned no such established common law rule. All that remained to be
done was to carry the logic to some extreme conclusion and test the
rule to determine its limitations. Such an opportunity presented itself
just two years later in the state of Washington.
In Roller v. Roller," the Supreme Court of Washington was faced
with a civil action where a minor daughter sought damages for injuries
14. Id. at 887.
15. 11 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
16. Id. at 665.
17. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
29 1
32
Nova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol4/iss1/1
S30 Nova Law Journal 4:1980 1
inflicted as a result of being raped by her father. Even though the fa-
ther had been convicted of this violent and shocking criminal offense,
the court held that the daughter's rape would not be sufficient grounds
for allowing her to sue the father for damages. In reversing the trial
court's judgment in favor of the daughter, the court reasoned that any
other result would threaten family harmony and tranquility. 8 The
opinion went on to perpetuate the myth that commenced with McKel-
vey that there was a well-established common law rule absolutely
preventing any tort action from being brought by a minor child against
a parent.
In this manner, Roller announced and justified the fact that the
parental tort immunity rule, created in Hewlett and stated in McKel-
vey to be based on common law principles, was an absolute bar to suits
by children against their parents.
C. Establishment
The opinions in Hewlett, McKelvey and Roller have been said to
"constitute the great trilogy upon which American rule of parent-child
tort immunity is based."" Since the rule was enunciated as absolute,
even though all three cases involved intentional torts, it was not diffi-
cult for courts in those and other jurisdictions throughout the country
to uiiiformly apply the immunity rule in subsequent cases, whether the
tortious conduct of the parent was intentional, willful and wanton, or
negligent in nature.2 0
18. Id.
19. Comments, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-Husband and
Wife-Parent and Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 182 (1961).
20. Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908); Small v. Morri-
son, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E.
128 (1924); Mannion v. Mannion, 3 N.J. Misc. 68, 129 A. 431 (Cir. Ct. 1925); Mata-
rese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211
N.W. 88 (1926); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927); Sorrentino v.
Sorrentino, 222 App. Div. 835, 226 N.Y.S. 907 (1928); aff'd without opinion 248 N.Y.
628, 162 N.E. 551 (1928); Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Kelly
v. Kelly, 158 S.C. 517, 155 S.E. 888 (1930); Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 300 P.
7 (1931); Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1931); Securo v. Securo,
110 W.Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931); Krohngold v. Krohngold, 181 N.E. 910 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1932); Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930); Owens v. Auto
Mut. Indemnity Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937); Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832,
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The often cited case of Small v.Morrison,21 decided by the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina in 1923, helped to firmly establish the
parent-child tort immunity rule. Small is indicative of the personal phi-
losophy and narrow interpretation of public policy that underlies the
great majority of decisions upholding the immunity doctrine. A nine
year old girl sued her father and his insurance company for injuries
suffered in an automobile accident allegedly resulting from the father's
negligent driving. The court reviewed prior opinions and several legal
writings dealing with parental immunity and concluded that the child
had no right to sue her father in tort. The majority found that its posi-
tion was supported by all authorities on the subject, with no authority
to the contrary, 22 a statement clearly contra to the cases and scholarly
works mentioned previously herein. It justified its decision as being
consonant with natural justice and in keeping with the eternal order of
things,2 3 and further emphasized the importance of the immunity rule
in maintaining the peace and tranquility of the home.24 The majority
was so confident of its position that its rationale was ultimately
founded upon Biblical and spiritual comparisons such as the following:
"Honor thy father and thy mother that thy days may be long upon the
land which the Lord thy God giveth thee ..."
Small also contains a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Clark
which has been called the "first strong, well-reasoned, and extensively
quoted attack on the immunity doctrine .,2 6 The dissent carefully
114 S.W.2d 468 (1938). See also Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 904 (1972). In a period of ap-
proximately thirty years, the parent-child immunity rule became firmly entrenched in
almost every jurisdiction of this country. The above cases represent a sampling of these
decisions adopting the immunity rule.
21. 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
22. Id. at 13.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 16.
25. Id.
26. Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 904, 911 (1972). As will be shown infra, Justice Clark's
reasoning has been adopted by an increasing number of courts today. In Small, he
stated:
Never before now has this court ever been called upon to take the backward
track and bar the claim of justice to the weak, or to "outlaw" the children of the
land from their just demand to have their pleas heard for redress of wrongs.
118 S.E. at 21.
The doors of the Temple of Justice should always stand wide open, and to every-
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analyzed all prior authority and decided that neither the common law,
statutory law, nor any judicial decision prior to Hewlett would forbid
the maintenance of a tort action by a minor child against his parents.
It concluded by calling for the courts to lead the way to greater justice
in the redress of such grievances.
By 1930, when Dunlap v. Dunlap27 came before the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire, the parental immunity rule was accepted in
jurisdictions throughout the United States. In Dunlap, a .sixteen year
old boy sued his father for injuries suffered when a platform collapsed
while he was working for his contractor-father. For the first time in
any American jurisdiction, the majority opinion announced that the
doctrine of parent-child tort immunity was not absolute, and that when
a minor child was employed by a parent who carried liability insurance
and when such minor was injured in his capacity as employee, the child
could legitimately sue his parent for such negligence. The immunity
doctrine was said.to arise from a disability to sue, and not from a lack
of any violated duty." The disability should, thus, not be raised when
the allowance of a suit would fail to do violence to the policy underly-
ing the immunity rule, namely the protection of family harmony and
parental control.?
Although the court only created an exception to the immunity rule
where a master-servant relationship had replaced a parent-child rela-
tionship, it criticized the rule in its entirety after carefully reviewing
early English and American text-writers, prior judicial precedent,
American law review articles, and public policy considerations. Dunlap
has been considered:
a strong theoretical and broad-based attack on the concept of parental
tort immunity generally, revealing its uncertain and recent origin and
criticizing as vulnerable its legal foundation, particularly in view of the
one. Least of all they should be closed to the weak and "those who have no
helper," for most of all they need its protection.
Id. at 24.
The Master said, "Suffer little children to come unto me and forbid them not."
Certainly justice (sic) should not forbid them to plead their wrongs at her altar.
Id. at 25.
27. 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
28. Id. at 915.
29. Id.
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liability of parents for contract and property wrongs, and the breakdown
of tort immunity as between husband and wife, as well as the practical
effect of the general prevalence of insurance coverage in various situa-
tions involving negligent injury to the unemancipated child."
Dunlap did not, however, mark a turning point in the history of
the parental immunity rule. This was evidenced just four years later in
Briggs v. City of Philadelphia,3 1 where the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania, although citing Dunlap, upheld the doctrine by indicating the
deeply rooted policy concerns underlying the rule. 2
D. Justifications:
A "rule which so incongruously shields conceded wrongdoing
bears a heavy burden of justification." Since the establishment of par-
ent-child tort immunity, most courts confronting the question have
given specific and distinct reasons for upholding the doctrine. The most
frequent justifications cited for the immunity rule include: (1) domestic
harmony and tranquility; (2) parental care, discipline, and control; (3)
danger of fraud and collusion; and (4) depletion of family resources.
These rationales lack persuasive authority when closely scrutinized.
(1) DOMESTIC HARMONY AND TRANQUILITY
The preservation of family harmony and domestic tranquility is
the leading justification used by courts to support the parental immu-
nity rule.3 Again and again, courts have proclaimed their belief that
30. Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 904, 911 (1972).
31. 112 Pa. Super. 50, 170 A. 871 (1934).
32. Id.
33. Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 475; 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 38; 174 N.E.2d
718, 721 (1961) (Fuld, J., Dissenting).
34. The family harmony rationale has been emphasized by every jurisdiction
adopting the parent-child tort immunity rule as the foundation for such doctrine. See
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577,
118 S.E. 12 (1923); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927); Mesite v.
Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Securo v. Securo, 110 W.Va. 1, 156 S.E.
750 (1931); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Cowgill v. Boock,
189 Or. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950) (The policy of the law should preserve and maintain
the security, peace and tranquility of the home.); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 I11.2d 608, 131
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injuries sustained by minor children must remain uncompensated. The
counter-argument is that it is the tortious injury itself, rather than the
threatened litigation, that disrupts domestic life. 5 When the wrong has
been committed, the harm, if any, to the basic fabric of the family has
already been done and the course of rancor and discord already intro-
duced into family relations." The most acrimonious family disputes
concern lawsuits over property and contract rights. Such suits have
never been barred by any immunity rule; it is illogical to deny tort
actions because they are disruptive of family harmony.37
The weakness of this rationale is further demonstrated by noting
that in many reported cases in this area involving automobile accidents
where liability insurance is present, family harmony would be disrupted
far more by denying recovery than by granting it.38 Finally, if the inter-
est in family harmony is important enough to prevent minor children
from suing their parents, it is difficult to rationalize and understand
why other family members may sue each other when the possible dis-
N.E.2d 525 (1956); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App.2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (App. Ct.
1968). The public policy involved is the interest of the State in maintaining harmony,
avoiding strife, and insuring a proper atmosphere of cooperation, discipline and under-
standing in the family.
35. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
36. Most of the decisions adopting the family harmony rationale have not specif-
ically discussed whether the immunity rule would advance this justification with respect
to their particular fact situations. The following cases have critically examined whether
family harmony and domestic tranquility are, in fact, preserved by the doctrine of im-
munity. See Tamashiro v. DeGama, 51 Hawaii 74, 450 P.2d 998 (1969); Baits v. Baits,
273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 97 (Mass.
1975); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84
N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 16, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939). See
also cases cited in notes 37 and 38 infra.
37. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952). See also Silesky v.
Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968); Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142
N.W.2d 66 (1966); Gaudreau v. Gaudreau, 106 N.W. 551, 215 A.2d 695 (1965); Torts
Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1030, 1056 (1930).
38. Gaudreau v. Gaudreau, 106 N.W. 551, 215 A.2d 695 (1965); Gelbman v.
Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 245 N.E.2d 192 (1969); Lee v. Comer,
224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976); Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Sorenson v.
Sorenson, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351
(1971); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968); Goller v. White, 20
Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
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turbance to domestic tranquility is just as real."
(2) PARENTAL CARE, DISCIPLINE, AND CONTROL
A second reason frequently offered by courts to justify the paren-
tal immunity rule is that to permit a minor child to bring a tort action
against his parents is to impair society's interest in maintaining paren-
tal authority with respect to the care, discipline, and control of minor
children and to encourage such children to disobey their parents."
These protected parental interests have been deemed to consist of the
right and obligation of parents to maintain the home, to nurture and
protect their children and guard them from danger, to care for them
and to chastise them when necessary." A fear exists among courts that
to allow a minor child to bring a lawsuit against his parents would
alter the natural process of child development and damage the very
fabric of their relationship." Many of those jurisdictions which have
embraced a limited abrogation of the immunity rule view potential in-
terference with parental care, discipline, and control as the one viable
circumstance that should continue to prevent minor children from be-
ing able to sue their parents in tort. 3
39. Comments: Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-Husband and
Wife-Parent and Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 188 (1961). In this author's opinion,
this law review comment presents the finest detailed analysis of this topic to date.
40. McKelvey v. McKelvey, 11 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Small v. Morri-
son, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787
(1927); Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A.753 (1929); Matarese v. Matarese,
47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); Rodebaugh v. Grand Truck Western R.R. Co., 4
Mich. App. 559, 145 N.W.2d 401 (1966). As will be discussed infra, except for domes-
tic harmony and tranquility, the parental control argument has been the most fre-
quently cited justification for the continued retention of the parent-child immunity rule.
41. Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis.2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968); Rodebaugh v.
Grand Truck Western R.R. Co., 4 Mich. App. 559, 145 N.W.2d 401 (1966); Borst v.
Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). In all jurisdictions, criminal sanctions
have long been imposed for parental acts violating parental obligations to their chil-
dren. See FLA. STAT. §§ 827.01-827.07 (1977) for the criminal penalties relating to cer-
tain delineated breaches of parental obligations to their children.
42. See Holodook v. Spencer, 26 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338 (1974) for a strong
statement as to the judicial concern in this area.
43. See Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968); Rigdon v.
Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1971); Gross v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 158 N.J.
Super. 442, 386 A.2d 442 (1978); Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 330 A.2d 335 (1974).
1 4:1980
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The parental control argument was dealt with, and rejected by, the
Dunlap court which stated that the idea that children would become
unruly if given a right to legal redress was farfetched." The problem in
the typical case arises where a child is injured by his parent's negligent
operation of an automobile. A suit in most instances is brought at the
behest of the parents for the very purpose of allowing the child to re-
cover against their liability insurer." Any judgment rendered will, in all
probability, be paid by the insurer46 thereby providing the family with a
fund for the child. The interests of parental control and discipline are,
thus, not infringed upon nor weakened.
This rationale becomes further suspect by noting that lawsuits in-
volving property and contract rights, which have never been barred by
any immunity rule, may be as disruptive to the family unit as those
involving negligently inflicted injuries.47 Furthermore, the courts that
justify the immunity rule on this ground make no distinction between
suits brought by parents against children or those brought by children
against parents, although this justification is applicable only to cases
where a child is suing parent."*
(3) DANGER OF FRAUD AND COLLUSION
In upholding the parental immunity rule, a number of courts have
indicated concern over the proposition that to allow minor children to
maintain negligence actions against their parents would foster fraud
and collusion." The cases involving fraud and collusion have centered
See note 40 supra.
44. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
45. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d
472, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 174 N.E.2d 718 (1961). A good majority of reported cases deal-
ing with the parent-child tort immunity rule have involved motor vehicle accidents
where liability insurance existed.
46. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975); Lee v. Comer, 224
S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976).
47. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
48. Comments: Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-Husband and
Wife-Parent and Child, 26 Mo. L. REv. 152, 189 (1961).
49. Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d
642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938);
Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Dennis v. Walker, 284 F.Supp. 413
(D.D.C. 1968); Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901). The
A
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around situations where liability insurance is present, and the insurers
have raised the spectre of children and parents plotting, against them."0
An analysis of this rationale demonstrates that the possibility of
fraud and collusion exists not only in situations relating to the parent-
child tort immunity rule, but in all liability insurance cases where suits
have been allowed.5 1 Courts have entertained tort actions between driv-
ers and passengers of vehicles and close friends and family members
other than parents and children without the cry of collusion preventing
a consideration of the facts on their merits.5" Our legal system itself is
quite capable of ferreting out those fraudulent claims that may exist
without having to indiscriminately bar all meritorious claims due to a
fear of fraud.1
The fraud and collusion argument is, in actuality, entirely incom-
patible with the family harmony and tranquility argument most often
advanced by courts in support of the parental immunity rule. 4 The for-
mer rationale is premised upon the closeness of the family members
whereas the latter rationale is based upon the hostility and anger a suit
would bring so as to disturb the peace of the home. This blatant incon-
sistency is explained by taking into account the fact that the existence
of liability insurance is considered by courts when dealing with the pos-
sibility of fraud but is disregarded when the same courts discuss family
harmony."5 The illogical nature of this approach is indicative of the
cases decided in the last twenty years have, contra to these decisions, downplayed the
fraud and collusion rationale as a justification for the retention of the parent-child tort
immunity rule. The abrogation of Automobile Guest Statutes in most jurisdictions has
indicated the decreasing importance of fraud and collusion as a determining factor in
the threshold question of whether a lawsuit should be allowed to be maintained. Flor-
ida had abrogated its guest statute in 1972. See FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1937) (Repealed
by Laws 1972, c. 72-1 § 1).
50. Barlow v. Iblings, 156 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1968).
51. Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970).
52. Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966).
53. An example of the courts' rejection of this fraud rationale is indicated in the
trend toward the elimination of Automobile Guest Statutes which have been primarily
based on the fear of fraud and collusion between drivers and passengers. Florida re-
pealed its Guest Statute in 1972. (FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1972)). See Id.,; Tamashiro v.
DeGama, 450 P.2d 898 (Hawaii 1969); Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (Nev. 1974);
France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970).
54. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
55. Id.
1| :1 8
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precarious base upon which the immunity rule is built.
(4) DEPLETION OF FAMILY REsOURCES
Some courts have noted that to permit a child to sue his parents in
tort would deplete the family exchequer to the detriment of other chil-
dren by reducing both the amount of money available for their care
and the shares they would receive upon the death of their parents.56 The
argument assumes an equality among the children and an intention on
the part of parents to treat their children equally.
This assumption of equality conveniently omits the fact that the
child recovering has been injured while other children and family mem-
bers have not. Furthermore, the notion of equality seems to connote
that a child has a vested right to a specific distributive share of the
property of his parents. No such right exists.5" Courts advancing this
rationale have also not addressed themselves to the question as to why
an injured minor child should be treated differently than a third party
who has always been allowed to recover against one who is a parent;
both situations would allegedly deplete family resources.
A number of courts have emphasized the prevalence of liability
insurance as a complete refutation of the argument that recovery by a
child against his parent will deplete family resources. The insurance
company is the real party in interest and is the source from which the
injured child receives compensation.
E. Exceptions
The exceptions and limitations placed upon the immunity rule
have been many and varied. In fact, the doctrine of parent-child tort
immunity "is so limited by these exceptions it could be said liability is
56. Roller v. Roller, 27 Wash.2d 242, 79 P. 788 (1905); Small v. Morrison, 185
N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 156 N.W.2d 105
(1968); Orefice v. Albert, 237 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1970); Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App.
1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932). This argument assumes that the negligent parent will pay the
damage award, an assumption which is unrealistic given the widespread prevalence of
liability insurance.
57. Rice v. Andrews, 127 Misc. 826, 217 N.Y.S. 528 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
58. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa.
372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971). See also notes 70-75 infra.
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the rule and immunity the exception."'" These exceptions have centered
around cases where courts consider the parent-child relationship to
have been abandoned or where the tortious act of the parent does not
arise out of the family relationship." The exceptions most often cited
involve fact situations where (1) the minor child is emancipated;6 (2)
the parent's conduct is characterized as intentional or willful and wan-
ton;12 (3) the parent is acting in his business or vocational capacity and
not in his parental capacity when causing the injury; 3 and (4) the par-
ent and/or child dies as a result of the parent's negligent act.64
Some of these exceptions are clearly justified when examined in
light of the policies underlying the parental immunity rule. Where the
parents and/or children are dead as a result of the negligence of the
parents, numerous courts have allowed lawsuits to be maintained on
the ground that death terminates the family relationship; and, hence,
family harmony and discipline would not be disturbed. 5 Where a par-
59. Comments: Torts-Parent and Child Immunity-Suit Against Parent's Es-
tate, 59 Ky. L. J. 205, 207 (1970).
60. Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St.2d 117, 216 N.E.2d 375 (1966); Com-
ments: Parent-Child Tort Immunity: A Rule in Need of Change, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV.
191 (1972).
61. Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908); Ciani v. Ciani,
127 Misc. Rep. 304, 215 N.Y.S. 767 (1926); Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So.
885 (1891); Groh v. W.O. Krahn, Inc., 271 N.W. 374 (Wis. 1937); Wood v. Wood, 135
Conn. 280, 62 A.2d 586 (1948); Wright v. Wright, 229 N.C. 503, 50 S.E.2d 541 (1948);
Belleson v. Skillbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242 N.W. 1 (Minn. 1932); Mannion v. Mannion,
3 N.J. Misc. R. 68, 129 A. 431 (N.J. Cir. Ct. 1925); Cannon v. Cannon, 387 N.Y. 425,
40 N.E.2d 236 (1942); and Smith v. Kaufman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971).
62. Cogwill v. Boock, 218 P.2d 445 (Or. 1950); Rodebaugh v. Grand Truck
Western R.R. Co., 4 Mich. App. 559, 145 N.W.2d 401 (1966); Aboussie v. Aboussie,
270 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1954); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill.2d 608, 131
N.E.2d 525 (1956); Cannon v. Cannon, 387 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942); Mahnke
v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d
218 (1955).
63. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Worrell v. Worrell, 4
S.E.2d 343 (Va. 1939); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 592, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Den-
nis v. Walker, 284 F.Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968); Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Col. 418,
378 P.2d 64 (1963).
64. Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957); Palcsey v. Tepper. 71 N.J.
Super. 294, 176 A.2d 818 (1962); Hale v. Hale, 312 Ky. 867, 230 S.W.2d 610 (1950);
Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.
2d 68 (Mo. 1960).
65. See cases cited note 64 supra.
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ent has intentionally or willfully and wantonly injured his child, the
intrinsic peace and harmony of the family is greatly disrupted, if not
destroyed, by the very nature of the tortious act. It will not be further
disturbed by a severely injured child recovering from his parent for the
parent's reprehensible conduct. 6
The other exceptions do not so easily fit into the framework of the
policies underlying the immunity rule. All courts have permitted an
emancipated child to sue his parents on the ground that the parent-
child relationship is terminated since the child is his own master and no
longer under the control of his parents." Although the policy of paren-
tal discipline and control may no longer be of significance when a child
is emancipated, the fact remains that parents and children may still
constitute a very closely knit family structure. A lawsuit by an emanci-
pated child may be just as destructive to family harmony and tranquil-
ity as one maintained by a child who is under the control of his par-
ents. Furthermore, the same danger of fraud and collusion exists
whether the child is emancipated or unemancipated.
The courts that have held a parent liable to his child for the par-
ent's tortious conduct committed while acting in his business capacity
have reasoned that an action should be permitted since the parent's
negligence did not relate at all to the discharge of parental duties."
Typical of these cases is Trevarton v. Trevarton,9 where a father, en-
gaged in the business of cutting lumber, negligently injured his son by
allowing a tree to be dragged over him while he was sleeping. In grant-
ing recovery to the child, the court did not concern itself with whether
its decision was consonant with the policy justifications underlying the
immunity doctrine. It did not discuss the disruption of family har-
mony, or the disturbance of parental discipline and control, or the pos-
sibility of fraud and collusion against the liability insurer of the father,
although these policies were as applicable here as in any other case.
Rather than abrogate the parent-child tort immunity rule, the
courts have created this series of exceptions to justify the maintenance
of actions by injured children against their parents. To allow such suits
courts have, in certain instances, conveniently overlooked the policy ra-
66. See cases cited note 62 supra.
67. See cases cited note 61 supra.
68. See cases cited note 63 supra.
69. 378 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1963).
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tionalbs so often quoted in support of the doctrine.
F. Abrogation of Parent-Child Tort Immunity
(1) PARTIAL ABROGATION OF IMMUNITY
A wave of recent decisions has abrogated the parental immunity
rule to the extent of permitting actions by unemancipated children
against their parents for negligently-inflicted injuries arising out of
automobile accidents.70 These courts have taken judicial notice of the al-
most universal existence and availability of liability insurance and have
indicated that although such insurance cannot create liability where
there was no previous legal duty, it is a proper element to consider
when discussing the ratonale underlying the immunity doctrine. It is
the unanimous opinion of these courts that where liability insurance is
present, there is little, if any, possibility that family harmony, parental
discipline and control and family resources will be disturbed. In fact,
where liability insurance exists, an action by the injured child against
his parent will be beneficial rather than detrimental to the family
relationship.71
Two jurisdictions have abrogated the parental immunity rule in
automobile accident cases only to the extent of the parent's liability
insurance coverage. 72 However, the great majority of courts eliminating
parental immunity in such cases have not limited their abrogation of
70. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86,
471 P.2d 282 (1970); Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976); Smith v. Kauff-
man, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d
169 (1972); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (Minn. 1968);
Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192 (1969); Schenk v. Schenk, 100
IIl.App.2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968); Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976).
These recent cases correspond with the legislative and judicial emphasis on accident
victim compensation through mechanisms such as no-fault automobile liability insur-
ance, the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act and the waiver of governmen-
tal and charitable immunities.
71. See cases cited note 38 supra.
72. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975); Williams v. Williams,
369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976); See also the concurring opinion of Justice Neely in Lee v.
Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976). Such abrogation reflects changing conditions
and circumstances where the existence of liability insurance has become the rule, not
the exception.
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the doctrine to situations specifically involving insurance, since they ac-
knowledge that insurance is present in almost all cases and that with-
out insurance, it is highly unlikely that any action will be instituted at
all. These courts have balanced the competing considerations and have
concluded that the interest in securing legal redress to injured children
outweighs the policy factors supporting immunity in such cases.13
Furthermore, two courts have indicated that if the parent-child
tort immunity is to be changed with regard to the automobile accident
problem, such change should be by legislative decree and not by
judicial fiat. The legislatures of these states have acted upon these judi-
cial suggestions and have partially abrogated the immunity rule as it
relates to injuries caused by the negligent operation of an automobile.74
(2) PARTIAL RETENTION OF IMMUNITY
The trend among the courts that have recently reviewed the par-
ent-child tort immunity rule has been to abrogate the doctrine with the
noteworthy exception of retaining such immunity for parental conduct
involving the authority, care, discipline, and control of their children.
The avowed purpose behind this limited retention of the immunity rule
has been "preserving, fostering and maintaining a proper and whole-
some parent-child relationship in a family' 75 to enable parents to freely
and properly discharge the duties that society exacts." Many of these
73. Almost all of the reported cases involving torts committed by parents unre-
lated to the exercise of parental functions deal with automobile accidents.
74. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572C (1970) states as follows:
In all actions for negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and in all ac-
tions occurring on or after October 1, 1979, for negligence in the operation of an
aircraft or vessel, as defined in Section 15-127, resulting in personal injury,
wrongful death or injury to property, the immunity between parent and child in
such negligence action brought by a parent against his child or by or on behalf of
a child against his parent is abrogated.
N.C. GEN. STAT. Article 43D, § 1-539.21 states as follows:
Abolition of parent-child immunity in motor vehicle cases. The relationship of
parent and child shall not bar the right of action by a minor child against a
parent for personal injury or property damage arising out of the operation of a
motor vehicle owned or operated by such parent.
75. Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 158 N.W. 2d 342 (1968).
76. The following cases are a sampling of the many jurisdictions that follow this
principle: See Rodebaugh v. Grand Truck Western R.R. Co., 4 Mich. App. 559, 145
N.W.2d 401 (1966); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); Goller v.
I
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courts cite the leading Wisconsin case of Goller v. White77 as persua-
sive authority for this exception to the abrogation of the. immunity
rule. The Goller court retained parental immunity for the following
two situations: (1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise
of parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent
act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to
the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services,
and other care.78 According to the language of the decision, the ques-
tion that must first be decided is one of law as to whether the act falls
within the scope of parental authority and discretion; the question of
the reasonableness of the act has no bearing in this determination. If a
court answers the question in the affirmative, an injured child cannot
bring any action against his parents.
The validity of the rationale underlying this remaining area of im-
munity becomes suspect when analyzing a fact situation involving pa-
rental conduct which would present itself to a court for resolution. If a
child sues his parents on the theory of negligent supervision or care for
injuries incurred in or around the home, the action will, in all likeli-
hood, be instituted by the parents on behalf of the child, and only if
insurance is involved.71 Parental authority and discretion will not be
circumscribed or disrupted in situations such as these. It is true that
the possibility exists that by his own volition, an injured minor, by and
through a guardian ad litem, may sue his parents for negligent care
and supervision when no liability insurance is involved. However, this
may also occur in automobile accident cases and would indicate that
parental authority, discipline, and control has already been dealt a fa-
tal blow."
White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471
P.2d 282 (1970); Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 330 A.2d 335 (1974); Plumley v.
Klein, 338 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Il.App.2d 199,
241 N.E.2d 12 (1968); Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis.2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968);
Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338 (1974); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465
S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970).
77. 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
had the distinction of becoming the first judicial body in the United States to abrogate
the parental immunity doctrine for injuries negligently inflicted.
78. Id. at 198.
79. Id. at 197.
80. Cole v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 47 Wis.2d 629, 177 N.W.2d 866 (1970).
14:1980
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The Goller court made specific reference to the importance of in-
surance in negating any possible disturbance to parental discipline and
authority but did not discuss the relationship of insurance to the excep-
tions it carved out."' The court cited the Law of Torts, by Harper and
James 2 as authority for the proposition that an injured child should be
allowed to sue his parents where family harmony is not in jeopardy and
the "reasonableness of family discipline is not involved, '8 3 but it did
not critically apply these factors to parental conduct involving the care
and supervision of children to determine whether a tort action brought
by a minor against his parent would, in reality, have an effect on fam-
ily discipline.
Seven years after GolIer, in Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,4 the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin was presented with the opportunity to
interpret the exceptions to the abrogation of the parental immunity
rule it had earlier delineated. The question at issue was whether the
parents of an injured minor child would be liable, in a third party ac-
tion for contribution, for negligent supervision in allowing their child to
play with a defectively designed swing set when they knew or should
have known of the set's inherently dangerous nature. The court inter-
preted the Goller exceptions very broadly by stating that negligent su-
pervision of a child's play is not an act involving parental discretion
with respect to the care of the child.8" The term "other care" set forth
in the Goller exceptions was deemed not to be so broad in scope as to
cover all parental conduct associated with the family relationship; and,
specifically, parents' supervision of their children at play was held to
fall outside the area where immunity has been retained.8 Parental im-
munity was, by inference, limited to the legal obligations of exercising
authority over, and providing actual necessities to, the child. Since the
great majority of reported cases dealing with strictly parental transac-
tions involve acts of supervision, 7 the immunity exceptions are thus
81. Goller v. White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963).
82. 1 HARPER AND JAMES, LAW OF ToRTs, 650 § 8.11.
83. Id. at 650.
84. 47 Wis.2d 629, 177 N.W.2d 866 (1970).
85. Id. at 869.
86. Id. at 868.
87. Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis.2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968); Gross v. Sears,
Roebuck and Co., 158 N.J. Super. 442, 386 A.2d 442 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978);
Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968); Holodook v. Spencer, 36
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severely limited in their application.
(3) TOTAL ABROGATION OF IMMUNITY
A number of jurisdictions have completely abolished the parental
immunity rule.m In the leading case of Gibson v. Gibson,9 a minor
sued his father for negligently stopping his car at night on a highway
and instructing his son to go out onto the roadway to correct the posi-
tion of the wheels of the jeep he was towing. After reviewing the immu-
nity rule, the Supreme Court of California recognized the concern
voiced by courts with regard to questions of parental discretion and
supervision and cited Goller as the precedent setting case for the reten-
tion of immunity for such parental conduct. 0
In rejecting the Goller approach, the court summarily rejected the
granting of spheres of influence to parents where their actions could
not be reviewed as a matter of law. Parents could thus act negligently
toward their children with impunity." For example, a child could be
injured by the negligence of his mother in leaving a known defective
electric wire easily within his reach. Pursuant to the Goller exceptions,
the child foreseeably would not have his day in court regardless of the
negligence of his mother and the existence of insurance to pay the dam-
age award. The reasonableness of the mother's actions would not be
reviewed.
A further concern of the Supreme Court of California was the
specte that the courts adopting the Goller rationale would develop a
superstructure of arbitrary and conflicting distinctions as to whether
specific parental conduct lies within the immunity guidelines." The
N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338 (1974). Some courts have interpreted Goller in a different
manner so as to include parental supervision and control as areas where immunity still
remains. See note 94 infra.
88. Gibson v. Gibson, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 479 P.2d 648 (1971); Rupert v. Stienne,
90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu, 5 Hawaii
484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1970); Dower v. Goldstein, 143 N.J. Super. 418, 363 A.2d 373
(1976); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
89. 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 479 P.2d 648 (1971). The Gibson rationale has been cited
in numerous law review articles which call for the total abrogation of the parent-child
tort immunity rule.
90. Id. at 652.
91. Id. at 653.
92. Id.
! I
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emergence of such a structure is already developing as courts spend
much of their time determining if an exception applies in the specific
fact situation as opposed to determining the reasonableness of parental
conduct regardless of any exception." This lack of uniformity in ap-
proach can only lead to confusion as courts concentrate on catego-
rizing a parent's conduct as opposed to analyzing whether any circum-
stances exist for allowing a child's injuries to remain uncompensated.94
The solution proposed by the Supreme Court of California is to
abrogate the parental immunity rule in its entirety and judge parental
conduct according to the following question: "What would an ordina-
rily reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar circim-
stances?"95 A parent is thus held to a standard of reasonableness
viewed in light of the parental role, regardless of the classification of
his conduct.
The California approach will not interfere with the exercise of pa-
rental discretion as long as parental actions are reasonable. To allay
the fears of those who raise the cry of tampering with the parental
prerogative, the court acknowledged that parents must be allowed a
wide range of discretion in the performance of their parental func-
tions." The "reasonable parent" standard should thus be construed to
93. See Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis.2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968). The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin decided that alleged parental negligence in failing to instruct their
child in how to leave a school bus and cross a highway was not actionable since the act
involved the exercise of parental discretion with respect to the care of their child; Gross
v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 158 N.J. Super. 442, 386 A.2d 442 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978). The Superior Court of New Jersey decided that the alleged negligence of a fa-
ther in mowing his lawn and injuring his child was actionable since the act did not arise
out of the exercise of "parental authority." The entire opinion dealt with whether an
exception was applicable to this fact situation. See also Rodenbaugh v. Grand Trunk
Western R.R. Co., 4 Mich. App. 559, 145 N.W.2d 401 (1966); Holodook v. Spencer,
36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338 (1974).
94. The confusion and lack of uniformity already exists as evidenced by the
number of courts interpreting the Goller exceptions to apply to parental functions in
general, including supervision. Whereas the court that decided Goller has interpreted
the decision to allow actions for parental negligence in supervising their children. See
Cole v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 47 Wis.2d 629, 177 N.W.2d 886 (1970); but see
Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338 (1974); Rodenbaugh v. Grand
Trunk Western R.R. Co., 4 Mich. App. 559, 145 N.W. 2d 401 (1966).
95. Gibson v. Gibson, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 479 P.2d 648, 653 (1971).
96. Id. at 653.
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take into consideration situations where parents may be forgetful or
careless without such conduct being interpreted as stepping beyond rea-
sonable parental behavior. 7 When parental conduct is deemed to be
unreasonable under this standard, the time has possibly arrived for
consideration of the imposition of criminal sanctions 8 and has cer-
tainly arrived for granting a civil remedy to the child to recover for the
damages he has suffered. Such parental conduct should not be
tolerated.
Where the Goller approach gave to parents a "right" to be negli-
gent in the performance of certain parental functions, the Gibson ap-
proach would subject parental conduct to judicial review to determine
whether such conduct was clearly unacceptable and unreasonable in
view of the wide latitude of discretion that should be granted to par-
ents. Given the state interest in insuring the safety and well being of
children, the Gibson rationale is clearly preferable.
3. FLORIDA: BASTION OF PARENT-CHILD TORT
IMMUNITY
Florida's appellate courts first addressed the question of whether a
negligence action could be maintained between a parent and child in
1961 when the Second District Court of Appeal decided Meehan v.
Meehan.99 In Meehan, a father sued his minor son, and others, for the
97. The "Reasonable Parent" Standard: An Alternative to Parent-Child Tort
Immunity, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 795 (1976).
98. The Florida legislature has specifically provided for criminal penalties
against a parent or third party who willfully or through culpable negligence abuses or
maltreats a minor child, or deprives a minor child of necessary food, clothing, shelter
or medical treatment.
FLA. STAT. § 827.03 deals with aggravated child abuse. FLA. STAT. § 827.04 deals
with the willful or culpable deprivation of basic necessities to a minor child and the
knowing or culpable allowance of physical or mental injury to the child. FLA. STAT. §
827.05 deals with an individual, though financially able, negligently depriving a minor
child of basic necessities. FLA. STAT. § 827.07 deals with the abuse of minor children by
willful or negligent acts and provides the procedural mechanisms through which public
agencies come into play to safeguard the welfare of the minor child.
99. 133 So.2d 776 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961). See Russell v. Meehan, 141
So.2d 332 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962). See Shiver v. Session, 80 So.2d 905 (Fla.
1955); Henderson v. Henderson, 14 Fla. Supp. 181 (Cir. Ct. 1958) for the proposition
that minor children are allowed to maintain lawsuits against a parent for the inten-
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wrongful death of another minor son and alleged that the defendant
child was negligent in failing to inform his deceased brother of a
known defective condition of an electric buffing machine when he gave
the machine to him. As a result of the failure to warn, the deceased
child was electrocuted while using the machine.
With no precedent in this state to guide it, the court viewed the
question facing it as solely one involving public policy. In affirming the
summary judgment granted the defendants in the lower court, the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal adopted the position that neither parents nor
their representatives could maintain an action in tort against an un-
emancipated minor child. The rationale advanced for adhering to the
parental immunity rule, prevalent in the majority of jurisdictions at
that time, was the importance of preserving family unity and maintain-
ing family discipline. No discussion appeared relating to whether the
area of immunity the court was creating was justified under the facts of
the case in light of the rationale it cited.
The Second District Court of Appeal again had the opportunity to
review the immunity doctrine in Rickard v. Rickard,' where a seven
year old child, by and through his father, sued his parents for negli-
gence in failing to provide him with a safe place to play. While in his
parents' home, the plaintiff and two of his friends were squirting char-
coal lighter fluid when a match was struck by one of the boys resulting
in plaintiff's clothing being engulfed in flames. In affirming the lower
court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, the court cited Meehan,101
noting that the rule adopted there should be controlling regardless of
tional killing of the other parent. It would thus seem that although such actions are
statutory in nature, these cases can stand for the broader principle that a child can sue
a parent for an intentional tort.
In Henderson, the Court of Record of Escambia County reviewed and discussed
the parental immunity doctrine as it had developed on the national scene. The court
concluded that although parental immunity should exist where the tort involved the
discharge of parental duties or the exercise of parental control, there was no sound
reason for applying immunity in cases that do not involve parental control and disci-
pline; i.e., automobile accidents where a parent has negligently injured a child. The
court went on to state that this view was the only one "for a court in this enlightened
age to follow." A trial court decision, Henderson has not been cited by appellate courts
in their discussion of the immunity doctrine. However, the reasoning in Henderson was
far more extensive than most of the appellate decisions following it.
100. 203 So.2d 7 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
101. Id. at 8.
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the fact that a minor was now suing his parents, not a parent suing a
minor child. Again, the court emphasized the importance and necessity
of preserving and encouraging family unity and maintaining family dis-
cipline as the policy justifications underlying the parental immunity
rule. 112
Although the court indicated that the immunity rule was not not
absolute and existed only where the suit would disturb family rela-
tions,10° it did not undertake to analyze whether family harmony and
discipline would be disturbed since the father was, in reality, instituting
the action against himself and his wife. The court also did not discuss
the effect of the parents' homeowners' insurance policy which insured
them against personal legal liability for bodily injury to another, nor
were the policy goals the court was attempting to achieve through the
doctrine of immunity delineated. The insurance policy was not deemed
to be material to the action."0 4
The Fourth District Court of Appeal next considered the question
of parental immunity in Denault v. Denault,'°5 where an unemanci-
pated minor child sued her mother for the negligent infliction of inju-
ries sustained in a collision in which the minor was a passenger in the
mother's automobile. This case was of significance since it was the first
in Florida to deal with a negligence action arising out of an automobile
accident. In affirming the lower court's dismissal of the action on the
authority of Meehan"'6 and Rickard,'° the District Court of Appeal did
not discuss the factual differences in the cases or whether such differ-
ences should possibly lead to different results. Meehan and Rickard
involved the exercise of parental duties and discretion peculiar to the
family relation itself, where Denault dealt with a duty to drive with
reasonable care, an obligation which was neither limited to the family
nor involved parental discretion. Furthermore, the court did not men-
tion the existence or non-existence of liability insurance coverage under
the specific facts, and the only conclusion thus to be reached is that it
did not consider this factor important in arriving at its decision.
102. Id.
103. 39 AM. JUR., Parent and Child § 90 (1942).
104. Rickard v. Rickard, 203 So.2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
105. 220 So.2d 27 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
106. 133 So.2d 776 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
107. 203 So.2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
1 4:98
49 1
52
Nova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol4/iss1/1
50 Nova Law Journal 4:1980 I
In 1970, the Florida Supreme Court decided Orefice v. Albert,08 a
decision which remains the leading case in Florida on the subject of
parent-child tort immunity.' In Orefice, a minor and his father were
both killed in an airplane crash due to the negligence of the father-pilot
who was also the co-owner of the airplane. On the basis of the parental
immunity rule, the court held that as a matter of law, lawsuits brought
by the mother, in her own right and as a parent, and by the estate of
the deceased minor child, would be barred. The court indicated that
established policy in Florida prevented children from suing their par-
ents and that such policy was grounded upon the protection of family
harmony and resources,"' although no prior Florida decision had ever
mentioned the preservation of family resources as a reason for uphold-
ing the immunity rule.
There was no discussion by the court as to whether the policies
underlying the immunity doctrine would be appicable to the facts of
the case since both the father and son were killed, and the family rela-
tionship was thus terminated. As in Denault," no statement appeared
regarding the existence of liability insurance and its effect upon the
preservation of family harmony and resources. The Florida Supreme
Court followed the lead of the district courts of appeal that had previ-
ously considered the parental immunity question by repeating general
policy statements without critically examining whether the application
of the immunity rule in the particular case furthered these declared
policy goals.
In 1972, the Third District Court of Appeal first reviewed the im-
munity rule in Webb v. Allstate Insurance Co.,"2 where a nine year old
child, through a guardian, brought an action against his father, his fa-
ther's automobile liability insurer, his father's employer and the em-
ployer's insurer. The plaintiff had accompanied his father to work
where the father became so intoxicated that several fellow employees
discussed having someone drive him and his son home. The father then
took a vehicle belonging to his employer and, while driving home with
108. 237 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1970).
109. Id. Orefice has been cited by all subsequent cases in Florida involving the
question of tort immunity between parents and children.
110. Id. at 145.
111. 220 So.2d 27 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
112. Webb v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 So.2d 840 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
o
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his son as a passenger, negligently collided with the rear of another car
causing injuries to the child. The court affirmed the lower court's
granting of a summary judgment in favor of the father and his insurer
on the ground that, as a matter of law, an unemancipated minor child
cannot maintain an action against his parents for negligence.
Although the father's liability insurance carrier was a named party
defendant, nowhere in the opinion was the importance of insurance
mentioned as it related to the policies underlying the immunity rule.
The court also did not analyze whether the father's voluntary intoxica-
tion removed the shield of immunity surrounding him by making his
actions so grossly negligent and/or willful and wanton that he com-
pletely departed from his parental role. 13 As in prior Florida cases, this
district court of appeal justified its legal position solely on the basis of
broad statements of general public policy. The circumstances of the
particular case were not considered.
The same year Webb was decided, the Second District Court of
Appeal, in Vinci v. Gensler,"' applied the parental immunity rule to a
tragic situation where an entire family, consisting of a mother, father,
and two minor children, died in an airplane accident caused by the
alleged negligent operation or maintenance of the airplane by the de-
ceased father. The personal representative of the estates of the mother
and children brought an action against the administrator of the father's
estate and Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, the liability insurer of
the subject airplane. The policies underlying the disability of the child's
suit against his parents were not even mentioned in this per curiam
decision which upheld the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's
complaint.
The dissent in Vinci was lengthy and sharp in its criticism of the
majority's failure to scrutinize the "mistaken axioms and ill-founded
reasons" upon which the parental immunity rule was based; and fur-
ther alleged that "in this particular case even those ill-founded reasons
are absent." 5 Since no family member survived the crash, the disrup-
tion of family harmony, the danger of fraud and collusion, the destruc-
tion of parental discipline and control and the raid on family resources,
all often quoted reasons for the maintenance of immunity, were ren-
113. Id. at 841.
114. 269 So.2d 20 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
115. Id. at 22.
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dered moot. The existence of liability insurance, in and of itself, would
render most of these rationales inapplicable to this and all cases involv-
ing the immunity rule. The majority did not address itself to any of
these issues.
The parent-child tort immunity rule is strongly entrenched in Flor-
ida tort law."' In decisions consistently upholding the immunity doc-
trine, Florida courts have resisted the changes in the rule that are being
proposed and adopted in a majority of courts throughout the country.
4. PARENT-CHILD TORT IMMUNITY: AN
ANACHRONISM IN FLORIDA TORT LAW
Florida has experienced rapid change in its tort law in the 1970's
with the judicial adoption of comparative negligence in 1973,117 the
statutory waiver in 1973 of sovereign immunity for tort actions,"' the
legislative enactment in 1975 of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act (UCATA),"9 and the judicial adoption of strict liabil-
ity in tort in 1976.20 Changes such as these have led the First District
Court of Appeal to state:
In view of the recent developments in the tort field, the abrogation of
contributory negligence, the adoption of comparative negligence, the en-
actment of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, and
others, the time may be ripe for the abrogation of the family immunity
doctrine. It appears that this would be consistent with the recent devel-
opment that a loss should be apportioned among those whose fault con-
tributed to the event, as well as providing for contribution among joint
tortfeasors. 21
In abrogating the doctrine of contributory negligence and adopting
a pure comparative negligence system, the Florida Supreme Court em-
phasized its concern for the automobile accident problem and the need
to secure just and adequate compensation for accident victims.12 The
116. Horton v. Unigard Ins. Co., 355 So.2d 154 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
117. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
118. FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1973).
119. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1975).
120. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1978).
121. Mieure v. Moore, 330 So.2d 546, 547 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
122. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
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court was also concerned with adopting a more socially desirable
method of loss distribution so that when the negligence of more than
one person contributed to an accident causing injuries, each tortfeasor
should pay the proportionate share of the total damages he had caused
the injured party.'2
Shortly after the adoption of comparative negligence, Justice
Dekle, in a special concurring opinion in Ward v. Ochoa 24 noted that
Florida's common law doctrine preventing contribution among joint
tortfeasors was inconsistent with its newly adopted doctrine of appor-
tionment of fault.'2 To accomplish complete equity in determining lia-
bility and in achieving a more desirable method of loss distribution, the
UCATA was untimely adopted,128 permitting contribution when two or
more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same
injury.
The widespread availability and use of liability insurance has
played an important role in the judicial adoption of comparative negli-
gence and the legislative enactment of the UCATA. 2 1 When the doc-
trines of fault and contributory negligence first came into prominence
during the period of the Industrial Revolution,12u the legal question to
then be decided was solely whether a loss should fall on the plaintiff or
defendant. Liability insurance against accidents was unknown until the
latter part of the nineteenth century. 2 Such insurance is the vehicle by
which the burden of bearing losses is shifted from the individual to all
the policyholders benefiting from the insured activities. 3 ' Accident vic-
tims may be compensated and human suffering may be lessened by
apportioning fault and allocating losses through insurance.'
In addition to these methods for providing adequate compensation
for accident victims and distributing losses, the legislature has also in-
123. Id. at 437.
124. 284 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1973).
125. Id. at 388.
126. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1975).
127. See Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed
Law Reform, I I U. FLA. L. REV. 135 (1958).
128. Id. at 137.
129. Id. at 138.
130. James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YALE L. J. 549 (1948).
131. Id.
14:1980
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dicated its interest in this area by its enactment of the Florida Automo-
bile Reparations Reform Act in 1971.132 This act requires every owner
or registrant of a motor vehicle in this state to show proof of security
by an insurance policy 33 or other means provided by the Financial Re-
sponsibility Law.134 The purpose of such security is to provide for pay-
ment of personal injury protection benefits to certain designated indi-
viduals, regardless of fault, for specifically delineated medical expenses
and services, funeral expenses and disability benefits."' By recognizing
and primarily employing the mechanism of insurance, the legislature
has thus provided a means for guaranteeing the payment of specified
amounts to an injured victim by a distribution of losses borne by the
total group of policyholders.
The Florida Supreme Court again emphasized the tort goals of
accident victim compensation and the distribution of losses resulting
from such compensation .by its adoption of the theory of strict liability
in tort. 36 The court characterized the doctrine of strict liability as one
of "enterprise liability" where the cost of injuries should be borne by
the makers of products who place them in commerce, rather than by
the injured persons who are usually powerless to protect themselves. 37
Strict liability was held applicable to not only users and consumers of
defective products, but also to foreseeable bystanders who might be
injured by such products.13 1
The theory of enterprise liability is based, in part, on the concept
of "risk spreading" whereby manufacturers absorb the inevitable losses
incurred as a result of the use of their products by passing such losses
on to the public.'39 Manufacturers are in a better position to spread this
risk by insuring themselves against the risk of injuries and distributing
132. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-.741 (1975).
133. FLA. STAT. § 627.733 (1975).
134. FLA. STAT. § 324.031 (1975).
135. FLA. STAT. § 627.731 (1975).
136. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1978).
137. Id. at 92.
138. Id. at 88. The strict liability doctrine set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) was adopted by the Florida Supreme Court. The lan-
guage of the RESTATEMENT applies strict liability to users and consumers of products,
but public policy considerations surrounding the concepts of enterprise liability are
equally applicable to innocent bystanders.
139. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1120 (1960).
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the price of such insurance to the public as a cost of doing business.14
Although few courts have overtly discussed the importance of liability
insurance and its relationship to the theory of enterprise liability, a
number of writers have emphasized such insurance as critical to the
theory's vitality.1 41
The continued failure of Florida's courts to permit a minor child
to recover against his parents for injuries negligently inflicted is incon-
gruous in view of these clearly delineated tort goals and policies. The
compensation of accident victims and the distribution of losses through
the vehicle of liability insurance is clearly hampered by the immunity
rule.
5. PARENTAL IMMUNITY AND THE UCATA
The Florida courts were recently faced with a series of cases in
which the avowed goals of fault apportionment 14  and loss distribu-
tion"' came into direct confrontation with the parental immunity
rule.14 All of the cases involved the question as to whether a tortfeasor
could obtain contribution from another tortfeasor who was immune
from suit by the injured party because of either parental or inter-
spousal immunity. In Mieure v. Moore,"' a case involving injuries suf-
fered in an automobile accident, the First District Court of Appeal
answered the question in the negative, unanimously finding that the
negligent father/husband was not a joint tortfeasor with the third party
defendant seeking contribution from him since, on the basis of the fam-
ily immunity rule, there was no common liability to the injured chil-
140. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944).
141. Prosser, supra at 1121.
142. See note 121 supra.
143. See note 123 supra.
144. Mieure v. Moore, 330 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Paoli v.
Shor, 345 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Shor v. Paoli, 353 So.2d 825 (Fla.
1977); 3-M Electric Corp. v. Vigoa, 369 So.2d 405 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 371 So.2d 166 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Petrick v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., - So.2d - (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1979) [1979 FLW 758]. In each of these cases, a third party sought contribu-
tion from the negligent spouse and/or child of the injured victim or the liability insur-
ance carrier of such spouse or child.
145. 330 So.2d 546 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
14:1980
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dren and wife who were plaintiffs."' The court considered itself bound
by established precedent to reach its decision, and it called on the Flor-
ida Supreme Court to review the wisdom of retaining the family immu-
nity rule in light of recent developments in Florida tort law.14
Approximately one year after Mieure was decided, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal, in Paoli v. Shor,48 considered a very similar
question when a plaintiff husband was injured while a passenger in an
automobile being driven by his wife where both the wife and a third
party were negligent. In allowing the contribution claim by the negli-
gent third party against the wife, the majority of the court held, contra
to Mieure, that the doctrine of interspousal immunity does not bar a
right of contribution that would otherwise exist under the UCATA. To
hold otherwise, the majority found, would be unfair to the defendant
and a windfall to the tortfeasor wife.' The dissent noted that the effect
of the majority opinion is to "dilute and compromise" the family im-
munity doctrine since according to such doctrine, the wife and third
party cannot be considered joint tortfeasors for the purpose of allowing
146. Id. at 547. See Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 1108. Until the last decade, most
courts that have considered this question have denied a third party tortfeasor the right
of contribution from a parent or child on the ground that the essential element of
contribution, namely common liability of the tortfeasors to the injured person, is lack-
ing. See also London Guarantee and Accident Co. v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 64 S.W.2d
781 (1954); Scruggs v. Meredith, 135 F. Supp. 376 (D. Hawaii 1955); Lewis v. Farm
Bureau Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 243 N.C. 55, 89 S.E.2d 788 (1955); Strahorn v.
Sears, Roebuck and Co., 50 Del. 50, 123 A.2d 107 (Super. Ct. 1956); Chosney v.
Konkus, 64 N.J. Super. 328, 165 A.2d 870 (Essex County Ct. 1960). However, a num-
ber of courts that have recently addressed themselves to this issue have allowed contri-
bution claims to take precedence over the rules of parent-child tort immunity or inter-
spousal immunity. See Peterson v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Ha% aii 484, 462
P.2d 1007 (1970); France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 57 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490
(1969); Hayon v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of New England, 378 N.E.2d 442 (Mass.
1978); Zarrella v. Miller, 100 R.I. 545, 217 A.2d 673 (1966); Ross v. Atwell, 315 So.2d
333 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Perchell v. District of Columbia, 444 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
147. Mieure v. Moore, 330 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976). Although
this case involved interspousal tort immunity, the policy concerns and issues involved
are the same as in the consideration of the parent-child immunity rule. Furthermore,
reference is made in the case to the broad doctrine of family immunity.
148. 345 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
149. Id. at 790.
59
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1980
1 4:1980 Parent-Child Tort Immunity 57I
contribution. 50
The Florida Supreme Court, in Shor v. Paoli,5 ' responded to the
Fourth District's certified question' by affirming the majority position
and adopting its reasoning. Both courts stated that permitting contri-
bution would not destroy the family unit and thus would not injure the
very underpinning of the family immunity doctrine.1 3
However, a closer look at Shor indicates that by favoring the tort
objectives of fault apportionment and loss distribution, the Florida Su-
preme Court's opinion did, on its face, do violence to the family immu-
nity rule it so clearly delineated in the leading case of Orefice v. Al-
bert.' The Orefice court stated that the preservation of family
harmony and resources was the cornerstone of the immunity rule. By
allowing a negligent third party to obtain contribution against a spouse
or child, the court is denying full recovery to the injured family mem-
ber since the family unit, which in reality must be looked upon as a
whole, is not receiving the full amount of compensation that would be
due the victim. Family resources are thus drained because such re-
sources must be used to fully compensate the injured party and as a
result, family harmony may be threatened due to the costly negligence
of the family member."'
150. Id. at 791.
151. 353 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1977).
152. Paoli v. Shor, 345 So.2d 789, 790 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977). The ques-
tion certified by the Fourth District Court of Appeal to the Florida Supreme Court
was as follows:
DOES THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY CONTROL OVER
THE UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS ACT (75-108 LAWS OF
FLORIDA, SECTION 768.31, FLORIDA STATUTES) TO PREVENT ONE TORTFEASOR
FROM SEEKING A CONTRIBUTION FROM ANOTHER TORTFEASOR WHEN THE OTHER
TORTFEASOR IS THE SPOUSE OF THE INJURED PERSON WHO RECEIVED DAMAGES
FROM THE FIRST TORTFEASOR?
The court certified this question due to the obvious conflict of its opinion with that of
the opinion of the First District Court of Appeal in Mieure v. Moore, 330 So.2d 546
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
153. Id. at 790; Shor v. Paoli, 353 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1977).
154. 237 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1970).
155. Underlying the court's decision in Shor v. Paoli, supra must have been an
awareness that the existence of liability insurance would prevent the disturbance of
family harmony and resources. Otherwise, its policy goals would have been in jeop-
ardy. The liability insurance carriers of both the plaintiff and defendant were named
parties in interest. The Florida Supreme Court, following the pattern set by other Flor-
P m
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The court's decision in Shor has marked a judicial retreat from its
strict adherence to the parental immunity rule. The UCATA is to be
liberally interpreted to achieve the tort goals of fault apportionment
and loss distribution; neither the interspousal tort immunity rule nor
the parent-child tort immunity rule are to hinder their accomp-
lishment.156
The First District Court of Appeal has very recently strengthened
the controlling position of the UCATA over the parental immunity
rule in two cases dealing with family exclusion clauses in automobile
ida courts in their consideration of this doctrine, did not directly confront the family
immunity issue by relating the facts of the particular case to policy concerns.
156. See Judge Mager's special concurring opinion in Paoli v. Shor, supra where
he quoted with approval from Zarrella v. Miller, 100 R.I. 545, 217 A.2d 673 (1966), an
opinion which gave precedence to the UCATA over the interspousal immunity doctrine
prevalent in that state. Judge Mager quoted as follows:
[W]e cannot believe that in enacting such act the legislature intended to extend
the doctrine of interspousal immunity to actions under the act in the light of
modern-day conditions. Such intent would be contrary to common sense and
justice. We are convinced that the legislature intended contribution in a case
such as this. We agree with the words of Dean Prosser that 'There is obvious
lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for
which two defendants were equally unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered
onto one alone * * * while the latter goes scot free.'
PROSSER, TORTS 2d 3d., Chap. 8 § 46, p. 248. However, in 3-M Electric Corp. v.
Vigoa, 369 So.2d 405 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), the Third District Court of Appeal
retreated, in part, from Shor in its interpretation of the UCATA. Parents sued an
electrical contractor on behalf of their minor child, alleging that the child was injured
by the contractor's negligence in leaving a pipe protruding in their backyard. The court
denied the contractor's counterclaim for contribution against the parents stating that
there was a lack of common liability between the parents and defendant due to the
family immunity doctrine. The court simply stated that the "instant case remains
within the parameters of the Mieure decision in regard to precluding contribution from
the parents." No policy or other rationale was offered regarding the purposes of the
UCATA or the tort objective of loss distribution. This case differs from the others
involving the UCATA in that contribution was sought against parents for their negli-
gent supervision of the injured child, and not for their negligent operation of a vehicle.
If contribution is allowed in this case, and the parents are without liability insurance or
are under-insured, then a part of anything the child recovers against the defendant will
have to come out of the family's resources. This is, in all probability, the reason why
the Third District Court of Appeal distinguished this case from Shor. See also, Schnei-
der v. Coe, - A.2d - (Del. 1979).
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liability insurance policies.1"' In Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v.
Government Employees Insurance Company,158 a wife, injured in an
accident while a passenger in a vehicle being driven by her husband,
sued the third party driver, owner, and the owner's insurer for negli-
gence. After paying the damage award to the wife, the defendant in-
surer filed a third party complaint against the husband's insurer seek-
ing contribution. The husband's insurer denied coverage based upon a
family exclusion clause in its policy which precluded coverage "to bod-
ily injury or to death of the insured or any member of the family of the
insured residing in the same household." ' The court affirmed the trial
court's allowance of the contribution claim and stated that Shor v.
Paoli had clearly given the UCATA precedence over the doctrine of
interspousal immunity. 6' Family exclusion clauses were contrary to the
established public policy of apportioning joint tortfeasors' responsibil-
ity for the payment of claims of innocent injured parties."'
In Petrik v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.,' decided by the First
District on the same day as Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Co., the
court applied the same rationale to allow a third party contribution
against a child's insurer when the parents of the child were injured in
an accident due to the negligence of both the third party and the child.
The family exclusion clause in the child's liability insurance policy was
found to be against public policy. In both cases, the First District certi-
fied questions to the Florida Supreme Court.,'
157. Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 371
So.2d 166 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Petrick v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., - So.2d
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979) [1979 FLW 758].
158. 371 So.2d 166 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
159. Id. at 167.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. - So.2d - (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979) [1979 FLW 758].
163. In Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Co., note 157 supra, the court certified
the following question:
DOES A FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSE IN AN AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE POL-
ICY CONTROL OVER THE UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TROTFEASORS ACT TO
PREVENT ONE TORTFEASOR FROM SEEKING CONTRIBUTION FROM ANOTHER
TORTFEASOR WHEN THE OTHER TORTFEASOR IS THE SPOUSE OF THE INJURED PER-
SON WHO HAS RECEIVED DAMAGES FROM THE FIRST TORTFEASOR?
In Petrick v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., note 157 supra, the court certified the
following question:
, !
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It is time for the Florida Supreme Court to critically examine the
parental immunity rule in light of its avowed goals of accident victim
compensation, fault apportionment and loss distribution as evidenced
by the judicial adoption of comparative negligence and strict liability in
tort, the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity for tort actions and
the legislative enactment of both the Florida Automobile Reparations
Reform Act and the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.
The importance of liability insurance to the accomplishment of these
goals must be recognized. The increasing number of questions certified
to the high court indicate the confusion in this area and the friction
between the maintenance of the immunity rule and the policies in tort
law being espoused by our legislature and courts."6 4 The present law
barring an injured minor child from suing a parent continues to perpet-
uate the human suffering which our legal system has been attempting
to alleviate.
If the policy reasons which gave birth to the parental immunity
rule are no longer valid, it is within the authority of the Florida Su-
preme Court to change or abrogate the doctrine.16 Preservation of
family harmony and resources can no longer be cited as unquestioned
DOES A FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSE IN AN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY CON-
TROL OVER THE UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT TO PREVENT
ONE TORTFEASOR FROM SEEKING CONTRIBUTION FROM ANOTHER TORTFEASOR?
As of this date, neither of the above two certified questions have been answered by the
Florida Supreme Court.
164. Furthermore, the parental immunity rule intrinsically conflicts with the well
established principle of Florida tort law that an injured third party may, under certain
circumstances, sue a parent on the theory of negligent care and control over his child
as the causative factor of the injuries. See Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So.2d 701 (Fla.
1955); Seabrook v. Taylor, 199 So.2d 315 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Spector v.
Neer, 262 So.2d 689 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Southern American Fire Ins. Co. v.
Maxwell, 274 So.2d 579 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
Allowing such actions by third parties against parents who are negligent may dis-
turb family unity and drain family resources. Liability insurance is more unlikely to
exist in situations such as these than in the typical parental immunity case with the
result that the damage award must be paid by the parents themselves. There is no
compelling reason for granting a third party the right to sue a parent by denying such a
right to an injured child. This is especially true in light of the fact that in situations
where a child sues a parent, the suit will invariably be brought only with the consent of
the parents and only if liability insurance is present. See note 46 supra.
165. Mieure v. Moore, 330 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Paoli v.
Shor, 345 So.2d 789, 791 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (Alderman, J., dissenting).
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policy arguments for the maintenance of such immunity. In fact, the
continuted existence of parental immunity threatens the family har-
mony and resources which the doctrine was meant to preserve. 166
The recent Florida cases dealing with the family immunity doc-
trine and the UCATA have created cracks in a dam of unyielding
dogma whose time for a critical review has arrived. A setback in the
attempt to deal with losses suffered by accident victims occurs each
time a court precludes an injured child from recovering, as a matter of
law, against his parents and against, in the overwhelming number of
cases, his parent's liability insurer.
CONCLUSION
One of the greatest strengths of the common law is its flexibility
and capacity to change, grow and adapt to new conditions and develop-
ments in society" 7 so as to provide remedies to all wrongs commit-
ted.16 Courts have tended to implement such change gradually by "dif-
ferentiation, exception, and ultimately extinction" of outmoded legal
doctrines. 69 In the grand tradition of the common law, recent years
have seen the edifice of family immunity beginning to crumble. The
time has come to set aside the parent-child tort immunity rule along
with all of the exceptions and limitations that have grown around it.
The cries of justice must be heard and a remedy provided for what, in
reality, is our most precious resource, our children.
166. See cases cited note 72, supra.
167. 15 AM.JUR.2d Common Law § 2 (1976).
168. 11 Am.JuR., Common Law § 2 (1937).
169. Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147, 155 (1960) (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting).
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Beyond Reverse Discrimination: The Quest For A
Legitimizing Principle
STEVEN JAY WISOTSKY*
Is the Constitution colorblind? Should preferential treatment for mi-
norities be construed to violate the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment or the Civil Rights Act of 1964? If preferential
treatment is permissible, which groups should be favored? These funda-
mental questions about the meaning of equality remain shrouded in
controversy and confusion despite, or perhaps because of, recent Su-
preme Court decisions and the rapidly burgeoning body of commentary
on the cases, both in the popular press' and legal literature.2 At the
heart of the confusion is the simple fact that the Supreme Court has
been unable to develop a coherent rationale for its decisions approving
affirmative action .3 What is worse, the fragmentation of the Court-
witness its six separate opinions in the Bakke case-has worked
against the attainment of doctrinal clarity.4 The Court has simply
* Professor of Law, Nova University Law Center. The author acknowledges the
able assistance of Professor Michael Burns and of Ms. Melanie May in critiquing the
various drafts of this paper.
I. Commenting upon the confusion, Thurgood Marshall humorously observed:
"I have seen so many interpretations of our decision [Bakke] now that it's hard for me
to distinguish between what we actually wrote and what the press says we wrote."
Address by Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall at the Second Circuit Judicial Con-
ference (September 8, 1978), 82 F.R.D. 221, 224 (1978).
2. The pages of the Index to Legal Periodicals continue to offer an apparently
inexhaustible supply of articles on various aspects of the preferential treatment debate.
A number of articles is cited in Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 288, n.25 (1978).
3. The origin of the term "affirmative action" has been traced to Executive Or-
der No. 10925 issued by President Kennedy. In bureaucratic practice, it usually means
(I) not discriminating against minorities, (2) advertising equal opportunity, and (3)
making special efforts to recruit qualified minorities by outreach and special training
programs. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION 46 (1975). Most commentators use
"affirmative action" interchangeably with benign or reverse discrimination to describe
preferential treatment for minorities because of minority status.
4. Several commentators have expressed this view. "The Bakke opinions ...
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failed to provide the authoritative guidance needed in order to facili-
tate the difficult task of reconciling the demands of racial justice and
the commands of equal treatment under the law.
The purpose of this article is to make a contribution to an under-
standing of the issue of preferential treatment for minorities by (1) re-
viewing the embryonic legal doctrine that has emerged in De Funis,
Bakke, Weber and the pending' Kreps case; (2) arguing that American
political and constitutional history, from slavery to segregation to the
present, requires recognition of the unique status of Blacks in our legal
system; and (3) concluding that affirmative action for Blacks for some
indefinite period of time is a legitimate and neutral constitutional prin-
ciple which ought to be adopted by the Supreme Court as the ratio
decidendi of future reverse discrimination cases.
I. REVIEW OF CURRENT DOCTRINE
A. De Funis
The question of the validity of race-conscious programs has been
presented to the United States Supreme Court four times. In the first
case, De Funis v. Odegaard, an unsuccessful white applicant to the
University of Washington Law School claimed the law school had dis-
criminated against him because of his race by admitting several minor-
ity applicants with lower grades and test scores. The Supreme Court of
Washington rejected De Funis' claim; but because he had been admit-
ted to school pendente lite and was about to graduate, the United
States Supreme Court, by a vote of 5 to 4, dismissed his claim as
moot.7
have complicated rather than simplified both benign discrimination and the under-
standing of the equal protection clause." Stone, Equal Protection in Special Admis-
sions Programs: Forward from Bakke, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 719, 742 (1979).
"Bakke settles so little that it is virtually useless as a precedent." Morris, The Bakke
Decision: One Holding or Two?, 58 OR. L. REv. 311, 334 (1979).
5. Kreps was argued before the Supreme Court on November 27, 1979, but has
not been decided as this article goes to the printer. 48 U.S.L.W. 3365-67 (Dec. 4,
1979).
6. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
7. Justice Douglas issued a lengthy dissent, arguing that the case was not moot
and that the minority admissions program was discriminatory because of its two-track
admissions process by which Blacks, Chicanos, American Indians and Filipinos re-
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B. Bakke
The issue of preferential treatment next arose in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,a a prolific source of law review com-
mentary.9 In Bakke, the California Supreme Court invalidated a proce-
dure whereby sixteen of one hundred seats in the entering medical
school class were set aside for a special admissions process employing
less stringent standards than those for non-minority applicants apply-
ing for the remaining eighty-four seats. Alan Bakke, a white applicant,
had applied to the University of California at Davis Medical School in
1973 and 1974 and was rejected both times. In both years, minority
applicants were admitted under the special program with grades and
test scores "significantly lower" than Bakke's."0 In addition, the minor-
ity applicants could compete for all one hundred places in the entering
class, while non-minority applicants were restricted to competing for
only eighty-four places.
Demonstrating clear antipathy for "a line drawn on the basis of
race and ethnic status,""1 Justice Powell's one-man "opinion of the
Court" rejected the concept of benign discrimination" and asserted
that "[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect
and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination. '"' In order to
pass constitutional muster, therefore, the Davis special admissions pro-
gram would have to be "precisely tailored to serve a compelling gov-
ceived preference. He concluded that "[t]here is no constitutional right for any race to
be preferred." Id. at 336.
Despite the mootness ruling, De Funis is not without significance in terms of the
development of reverse discrimination doctrine because the Douglas dissent is relied
upon by Mr. Justice Powell in Bakke. See note 75 infra and accompanying text.
8. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
9. See, e.g., Symposium: Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 67 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1979).
10. 438 U.S. at 277. The issue of qualifications is confused by the fact that other
non-minority applicants with higher scores than Bakke were also rejected. Addition-
ally, Bakke's age was a factor considered by the admissions committee; he was 33 at
the time of his second application. The implications of Alan Bakke's ambiguous posi-
tion relative to other applicants is creatively explored in Smith, The Road Not Taken:
More Reflections on the Bakke Case, 5 S. U.L. REV. 23, 58-60 (1978).
11. 438 U.S. at 289.
12. Id. at 294-95.
13. Id. at 291.
1 4:1980 Beyond Reverse Discrimination 65 1
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Justice Powell agreed that the admission of a diverse student body
was a compelling governmental interest. 5 Nevertheless, the particular
two-track procedure used by Davis was held unconstitutional because it
was not necessary to the attainment of racial and ethnic diversity in
light of the alternative means available. Justice Powell reasoned that
race could be considered-that race could be given a "plus" to "tip the
balance" in favor of an otherwise qualified minority applicant"6-so
long as majority group applicants were not automatically foreclosed
from consideration for any of the available seats. 7 Thus, as an example
of a constitutionally acceptable alternative means by which to attain
ethnic diversity, Powell placed his imprimatur on the Harvard College
Admissions Program, attaching it as an Appendix"8 to his opinion.
Justice Powell concluded by affirming that portion of the order of
the California Supreme Court ordering Bakke's admission to the medi-
cal school. Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice
Stewart, and Justice Rehnquist, agreed that Alan Bakke had been the
victim of unlawful racial discrimination but declined to reach the con-
stitutional question. They concurred on statutory grounds, 9 that is, Ti-
tle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 imposed a standard of color
blindness and barred exclusion on the grounds of race, color or na-
tional origin from benefits "under any program or activity receiving
14. Id. at 299.
15. Id. at 314. Justice Powell rejected the first three of the four interests asserted
by Davis as being served by the special admissions program: (1) reducing the under-
representation of minorities in the medical profession; (2) mitigating the effects of gen-
eral societal discrimination; (3) increasing the number of physicians who will practice
in underserved communities; and (4) obtaining the educational benefits arising from an
increased ethnic diversity among the student body.
16. Id. at 316-17.
17. Id. at 318.
18. Id. at 321-24. The Harvard program establishes a pool of qualified applicants
in terms of grades and test scores. It then gives preferences to "equally qualified" ap-
plicants who possess desired non-academic attributes: geographical background, ath-
letic or musical skills, or particular racial or ethnic origins.
For a discussion of the implications of Bakke for law schools, see Lesnick, What
Does Bakke Require of Law Schools: The SALT Board of Governors Statement, 128
U. PA. L. REV. 141 (1979).
19. For Justice Powell, the standards under Title VI and the Constitution were
the same. 438 U.S. at 287.
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Federal financial assistance."2 At the other antipode, Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall and Blackmun approved the use of race-conscious ad-
missions procedures. They, therefore, joined Justice Powell to form a
five-man majority to reverse the California Supreme Court's order "in-
sofar as it prohibits the University from establishing race-conscious
programs in the future."'"
C. Weber
The next test of preferential treatment programs came the follow-
ing year in United Steel Workers of America v. Weber.Y In Weber, a
new on-the-job training program was created by a master collective-
bargaining agreement between Kaiser and the United Steel Workers of
America (USWA) covering fifteen Kaiser plants. The agreement be-
tween Kaiser and USWA was designed to eliminate "a conspicuous
racial imbalance" in Kaiser's craft work force by reserving 50% of the
trainee positions for Blacks until the almost all-white craft work force
was integrated in proportion to the percentage of Blacks in the local
labor force. Both Black and white trainee applicants were selected on
the basis of seniority.
At the Gramercy plant where Brian Weber worked, thirteen train-
ees-seven Blacks and six whites-were accepted from the ranks of
production workers. Brian Weber was not among them, even though
the most junior Black chosen had less seniority. Weber filed a federal
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. The record reflected that Davis was a recipient of
federal funds. 438 U.S. at 412.
21. Id. at 326. The net result of these shifting alliances by the Justices was three-
fold: (1) Bakke was admitted to the medical school; (2) the Davis two-track special
admissions program was invalidated as an explicit racial classification; and (3) Davis
was free to go back to the drawing board to reformulate its special admissions
program.
Davis did not in fact revise its special admissions program in the aftermath of
Bakke. A single admissions committee was established to replace the previous dual
system which allowed minorities to be screened by a separate group. A minimum of
fifteen out of a possible thirty points is required in order for the applicant to advance
beyond the first cut in the admissions process. The system awards five points for race
or for severe economic disadvantage, allowing a minority student to reach the second
level of review more easily than a non-minority student. DREYFUSS & LAWRENCE, THE
BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 231 (1979).
22. 443 U.S. , 99 S.Ct. 2721 (1979).
7 114:1980
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class action law suit against Kaiser and USWA under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging that the Kaiser/USWA plan
illegally discriminated against white workers on the basis of race.?3
The Supreme Court framed the issue as whether Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers and unions in the private
sector from voluntarily adopting "race-conscious" affirmative action
plans "to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segre-
gated job categories, ' 2 and concluded that it did not.
The opinion21 by Justice Brennan emphasized the "narrowness" of
the decision. Conceding that the Kaiser/USWA plan violated the lit-
eral language of Title VII, Brennan wrote that the plan was neverthe-
less within the "spirit" of the statute because of the long years of dis-
crimination against Black workers and their worsening position in the
national labor force:
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over
centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who
had "been excluded from the American dream for so long," 110 Cong.
Rec., at 6552 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey), constituted the first legisla-
tive prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish
traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy."
Therefore, the Court concluded, a voluntary affirmative action plan
designed to correct "a manifest racial imbalance" is not inconsistent
with the legislative intention "to open employment opportunity for Ne-
groes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them."
In upholding the Kaiser/USWA plan, the Court gave consider-
able weight to the moderate and voluntary2l nature of the affirmative
23. Weber's argument focused on McDonald v. Santa Fe Transportation Co.,
427 U.S. 273 (1976), in which the Court held that whites as well as Blacks are pro-
tected, by Title VII.
24. 443 U.S. at , 99 S.Ct. at 2725.
25. Justice Brennan wrote for himself and Justices White, Stewart, and Mar-
shall. Justice Blackmun concurred. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dis-
sented. Justices Stevens and Powell did not participate in the decision.
26. 443 U.S. at , 99 S.Ct. at 2728.
27. Id. at 2730, quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
28. As noted by Mr. Justice Rehnquist in dissent, the voluntariness of the Kai-
ser/USWA plan was attenuated by pressures exerted by the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance. Id. at 2737-38, n.2. To the extent such a program is truly voluntary, the
Weber decision does not require employers or unions to do anything; it merely permits
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action program in terms of its size, scope and duration. First, the craft
training program was small; only thirteen jobs were available. Second,
it did not require the discharge of any white employee in favor of
Blacks. And third, in the words of Mr. Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion, the plan "does not afford an absolute preference for blacks,
and .. .it ends when the racial composition of Kaiser's craft work
force matches the racial composition of the local population. It thus
operates as a temporary tool for remedying past discrimination without
attempting to 'maintain' a previously achieved balance.",,
Moderate or not, Justice Rehnquist excoriated the majority for its
approval of the racial quota, which it had refused to uphold in Bakke.
In a caustic seventeen-page dissent, he denounced the majority for its
"Orwellian" interpretation of Title VII and for using tactics reminis-
cent of "escape artists such as Houdini." 0 He insisted that the major-
ity opinion had turned the legislative history on its head in holding that
it permitted voluntary racial discrimination in employment. He con-
demned the racial quota in the Kaiser/USWA plan as a device "de-
structive to the notion of equality. . . .Whether described as 'benign
discrimination' or 'affirmative action,' the racial quota is nonetheless
a creator of castes, a two-edged sword that must demean one in order
to prefer another. . . . [N]o discrimination based on race is
benign. "31
D. Kreps
The most recent manifestation of the preferential treatment issue
those who wish to implement affirmative action plans to do so. It is questionable how
many union negotiators will find it politically feasible to risk antagonizing their own
constituents by adopting plans that benefit the Black minority at the expense of the
white majority. For further ruminations on the practical impact of Weber, see
Neuborne, Observations on Weber, 54 N.Y.U.L. REv. 546, 556 (1979).
29. 443 U.S. at __, 99 S.Ct. at 2734.
30. Id. at 2737. For a critical examination of Justice Rehnquist's analysis of the
legislative intent underlying Title VII, see Dworkin, How To Read The Civil Rights
Act, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 37 (Dec. 20, 1979).
31. Id. at 2753. Chief Justice Burger also dissented on the ground that although
he would be inclined to vote for such an amendment to Title VII were he a member of
Congress, the "statute was conceived and enacted to make discrimination against any
individual illegal. . . ." Id. at 2735.
69 
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is Fullilove v. Kreps,"2 in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the 10% minority set-aside provision of the Public Works Em-
ployment Act of 1977,33 rejecting a constitutional challenge by associa-
tions of building contractors and subcontractors. The challenged provi-
sion was an amendment to the Local Public Works Capital
Development and Investment Act of 1976,11 a two billion dollar appro-
priation designed to alleviate unemployment in the economically de-
pressed construction industry. The set-aside operated by prohibiting
grants for any local public works project "unless the applicant gives
satisfactory assurance to the Secretary [of Commerce] that at least 10
per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority
business enterprises. ' 35 A minority business enterprise (MBE) is de-
fined as a business, at least 50% of which is owned by minority group
members-Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, American Indians,
Eskimos and Aleuts.3 6
In evaluating the constitutional validity of the 10% set-aside for
minorities under the fifth amendment,37 the Court, in an opinion that is
less than a model of clarity, chose not to articulate the appropriate
standard of review, stating in dictum that "even under the most exact-
ing standard of review the MBE provision passes constitutional mus-
ter. '38 In reaching this conclusion, the Court gave substantial weight to
the inferred Congressional purpose39 to remedy the effects of past dis-
32. 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2)(Supp. 1 1977).
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6735 (1976).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2)(Supp. 1 1977).
36. Id.
37. The fifth amendment contains no equal protection clause. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court, in order to prevent the anomaly of permitting discrimination by the
federal government that would be prohibited by a state, has held that equal protection
principles are embodied in the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239
(1976); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
38. 584 F.2d at 603 (footnote omitted).
39. In order to establish the Congressional purpose of rectifying prior discrimi-
nation, the Court referred to statements made by supporters of the amendment in Con-
gress. Statistics prepared by the Department of Commerce and House Committee Re-
ports provided proof of a severe underrepresentation of minorities in the construction
industry. 584 F.2d at 605-06. Having inferred a Congressional finding of past discrimi-
nation, the Court distinguished Bakke, id. at 607, in which Justice Powell emphasized
that "[wle have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members
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crimination in the construction industry. The Court acknowledged "the
special competence of Congress to make findings with respect to the
effects of identified past discrimination and its discretionary authority
[under §2 of the thirteenth amendment and §5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment] to take appropriate remedial measures."4
Finally, the Court of Appeals considered the effects of the set-
aside on non-minority business enterprises. "[Iln fashioning remedies
for past discrimination, courts must be sensitive to interests which may
be adversely affected by the remedy."' 1 In this examination, the Court
emphasized the small dollar amount of the set-aside in relation to the
total 1977 construction industry expenditure of $170 billion, 2 and con-
cluded that the burden 3 imposed on non-minority business was de
minimis.
The Second Circuit decision in Kreps is currently under review.
Certiorari was granted," and the case was argued before the Supreme
of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the ab-
sence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory
violations." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
40. 584 F.2d at 604, quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302, n.41. The reliance is not
quite apposite for the Piiblic Works Employment Act is probably an exercise of the
commerce power under Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3. During oral argument in the Supreme
Court, however, the government did rely on § 2 of the thirteenth amendment as a
power source. 48 U.S.L.W. 3365 (Dec. 4, 1979).
41. 584 F.2d at 607.
42. The court of appeals reasoned that the 1977 amendment appropriated $4
billion, or about 2.5 percent of the total of nearly $170 billion spent on construction in
the United States that year. The set-aside was for 10 percent of the total grant, or only
.25 percent of funds expended on construction work in the United States. "Further-
more, since according to 1972 census figures minority-owned businesses amount to
only 4.3 percent of the total number of firms in the construction industry, the burden
of being dispreferred with .25 percent of the opportunities ...was thinly spread
among nonminority businesses comprising 96 percent of the industry." Id. at 608 (foot-
note omitted).
43. For a theoretical consideration of the extent of the burden test in equal pro-
tection analysis, see Comment, Beyond Strict Scrutiny: The Limits of Congressional
Power to Use Racial Classifications, 74 N.W.U.L. Rnv. 617, 630 (1979).
44. The Court granted certiorari on two questions:
"(1) Is congressional requirement that ten percent of federal grants for local
public works projects be set aside for minority business enterprises constitution-
ally permissible under Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses?
(2) Is minority set-aside program in violation of Title VI of 1964 Civil Rights
Act?"
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Court. The questioning at oral argument reflected some skepticism by
the Justices regarding the inherent illimitability of the concept of pref-
erential treatment predicated upon past discrimination. For example,
Justice Rehnquist wanted to know if under that rationale a preference
for Norwegian-Americans would be constitutional." Justice Stewart
similarly asked if a finding of past discrimination would justify a set-
aside for Presbyterians." Justice Stevens questioned whether Republi-
cans could seek affirmative action programs based on past Democratic
majority bias. 7 And other comments from the bench questioned the
adequacy of the Congressional "findings" of past discrimination, sug-
gesting that the 10% set-aside was simply a political decision to spread
the wealth around.48
II. PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT: THE QUEST
FOR A RATIONALE
A. Who Should Be The Beneficiaries Of Preferential Treatment?
The questions posed by Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens
go directly to the crux of the matter: What is the scope of the proposi-
tion that past discrimination is a proper predicate for preferential
treatment? Which groups would qualify for the preference? Is a show-
ing of past discrimination sufficient, or must there also be present so-
cial, economic or political disadvantage resulting from that discrimina-
tion? The statements of the Justices on these matters are hopelessly
conflicting and reveal no progress toward the development of a cogent
juridical principle.
One of the principal difficulties in arriving at an intellectually co-
herent and ethically satisfactory resolution of the issue of preferential
treatment is the failure of the Court to articulate a rationale rejecting
or justifying the grab bag of racial and ethnic minorities favored by the
various affirmative action programs. In De Funis, Blacks, American
47 U.S.L.W. 3562-63 (Feb. 20, 1979). See note 5 supra.
45. 48 U.S.L.W. at 3366 (Dec. 4, 1979).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. Regarding the danger of purely conclusory legislative factfinding of past
discrimination, see Posner, The Bakke Case and the Future of "Affirmative Action,"
67 CAL. L. REV. 171, 179 (1979).
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Indians, Chicanos and Filipinos were favored. In Bakke, the favored
minorities were Blacks, Chicanos, Asians and American Indians and,
in theory, the economically or educationally disadvantaged of any
race.49 In Weber, the affirmative action plan for the craft training pro-
gram was a straightforward quota of 50% Blacks and whites. But in
Kreps, the favored groups included Blacks, Spanish-speaking,
Orientals, American Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts."
It is difficult to discern in this potpourri of racial and ethnic
groups any unifying principle. The groups are not similarly situated5'
with respect to either past discrimination or present disability, assum-
ing for the moment, those are the relevant criteria. Orientals, for ex-
ample, are generally well off in terms of economic status52 and educa-
tional attainment." Notwithstanding a long history of virulent
discrimination against the Chinese5' and the Japanese,5 it is difficult to
49. No non-minority disadvantaged students were admitted to Davis under the
special admissions program. 438 U.S. at 276.
50. The inclusion of Eskimos and Aleuts in the definition of minorities is appar-
ently attributable to 42 U.S.C. § 6707(a)(1)(Supp. 1 1977) providing for a 2- percent
set-aside "for grants for public works projects. . . to Indian tribes and Alaska Native
villages."
51. GLAZER, supra note 3, at 74 (1975).
52. The median family income of foreign born and native born (first generation)
Japanese in 1969 was $12,772. The parallel figure for Chinese (including Taiwanese)
was $10,683. Both figures compare quite favorably, after allowing for inflation, with
the 1977 median household income of $14,272 for whites. Based on the rise in the
consumer price index between 1969 and 1977, the income figures for Japanese and
Chinese corrected for inflation would be approximately 66% higher, or $20,118 and
$17,733 respectively. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1978, at 38, Table 43 and at 462, Table 747. [here-
inafter cited as 1978 ABSTRACT].
53. Asian Americans comprise .67% of the general population, but 1.05% of to-
tal college enrollment. Id. at 35, table 38 and at 163, table 265.
54. The Chinese were the first Asians to immigrate to California. A mass immi-
gration made up primarily of laborers from Kwantung province began around 1850
and received impetus from the discovery of gold at Sutter's Mill. By 1879 the Chinese
population of California exceeded 111,000. Much of the immigration was the product
of the "coolie trade," an arrangement by which Chinese laborers were imported under
"contracts" that amounted to a form of slavery.
The efficiency of the Chinese laborers, coupled with their large numbers, earned
them the animosity of white labor groups. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886). Vindictive political measures were enacted by the California legislature and
subsequently by Congress.
1 4:98
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regard them as disadvantaged. In addition, there is good reason for
regarding discrimination against Orientals as a regional concern." The
"Spanish-speaking" classification,57 is absurdly over-inclusive. It en-
compasses not only the typically low-income Chicanos 8 and Puerto Ri-
The principle legal manifestation of hostility to the Chinese was the Chinese Ex-
clusion Act of 1882, which suspended the immigration of Chinese laborers for ten
years. It also provided that those who had been in the United States since 1880 could
leave and enter the United States on an identifying certificate. However, the Scott Act
of 1888 voided all outstanding certificates and barred all laborers who had not reen-
tered at the time of the Act's passage. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
Act in The Chinese Exclusion Case, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581
(1889).
The Geary Act of 1892 extended the "suspension" for an additional ten years. In
1902, it was converted into permanent exclusion. The Geary Act was also upheld by
the Supreme Court, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
The hostility to the Chinese subsided considerably when the United States entered
World War II as an ally of China. The exclusion acts were repealed in 1943, although
highly restrictive quotas were established. In 1965, the special immigration restrictions
pertaining to Asians were abolished. See BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW
69-72 (1972).
55. The Japanese began arriving in the United States in large numbers about
1890. Anti-Chinese feeling was very high, and the hostility was easily transferred to the
new Asian arrivals. The victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 aroused fears of a
"yellow peril" in the United States.
California agriculture was a principal point of confrontation. Japanese efficiency
stimulated the enactment in 1913 of the Alien Land Laws in California. Many states
followed suit.
Immigration policy also reflected anti-Japanese sentiment. The Quota Act of 1924
excluded "aliens ineligible to citizenship;" the Japanese did not gain the right to citi-
zenship until 1952. World War II added obvious stresses culminating in the removal of
the Japanese from the West Coast. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). See BELL supra note 54, at
72-76.
56. More than one-third of the 591,000 Japanese live in California, with another
third in Hawaii. Similarly, nearly 40% of the Chinese live in California, with Hawaii
and New York accounting for an additional 35%. 1978 ABSTRACT at 35, table 39.
57. Statistics for the "Spanish" category are generally not broken down into the
constituent national origins. The 1977 median household income for Spanish families
was $10,647, compared to $14,272 for whites and $8,422 for blacks. Only 8.4% of
Spanish families have median incomes below $3000 per year, compared to 6.3% of the
white families and 15.3% of the black families. Id. at 462, table 747.
58. The Chicanos are of Mexican origin and comprise the largest single group of
Spanish-surnamed people in the United States. About 7,000,000 Chicanos live in the
Southwest-, BELL, supra note 54, at 76-81.
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cans, but the relatively affluent and upwardly mobile Cubans, who as
recent arrivals have no history of discrimination and who were given
refugee assistance59 in the flight from Castro's Cuba.
It is clear that Blacks are the largest,"0 poorest,61 and among the
least well educated" of any of the disadvantaged groups typically in-
cluded in affirmative action plans. No other group in America, with the
arguable exception of the American Indian," has a comparable history
of systematic racial oppression and resulting social and economic infer-
iority.6 ' "At every point from birth to death, the impact of the past is
reflected in the still disfavored position of the Negro."6
B. Standards For Preferential Treatment
As demonstrated by the foregoing discussion, the racial and ethnic
59. See 22 U.S.C. § 2603 (1976).
60. The 1970 census reflects a total United States population of 203,212,000. Of
that number, 177,749,000 are whites; 22,580,000 are Blacks; 793,000 are Indians;
591,000 are Japanese; 435,000 are Chinese; and 343,000 are Filipino. Spanish-speaking
persons are included in the white category. Id. at 35, table 38.
61. See note 57 supra.
62. Blacks comprise 11.11% of the total population, but only 6.95% of college
enrollment. Whites-are enrolled in proportion to their percentage of the population.
1978 ABSTRACT at 35, table 38 and at 163, table 265.
63. The brutal, at times genocidal, policies of the American government with
respect to the Indian tribes cannot be denied. However, for purposes of this article,
there are significant practical and legal considerations justifying consideration of Indi-
ans as sui generis. The physical concentration of the Indians on reservations in the
Western States, their limited numbers (793,000), and their unique statutory, adminis-
trative, and treaty ,status renders it difficult, if not impossible, to fit their situation
within the analytical framework relevant to preferential treatment. In Morton v. Man-
cari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974), the Supreme Court acknowledged "the unique legal
status of Indian tribes under federal law and . . . the plenary power of Congress,
based on a history of treaties and the assumption of a 'guardian ward' status. .. ."
The Court also cited Title 25 of the United States Code as further evidence of the
unique historical and legal position of the Indian tribes. Id. at 552. See also note 135
infra.
64. See generally Lewis, Parry and Riposte to Gregor's "The Law, Social Sci-
ence, and School Segregation: An Assessment," DEFACTO SEGREGATION AND CIVIL
RIGHTS 115 (0. Schroeder, Jr. & D. Smith eds. 1965).
65. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 396. For a further discussion of the disadvantaged status
of Black Americans, see Justice Marshall's opinion, id. at 395-96. See also THE STATE
OF BLACK AMERICA 1979 (National Urban League, Inc. 1979).
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groups selected for inclusion in affirmative action plans are not simi-
larly situated. Nevertheless, two common factors are apparent: a his-
tory of discrimination and/or a presently disadvantaged status. These
factors are frequently identified by writers as the basis of affirmative
action. For example, prior discrimination corresponds roughly to a
compensatory rationale and present disadvantage to a distributive ra-
tionale, two of the four justifications for racial preference identified by
Paul Brest.6
The distributive rationale "holds that it is prima facie unjust for
any racial or ethnic group in our society to be appreciably less well off
than other groups," 7 regardless of the reason for the inequality. Its use
is thus independent of a showing of prior discrimination." The com-
pensatory rationale, on the other. hand, focuses on past injustices and
would justify compensatory treatment or reparations69 for historical
66. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 544-45 (1975). The
preventive rationale is primarily concerned with institutional self-preservation, i.e., to
avoid a charge of de jure discrimination. Cf. Weber, 99 S.Ct. at 2730-32 (Justice
Blackmun's opinion discussing the "arguable violations" theory); and 99 S.Ct. at 2737-
38, n.2 (Justice Rehnquist's questioning of the voluntariness of the Kaiser program).
The instrumental rationale is concerned with institutional or societal improvement. It
is exemplified by Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke in which he accepted educational
enrichment resulting from ethnic diversity of the student body as a compelling govern-
mental interest.
67. See BREST, supra note 66, at 545.
68. A distributive rationale is the basis of all anti-poverty programs, which are
the most efficacious way to address the problem of have-not groups. Payments to or
preference for an entire race or ethnic group which is poor as a race or group would
necessarily be over-inclusive and under-inclusive. For example, Blacks would be com-
pensated, rich or poor, while whites would not. On the other hand, there are substan-
tial savings in administrative costs to be realized from using race as a proxy for other
characteristics, such as poverty. See generally Posner, The De Funis Case and the Con-
stitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
69. The compensatory rationale is analogous to the shifting of losses from victim
to wrongdoer which forms the basis of our civil justice system. As applied to racial or
ethnic groups, the compensatory rationale is similar to the payment of reparations for
injustices committed by one nation or race against another. The outstanding contempo-
rary example is the payment of $820 million by the government of West Germany to
the government of Israel in 1967 as reparations for the Holocaust.
On May 4, 1969, James Forman interrupted the Sunday morning service at River-
side Church in New York City and read the Black Manifesto which demanded that the
churches and synagogues pay $500 million as "a beginning of the reparations due us as
people who have been exploited and degraded, brutalized, killed and persecuted." Birr-
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wrongs, regardless of present disadvantage. The compensatory ratio-
nale was given short shrift by Justice Powell in Bakke.70
Intuitively, neither rationale standing alone seems sufficient to jus-
tify preferential treatment based on race. But a combination of the two
rationales was relied upon by the Court to validate a state law prefer-
ring women over men. In Kahn v. Shevin,71 the Supreme Court upheld
preferential tax status for women because of prior discrimination and
their inferior economic position. Nevertheless, in Bakke Justice Powell
rejected the analogy to preferential treatment based on sex because ra-
cial and ethnic preference "presents far more complex and intractable
problems . .. . Fearing to tread upon the slippery slope, he was un-
willing "to evaluate the extent of the prejudice and consequent harm
suffered by various minority groups."73 He asserted that there would be
"no principled basis for deciding which groups would merit"74 preferen-
tial treatment and that the rankings of minority groups "simply does
not lie within the judicial competence. .. .
Thus, the thrust of Justice Powell's position is that "no principled
basis" can be found to justify preferential treatment even for those
KER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 4 (1973). See also SCHUCHTER, REPARA-
TIONS (1970).
70. 438 U.S. at 306, n.43. Undoubtedly, there are serious ethical problems inher-
ent in the concept of reparations and its practical administration. How are victims to
be identified? If payment is made to the group as a whole, then non-victims will be
gifted with a windfall. In addition, many persons in the "majority" have no connection
with the historical wrongs. These and other issues are explored in sophisticated detail
in GROSS, DISCRIMINATION IN REVERSE: Is TURNABOUT FAIR PLAY, (1978). See also
Calabresi, Bakke as Pseudo-Tragedy, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 427 (1979). Professor Cala-
bresi is one of the few advocates of a reparations rationale for the solution of the
Bakke issue. See note 135 infra.
71. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). In Kahn, Justice Douglas relied upon the traditional
economic disadvantages imposed upon women in the marketplace and the fact that
women's median annual income was only 57.9% that of men in 1972. Id. at 353. Other
cases have sustained sex-based preferences on a compensatory rationale. See, e.g.,
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
72. 438 U.S. at 303.
73. Id. at 296-97.
74. Id. at 296.
75. Id. at 297. Justice Powell quoted from Justice Douglas' dissent in De Funis
that "[t]he reservation of a proportion of the law school class for members of selected
minority groups is fraught with . . . dangers, for one must immediately determine
which groups are to receive such favored treatment and which are to be ex-
cluded. . . ." Id. at 297, n.37.
80
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groups who have been historically oppressed and who are currently dis-
advantaged. The remainder of this article will attempt to demonstrate
that Mr. Justice Powell's conclusion is significantly mistaken insofar as
it lumps together all racial and ethnic groups for the purpose of consti-
tutional analysis. Without resorting to the compensatory or distributive
rationale, or to any extra-constitutional justification, a neutral princi-
ple78 for preferential treatment for Blacks can be anchored in the con-
crete foundation of constitutional legitimacy.77 All that is required is a
recognition that the Constitution and laws have not been color blind
and that they have a special mission to fulfill with respect to the Eman-
cipation of Blacks.
III. THE UNIQUE ROLE OF BLACKS IN THE
FORGING OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM:
THE UNCOMPLETED EMANCIPATION
The history of Black slavery, segregation, and discrimination was
summarized with great eloquence by Mr. Justice Marshall in the sepa-
rate opinion in Bakke:
Three hundred and fifty years ago, the Negro was dragged to this coun-
try in chains to be sold into slavery. Uprooted from his homeland and
thrust into bondage for forced labor, the slave was deprived of all legal
rights. It was unlawful to teach him to read; he could be sold away from
his family and friends at the whim of his master; and killing or maiming
him was not a crime.78  I
The advent of the Constitution did not undermine slavery; on the
contrary, the acknowledgment and protection of slavery were made ex-
plicit in the Constitution. 79 The Supreme Court itself, beginning with
76. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 15 (1959).
77. See Wisotsky, Beyond Legitimacy, 33 U.MIAMI L. REV. 173 (1979) for a
general discussion of the concept of legitimacy in Supreme Court adjudication.
78. 438 U.S. at 387-88. The American slave trade is thought to have begun in
Jamestown in 1619. "By 1776, there were about 500,000 Negroes held in slavery and
indentured servitude in the United States. Nearly one of every six persons in the coun-
try was a slave." Rep. of Nat. Comm. on Civil Disorders, Rejection and Protest: An
Historical Sketch 95 (1968), cited in BELL, supra note 54, at 1.
79. Article I, § 2 treated each slave as 3/5ths of a person for purposes of appor-
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the Marshall Court,"0 reinforced the institution of slavery in several
early decisions. The most infamous case, Dred Scott v. Sanford,"1 held
that the Missouri Compromise prohibiting slavery in the portion of the
Louisiana purchase territory north of the Missouri River was unconsti-
tutional because it deprived slave owners of their property without due
process of law. In rejecting Dred Scott's claim of citizenship, Chief
Justice Taney wrote that Negroes were not intended to be included as
citizens under the Constitution but were "regarded as beings of an in-
ferior order . . . altogether unfit to associate with the white race, ei-
ther in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respecf .... "82
The status of the Negro as property and as a non-citizen was offi-
cially transformed by the Civil War and by the post-war constitutional
amendments. The thirteenth amendment abolished slavery and involun-
tary servitude; the fourteenth amendment conferred citizenship upon
the freedmen; and the fifteenth amendment guaranteed the right to
vote, at least in theory. But the promise of Reconstruction and the
Civil War Amendments was nullified by the systematic enslavement of
the freedmen:
The Southern States took the first steps to re-enslave the Negroes. Im-
mediately following the end of the Civil War, many of the provisional
legislatures passed Black Codes, similar to the Slave Codes, which,
among other things, limited the rights of Negroes to own or rent prop-
erty and permitted imprisonment for breach of employment contracts.
Over the next several decades, the South managed to disenfranchise the
Negroes in spite of the Fifteenth Amendment by various techniques, in-
cluding poll taxes, deliberately complicated balloting processes, property
and literacy qualifications, and finally the white primary.,
In every other area of social, political and economic life the freed-
tioning representatives and taxes among the states. Article I, § 9 specifically denied
Congress the power to end the slave trade until the year 1808. Article IV, § 2, cl.3, the
fugitive slave clause, required that a slave who escaped to another state must be re-
turned upon the demand of his master.
80. Roper, In Quest of Judicial Objectivity: The Marshall Court and the Legiti-
mation of Slavery, 21 STAN. L. REV. 532 (1969).
81. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
82. Id. at 407.
83. 438 U.S. at 390 (opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall).
82
Nova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol4/iss1/1
Nova Law Journal
men were degraded, humiliated, and relegated to a position of inferi-
ority. But most of all, it was the absolute inability of the law to protect
their personal safety that was responsible for the subjugation of Blacks.
Starting immediately after the Civil War and easing for a short period
during Reconsturuction when federal troops were present in the South,
a reign of white supremacist terror was carried on by the Ku Klux
Klan, the White Camellias, and other secret societies."4 By intimida-
tion, burnings, beatings and lynchings-a reign of terror that could jus-
tifiably be called an American pogrom-the freedmen were wantonly
victimized and brutalized. Approximately 5,000 lynchings have been
documented.8 5
The physical degradation and persecution of Blacks was reflected
in the law by physical separation of the races in public accomodations
and virtually all other aspects of life. The Supreme Court itself contrib-
uted to this process of segregation by creating the state action doctrine
in the Civil Rights Cases,"8 which had the legal effect of immunizing
"private" racial discrimination from constitutional scrutiny and the
psychological effect of encouraging the South in its oppression of
Blacks. The coup de grace was delivered in the Court's "separate-but-
equal" ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson.s7 The enforced separation of the
races in railway cars upheld in Plessy was accurately interpreted in Mr.
Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion to mean that "colored citizens are
so far inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public
coaches occupied by white citizens." 8 The effect of the Plessy decision
was to encourage the Southern States to expand the scope of the Jim
Crow laws to include segregated residential areas, parks, hospitals,
theatres, waiting rooms and bathrooms."
84. The lawlessness was so vindictive and destructive that Congress was moved
to enact the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 and related civil rights statutes now codified as
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 et seq.
85. See BELL, supra note 54, at 857.
86. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
87. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
88. id. at 560.
89. Jim Crow laws also infected the legal system. In the South, there were segre-
gated jury boxes, witness docks and even a Jim Crow Bible for colored witnesses to
kiss. 438 U.S. at 393 (opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall), citing C. VANN WOODWARD,
THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 68 (3d ed. 1974).
These pernicious practices were not confined to the South. Segregation spread to
the Northern States and even to the practices of the federal government. "Under Presi-
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The enforced segregation of the races continued into the middle of the
20th century. In both World Wars, Negroes were for the most part con-
fined to separate military units; it was not until 1948 that an end to
segregation in the military was ordered by President Truman. And the
history of the exclusion of Negro children from white public schools is
too well known and recent to require repeating here. That Negroes were
deliberately excluded from public graduate and professional
schools-and thereby denied the opportunity to become doctors, law-
yers, engineers, and the like-is also well established."
The first 'major blow to segregation-to separate-but-equal as a
constitutional doctrine-did not transpire until nearly a century after
the Civil War. In Brown v. Board of Education,9 the Supreme Court
held that the segregation of public school children on the basis of race
"generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
and may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone."92 The Court concluded that "[s]eparate educational facilities
are inherently unequal."93 Brown was rapidly extended in a series of
per curiam decisions to a full range of public facilities such as
beaches,94 buses,95 golf courses" and parks.97 The pernicious separate-
but-equal doctrine of Plessy was interred. Blacks were no longer to be
excluded by law from public facilities used by whites.
Of course, the process of desegregation of public facilities, particu-
dent Wilson, the federal government began to require segregation in government build-
ings; desks of Negro employees were curtained off; separate bathrooms and separate
tables in the cafeterias were provided; and even the galleries of the Congress were
segregated." Id. at 394.
90. Id.
91. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
92. Id. at 494.
93. Id. at 495. The companion case of Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954),
has special symbolic importance in that segregation of the races by law was practiced
in the capital city of the United States until the Supreme Court declared it
unconstitutional.
94. Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), affg 220 F.2d 386 (4th
Cir. 1955).
95. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), affg .142 F.Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.
1956).
96. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955), vacating and remanding 223
F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955).
97. New Orleans City Park Imp. Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958), aff'g 252
F.2d 122 (5th Cir: 1958).
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larly schools,98 was not accomplished without a struggle and
violent resistance. There were freedom marches, demonstrations in
the streets and elsewhere,99 sit-ins at lunch counters, 10 stand-ins at vot-
ing registration centers. The nightly news in the early sixties was a ka-
leidoscope of villainy: Bull Connor's men using cattle prods and high
pressure hoses on demonstrators; Lester Maddox chasing Black cus-
tomers with his pick handles; George Wallace standing in the school-
house door; Orval Faubus at Little Rock defying the mandate of
Brown v. Board of Education.101 And there were killings: four young
girls bombed to death while attending church services in Birmingham,
Alabama; Viola Luzzo, the civil rights worker from Detroit gunned
down by three Klansmen in Alabama; James Chaney, Andrew Good-
man, and Michael Schwerner shot in the night and buried in shallow
Mississippi graves; Medgar Evers, NAACP field secretary, shot by an
assassin while marching for freedom; and finally Martin Luther King,
assassinated by James Earl Ray in Memphis, Tennessee in 1968. Many
were martyred in the Civil Rights Movement.1 12
The second phase of the modern Black Emancipation began with
the intervention of Congress. After a decade of virtual torpor on civil
rights issues (excepting only voting rights)" 3 while under the domina-
98. "A decade after Brown, only 1.17 percent of black children in the eleven
states of the old Confederacy attended school with whites." BARRON & DIENES, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICY 607 (1975). A variety of evasive tactics, inge-
nious and disingenuous, for avoiding desegregation was utilized: pupil assignment laws,
Orleans Parish School Board v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354
U.S. 921 (1957); student transfer plans, Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683
(1963); freedom of choice plans, Green v. County School Board of New Kent County,
391 U.S. 430 (1968); and even the closing of the public schools, Griffin v. County
School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). The close-down maneu-
ver was also employed to avoid desegregation of public swimming pools in Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
99. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229 (1963); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
100. See, e.'g., Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Lombard v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
101. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Faubus' defiance caused President
Eisenhower to mobilize federal troops in order to effect the admission of Negro stu-
dents to Central High School.
102. See EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 1000-03 (Student ed. 1967).
103. The Civil Rights Act of 1957, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1976).
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tion of Southern Congressmen vested with seniority and therefore pow-
erful committee chairmanships, Congress was roused to take legislative
action. Under the pressure of international condemnation and domestic
dissent, the latter brought to a climax by the People's March on Wash-
ington, Congress broke through the obstruction of racist fillibusters
and enacted the first modem comprehensive civil rights law, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.104 Continued Southern denial of Black citizenship
necessitated the Voting Rights Act of 1965,15 and a series of broaden-
ing amendments. After the adoption of the 1965 Voting Rights Act,
Johnson Administration proposals for additional omnibus civil rights
legislation were repeatedly blocked in the Senate."' Once again, dra-
matic political developments-in particular, the assassination of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr.-broke the impasse and Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1968.107
This abbreviated review of the Civil Rights Movement and of con-
gressional civil rights legislation is intended to underscore the extent to
which the American legal system has been preoccupied with issues of
slavery, segregation, and their aftermath, the extent to which special
consideration of Blacks is an institutionalized feature of our laws. This
leads to a second point. The legacy of white supremacy has been a
legacy of subjugation, persecution, and degradation which has uniquely
burdened the Black race. As Mr. Justice Marshall put the matter:
The experience of Negroes in America has been different in kind, not
just in degree, from that of other ethnic groups. It is not merely the
history of slavery alone but also that a whole people were marked as
inferior by the law. And that mark has endured.'
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1976); and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-(e) (1976). The act lim-
ited the use of exclusionary voter tests (Title I), outlawed discrimination in places of
public accomodation (Title II), authorized suits by the Attorney General to desegre-
gate public facilities (Title III), provided for the desegregation of public education (Ti-
tle IV), banned discrimination in federally funded programs (Title VI), and prohibited
discrimination in employment by employers, employment agencies, and labor unions
(Title VII).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976).
106. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 905 (9th ed. 1975).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. Perhaps the most important provision was Title
VIII, prohibiting discrimination, inter alia, in the sale or rental of property.
108. 438 U.S. at 400.
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The question now becomes one of determining the legal significance of
that enduring mark.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF NEGRO
FREEDOM: THE LEGITIMIZING PRINCIPLE
In Bakke, Justice Powell acknowledged the original interpretation
of the equal protection clause, which viewed its "one pervading pur-
pose" as securing "the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm
establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly made
freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly
exercised unlimited dominion over him." ' 9 But, he argued, the late
nineteenth century wave of European immigration transformed the
United States into "a Nation of minorities. . . .As the Nation filled
with the stock of many lands, the reach of the Clause was gradually
extended to all ethnic groups seeking protection from official discrimi-
nation." 110 It was "no longer possible," Justice Powell concluded, "to
peg the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the struggle for
equality of one racial minority." '' "The clock of our liberties . . . can-
not be turned back to 1868.1112
Although Justice Powell's rhetoric is seductive, his conclusion is
predicated upon a false dichotomy: Either the equal protection clause
protects all groups equally, or there is "no principled basis" for choos-
ing one group over another for preferential treatment. But Justice Pow-
ell's premise may be rejected. It is a judicial value preference, of
course. It is not historically compelled; nor does it reflect sufficient sen-
sitivity to the problems of "a Nation confronting a legacy of slavery
and racial discrimination.""' More fundamentally, Justice Powell's
universe of discourse is unduly restrictive in its exclusive focus on the
contours of the equal protection clause. The constitutional dimensions
of the issue are broader.
The inadequacies of Justice Powell's analysis are revealed by com-
parison to the force and clarity of Arthur Kinoy's 1967 essay, The
109. Id. at 291, quoting Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873).
110. Id. at 292.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 295.
113. Id. at 294.
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Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom.11 4 Kinoy's argument, focusing
on the debate between Justices Bradley and Harlan in the Civil Rights
Cases, persuasively establishes that the Civil War Amendments em-
body a continuing national commitment to complete the process of
Emancipation begun in the Civil War.
Kinoy explains that in Dred Scott, the Supreme Court had articu-
lated, largely in dictum, "a full blown legal and constitutional theory
designed to serve as a national justification for the preservation of the
institution of slavery."1 '5 That rationale was the non-citizenship of
Blacks, which was justified because they were "a subordinate and infer-
ior class of beings who had been subjugated by the dominant race.""'
After the Civil War, the Dred Scott opinion was directly repudiated by
ratification of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. The
effect of these amendments was to free the Negro "from any discrimi-
nation by reason of race or color in the exercise of rights or privileges
hitherto enjoyed by white men .. .""7 Yet, the nature of the rights
created by the Civil War Amendments was not merely to be free of
oppression by the states, but ,as an essential attribute of the newly con-
ferred citizenship "to be free from the stigma of inferiority implicit in
the institution of slavery .. ."Is
Of course, that degree of equality was antithetical to the political
realities of the time. The dominant fact of political life was the Com-
promise of 1877, a genteel phrase for the sell-out of the freedmen,
which was accomplished by the withdrawal of federal troops from the
South in exchange for southern Democrat support in the deadlocked
House of Representatives for the election of Republican candidiate
Rutherford B. Hayes as President."' This Compromise represented the
abandonment "in the political arena . . . of national responsibility for
the enforcement of the newly created rights of the race of freedmen.' ' 2
Justice Bradley's opinion in the Civil Rights Cases was the constitu-
tional counterpart of that abandonment, shifting the focus of responsi-
114. 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 387 (1967).
115. Id. at 391.
116. Id., quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1856)
(footnote omitted).
117. Id. at 394.
118. Id. at 395.
119. The Compromise of 1877 is pithily summarized by Kinoy, id. at 396, n.31.
120. Id. at 396 (emphasis in the original) (footnote omitted).
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bility back to the individual Southern States. Thus, Justice Bradley ar-
gued that the fourteenth amendment was essentially negative in
character, prohibiting state denials of Black equality, but vesting no
corrective power in Congress over "private" discrimination. This is the
etiology of the state action doctrine which was used to strike down the
Civil Rights Act of 1875.
More fundamental and more enduring in its destructive impact
was the denial of the special mission of the Civil War Amendments to
ameliorate the oppressed condition of the freedmen:
Once he had b6en granted citizenship the freedman's right not to be dis-
criminated against by reason of his race had no special constitutional
significance distinct from any citizen's right not to be discriminated
against in the equal enjoyment of rights and privileges. Like the ordinary
citizen's right under the laws of a state to be treated equally with any
other citizen, the freedman must now look in the first instance for pro-
tection in the exercise of these rights to the original source of the "ordi-
nary" civil rights of all citizens, the individual state. It is time, said the
Bradley Court in 1883, to eliminate any preferred status for the
freedman.'
It is almost as if the shield of the Civil War Amendments were
transformed into a sword against the mythical "preferred status" of
the freedmen. Kinoy labels this transformation "a rather extraordinary
piece of legal legerdemain." '
Discrimination against the freedman in all areas of public life had be-
come, by this skillful process of judicial reasoning, wholly merged into
the general phenomenon of any discrimination against any class or
group of citizens. The problem legally as well as politically was no
longer to be verbalized in terms of the special and unique national re-
sponsibility of the elimination of the influences of an entire social and
economic institution-human slavery-from the life of the country.' 2
But the right of the Negro not to be discriminated against "is not iden-
tical to the general right of all citizens not to be arbitrarily discrimi-
121. Id. at 400-01 (footnotes omitted).
122. Id. at 401.
123. Id. at 402.
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nated against,"'' 4 and it is not an "ordinary civil right."
It is a nationally created right essential to the establishment of a para-
mount national objective, the elevation of the black man from the status
of slave and inferior being to the status of a free and equal member of
the political community of the United States, an elevation without which
the grant of citizenship to the Negro would become meaningless. For, as
Justice Harlan prophetically warned, unless this nationally created right
was protected by the national government the race of freedmen would
inevitably sink back into a "second-class" citizenship equivalent in es-
sential respects to the former status of "inferiority" and "degradation"
which was the legal and social hallmark of the slave society.'1
And that is exactly what happened. The withdrawal of federal
troops from the South, the enactment of the Black Codes, the spread
of segregationist practices to the North, made a mockery even of Jus-
tice Bradley's grudging grant of formal equality under the law. Instead
of steady progress toward the goal of Emancipation of the freedmen,
the next ninety years were spent confronting the racial animus of slav-
ery and the Civil War in the streets and the courtrooms, while Blacks
remained in a conditon of political, social, economic, and legal
inferiority.
Although he does not explicitly consider the issue of affirmative
action in his 1967 essay, the power of Kinoy's analysis is remarkable.
First, it clarifies the nature and meaning of the Civil War Amend-
ments, demonstrating them to be an overriding national commitment
to elevate the status of the former slaves to a position of full equality in
society. "Until this change in status is achieved the national objective
remains unfulfilled and the national responsibility for its accomplish-
ment remains in force."' 2'
Simultaneously, Kinoy's broader conceptualization of the issue
succeeds in developing the sought-after neutral jural principle that le-
gitimates affirmative action. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more
neutral principle, assuming such a thing exists at all,' 2 than the force
of the national commitment embodied in the extraordinary majorities
124. Id. (emphasis in original).
125. Id. at 403 (footnote omitted).
126. Id. at 404.
127. See Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 661, 671 (1960).
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required to ratify three constitutional amendments in five years. Ki-
noy's Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom thus offers a principled
justification for affirmative action for Blacks. By simply acknowledging
the special mission of the Civil War Amendments and the national fail-
ure to complete the Emancipation begun over a century ago, we are
liberated from the intractable constitutional dilemmas so widely
thought to be inherent in preferential treatment. More than a century
after the Civil War, the status of Blacks remains inferior; the badges of
slavery have not been eradicated. As recently as 1968, the Supreme
Court obseved that racial discrimination against Blacks is a '."relic of
slavery."' 8 Substantive equality has not been achieved, nor is it likely
in light of a century of post-Civil War oppression to come about with-
out "reverse discrimination."
CONCLUSION
The acceptance of the duty to complete Emancipation as the oper-
ative juridical principle justifying affirmative action will not put an end
to the difficult issues which will arise in the course of implementation.
Foremost among these is the allocation of benefits and burdens-which
Blacks shall be benefitted and which whites burdened by preferential
treatment?' In addition, the abandonment of fuzzy thinking (or expe-
diency) 3° reflected in a nebulous concept of affirmative action for racial
and ethnic minorities generally in favor of one for Blacks only 3' is
128. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968).
129. DREYFUSS & LAWRENCE, supra note 21, at 260 titled their last chapter "A
Choice of Victims." One writer suggests that "[tihe interest of blacks in achieving
racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of
whites." Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). Professor Bell also discusses the pressures militating
toward social class divisions among whites on the issue of affirmative action in Bell,
Bakke, Minority Admissions and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CAL. L.
REV. 3 (1979).
130. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
131. Professor Calabresi, supra note 70, at 432, in his proposed reparations solu-
tion to the issue posed by the Bakke case, would limit "benign quotas" to Blacks "and
perhaps to American Indians. . . ." Professor Sedler, less attentive to principle, offers
no justification for the cognitive leap from Professor Kinoy's Constitutional Right of
Negro Freedom to the inclusion of "Puerto Ricans, Chicanos and Native Americans"
in racially preferential admissions programs. Sedler, Racial Preference, Reality and the
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certain to be politically troublesome. It would require, for example, the
invalidation of the set-aside in Kreps.32
Consideration of these and related questions has been avoided by
the Court because it has failed to undertake the antecedent task of
developing an analytical framework for the adjudication of affirmative
action cases.11 Thus, the failure of the Bakke opinions (excepting Jus-
tice Marshall's) is their failure to confront squarely and cleanly the
issue of race in light of the national "legacy of slavery and racial dis-
crimination,"'' 34 and to use the decision as another opportunity to fulfill
the Court's continuing mission of national consciousness-raising on
matters of racial justice. It could fulfill that mission most effectively by
a judicial acknowledgement of the truth' about American racism.
Constitution: Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 17 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 329, n.3, and 365-68 (1977).
132. The invalidation of the minorities set-aside in Kreps would be required
under the incompleted Emancipation analysis suggested here. However, it remains pos-
sible that the Court could uphold the set-aside under the plenary power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce. Cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). The latter decisions, of
course, were predicated on the injury to commerce resulting from racial discrimination
against Blacks.
An alternative theory for upholding the Kreps set-aside is a Congressional affirma-
tive action power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, suggested by Comment,
supra note 43, at 635-37.
133. Although Weber was correctly decided, it deals with benign quotas in the
private sector and does not, therefore, address the more prickly issue of publicly
funded "reverse discrimination," as in Bakke.
134. 438 U.S. at 294. The failure is also ironic in view of the fact that Justice
Brennan's opinion, joined by Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun, attempts to jus-
tify the Davis special admissions program almost exclusively in terms of the history of
discrimination against Blacks. Id. at 324 et seq.
135. It has taken almost eighty-five years and an unprecedented upsurge of
the descendants of the freedmen for the nation to begin to face frankly the
extraordinary fact of American history-that the "universal freedom"
which the Emancipation Amendment was supposed to enact was never
achieved; that the social institution of slavery was never fully uprooted;
that its badges and indicia continued to mark the Negro with the hallmark
of slavery, the stamp of an "inferior race." Neither the Court nor the
nation could face this reality. For some it was an evil lived with but never
discussed; for some it was an unfortunate but inevitable concomitant of
American society; for others it was a welcomed reestablishment of a for-
mer way of life. But all shared one common unspoken agreement-the
reality was not to be discussed; the phenomenon was not to be named; the
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unpleasant truth could not be faced. It can be argued, as the first Justice
Harlan might well have argued, that this strange and deep-seated reluc-
tance to face the reality of the incompleted Emancipation lies not only at
the root of the complicated conceptual problems which still beset the
Court in interpreting the scope and thrust of the Wartime Amendments
but, in a more important sense, remains at the heart of the most difficult
unresolved problems of contemporary national life.
Kinoy, supra note 114, at 414.
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Legislative Overview: The Florida Workers'
Compensation Act, 1979
BENJAMIN LESTER ABBERGER,* GARY GRANOFF**
INTRODUCTION
The innovative, unprecendented changes in the Florida Workers' Com-
pensation Act have focused national attention on the state's compensa-
tion reform efforts. The reforms are viewed as a creative approach to
the resolution of the persistent permanent-partial controversy and as an
imaginative response to critics of state-regulated compensation sys-
tems. The changes, of course, will have pervasive impact on the prac-
tice of workers' compensation law in the state. This article will outline
problems the revisions were designed to address. Then, the major
changes in the compensation act will bi developed. Finally, the antici-
pated impact of the revisions as well as potential problems will be
treated.
HISTORY
Workers' Compensation insurance is a unique social, political, le-
gal and economic mechanism. A major tenet of the progressive politi-
cal movement of the early twentieth century, workers' compensation
was the first social insurance mechanism in the United States.' It was
also the first "no-fault" insurance mechanism.2 The concept of work-
ers' compensation developed as rapid industrialization resulted in
* Administrative Assistant, Florida State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner.
** Director, Massachusetts State Rating Bureau. Former Actuary, Florida Insur-
ance Department.
1. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS,
COMPENDIUM ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION, Chapter 2, a report prepared in accor-
dance with the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. The report was presented
to the President and Congress July 31, 1972.
2. Id.
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vastly increased numbers of industrial accidents. Industrial injury rates
in the United States reached their peak in 1907 when in two industries
alone, railroading and coal mining, there were 7,000 deaths.3
Before the advent of worker's compensation, a worker injured on
the job was required to prove that the injury was a result of the em-
ployer's negligence.4 Work-related injuries fell under the tort liability
system. Employees were required to prove not only that the injury was
entirely the fault of the employer, but that they and their co-workers
were totally without fault.' By suing an employer, employees risked job
loss and long delays for awards of damages. Also, the courts frequently
held that certain risks were assumed by an employee in taking a job,
and if the injury resulted from those risks, no recovery was permitted.
By the middle of the 19th century, protests against the blatant deficien-
cies and inequities of the common law approach to handling work-re-
lated injuries resulted in the development and enactment of various em-
ployers' liability laws in many jurisdictions.' Although these laws
restricted the employers' legal defenses, they continued to require that
an employee prove employer negligence in order to receive
compensation.8
This inequitable situation generated the proposal that is the foun-
dation of all modern workers' compensation systems. Reformers recog-
nized the shortcomings of traditional legal remedies that relied on com-
mon law doctrines of blame and fault. The approach they suggested
was a tradeoff. Injured workers relinquished their right to tort action
against their employers for negligence. In exchange, the injured worker
received the security of medical and income replacement benefits cover-
ing all injuries incurred in the course of employment. Because the in-
herent hazards of employment were a cost of production, all of the
costs of work-related injuries were borne by the employer. New York
3. THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION LAWS 33, prepared as required by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970.
4. Workers' Compensation: Is There a Better Way? REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND THE CONGRESS OF THE POLICY GROUP OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL WORKERS'
COMPENSATION TASK FORCE 2 (January 19, 1977).
5. Id. at 3.
6. ° COMPENDIUM ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION at 16-17.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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enacted the first compensation act of general application in 1910, and
by 1919 thirty-five other states had adopted some form of compensa-
tion legislation? The first Florida Compensation Act became law in
1935.10 Although most jurisdictions enacted such legislation before the
Second World War, workers' compensation was not provided in every
state until Mississippi enacted its law in 1948.11
There are five generally accepted objectives of workers' compensa-
tion. The first objective is income replacement. That is, the system
seeks to replace wages lost by workers disabled by a job-related injury
or sickness. Income replacement should be adequate, equitable,
prompt, and certain. The second objective is to provide the injured
worker with the medical and vocational rehabilitation necessary to re-
store earning capacity and foster return to employment. The third ob-
jective is occupational accident prevention and reduction. The system
should provide significant financial and other incentives for employers
to strive to decrease the severity and frequency of accidents. The fourth
objective is proper cost allocation. The costs of the program should be
divided among employers and industries according to the extent to
which they are responsible for losses incurred by employees and for
expenses related to the insurance mechanism. Finally, the achievement
of the four objectives mentioned above should be met in the most effi-
cient manner possible.1 2 While the objectives sometimes conflict with
one another, the accomplishment of multiple objectives should be en-
couraged to the greatest possible extent.
In general, the workers' compensation statutes impose limited lia-
bility on employers for injuries incurred by employees in the course of
employment. Adequate benefits are to be predetermined and promptly
paid. Appropriate medical care is to be provided. The administration
of the Act is the responsibility of an administrative body rather than
the courts so that, theoretically, administration is expeditious, some-
what informal, and efficient.1 3
9. Id. at 18.
10. ALPERT, FLORIDA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 37 (2nd ed., 1975).
11. COMPENDIUM ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION, at 18.
12. See THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAWS, Chapter 1; also WHITE PAPER ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION
prepared by U.S. Departments of Labor, Commerce, Health, Education, and Welfare,
and Housing and Urban Development, 1974.
13. ALPERT, Chapter 1.
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The legal obligation of the employer to have benefits paid to
workers in accordance with state law is usually met through an insur-
ance policy purchased from a private insurance company. If, however,
the employer has the financial ability, he may "self-insure" by posting
appropriate security. Thus, he may bypass the need for an insurance
company and assume the risks of the workplace directly. About 22% of
workers' compensation insurance premium volume in Florida is self-
insurance.14 Several states provide a mechanism known as a state fund,
a system under which insurance coverage may be purchased from the
state. Under the Florida Act, there is no state fund. Most employers
use the private insurance mechanism to meet their obligations under
the law.
PROBLEMS
Although workers' compensation is a patchwork of state by state
legislation, severe problems with both the availability and the af-
fordability of compensation insurance coverage arose across the coun-
try in the mid-1970's. 15 The compensation system had been subjected to
a series of increasingly complicated pressures. Benefit levels rose signif-
icantly to keep pace with inflation-induced wage increases. Political
considerations also exerted upward pressure on benefit levels. Diseases
such as heart trouble, hypertension, and cumulative trauma, which may
bear only a remote relationship to an individual's employment, found
their way into the compensation system. Inflation, particularly in the
cost of health care, caused tremendous increases in expenditures for
benefits. Insurance companies were forced to charge significantly
higher premiums for coverage to meet higher costs.
These conditions were exacerbated by the recession of the mid-
1970's. Insurance rates skyrocketed across the country as insurance
companies attempted to cover eroding profits and vastly increased loss
payouts. When profits dropped, companies reacted by implementing se-
14. See James Nicholas, Self Insurance for Workmen's Compensation in Flor-
ida, prepared for and included in the FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION OF THE FLORIDA LEG-
ISLATURE, March, 1979.
15. See Herbert E. Goodfriend and Robert G. Smith, Workers' Compensation:
A Recurring Trauma or Profit, a report prepared for Loeb Rhodes, in Focus ON IN-
SURANCE, Vol. 2, No. 2, September, 1976.
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verely restrictive underwriting standards. This caused considerable ex-
pansion of the involuntary insurance market. As a result, consumers
experienced severe availability problems.
Florida did not escape the availability crunch. It was accompanied
by soaring rates that increased by 169% between January, 1973, and
January, 1978.18 The financial burdens imposed on businessmen
became increasingly onerous. Despite these increases, from 1972
through 1976, insurance companies contended that they were continu-
ing to sustain significant underwriting losses. Underwriting losses such
as those experienced by companies in recent years meant, in practical
terms, even higher rates, inadequate markets for consumers, and insuf-
ficient funds to improve benefits.
The climate facing Florida legislation in 1979 was characterized in
the words of compensation expert, Cornell University Professor John
Burton, as "the worst of all possible worlds".17 The rapid rate esca-
lation prodded employers, legislators, and regulators to question the
validity of overall rate levels as well as the integrity of the underlying
data. These conditions led to articulate but erroneous arguments in-
volving insurance company profits and the like.
The 1978 Florida Legislature established a Joint House-Senate
Committee to study the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act and to
make recommendations for reforms. The 1978 Legislature also added a
sunset provision to repeal the Workmen's Compensation Statute
(Chapter 440) July 1, 1979, unless the Legislature reenacted a worker's
compensation law."8 The Joint Legislative Committee identified six ma-
jor problem areas in the system. They were: the high cost of coverage;
the rapid increase of job-related injuries; the minimal utilization of re-
habilitation; the high cost and volume of permanent-partial disability
claims; the inequity in income compensation among workers with
permanent-partial disability claims; the inequity in income compensa-
tion among workers with permanent-partial disabilities; and the high
16. Statistics compiled by the Florida Department of Insurance based on rate
filings submitted on behalf of Florida workers' compensation carriers by the National
Council on Compensation Insurance.
17. Keynote address to the Third Annual National Symposium on Workers'
Compensation at the University of Maine, July 9, 1979.
18. 78-300 Fla. Laws §23.
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degree of attorney involvement."9
A detailed study conducted by the National Council on Compen-
sation Insurance of closed claims in Florida, Alabama, and Wisconsin
underscored the problems plaguing the Florida compensation system."0
The study showed that the system was overused and badly abused.
High utilization of attorneys and medical services contributed to the
excessive cost of the system. Injured Florida workers, for example, re-
ceived two to three times the medical benefits of their counterparts in
Wisconsin and Alabama. They were confined to hospitals more fre-
quently, had higher hospital bills, and utilized the services of special-
ized medical practitioners more often. The study showed that claim-
ant's attorneys in Florida were involved more frequently in
compensation cases than claimant's attorneys in Alabama or Wiscon-
sin. Florida attorneys were involved sooner and received substantially
higher fees.21 Of course, it is important to note that higher attorney
involvement in Florida was also attributable to inefficient claims han-
dling by compensation insurance carriers.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the closed claims study
showed that the cost of permanent-partial disabilities was much higher
in Florida than in the other two states. Benefits for permanent-partial
injuries are paid to workers who, after ieaching maximum medical re-
covery from their injuries, continue to experience either actual loss in
wages earned or a loss in their capacity to earn wages. Put another
way, there is a permanent-partial disability when a worker is incapaci-
tated but not completely disabled for the rest of his or her life. Perma-
nent-partial disabilities accounted for a significantly greater percentage
of cases in Florida (30%) than in Alabama (7.1%) or Wisconsin (9%).
The cost of permanent-partial claims as 4a percentage of total medical
and lost time payments was 67% compared to 37% in Alabama and
40% in Wisconsin.2
19. See FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE
COMMITTEE ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Mar., 1979.
20. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INSURANCE, WORKMENS' COM-
PENSATION RESOLVED CLAIMS SURVEY, HOUSE INSURANCE COMMITTEE, a study by the
National Council on Compensation Insurance. The study was based on cases resulting
in seven days of more of total lost time from work that were resolved in November and
December, 1977, in Florida, Alabama, and Wisconsin.
21. All of the above statistics were drawn from the RESOLVED CLAIMS SURVEY.
22. Id.
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Although the closed claims 'survey, the Joint Committee, and
other involved parties noted highlighted a number of severe problems
in the Florida system, it must be noted that the Act worked as it was
supposed to for most of the workers injuried each year. Injuries requir-
ing only medical treatment and involving brief periods of temporary
disability represented more than 95% of work-related accidents.? In
these cases, the system was virtually self-executing. The injuried
worker enjoyed the sec-drity of prompt, approriate medical treatment
and regular benefit checks. The prolonged insecurity of litigation in or-
der to assess fault and obtain judgments was avoided. About 23% of
the system's dollar payout stemmed from this vast majority of rou-
tinely handled incidents.24
On the other hand, permanent-partial cases that amounted to only
about 3% of all claims absorbed almost 70% of the money expended in
the system.? The permanent-partial injury was the Achilles' heel of the
Florida compensation system. Legislators focused much of their atten-
tion on this aspect of the system in their reform efforts.
Under the pre-1979 act, the Florida. system used a bifurcated ap-
proach for compensating the permanent-partial injury. Some of the se-
rious injuries fell within a statutory list that specified fixed amounts of
compensation for each injury. Most injuries, however, were not on the
statutory schedule. For those injuries compensation was based on ei-
ther a physician's physical impairment rating or on the diminution of
wage-earning capacity, whichever was greater. This numerical rating
then was plugged into a formula to determine the amount of compen-
sation payable to the injured worker.2 Both methods were highly sub-
jective. With physical impairment ratings, disputes often arose between
the claimant's physician and the insurance company's physician. This
led to "doctor shopping" and contributed to the escalation of fraudu-
lent claims. The diminution of wage-earning capacity rating was just as
subjective as the physical impairment rating in that it attempted to
take factors such as the worker's age, education and experience into
account in order to make a prospective estimate of the effect an injury
23. See 1976 CASES, CAUSES, COSTS, compilation prepared by the Florida De-
partment of Commerce.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.15 (3), (4) (1979).
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might have on the worker's future wage-earning ability.
This complex mechanism to compensate injured workers ostensi-
bly protected a worker from the adverse financial impact of work-re-
lated injury. Practically, it bore little relation to that purpose. The stat-
ute provided fixed compensation to workers suffering scheduled
injuries, whether the worker was a carpenter or an attorney. If income
protection was the objective, this method was obviously arbitrary. The
physician's impairment rating also failed to meet the income protection
objective as it was a purely medical evlauation and thus unrelated to a
worker's economic needs. The dimuntion of wage-earning capacity
standard came closer to the income protection objective but it, like the
others, was inherently flawed by its prospective application. That is,
when a worker reached maximum medical improvement, an estimate
would be made as to the effect of the injury on future wage-earning
ability. These crystal ball judgments were notoriously imprecise and
were aggravated by the fact that more than two-thirds of permanent-
partial cases were "washed out" (settled by lump-sum payments),2 Se-
riously injured workers often found themselves destitute while workers
with minor injuries received large cash awards although they actually
suffered little, if any, income loss.
It is important to point out that Florida was not alone in exper-
iencing serious problems with its approach to handling permanent-par-
tial disabilities. The Report of the National Commission of State
Workmen's Compensation Laws, completed in July of 1972, pointed
out that the "issue arising from benefits for permanent-partial disabil-
ity are so critical to the future of workmen's compensation that the
subject warrants the highest priority. Unfortunately, the critical need
for corrective action is matched by the elusiveness of the proper rem-
edy. . . ."2 In January, 1977, the Policy Group of the federal govern-
ment's Inter-departmental Workers' Compensation Task Force ex-
pressed deep concern about permanent disability cases, observing
"excessive litigation, long delays in payments, high subsequent rates of
persons without employment, and little relationship between benefits
27. See FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE
COMMITTEE ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Commerce Committee of the Florida
Senate.
28. See note 3 supra.
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awarded and the actual wage loss."
WAGE-LOSS
The wage-loss concept, adopted by the Florida Legislature as the
cornerstone of the 1979 Workers' Compensation Reform Act, focuses
on the permanent-partial injury as the key to meaningful progress in
restoring the vitality of the compensation system. The primary aim of
the wage-loss concept is to abandon the present system, which attempts
to predict future earning loss and to replace it with a system that com-
pensates a worker for earning loss when he shows, retrospectively, that
he is actually losing money as a result of the injury.
The worker who suffers a permanent injury will receive compensa-
tion based upon any actual loss in wages he experiences as a result of
the injury. A month-by-month analysis of wages earned after maxi-
mum medical improvement will determine the amount of compensation
to which the worker is entitled. This formula is known as the 85/95
formula. The worker bears the first 15% of wage-loss. He is then enti-
tled to wage-loss benefits calculated as 95% of the difference between
post injury wages and 85% of pre-injury wages, subject to a cap of 66
2/3% of the pre-injury wage.3" Reformers hope this approach will result
in the payment of compensation to workers who actually need it while
eliminating compensation paid to workers who are as financially secure
after the injury as they were before it. There are three situations in
which injured workers are eligible to receive compensation in addition
to wage-loss benefits. Wage-loss benefits are paid for a maximum of
350 weeks. To partially protect workers from inflation, pre-injury
wages will be discounted for 3% after wage-loss benefits have been paid
for two years. For workers injured after July 1, 1980, the discount is
5%.31
The Legislature concluded that the lump sum settlements so fre-
quently utilized under the old system did not contribute to the basic
purpose of the wage-loss system. A study conducted by Associated In-
dustries of Florida showed that payments in washouts for future medi-
cal benefits accounted for more than a fourth of the system-wide pay-
29. See note 4 supra at 19.
30. FLA. STAT. § 440.15 (1979).
31. Id.
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out for medical expenses." The Joint Committee concluded that
utilization of lump-sum settlements for future medical benefits involved
a very high degree of subjectivity and imprecision, especially in cases
when a settlement was made soon after the injury." Periodic payments
are considered preferable to one-time cash awards because they insure
worker protection against an actual loss in wages. For these reasons,
the new Act severely restricts the ability of .the parties involved to
"wash out" a case. No lump sum settlements are permitted until six
months after maximum medical improvement. Lump sum payments in
exchange for the release of the employer's liability for future medical
expenses are prohibited.34
While the wage-loss plan places the basis of compensation for per-
manent-partial injuries on more objective criteria, it will not eliminate
litigation. A significant new litigable issue will undoubtedly develop
from determinations as to whether wage-loss is, in fact, due to injuries
or whether it is a result of other unrelated factors.
ATTORNEY FEES
As pointed out previously, excessive attorney involvement was a
significant problem in the Florida system. The closed claims survey un-
derscored the significantly greater frequency of attorney involvement in
the Florida system as compared to other states. In some respects, this
extensive involvement can be justified by the accurate observation that,
under the old system, a worker without an attorney was a sheep among
wolves. This necessary assistance of attorneys was, however, expensive.
The Miami Herald reported in February of 1979 that workers' com-
pensation attorney fees in Florida totaled nearly $20 million.15 Until
1978, the employer and his insurance company were responsible for
paying all attorney fees of the successful claimant.38 This provision was
32. See note 14 supra at 20.
33. Id.
34. FLA. STAT. §440.19 (12)(a)(1979).
35. See THE PAYOFF FOR PAIN: A LOOK AT FLORIDA'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION SYSTEM, a reprint of articles published in the Miami Herald between March 18,
1979, and March 25, 1979. The article cited herein appeared March 18, 1979, and was
written by Robert D. Shaw, Jr., Director of the Miami Herald reporting team that
investigated and reported on the Florida workmen's compensation system.
36. See, for example, FLA. STAT. § 440.34 (1979).
1 00 4:980 1
103
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1980
amended in 1978 to require that the claimant pay 25% of his legal fees.
Now, with certain exceptions, the employee is responsible for payment
of his entire attorney fee."7 Because a compensation claimant is now
subject to the normal risks of litigation, the number of unwarranted
claims should be reduced.
It should be noted that stringent guidelines have been established
for attorney's fees, and approval of such fees by the "deputy commis-
sioner, commission, or court having jurisdiction over such proceed-
ings"3 is required. Factors are delineated which may be considered if it
appears that "the circumstances of [a] particular case warrant" 9 an
increase or decrease from the amount allowed under the basic statutory
provision."
There are three situations in which the employer or the insurance
company still must pay the claimant's attorney fees. If the claim is for
medical benefits only, the claimant pays no fees.41 In situations when
the insurance company denies that a compensible injury occurred, and
the claimant prevails, the employer/carrier must pay the fees.42 Also,
when it is determined that the employer or insurance company have
handled the claim in bad faith, they must pay the claimant's legal ex-
penses.43 By requiring that claimants pay attorney fees in most cases,
the Legislature has brought the Florida system in line with most other
states.
BENEFITS
The 1979 legislation raised benefits. Most disabled workers, previ-
ously entitled to only 60% of their average weekly salary, now receive
66 2/3% of their average weekly salary during the period of total disa-
bility.4 4 The pre-1979 cap on benefits at 66 2/3% of the statewide aver-
age weekly wage was increased to 100% of the statewide weekly wages
37. FLA. STAT. § 440.34 (1979).
38. The statute provides in subsection (4) that one who receives such fees without
the proper approval is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree.
39. Id.
40. FLA. STAT. § 440.34 (1)(a)(b)(1979).
41. FLA. STAT. § 440.34(2)(a)(1979).
42. FLA. STAT. § 440.34(2)(b)(1979).
43. FLA. STAT. § 440.12 (2)(c) (1979).
44. FLA. STAT. § 440.15 (2) (1979).
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or $196 per week. 5 Moreover, this maximum benefit will increase in
amounts equal to increases in the statewide weekly wage.46
Superficial treatment of benefits focuses only on their amount and
adequacy. But the new law also addresses the equity of those benefits.
The Joint Legislative Committee found that an unjustifiably large per-
centage of compensation benefit dollars were going to a small group of
workers with relatively minor disabilities. Statistics compiled by the
Florida Division of Labor showed that in 1978, for example, only 2.6%
of all work injuries and 18% of all disabling injuries resulted in perma-
nent-partial impairments. Yet over 46% of benefits paid out that year
went to these workers, many of whom had disabilities of 10% of less.4"
Wage-loss is designed to redistribute benefits so that workers with le-
gitimate need for compensation will receive it. The changes in the bene-
fit structure will result in 80% to 90% of disabled workers receiving
higher benefits. Actuaries, nonetheless, estimate that the use of objec-
tive criteria generated by wage-loss and more equitable distributionof
benefits will result in overall cost saving.
ADMINISTRATION
The success of the new Workers' Compensation Act depends heav-
ily on aggressive, efficient, and effective administration. The Bureau of
Workers' Compensation has been upgraded to division status, and 168
new positions have been authorized reflecting the Legislature's commit-
ment to better administration of the system." The new Act requires the
Division to take forceful action to inform parties of their rights and
obligations, to endeavor to resolve disputes prior to attorney involve-
ment, to compel carriers to handle claims properly, to regulate self-
insurers more aggressively, and to oversee utilization of medical ser-
vices. Without aggressive administration and regulation in the system
will be jeopardized.
Before the 1979 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Law
were enacted, appeals of orders from judges of industrial claims were
45. FLA. STAT. § 440.12 (1)(a) (1979).
46. FLA. STAT. § 440.12 (2)(b) (1979).
47. See FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE
COMMITTEE ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Mar, 1979.
48. FLA. STAT. § 440.02 (8)(b) (1979).
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made directly to the Industrial Relations Commission, subject to re-
view only by petition for writ of certiorari to the Florida Supreme
Court. The new act abolished the Industrial Relations Commission.
Appeals from orders of deputy commissioners (formerly known as
judges of industrial claims) will be made directly to the First District
Court of Appeal in Tallahassee." Appeal to the Supreme Court will be
by petition for writ of certiorari. All appeals that were pending before
the Industrial Relations Commission as of October 1, 1979, were trans-
ferred to the First District Court of Appeal for resolution. 0
REHABILITATION
Although most employees injured in work-related accidents return
to their jobs after minor medical attention with little if any work time
lost, a minority of injured workers suffer injuries that disrupt their
lives. For some, injuries are so severe that prolonged medical treatment
and convalescence fail to restore them completely to their pre-injury
financial, physical or psychological status." Only retraining and educa-
tion, combined with special treatment, offer a reasonable prospect for
return to employment. It is anticipated that the introduction of wage-
loss in the Florida system will result in increased attention by employ-
ers and insurance carriers to rehabilitation programs.
Under the pre-1979 compensation act, the provision of rehabilita-
tion was the responsibility of the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation
of the Department of Labor and Employment Security. The 1979
amendments placed the responsibility on the employer and carrier, at
their expense. The wage-loss system gives the employer and insurance
carrier a direct economic incentive to rehabilitate an injured worker.
Wage-loss benefits payable to the worker will be reduced for every dol-
lar the worker is able to earn after reaching maximum medical im-
provement. Consequently, the employer and insurance carrier will
strive to return the permanently injured worker to the labor force as
quickly as possible at the highest possible wage. Additionally, by plac-
49. FLA. STAT. § 440.25 (4)() (1979).
50. Id.
51. See Walter Y. Oi, An Essay on Workmen's Compensation and Industrial
Safety, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, Volume
1, at 41-106.
52. FLA. STAT. § 440.49 (1979).
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ing the responsibility for rehabilitation with the employer and carrier,
immediate contact with and attention to the injured worker will be
insured. It is clear that prompt rehabilitation is an essential element
in the effective operation of the wage-loss system. The changes in the
compensation act relating to rehabilitation are designed to return the
injured employee to the labor force as soon as possible. As a result, the
injured worker is provided with employment and less wage-loss benefits
are paid out exerting subsequent downward pressure on premium
levels.
CONCLUSION
The limited scope of this article precludes discussion of many
other changes in the 1979 Workers' Compensation Law. Those changes
are less important only in comparison to the significant reforms de-
scribed above. The reforms enacted by the 1979 Florida Legislature are
an amibitious effort to resolve the problems that have plagued the com-
pensation system for many years. The reforms, however, are not a pan-
acea. Even the most optimistic advocates of the reforms recognize that
the revisions have engendered some problems.53
Initially, education will be the most significant problem area. Be-
cause the Compensation Act has been altered in so many ways, there
will be a period of confusion as workers, employers, insurance carriers,
attorneys, regulators, and other involved parties attempt to familiarize
themselves with their new responsibilities and obligations under the
law. However, after involved parties acquire experience with the Act,
this problem should gradually disappear.
Another anticipated area of concern is the shift of appeals of com-
pensation cases from the Industrial Relations Commission to the First
District Court of Appeal. It is feared that the court of appeal will expe-
rience a tremendous increase in its new caseload. Indeed, when the new
Act took effect October 1, 1979, 1,114 cases pending before the Indus-
trial Relations Commission were transferred to the First District Court
of Appeal."4 With the addition of workers' compensation appeals, the
53. See preface in ALPERT AND MURPHY, FLORIDA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW (3d ed. 1979) The special 1979 interim supplement provides a pessimistic assess-
ment of 1979 revisions.
54. The Orlando Sentinel Star, October 16, 1979, at 5-C.
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court's workload could exceed 4,000 new cases each year. This is an
overwhelming burden. When the legislature convenes in 1980, it must
respond to this situation.
Finally, as pointed out above,'the success of the 1979 reforms de-
pends to a significant extent on the strength and efficiency of the Divi-
sion of Workers' Compensation. The new law contemplates and en-
courages nonadversary resolution of conflicts in which the need for
litigation is reduced. But, in order for this to happen, the Division of
Workers' Compensation must exert forceful leadership in the execution
of every aspect of its responsibilities. Further, there must be increased
coordination between the Division and the Department of Insurance in
terms of essential regulatory responsibilities.
The innovative approaches adopted by the Florida Legislature in
response to problems that brought the state's workers' compensation
system to the brink of collapse will focus national attention on Flor-
ida's experience under the new Act during the next few years. The
Florida experience will be particularly important in light of recent pro-
posals for federal intervention in workers' compensation. The Florida
experience can prove that reasonable reform is possible under state au-
thority. But, if the Florida system is to complete its move to greater
equity, greater efficiency, and more complete coverage and benefits for
injured workers, cooperation among employers, workers, insurers, at-
torneys, and regulators will be essential.
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I I
David's Copperfield And FIFRA's Labelling
Misadventures
I. INTRODUCTION
Compounding the American farmer's struggle for existence is a myriad
of federal pesticide regulations. Although formulated with the intent to
benefit both the farmer and the public through the protection of envi-
ronmental quality, such regulations too often place the farmer under a
hodgepodge of federal red tape. The resulting effect of such regulation
often increases rather than decreases environmental pollution and sub-
sequently places the small crop producer and pesticide manufacturer in
a legally precarious position. Nowhere is this more apparent than in
the results of across the board compliance with the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency's (hereinafter referred to as EPA) pesticide registration
policies pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act (hereinafter referred to as FIFRA or the Act)' and specifically sec-
tion 12(a)(2)(G). 2
Strict compliance raises serious questions of diminished minor
crop3 production and resulting environmental and agricultural ecosys-
tem deterioration. Scientifically viewed, fallout, resulting from strict
compliance, subjects these ecosystems to long term or perhaps irrevers-
ible pesticide damage. Ironically, EPA's enforcement pursuant to the
Act may be creating the very pesticide pollution problems it has so
earnestly sought, and is presently seeking, to prevent.
It is the objective of this article to present examples where compli-
ance with EPA pesticide registration and section 12(a)(2)(G) of the Act
produce dysfunctional results and to review the impact of such compli-
1. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
2. Section 12(a)(2)(G) reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person. . . to use any
registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling." Codified at 7 U.S.C. §
136j(a)(2)(G)(1976).
3. As used herein, minor crops are those other than corn, cotton, rice, soybeans
and wheat. H. HUGHES & D. METCALFE, CROP PRODUCTION 16, 23 (1st ed. 1972).
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ance upon minor crop production and environmental quality. In addi-
tion, the author recommends:
(1) Accelerated development and relaxation of FIFRA laws in the
manufacture of environmentally sound pesticides.
(2) Increased implementation of integrated pest management programs
to minimize the adverse effects of pesticide pollution.
(3) Further FIFRA amendment to permit minor crop growers the ben-
efit of interchange of pesticides with substantially similar or identical
chemical composition and usages.
(4) Increased scientific and legal interaction in future formulation of
FIFRA laws.
II. EVOLUTION OF REGULATION AND REGIS-
TRATION PROVISIONS
A. Early Perspectives and Authority of the USDA
Federal regulations and registration provisions find their roots
early in the twentieth century. Pesticides4 were first subject to federal
regulations through the Insecticide Act of 1910.5 Briefly, this act pre-
vented the manufacture, sale or transportation of adulterated or mis-
branded pesticides and established minimal regulation of fungicide and
insecticide sale. Following a surge in the development and usage of pes-
ticides during and after the Second World War, Congress reexamined
and repealed the Act of 1910 and enacted the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act of 1947.6 Under this forerunner of the
present day FIFRA, the United States Department of Agriculture
(hereinafter referred to as USDA) was charged with the promulgation
of registration and labeling regulations of pesticides prior to their in-
troduction into interstate commerce. USDA efforts at registration and
labeling regulation commenced with the signing of that Act.
4. As used herein, pesticide as defined pursuant to § 136(u) of the Act is "any
substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or
mitigating any pest ...... "
5. Pub. L. No. 61-152, § 1-13, 36 Stat. 335 (1910).
6. Pub. L. No. 80-104, § 16, 61 Stat. 163 (1947).
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B. USDA Under Criticism and EPA Entrance
Opposition to the USDA's role in pesticide regulation first oc-
curred in 1959 when the organization came under sharp criticism for
its fire ant eradication program.7 Criticism continued in Rachel Car-
son's highly popular The Silent Spring.' As public awareness of pesti-
cide usage increased, there followed, in 1964, an amendment of
FIFRA9 which gave the Secretary of Agriculture authority to refuse to
register new pesticides and authorized him to "remove from the mar-
ket any product whose safety or effectiveness was doubtful."10 Shortly
thereafter, the USDA again came under criticism, this time from the
General Accounting Office for lax enforcement of the Act." Pressures
exerted by both governmental agencies and the environmental move-
ment of the mid and late sixties over widespread pesticide usage and
lax enforcement served as the catalyst for the establishment of the En-
vironmental Protection Agency in 1970.12 Enforcement of FIFRA was
subsequently transferred to the EPA whose primary function was "pro-
tection and enhancement of environmental quality."' 3 Continued public
concern of pesticide usage resulted in yet further amendment of the Act
in 1972." Through the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of
1972 (hereinafter referred to as FEPCA) Congress emphasized protec-
tion via federally controlled use, manufacture, and distribution of pesti-
cides. 5 Two of FEPCA's provisions central to the theme of this paper
included: 1. Registration of pesticides, and 2. EPA's authority to pre-
vent use of a pesticide inconsistent with its labeling. The regulations
and procedures for implementation of the Act became effective on Au-
gust 4, 1975.16 Additional amendments affecting "use inconsistent with
7. Clement, The Pesticide Problem, 8 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL 11 (1968).
8. R. CARSON, THE SILENT SPRING 162 (1st ed. 1962).
9. Act of May 12, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-305, § 3, 78 Stat. 190.
10. A. Lovins, Pesticide Regulation: Risk Assessment and Burden of Proof, 45
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1066, 1068-69 (1977).
11. E. Megysey, Governmental Authority to Regulate the Use and Application
of Pesticides: State v. Federal, 21 S. DAK. L. REV. 653 (1976).
12. Reorg. Plan of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15, 623 (1970).
13. Lovins, supra note 10, at 1069.
14. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516,
86 Stat. 973.
15. Codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a),(d)(1976).
16. 40 Fed. Reg. 28, 285 (1975).
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the label" were signed into law in 1978 and became known as the Fed-
eral Pesticide Act of 1978.11 The provisions of this latest amendment
and their relation to minor crop production and environmental quality
will be discussed in the text of the paper.
III. THE PROBLEMS OF STRICT COMPLIANCE
WITH FIFRA REGISTRATION AS IT AFFECTS
MINOR PESTICIDE PRODUCTION AND ENVI-
RONMENTAL QUALITY
A. The Registration Process In Review
Development of an effective yet environmentally safe pesticide
which is in compliance with EPA registration is a time-consuming and
costly enterprise. Basic tests required for registration of a newly devel-
oped pesticide include mammalian toxicity, carcenogenicity,18 ter-
atogenicity,"9 mutagenicity,20 fetotoxicity, 21 and adverse effects on wild-
life, particularly endangered species.22 When EPA scientists determine
through nomination23 that, on the basis of a single study, the pesticide
meets the risk criteria, 4 a rebuttable presumption arises.2 Issuance of
17. Pub. L. No. 95-396, § 136, 92 Stat. 819 (1978) (codified in scattered sections
of 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a-136y).
18. The ability of an agent to incite development of a carcinoma or any other
sort of malignancy. MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
TERMS 247 (2d ed. 1978) (hereinafter cited as MCGRAW-HILL).
19. The ability of an agent to cause formation of a congenital anomaly or Ion-
strosity. Id. at 1606.
20. The ability of an agent to raise the frequency of mutation above the sponta-
neous rate. Id. at 1062.
21. Fetotoxicity refers to poisoning of the fetus. Id.
22. 36 Fed. Reg. 22, 496 (1971).
23. Nomination refers to the procedure whereby once the compound is deter-
mined to possess a potential hazard on the basis of a single study which indicates that
it may be a carcinogen, teratogen, mutagen, fetotoxin, or mammalian toxin, it is sub-
mitted for review by either the Office of Special Pesticide Reviews, EPA Registration
Division or Reregistration Task Force, an environmental group, Congressional com-
mittee or other interested parties.
24. If a compound is found to be a mammalian toxin, carcinogen, teratogen,
mutagen, fetotoxin or adversely affects wildlife on the basis of a single study, then its
risk criteria or potential for initiating these effects is said to have been reached.
25. 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1976).
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a rebuttable presumption against registration is not, however, notifica-
tion of the pesticide's cancellation. Once the presumption is raised, a
four stage procedure ensues as follows:
I. Investigation of the risk.
II. Rebuttal of the risk.
III. Risk/benefit analysis.
IV. Review of outside recommendation. 26
During the first phase, the information implicating the pesticide as
a potential hazard is reviewed within the Office of Special Pesticide
Reviews. Here, the scientific methods employed, as well as conclusions
reached during the investigation of the pesticide, are examined by a
project manager.
During the rebuttal stage, registrants, envoronmental groups, and
interested parties may submit data to the Agency which either supports
or refutes the presumption of risk. The presumption is rebutted either
1) by a demonstration that the research utilized to establish the pre-
sumption is not scientifically valid; or, 2) by proof that exposure to the
pesticide will not produce the adverse effects as described in the study.
For example, the manufacturer must demonstrate that exposure which
is most probable to occur is not sufficient to produce the described ef-
fects of test exposure.
In the third phase, public participation is encouraged in submitting
risk/benefit data. Benefit analysis is confined only to those aspects
which are of prime importance among which is the value of the crop. 2
Producers of minor crops are especially concerned with this aspect of
the risk/benefit analysis, for if registration is denied on the basis of a
crop's limited marketability, the grower could be faced with little if
any pesticide protection against disease outbreak.
Several aspects of risk/benefit assessment have been subject to
criticism."s Arguments have been made that greater scientific input and
26. IFAS/FARI Pesticide Workshop, The New Federal Pesticide Law, 1978
(Univ. of Fla., 1979).
27. Here the author wishes to convey the thought that the collective value of the
crop is considered in assessing the pesticide's benefit to agriculture as balanced against
its toxic detriments.
28. J. Wilkes, Pesticide Regulation: Why Not Preventative Legislation, 2 NOVA
L. J. 93, 115 (1978).
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less risk/benefit analysis should be accorded this third phase. It is fur-
ther contended that the balancing test is not rational in that human
safety is placed second to that of crop economics. In addition, some
lawmakers criticize court use of the risk/benefit analysis, contending
that Agency review is far more effective in examining available
alternatives.29
Finally, following a review of the important aspects of the pesti-
cide's use, conclusions are submitted to the USDA for review.30 After
additional study of important uses the data is submitted to the EPA
where it is decided whether the pesticide will be reviewed further.31
B. Research and Developmental Costs
Estimates of expenditures for such registration vary somewhat
with the source. The EPA, in citing the National Agricultural Chemi-
cal Association regarding research and development expenditures
(hereinafter referred to as R & D) notes that these expenses alone have
increased from an estimated 70 million dollars in 1970 to an estimated
195 million dollars in 1976.3 These estimates are believed to be accu-
rate representations of the pesticide industry's expenditures for those
respective years and are thought to be a reliable indication of the R &
D expenditures of the industry.3
Additionally, EPA estimates that such expenditures per company
nearly tripled from 2.1 million dollars in 1970 to 5.9 million in 1976.31
This in itself represents an increase of 68 percent which exceeds other
29. Id.
30. IFAS/FARI Pesticide Workshop, supra note 26. The EPA submits a list of
specific questions for USDA assessment teams. Questions may center on the total
acreage treated with the pesticide in question, the occurrence of pest outbreaks, envi-
ronmental residue data, the effect of the pesticide on crop yield, and conditions for the
pesticide's usage.
31. Id. The EPA decides whether all or some of the pesticide's uses should be
cancelled, registered or reregistered, and whether the pesticide should be restricted.
32. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS BRANCH OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY. ECONOMIC TRENDS AND OUTLOOK OF THE PESTICIDE
INDUSTRY: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE NEED FOR EXCLUSIVE USE AMEND-
MENTS TO FIFRA (1978) (hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC TRENDS.)
33. Id. at 32.
34. Id.
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industrial R & D expenditures in the U.S. in general.35 Some estimate
the cost required from discovery of a pesticide to its registration to be
approximately 20 million dollars.38 Others place the cost average be-
tween 2.1 and 4.0 million dollars. 3 Additionally, time from discovery
to registration alone exceeds six years.3 Paul F. Oreffice, Dow presi-
dent and chief executive officer recently stated that "there is no faster
rising costs of business than expense related to government
regulations. '39
C. The Manufacturer's Liability
In addition to R & D costs, pesticide producers are continually
faced with the impending thought of legal liability and excessive ex-
penditures in the forecast development of new pesticides." In his article
The Law of Pesticides," Rohrmann notes that "A duty of care binds
manufacturers and sellers of pesticides. This duty includes a duty to
warn of product connected dangers, a duty on the part of the manufac-
turer to subject the compound to reasonable tests and a duty on the
part of the seller to subject the product to reasonable inspection. 42 In
addition, the extent of the manufacturers liability often extends to the
unforeseeable.
Hubbard-Hall Chemical Co. v. Silverman43 epitomizes this aspect
of unforeseen liability. Here, the manufacturer's pesticide label ade-
quately warned of the dangers of the insecticide in accordance with
existing laws. Following an application of the pesticide two workers
died. Although the company complied with the labeling laws, the court
noted that the jury could have found the manufacturer liable on the
premise that the pesticide would be used by illiterates; and therefore,
35. Id.
36. INSTITUTE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF FLOR-
IDA, CHEMICALLY SPEAKING (October 1978).
37. Wilkes, supra note 28, at 98.
38. ECONOMIC TRENDS, supra note 32.
39. Letter from Paul F. Oreffice, Dow Today News (Feb. 5, 1979).
40. J. Gross, Pesticide Use and Liability in North Dakota, 47 N. DAK. L. REV.
335 (1971).
41. Rhormann, The Law of Pesticides, 17 J. PUBL. LAW 351 (1968).
42. Id. at 369.
43. 349 F. 2d 402 (1st Cir. 1965).
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the label should have included the skull and crossbones."1 This poses a
question as to the extent the manufacturer of newly developed pesti-
cides must be held accountable. Are the present legal sanctions of
strick liability and negligence appropriate in view of the massive num-
ber of uses and unforeseeable accidents which could occur through such
usage?
Ironically, in Edwards v. California Chemical Co.,15 the skull and
crossbones were adequately displayed, but the appellate court sided
with the plaintiff applicator. Plaintiff, an illiterate, was employed as a
groundskeeper in Boca Raton, Florida. After an application of lead
arsenate, the laborer became ill. Counsel for the manufacturer brought
the court's attention to the skull and crossbones broadly displayed on
the label adjacent td the word poison. In addition, the label contained a
warning for its use and application. While reversing the lower court's
decision, the appellate court noted that a manufacturer of inherently
dangerous products has a duty to inform applicators of the product's
dangerous potentialities."6 The court further stated that the applicator
was within a class which the manufacturer should have foreseen would
be using the product.47
Such decisions place the manufacturer in the precarious position
of uncertainty even when following legal dictates. In essence, the pro-
ducer is placed in a legal vice. In one grip is the compliance with ex-
isting law, while in the other looms the infinite possibilities of liability
through unforeseeable accidents.
In yet another case, a manufacturer was found liable for an acci-
dent incurred days after the use of an arsenic compound." Here, the
plaintiff had taken a sunbath on a grassy site onto which she had previ-
ously discarded rinse water from a tank containing sodium arsenite.
Suffering from "physical malfunction" she brought suit against the
producer California Chemical. In noting the producer's negligence, the
court stated that it was the manufacturer's duty to warn not only of the
dangers related to the purpose for which the pesticide was produced,
44. Id. at 405.
45. 245 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
46. Id. at 263.
47. Id.
48. Boyl v. California Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 669 (D. Oregon 1963).
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but also all other necessarily incidental and attendant uses.49 The court
made mention of the manufacturer's duty to reasonably warn of the
"lingering dangers not known or reasonably to be expected by the ordi-
nary user, but which was foreseeably probable to the manufacture with
his expertise."5 Thus, courts frequently follow the rational of Harper
and James in noting that a manufacturer must warn not only of the
purposes for which the pesticide was intended, but also all other neces-
sary and attendant uses.5" Such logic is ill founded if not impractical in
light of the costs of production and registration of minor pesticides.
Courts and legislators must realize the impact of such litigation and
act accordingly. Litigation costs and penalties far too often direct pes-
ticide development toward the major crop area, since these expenses
can be absorbed far more easily by the widely manufactured and mar-
keted pesticides than by the pesticides directed toward a small and se-
lect market. As a result of such shifting pesticide production and devel-
opment trends fostered by compliance with FIFRA dictates and the
threat of legal liability, minor pesticide shortages appear imminent.
Such shortages present a dilemma for the minor crop producer who is
dependent upon the use of such pesticides for the control of rampant
pest outbreaks.
D. Ramification of Pesticide Production Resulting from Compli-
ance with EPA Standards Pursuant to FIFRA
The cost of litigation, research, recall and registration of a pesti-
cide is by no means designed to depict a struggling pesticide industry.
Quite to the contrary, the industry's outlook is far from bleak. Pesti-
cide manufacturing is "slightly more profitable than chemical manufac-
turing"5" and has collectively enjoyed higher profits over the past five
years than the average industry.53 The EPA notes that "leading pesti-
cide manufacturers are among the largest industrial corporations in the
U.S. and generally have fared well compared with the other corpora-
49. Id. at 674.
50. Id.
51. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1541 (4th ed. 1974).
52. ECONOMIC TRENDS, supra note 32, at 25.
53. Id.
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tions on basis of sales and profits."54 Nevertheless, corporate incentive
towards development of those pesticides with "inherent limitations on
market size,"55 that is minor crop pesticides, is influenced by the ines-
capable realities of skyrocketing R & D costs coupled with litigation
costs and minimal foreseeable profits. Future growth trends in the pes-
ticide market thus appear to be directed toward the development of
existing markets of major crop usages.56 Such developmental trends
generate serious concern among agricultural extension agents57 and
small crop producers. The EPA has gone so far as to indirectly recog-
nize this problem by defining a minor pesticide as one "in which its
market potential is insufficient to economically justify the development
of needed data required for registration by the manufacturer." 9
Shortages of minor pesticides are thus foreseeable. Faced with the
probability of such shortages, the minor crop grower can either lose his
crop through pest damage and consequently lose the "back forty"" or
resort to broad spectrum"1 pesticide usage to accomplish satisfactory
pest control. Implementation of the second alternative far too often
results in an adverse effect upon environmental quality. 2 Nowhere are
environmental pollution problems as complex than in areas where
broad spectrum pesticides are used, 3 many of which have been ap-
proved for usage by the EPA.
54. Id. at 16.
55. Id. at 26.
56. Id. at 38.
57. Those individuals who convey applied agricultural expertise to members of
the agricultural community.
58. IFAS/FARI Workshop, supra note 26.
59. ECONOMIC TRENDS, supra note 32, at 34.
60. A colloquial term which refers to the farmer's collective holdings.
61. A broad spectrum pesticide is one which has no specificity and is designed to
kill a wide range of insects or insect like species and not a specific target organiim. R.
METCALF & W. LUCKMAN, INTRODUCTION TO INSECT PEST MANAGEMENT 17 (Ist ed.
1975).
62. See Sec. III, D-1, Shift to Broad Spectrum Pesticide Usage-The Copper
Dilemma, this text.
63. Id.
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1. SHIFT TO BROAD SPECTRUM PESTICIDE USAGE-THE COPPER
DILEMMA
Prior to the development of large numbers of organic fungicides"4
following World War II, inorganic fungicides" were extensively used in
plant disease control.66 Low soluble or neutral coppers were one such
group of inorganics widely accepted for the prevention of vegetable dis-
eases.67 Today, development of the organics has not completely elimi-
nated the vegetable grower's reliance on low soluble coppers6" and lim-
ited supplies of minor crop pesticides will no doubt increase this
reliance.
Copper fungicides are "characterized" by a copper molecule
securely fixed chemically." The effectiveness of these inorganics rest
with the copper. Copper is non-specific70 in its fungicidal properties and
consequently can protect the host plant from a large number of disease
causing organisms. Copper acts as a protectant in the case of some
fungal diseases in that it prevents the germinating fungal spore72 from
entering the plant tissue. Subsequently, to maximize the fungicide's
protective action, the crops must be consistently sprayed to protect new
growth and replace the fungicide lost to weathering. In the environ-
ment, copper fungicides persist indefinitely or breakdown leaving cop-
per residues.7" Herein lies the problem. Often many such fungicides find
64. That is, those fungicides containing carbon in their molecules. Those contain-
ing no carbon, are termed inorganic compounds. G. WARE, PESTICIDES, AN AUTO-
TUTORIAL APPROACH 13 (1st ed. 1975).
65. Id.
66. E. SHARVELLE, THE NATURE AND USES OF MODERN FUNGICIDES 62 (2d ed.
1961).
67. Id. at 69.
68. Interview with Dr. James Stranberg, Plant Pathologist, Univ. of Fla.,
Zellwood Experiment Station, Zellwood, Fla. (Mar. 8, 1979).
69. E. SHARVELLE, supra note 66, at 59.
70. Id. at 62.
71. Since the introduction of copper sulfate as a fungicide by Prevost in
1807 for treatment of wheat, coppers have acquired the status of highly
important and dependable fungicides for the prevention and control of a
large number of plant diseases. Coppers have assumed an important role
for combatting major diseases of vegetables and aie also important in pro-
tecting ornamental and flowering plants from injury, or destruction by fun-
gus diseases.
Bacterial diseases are also included. E. SHARVELLE, supra note 66, at 62.
72. A spore is defined as the reproductive unit of fungi consisting of one or more
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their way through irrigation systems into adjacent aquatic "ecosys-
tems '"7 or persist in the immediate application area.75
In entering the aquatic ecosystem, the copper residues move rap-
idly from the water to sediments and are taken up by aquatic plants,
algae and numerous marine organisms.7 Toxicity of such heavy metals
in the aquatic environment has been well established. For example,
some coppers are excellent molluscides77 and consequently are used to
control those transmitters of schistosomiosis. 71 Inshore marine environ-
ments near intensified agricultural areas in South Florida have been
found to have excessively high copper concentrations.79 Copper concen-
trations in these areas have approached values which have been shown
in laboratory experiments to reduce the survival of newly hatched am-
phipods 0 and to inhibit photosynthesis in phytoplankton. 1 Field studies
in the area indicate that such heavy metal pollutants lower levels of
foliar disease incidence"2 in mangrove communities thereby affecting
cells; it is analogous to the seed of green plants. G. AGRIOS, PLANT PATHOLOGY 607
(1st ed. 1969).
73. C. EDWARDS, PERSISTENT PESTICIDES IN THE ENVIRONMENT 109 (2d ed.
1973).
74. An ecosystem is defined as a functional system which includes the organisms
of a natural community together with their environment. MCGRAW-HILL, supra note
18, at 507.
75. H. Mattraw, Jr., Occurrence of Chlorinated . Hydrocarbon Insecticides,
Southern Florida-1968-72, 9 PESTICIDES MONITORING JOURNAL 106 (1975).
76. A. McIntosh, Fate of Copper in Ponds, 8 PESTICIDES MONITORING JOURNAL
225 (1975).
77. Molluscides are agents which kill mollusks or members of the divisions of
phyla of the animal kingdom containing snails, slugs, octopuses, squids, mussels, and
oysters, characterized by a shell-secreting organ, the mantle, and a radula, a food-
rasping organ located in the forward area of the mouth. MCGRAW-HILL, supra note
18, at 1043.
78. A disease in which humans are parasitized by any of three species of blood
flukes: Schistosoma mansoni, S. haematobium, and S. japonicum; adult worms inhabit
the blood vessels. Also known as snail fever. MCGRAW-HILL, supra note 18, at 1411.
79. G. Horvath, et. al., Land Development and Heavy Metal Distribution in the
Florida Everglades, 3 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 183 (1972).
80. A small crustacean of the order Amphipoda in which there is no distinct
carapace and the first thoracic somite is coalesced with the head. This group contains
those forms commonly known as sand fleas, sand hoppers, and scuds or side swim-
mers. THE DICTIONARY OF THE BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 13 (1st ed. 1967).
81. Horvath, supra note 79, at 182.
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the role of nutrient cycling and food chain stabilization.3 This in turn
generates ecological and economic problems resulting from decreased
marine populations."
Copper accumulation and persistence in intensified agricultural ar-
eas is astounding. Researchers have been able to plate copper onto
electrodes immersed in water collected from these soils.H5 In essence,
these soils can literally be "mined." Such concentrations of copper can
negatively affect the successful implementation of ecologically oriented
integrated pest management programs by inhibiting or eliminating the
establishment of desirable microflora 8
2. ECOLOGICALLY ORIENTED INTEGRATED PEST MANAGEMENT As
DETRIMENTALLY AFFECTED By COPPER USAGE
Integrated pest management (IPM) serves to alleviate possible
overuse of agricultural pesticides with resulting protection of the envi-
ronment." Originally, the term "integrated control" encompassed in-
secticide utilization in such manner as to permit predators and parasite
of insect pests to function in support with the pesticide., As the con-
cept evolved, it encompassed all techniques to improve increased pro-
duction of food and fiber with a minimal detriment to the environ-
ment. 9 It further evolved to include not only insect pests, but weed
pests as well as plant diseases.9
The EPA sanctions and fully supports the utilization of IPM pro-
82. The number of plant units (leaves) infected, expressed as a percentage of the
total number of units assessed. W. James, Assessment of Plant Diseases and Losses, 12
ANN. REV. PHYTOPATH 27, 48 (1974).
83. M. Olexa, The Distribution, Etiology, and Importance of Red Mangrove
Diseases in Florida 70 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Univ. of Fla., 1976).
84. Id.
85. Interview with Dr. James Stranberg, supra note 68.
86. Microscopic plants. The flora of a microhabitat. MCGRAW-HILL, supra note
18, at 1020.
87. C. Huttaker, et. al., Integrated Pest Management in the U.S.: Progress and
Promise, 14 ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 168 (1976).
88. Integrated Control of Pests and Diseases, SYMPOSIUM OF THE CO-OPERATIVE
PROGRAMME OF AGRO-ALLIED INDUSTRIES WITH F.A.O. AND OTHER U.N. ORGANIZA-
TIONS 53 (1972).
89. J. Strayer, The Pest Management Concept: The Extension Entomologist's
View, PROCEEDINGS TALL TIMBERS CONFERENCE ON ECOLOGICAL ANIMAL CONTROL
By HABITAT MANAGEMENT 21 (1971).
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grams. 1 In its definition and encouragement of IPM the EPA states:
Integrated pest management is a continual process of blending the most
feasible management practices which will maximize yield of food and
fiber in a socially acceptable manner. It is an interdisciplinary approach
to pest problems based upon the knowledge of each pest, its environment
and its natural enemies. The concept includes appropriate combinations
of pesticides, natural enemies, insect pathogens and cultural treatments.
The total effect of these combined methods is synergestic rather than
additive. Not only does it reduce the pesticide pollution problem, but the
control may be more effective.9"
The report continues,
IPM is based on the entire ecosystem, that is the complex of organisms,
the culture of the crop or ahiimal and the environment. It identifies ac-
tion thresholds-the population levels at which the pest species cause
harm, damage or constitute a nuisance-as a basis for determining the
proper timing and method of approaching a pest problem. Thus by using
measures only as needed, IPM may obtain adequate control in a manner
which is less likely to upset part of the ecosystem.93
Some IPM programs are also dependent upon disease control in
the soil environment through the utilization of various beneficial bacte-
rial and fungal microorganisms.94 Growth of such beneficial microorga-
nisms are encouraged in efforts to control soil borne diseases.95 Herein
lies the problem of IPM introduction into areas in which large
amounts of heavy metals have accumulated. Beneficial as well as harm-
ful microorganisms are eliminated from the soil biota due to the non-
specificity of copper fungicides. 9 With disease control through the use
90. SYMPosIUM, supra note 88, at 53.
91. C. Reese, The Role of the Environmental Protection Agency in Integrated
Pest Management. OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY 20 (1977).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. K. Baker, Elucidation and Exploitation of Naturally Occurring Biological
Control: An Introduction, BIOLOGY AND CONTROL OF SOIL-BORNE PLANT PATHO-
GENS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHYTOPATHOLOGICAL SOCIETY 136 (Univ. of
Minn. ed. 1975).
95. Id. at 191.
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of beneficial microorganisms no longer possible, the grower must resort
to pesticides. The agricultural system then becomes totally pesticide de-
pendent, and the grower is forced, through fear of crop loss, to con-
tinue on this "pesticidal treadmill."" Although the growers immediate
goals of food and fiber production are satisfied, the further accumula-
tion of pesticide residues from the broad spectrums undermines the ef-
fectiveness of implementing the IPM concept. Environmental harm
necessarily results from such pesticide accumulation, yet; the harm is
directly brought about by strict compliance, with FIFRA and repre-
sents an unintended result of the original regulations.
This raises the complex question of whether the small crop pro-
ducer faced with a pesticide shortage indirectly created by the Act, who
is unable to implement an effective IPM program, can resort to other
minor crop pesticides which are equally effective and essentially of the
same composition? This is answered with an emphatic no, unless the
pesticide is used consistent with its labeling pursuant to 12(a)(2)(G) of
FIFRA.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF STRICT COMPLIANCE
WITH SECTION 12(a)(2)(G) AS IT AFFECTS MI-
NOR CROP PRODUCTION AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY
A. Interpretation and Litigation
The EPA, pursuant to Section 12(a)(2)(G) of FIFRA prohibits the
use of any registered pesticide in a manner not permitted by the label-
ing.9" This section, however, has undergone considerable change since it
was first signed into law. Initially, because of its safety oriented con-
cepts, 12(a)(2)(G) appeared to be excellent legislation. Application of a
pesticide to a crop for which it had not been cleared could result in
severe health consequences. Yet, as the courts were to find, there were
many instances in which a chemical could be used quite effectively and
safely, but in a manner inconsistent with labeling requirements as dic-
tated by the laws. In short, the legislation prior to the 1978 amend-
96. E. SHARVELLE, supra note 66, at 59.
97. Van Den Bosch, Insecticides and the Law, 22 HASTINGS L. J. 615, 618
(1970).
.... . P • g . ... .
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ments did not encompass many use ramifications which, although un-
lawful pursuant to FIFRA, would be practical and safe.99 Such use
ambiguities were manifested in Kelly v. Butz.1"' Here, Kelley, the At-
torney Geieral of the State of Michigan brought suit against Secretary
of Agriculture, Earl Butz in an effort to prevent the United States For-
est Service from applying a mixture of herbicides to a national forest in
Michigan. During the proceedings, numerous ambiguities surrounding
strict compliance with each of the herbicide's labeling requirements
were brought into testimony. The State of Michigan sought to prevent
spraying of the forest by noting that use of the herbicide mixture was a
use inconsistent with the labeling of each herbicide. Inconsistencies
with this FIFRA requirement were all too obvious. It soon became
apparent to the court that the problems arising from strict compliance
with 12(a)(2)(G) were not adequately reviewed by framers of the sec-
tion. This was affirmed in expert scientific testimony. Recognizing
these problems, Congress once again set out to amend the Act in 1978.
B. Passage of the 1978 Federal Pesticide Act As An Effort To
Ease 12 (a) (2) (G) Restrictions-An Interpretation
The Federal Pesticide Act of 1978,111 also known as the amend-
ments to FIFRA, provided sweeping changes over prior FIFRA legis-
lation. One of the most important changes involved the incorporation
of exceptions to strict compliance with 12(a)(2)(G). These exceptions
provided the farmer with workable and practical laws. These, as noted
in the amendment, include:
(1) Applying a pesticide at any dosage concentration or frequency less
than that specified on the labeling.
(2) Applying a pesticide against any target pest not specified on the
labeling if the application is to the crop, animal or site specified on the
labeling unless the Administrator has required that the labeling specifi-
cally state that the pesticide may be used anly for pests specified on the
labeling after the Administrator has determined that the use of the pesti-
cide against other pests would cause an unreasonable adverse effect on
98. 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(G)(1976).
99. See Sec. IV, B-3, The Lannate-Nudrin 1.8 Controversy and Resulting
Ramifications-The Pink Bollworm, this text.
100. 404 F. Supp. 925 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
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the environment.
(3) Employing any method of application not prohibited by the lable-
ing, or
(4) Mixing a pesticide or pesticides with a fertilizer when such mixture
is not prohibited by the labeling." 2
The second exception is of considerable significance to the minor
crop producer. Prior to the amendment, it was unlawful to spray a pest
unless the target organism and the crop were both specified on the la-
bel:103 Briefly, if a pesticide was cleared for usage on a particular crop
which was infested with Pest A which was not cleared on the label, the
farmer could not, under the penalty of law, spray his crop. The farmer
was thus subjected to a legal straight jacket while the pests devoured
his crops. Today, section two provides the farmer with much needed
relief through a relaxation of the target pest labeling criteria. °4 Now,
target pests not listed on the label of a pesticide known to be effective
in their control may be sprayed with the pesticide. The pesticide, how-
ever, must be cleared for the crop onto which it is to be applied. For
the grower, this relaxation provides an expansion of pest control.
1. SECTION 12(a)(2)(G)'s INCORPORATION OF SECTION 18 AND
AMENDED SECTIONS 5 AND 24-BENEFITS AND SHORTCOMINGS
Congressional wisdom also implemented additional beneficial ex-
emptions through incorporation of section 18 and amended sections 5
and 24 of the 1978 Act into the definitional concept of 12(a)(2)(G).1°5
Viewed collectively, these sections provide an effective practical imple-
mentation of the labeling restrictions. This practicality is of special
benefit for the minor crop producer.
Section 5 provides for waiver of the 12(a)(2)(G) stipulation in the
issuance of experimental use permits."' Pursuant to subsection (d) of
101. Pub. L. No. 95-396, § 136, 92 Stat. 819 (1978) (codified in scattered sections
of 7 U.S.C. 136a-136y).
102. 7 U.S.C. § 136(ee)(Supp. 11 1978).
103. 7 U.S.C. § 136j(I)(2)(G)(1976).
104. 7 U.S.C. § 136(ee)(Supp. I 1978).
105. Section 5 reads:
Any person may apply to the Administrator for an experimental use permit for a
pesticide. The Administrator shall review the application. After completion of
the review, but not later than one hundred and twenty days after receipt of the
123 1FIFRA's Labeling Misadventures4:!980
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section 5, the Administrator may require preliminary studies be con-
ducted prior to field tests of any chemical not included in a previously
registered pesticide.10' Environmentally sound, section 5, also provides
an outlet for public and private agricultural research agencies or educa-
tional institutions to conduct pesticide experiments without strict com-
pliance to 12(a)(2)(G).0 8 The ramifications of such research projects
afford an ongoing element of minor pesticide research in a market
which is persistently shifting towards major crop emphasis.
Emergency conditions also provide an exemption to strict compli-
ance with 12(a)(2)(G).0 9 Under this broadly sweeping section, any fed-
eral or state agency may be exempt from compliance with any provi-
sions of the Act if the Administrator determines that such conditions
exist."' The Administrator must first, however, determine if an emer-
gency condition does indeed exist, and then, only upon request of the
application and all required supporting data, the Administrator shall either issue
the permit or notify the applicant of the Administrator's determination not to
issue the permit and the reasons therefore. The applicant may correct the appli-
cation or request a waiver of the conditions for such permit within thirty days of
receipt of the applicant of such notification. The Administrator may issue an
experimental use permit only if the Administrator determines that the applicant
needs such permit in order to accumulate information necessary to register a
pesticide under Section 3 of this Act. An application for an experimental use
permit may be filed at any time.
Codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136c(a) (Supp. 11 1978).
Section 18 reads:
The Administrator may, at his discretion, exempt any Federal or State
agency from any provision of this act if he determines that the emergency condi-
tions exist which require such exemption.
The Administration, in determining whether or not such emergency condi-
tions exist, shall consult with the Secretary of Agriculture and the Governor of
any state concerned if they request such determination.
Codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136p (Supp. 11 1978).
Section 24 reads:
A state may provide registration for additional uses of federally registered pesti-
cides formulated for distribution and use within that state to meet special local
needs in accord with the purposes of this Act and if registration for such use has
not previously been denied, disapproved, or cancelled by the Administrator.
Such registration shall be deemed registration under Section 3 for all purposes of
this Act, but shall authorize distribution and use only within such state.
Codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136v(c)(l)(Supp. 11 1978).
106. 7 U.S.C. § 136c(a)(Supp. I 1978).
107. 7 U.S.C. § 136(d)(1976).
108. 7 U.S.C. § 136c(g)(1976).
109. 7 U.S.C. § 136p (1976).
1 124 4:1980 1
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Secretary of Agriculture and the governor of the state.' This may not
be feasible in situations which involve small crop producers faced with
specific disease problems for which minor pesticides are not readily
available. The problem manifests itself with the nature of pest out-
breaks of plant disease and the size of the producers operation."2 For
example, it would appear that an independent south Florida grower of
watercress or malanga would have greater difficulty in acquiring a mi-
nor pesticide in an emergency situation than would a grower in a minor
crop co-op." 3 Additionally, the sheer rapidity of some plant disease
epidemics could easily ruin the grower before governmental operation
brought effective relief.14
Section 24 deals explicitly with the "Authority of States.""' Ex-
emptions provided under section 24(c) are received with favor among
agricultural extension agents and farmers alike. Of particular interest
to the minor crop producer is section 24(c)(1)." 6 Under this section, a
"state may provide registration for additional uses of federally regis-
tered pesticides formulated for distribution and use within that State to
meet special local needs . . ."I" At first, 24(c)(1) would appear to be
the panecea for the minor crop producer faced with pesticide shortage.
This section, however, is not without its reservation. In 24(c)(3),"8 em-
phasis is drawn to those registrations which are inconsistent with the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.' Pursuant to 24(c)(3) those
products not in compliance with food and feed tolerances are immedi-
ately subject to disapproval of registration by the Administrator. Since
disapproval can result in prevention of the pesticide's usage, section
24(c)(1) is therefore not a complete solution for the grower faced with
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. The phenomenon referred to herein is the rapidity of the disease or pest
outbreak under optimum conditions for proliferation. For instance, it has been esti-
mated that a single bacterium under optimum growth conditions can produce about
300 billion individuals within a 24 hour period. E. STAKMAN & J. HARRAR, PRINCIPLES
OF PLANT PATHOLOGY 180 (2d ed. 1957).
113. This is to suggest that a smaller grower might not have the co-op's collec-
tive expertise in dealing with the situation or in procuring the needed pesticide.
114. STAKMAN & HARRAR, supra note 112.
115. 7 U.S.C. § 136v (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
116. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(c)(1)(Supp. 11 1978).
117. Id.
118. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(c)(3)(Supp. II 1978).
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2. A MAJOR SHORTCOMING OF THE 1978 AMENDMENT.
The preceding amendments do provide progressive legislation.
However, as noted earlier, the minor crop producer is still prevented
from interchanging two pesticides of the same or similar generic for-
mulation, but marketed under different trade names during field appli-
cations. 12 These chemically similar pesticides cannot be interchanged
unless the crop upon which they are to be applied is specifically listed
on each label.12 ' Interchange of two such pesticides would again result
in violation of 12(a)(2)(G) and subsequent civil or criminal penalties
pursuant to Section 14 of the Act.'22
3. THE LANNATE-NUDRIN 1.8 CONTROVERSY AND RESULTING RAMIFI-
CATIONS.-THE PINK BOLLWORM
Civil penalties for violation of the law can be as high as $5,000.00
for each offense, and at the minimum, the issuance of a warning de-
pending upon the classification of the individual in violation and the
discretion of the Administrator.12 Severe criminal penalties can result
in fines of $25,000.00, imprisonment for not more than one year, or
both.u Private applicators can be subjected to criminal sanctions not
exceeding $1,000.00, imprisonment for not more than 30 days or
both. 12 As such, many pesticide applicators refuse to interchange
chemically similar pesticides and question the practicality of the law on
this point. Nowhere is this impracticality more blatantly obvious than
in the LANNATE L 8 and NUDRIN 1.8121 comparison. As used in
this comparison, active ingredient as defined pursuant to section 2(a)(1)
of the act is "an ingredient which will prevent, destroy, repel or miti-
gate any pest."'' 21
119. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-381 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
120. 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(G)(1976).
121. Id.
122. 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(1976).
123. 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(1976).
124. 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(1)(1976).
125. 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(2)(1976).
126. DUPONT CHEMICAL, LANNATE L INSECTICIDE (product brochure 1977).
127. SHELL CHEMICAL Co., NUDRIN 1.8 INSECTICIDE (product brochure 1977).
1 126
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Lannate L produced by DuPont Chemical contains:
ACTIVE INGREDIENT
Methomyl
S-methyl-N(methylcarbamoyl)oxy)
thioacetimidate
......................................... 24%
INERT INGREDIENTS
.............................................. 
76% 129
while NUDRIN 1.8 manufactured by Shell Chemical contains:
ACTIVE INGREDIENT
Methomyl
S-methyl-N-(methylcarbamoyl)oxy)
thioacetimidate
......................................... 24.1%
INERT INGREDIENTS
............................................. 75.9% 130
Both chemicals are jointly listed in the Farm Chemical Handbook
and are described under the common name methomyl .'3 Also listed are
the exact handling and storage cautions, antidote, applications, toxicity
and formulations.1 12 Entomologists note that if both pesticides were
mixed, it would be difficult if not impossible to distinguish the two.'3
LANNATE L has been cleared by the EPA for usage against beet
army worm on alfalfa and asparagus. lu Nudrin 1.8 does not however
have EPA clearance for application to asparagus but has been cleared
for alfalfa .13 The interchange problem can best be illustrated through
the following hypothetical. Assuume a minor crop producer has a field
of alfalfa and an adjacent field of asparagus, and both are heavily in-
fested with beet army worm. Faced with crop loss, the grower consults
128. 7 U.S.C. § 136(a)(1)(1976).
129. DuPoNT CHEMICAL, supra note 126, at 92.
130. SHELL CHEMICAL, supra note 127.
131. Chemical properties listed for lannate and, nudrin include: white crystaline
solid, with slightly sucturous odor, melting point 78-79"C, solubility in water, 5.8g
100g; in ethanol, 42 g, in methanol, 100g. FARM CHEMICAL HANDBOOK D180 (1979).
132. Id.
133. Interview with Dr. Fred Johnson, Entomologist with the Institute of Food
and Agricultural Sciences, Gainesville, Florida (Mar. 6 & 7, 1979).
134. DuPoNr CHEMICAL, supra note 126, at 92.
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the agricultural extension agent who naturally recommends LAN-
NATE L. Assume also that local supplies of LANNATE L are ex-
hausted, and only NUDRIN 1.8 appears available. Nudrin as with
Lannate is cleared for usage in the control of beet army worm. How-
ever, as noted, it is not cleared for application to asparagus. Its use on
asparagus would be unlawful pursuant to 12(a)(2)(G). In an effort to
save his asparagus crop, the grower can now either unlawfully apply
Nudrin 1.8 or use an alternative insecticide, which might be of greater
expense, environmentally less beneficial, or not readily available.
Of environmental significance are LANNATE L and Nudrin's ab-
sorption potential. Unlike some other broad spectrum substitutes,
LANNATE L and Nudrin are absorbed into the host crop. 36 As such,
beneficial insects are spared and only those target organisms feeding on
the crop are destroyed. Resort to a broad spectrum pesticide cleared by
EPA which is not immediately absorbed will result in destruction of
both the target insect as well as its predators and parasites. 31 What
follows then has been described by one commentator as "a dangerous
biotic vacuum in which either target species can resurge explosively or
the unleased non-target species can erupt abundantly.' ' 3 In addition,
the explosive populations may create a greater pest problem than pre-
viously encountered.' Thus, the grower is forced to use greater and
greater amounts of pesticide to control the situation. Again the insecti-
cidal treadmill emerges.
An excellent example of just such an effect of broad spectrum us-
age can be seen in the pink bollworm outbreak in California's Imperial
Valley.'4 Here, what had been originally planned as an integrated pest
managment concept evolved into a massive pesticide application pro-
gram, and subsequently a grower's nightmare. Over opposition of the
valley's cotton growers, the California Department of Agriculture con-
ducted an extended broad spectrum spray program. Large quantities of
pesticides were applied by aerial applicators. In all, twice the number
of anticipated treatments were applied.'' Ramifications of such pesti-
135. SHELL CHEMICAL, supra note 127.
136. Interview with Dr. Fred Johnson, supra note 133.
137. Id.
138. Van Den Bosch, supra note 97, at 618.
139. Id.
140. H. Dunning, Pests, Poisons, and the Living Law: The Control of Pesticides
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cide usage were astounding. Secondary outbreaks of previously minor
pests skyrocketed. The situation was further complicated by subsequent
outbreaks of beet army worms which caused havoc for the sugar beet
growers. Populations of the pink bollworm reached such proportions
that cotton growers actually contemplated cessation of planting in an
effort to dwindle pest populations."' As illustrated, the negative impact
of massive pesticide usage in fragile environmental ecosystems is too
evident. In addition, environmental effects are frequently noted in the
phenomenon known as biomagnification. This phenomenon first in-
volves entrance of the pesticide into the environment and its ingestion
by lower members of the food chain. As each organism is itself in-
gested, the pesticide's concentration increases progressively up the food
chain. 1 3 Humans form the last link in the chain. The phenomenon is
classically noted in the aquatic system. Pesticides carried through
drainage canals and water runoff from agricultural areas are accumu-
lated in high concentrations in the fatty tissues of marine organisms.
Oysters are extremely efficient in removing and concentrating pesti-
cides from water. Other organisms such as shrimp and plankton have
this same chemical concentrating ability."4
Biomagnification is not the only problem associated with specified
broad spectrum pesticides. Treatment with various broad spectrum pes-
ticides frequently poses a field reentry danger to both humans and ani-
mals.' In addition, accelerated usage of such pesticides can increase
resistance in various strains of pest species. It has been estimated that
at least 268 species of pests have developed resistance to numerous pes-
ticides."4 Prohibition of LANNATE L and Nudrin interchange and the
possible resulting environmental and agricultural ramification thereof
clearly demonstrates the need for further amendment to the Act in
guide with scientific and legalistic practicality. "
in California's Imperial Valley, 2 ECOL. L. QUARTERLY 668 (1972).
141. Id. at 673.
142. Id. at 678.
143. J. DuVall, Pesticides: The Problem and the Solution, 7 TEXAS TECH. L.
REV. 79, 80 (1975).
144. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT-CONTROL OF
AGRICULTURAL-RELATED POLLUTION 70 (1974).
145. Interview with Dr. Fred Johnson, supra note 133.
146. D. WATSON, et. al., PEST MANAGEMENT AND INSECTICIDE RESISTANCE 323
(1st ed. 1977).
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Due to the monoculture14s aspect of the agricultural ecosystem,
minor crop producers generally need some type of chemical control to
minimize their losses. Increasingly, however, minor crop growers as
well as pesticide. manufacturers feel the legal consequence of strict
oompliance with registration and section 12(a)(2)(G). In the end, the
environment suffers from laws originally directed toward its preserva-
tion. What are the solutions? Can these solutions be implemented with-
out further federal regulations pursuant to the Act?
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
Many of the problems faced by the small crop grower and the
environment can be eliminated through the development and use of
"bio-rational pesticides," ' proper use of those existing pesticides and
trends toward effective utilization of biological control and IPM. The
threat of a world overrun with pesticide pollution need not occur if
these programs are properly initiated.
A. Emphasis Towards Governmental Incentives Rather Than
Hindrance In the Production of "Bio-Rational Pesticides"
Perhaps one of the most dynamic areas of pesticide development
lies in the utilization of bio-rational pesticides. Encompassed within
this group are insect hormones, insect attractants and their analogs.
Plant metabolites having insect-repelling, insecticidal, anti-hormonal or
anti-feeding characteristics are also included. 5 An example of such
147. J. Street, Agriculture and the Pollution Problem 1970, UTAH L. REV. 395,
398 (1970).
148. Monoculture in "[t]he agricultural system refers to the replacement of a
diversified natural vegetation, having many component species, with uniform stands
made up of a single species. In such stands each species is generally represented by a
single variety or, for some crops, by a single clone composed of genetically identical
individuals. In some parts of the world the scale of this replacement is enormous and a
contiguous stand of a single variety may cover areas measured in millions of hectares
or thousands of square miles." J. Horsfall and E. Cowling, The Genetic Basis of
Epidemics, 2 PLANT DISEASE: AN ADVANCED TREATISE, How DISEASE DEVELOPS IN
POPULATIONS 263 (1st ed. 1978).
149. As utilized herein, a bio-rational pesticide is one which is primarily directed
toward insect control by selectively destroying specific pests through destruction of spe-
cific physiological functions. However, this group of pesticides does not rule ou those
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pesticides is pyrethrins. 151 Extracted from a variety of perennial chry-
santhemums found in areas of the equatorial world, these pesticides
present an exciting future in pest control. Their advantages are
many.' Pyrethrins are environmentally non-persistent, and degrade
rapidly in the presence of sunlight into innocuous organic compounds.
Pyrethrin residues on crops pose little to no hazard to wildlife, people
or to soils and other parts of the environment. Additionally, they are
extremely low in mammalian toxicity. This in itself is of considerable
legal importance for they provide no serious dangers to applicators or
field hands. Entomologists find this unique group of pesticides to be
fast acting, and possessing no time restriction from last application to
harvest."3 They can also be effectively utilized in post harvest applica-
tion, and have been evaluated as mosquito larvacides.1 4 Other similar
pesticides have been discovered, and the possibility of new discovery
here and abroad seems quite possible."5
Development of insect attractants and biological controls such as
insect bacterial and viral diseases also pose a promising future in pesti-
cide research. 55  Laboratories are presently gaining increased
knowledge of insect endrocrinology, defense and communication.15 Ad-
ditionally, investigation of plant metabolites that have insect-repelling,
insecticidal, anti-hormonal or anti-feeding characteristics "on which in-
sect behavior or development may be based," poses an interesting fu-
ture in insect control.5 Pesticides could literally be developed for spe-
pesticides such as pyrethrins, which, although function in controlling a broad group of
insect pests, if properly used minimize loss of non-target organisms, leave no harmful
residues, and dissipate within a matter of hours following introduction into the environ-
ment. The emphasis of such pesticides is thus one of maximizing pest control while
minimizing environmental damage.
150. J. Meinwold, et. al., Chemical Ecology: Studies from East Africa, 199 Sci-
ENCE 1167 (1978).
151. J. CASIDA, PYRETHRUM FROM THE NATURAL INSECTICIDE 311 (Ist ed.
1973).
152. Id.
153. Agriculturalists are prohibited from applying some pesticides immediately
before harvest for fear that the pesticide's residue, if ingested, could result in mamma-
lian toxicity.
154. J. CASIDA, supra note 151.
155. W. Tucker, Of Mites and Men, HARPERS, Aug. 1978, at 43.
156. Id.
157. Meinwald, et. al., supra note 150, at 1167.
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cific pests on specific minor crops. The possibilities for selected minor
pesticide development are phenomenal. Bio-rational pesticides have
generated such interest that their further investigation was an impor-
tant motive for founding the International Center of Insect Physiology
and Ecology."' This center is pursuing numerous avenues of novel ap-
proaches to insect control. Should such pesticides be developed for
widespread usage, the environmental impact through their utilization
would be minimized. There looms however the omnipresent threat of
research expenditures, registration costs and possible recall by the EPA
pursuant to FIFRA. Bio-rational pesticides, as with other pesticides,
must be subjected to identical registration processes.' Therefore, the
development of these specific pesticides would require expenditures
similar to those of the major pesticides. To alleviate some of the
problems, the EPA is permitted to waive all or part of the tolerance
petition fee if the pesticide producer "can show financial hardship or if
waiving the fee would be in the public interest."'' The EPA itself notes
that in considering the enormous cost of pesticide research and devel-
opment such waiver cannot be "much of an inducement to potential
developments of such products."'8 EPA clearance of the bio-rational
pesticides for agricultural production has been found to be a frustrat-
ing, if not abandoning, experience. In his expos6 on the conflicts be-
tween scientist developing the bio-rationals and the EPA registration
requirement, William Tucker notes specifically the problem encoun-
tered by Zoecon Corporation.6 3 Zoecon was formed by a nucleus of
outstanding scientists whose research goals were directed solely toward
the development of bio-rational pest control.'64 Ironically, Zoecon
found the greatest obstacle in the development of such materials was
the EPA. Tucker further notes that the company has only registered
one insect growth regulator after more than ten years of intensive re-
search. 65 The company spent half of a million dollars and three years
to register "methoprene." The frustrations encountered by the firm are
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
161. OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
FIFRA: IMPACT ON THE INDUSTRY 24 (Mar. 7, 1977).
162. Id.
163. Tucker, supra note 155.
164. That is, maximizing pest control while minimizing environmental damage.
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exemplified by Dr. Djerossi:
The EPA is still trying to change the label to say that it can't be sprayed
where it could get into shrimp beds. It's not that they say it does harm
shrimp, it's just that we haven't been able to generate the data yet to
show it can't. Methoprene has a half-life of one day and breaks down
entirely after seven days, yet they still require 900 pages of data to show
how it might affect non-target organisms. The whole thing was enor-
mously expensive and completely unnecessary. As far as we're con-
cerned, these environmental concerns have become completely
counterproductive.'
If this situation continues, development of environmentally safe pesti-
cides by many private firms may be discouraged altogether.
B. Relaxation of FIFRA Registration In The Production of
"Bio-Rational Pesticides"
Lawmakers must and should consider the distinctness between
bio-rational and nonbio-rational pesticides. Both groups of pesticides
should not be subjected to the same system of registration. Unless this
is done, development of bio-rational pesticides which are usually di-
rected towards a limited market cannot possibly prove economically
feasible. The registration system must b eased and governmental in-
centives must be initiated for production of these environmentally safer
pesticides for use in pest management systems.
Pursuant to section 3(2)(A)6 7 of the Act, the Administrator has,
however, provided some incentives for the registration of minor use
pesticides. Incentives for registration standards are made commensu-
rate with the extent and pattern of use and the level and degree of
potential human exposure as well as that of the environment."' Such
standards are based on the national volume of use, distribution, and
cost of meeting registration requirements." 9 Nevertheless, the cost of
present registration procedures are excessively expensive, and as noted,
but one factor in the consideration of minor pesticide development.
165. Tucker, supra note 155.
166. Id.
167. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(A)(Supp. II 1978).
168. Id.
1331
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The culmination of these costs and concerns have forced industry to
question continued development of minor pesticides. Incentives for mi-
nor use production pursuant to section 3(2)(A) provide not emphasis
towards this uniquely beneficial class of pesticides. Such incentives
should be implemented.
Solutions to the liability problems faced by manufacturers and
users of pesticides perplex lawmakers. 7 Some have suggested the con-
cept of shared liability by arguing that, since governmental agencies
register pesticides, the burden of compensation for damages caused by
these chemicals should be shared by the government. They further con-
tend that the responsibility of such an important aspect of food produc-
ing technology which is of benefit to the public and certified through
public agents should have shared public responsibility.' Many of the
consequences of usage are unknown at the time of certification and to
subject to innovator to the possibility of infinite liability can only harm
the market.' This is especially apparent with small manufacturers who
cannot absorb the cost of lawsuits and litigation, but are engaged in
valuable environmentally oriented research. Liability imposed upon
manufacturers for unforseen pesticide accidents should be reassessed in
a light favorable for the minor crop market. Pollution could be cur-
tailed through subsidies and tax incentives directed toward the develop-
ment of efficient and safe pesticide waste disposal, and the utilization
of these wastes in other marketing areas. These incentives should be
especially directed toward development and marketing of bio-rational
pesticides by small private firms.
Production of environmentally sound pesticides would doubtfully
decrease across the board corporate pesticide profits if such corpora-
tions directed their development in this area. Many corporations could
eventually realize greater profits by recognizing the public's desire to
purchase environmentally safe pesticides. In addition, it is quite doubt-
ful that the need for broad spectrum pesticides would completely dissi-
pate. Such pesticides are essential for effective control in many pest
management systems.
169. Id.
170. Street, supra note 147, at 401.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
It has been the objective of this article to present examples where
strict compliance with EPA dictates pursuant to FIFRA can result in
an impact on minor crop production and environmental quality. This
article is not a condemnation of the EPA.
The accomplishments of the EPA in the curtailment of pesticide
pollution pursuant to FIFRA are indeed impressive. Through legally
constructive action, the agency has removed from the market many
potentially harmful pesticides. Unfortunately, some aspects of strict
compliance with the Act have created questionable ramifications. Real-
izing some of the Act's shortcomings, legislators, through amendment,
have attempted to alleviate the hardships incurred by the small crop
producer and the pollution rendered the environment. Yet, more needs
to be done. The Act must be again amended to permit interchange of
similar pesticides with agricultural extension approval. More immedi-
ate aid must be accorded the small grower in the event of pest out-
breaks, coupled with Act created pesticide shortages. Additionally, the
registration of bio-rational pesticides must be subjected to further legis-
lative scrutiny in an effort to stimulate rather than discourage their
production and development. Further, there must be greater scientific-
legal interaction in future formulation and implementation of FIFRA.
Nowhere is this more acutely expressed than on the field level. No-
where is this more noticeably apparent than in the environment. The
time has arrived when these two different, yet socially oriented disci-
plines can no longer "go it alone."
The pesticidal triangle of minor crop producer, FIFRA, and envi-
ronmental quality portrays a complex matrix of law, liability, science
and dilemma. The immediate solutions proposed for these complex in-
teractions can only be solved with an objective overview of the entire
system, and then only through scientific-legal cooperation.
Michael T. Olexa*
* Ph.D. Plant Pathology, with minors in Entomology and Mycology, Univer-
sity of Florida 1976. The author does not advocate the use, nor does he endorse any
pesticide noted in the text of this paper.
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Impact Fees: National Perspectives to Florida
Practice; A Review of Mandatory Land Dedications
and Impact Fees That Affect Land Developments
Fast growing communities have found an increased need for the expan-
sion of their public facilities.' This has initiated numerous citizen com-
plaints, usually by older and more established residents, which have
been in the form of objections to higher taxes to pay for services and
facilities for new residents.2 As a result, local officials have increas-
ingly attempted to place the burden of bearing the construction cost of
new facilities on developers. Florida, as a high growth area, is a repre-
sentative example.3 The burdens placed on developers usually take
one of three forms: rezoning accompanied by certain conditions,
mandatory dedications of land to governmental units, or an impact fee.
1. The U.S. Bureau of the Census has indicated that Alaska, Arizona, Califor-
nia, Florida, Nevada, and Texas are states with the top projected percentage growth
and top projected growth in raw numbers of people during 1970 to 1976.
Raw Numbers of
Rank State %Growth Rank State Growth
I Alaska 27% 1 Florida 1,630,000
2 Florida 24% 2 California 1,567,000
3 Nevada 24% 3 Texas 1,290,000
4 Arizona 20% 4 Arizona 498,000
2. E.g.-Chirstian Science Monitor, June 12, 1979 at 13, col. 2-3 comments on
Citrus County, Florida growth.
3. Based on figures from the University of Florida, Bureau of Economic and
Business Research, Division of Population Studies and the U.S. Bureau of the Census,
the growth of the following counties is the greatest of Florida's 67 counties. Future
service needs will most likely be the greatest in these counties. (Note: The growth that
has already occurred in many counties has already exceeded some of these numbers.)
County 1970 Census Up% Projected 1980 Census
Broward 620,000 63% 1,016,000
Charlotte 27,000 114% 51,000
Citrus 19,200 142% 48,000
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In Florida, the impact fee has received increased attention by munici-
pal officials who are constantly searching for new, as well as increased,
revenue sources.
4
Naturally, the impact fee concept has aroused public attention.'
The fees seem to range from a low of $1256 to a high of $13,000 per
housing unit. The impact fee is a national phenomenum, and it has
been enacted in cities and counties from Petaluma, California' to West
Palm Beach, Florida?
1 138
Collier
Dade
Gilchrist
Hernando
Lee
Marion
Martin
Manatee
Okeechobee
Osceola
Palm Beach
Pasco
St. Lucie
Sarasota
Seminole
32,100
38,000
1,307,000
3,600
17,000
105,200
69,000
28,000
97,100
11,200
25,300
349,000
76,000
50,800
120,000
83,700
81%
113%
18%
83%
123%
89%
60%
110%
71%
74%
60%
76%
103%
57%
50%
82%
58,000
81,000
1,548,000
6,600
38,000
199,000
114,000
59,000
136,000
19,500
40,400
536,100
155,200
78,000
180,000
153,000
4. The cities of Dunedin, Clearwater, Gulf Breeze, Jacksonville, Maitland, and
Tallahassee and the counties of Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach are examples of those
Florida cities and counties that have attempted to enact impact ordinances.
5. Cf Fort Lauderdale News, October 25, 1978 at 2B, col. 3; Fort Lauderdale
News, June 13, 1979 at 20A, col. 1; San Diego Evening Tribune, August 25, 1978 at
Fl, col. 3; Palm Beach Post, August 17, 1978, at 15A, cole 1; Fort Lauderdale News,
August 31, 1978 at 18A, col. 1; Fort Lauderdale News, November 3, 1978 at 3B,
col. 1, 2.
6. Perlmutter's Inc. v. Ancell, 385 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1963) reh den.
7. Address by Prof. J. Nicholas, Impact Fee Conference, State Association of
County Commissioners (SACC) (June 13, 1979).
8. Petaluma, California, Ordinance 1311 (June 30, 1978).
9. Palm Beach County, Florida, Ordinance 79-7 (June 19, 1979).
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There are many reasons for the fee. Perhaps one of the most dras-
tic examples was illustrated in a recent circuit court decision in Dade
County, Florida in Marca, S.A. v. Dade County." March, S.A., a
Panamanian corporation, requested rezoning of 320 acres from agricul-
tural to permit varying degrees of residential development for an over-
all density of 3.5 units per acre. Marca, S.A. agreed to donate
$135,000 and eleven (11) acres of land for off-site improvements which
had become necessary due to the proposed development's impact on
the community. However, county planning officials estimated that even
if the County carried a 75% cost burden of $7,298,000, the developers
would still be required to donate between $435,000 and $534,000 to
completely cover the cost of off-site improvements." Thus, there was a
shortfall in available funding for necessary facilities such as roads,
schools, and water/sewer system expansion. The developers would be
required to donate at least an additional quarter of a million dollars
over their original donation, but the County would have to obtain $7.3
million of its own funds.'2 Not only did the County lack the funds, but
they did not anticipate any development in the area until at least 1985,
according to the County's land use plan. 3
Dade County turned down the rezoning primarily because the re-
zoning would cause increased burdens on an already over-burdened
school system. 4 The court concluded that these problems pre-existed
the rezoning application and therefore, "inaction on the part of those
who are responsible for providing already needed public service and
facilities should not be an obstacle to natural growth." The decision
was described as one of grave importance to County planners" because
it virtually forces a government to permit growth even if that govern-
ment can ill afford the burden. The local news media called for an
appeal of the decision, and noted that the logic of this case "denies any
possibility of sound land use planning."' 7 Eventually, the Dade County
10. No. 78-410AP (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. May 31, 1979).
11. Dade County, Florida Environmental Impact Committee Report (September
21, 1978) at 2.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 3.
14. See note 10 supra at 2.
15. Id. at 4.
16. Address by Jerry Knight, Asst. General Counsel for Broward County, Flor-
ida, Impact Fee Conference, supra note 7.
17. Miami Herald, June 15, 1979 at 6A, col. 1.
4:1980
Impact Fees 139 1
140
Nova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol4/iss1/1
140 Nova Law Journal 4:1980 1
Commission approved the rezoning in exchange for a withdrawal of
the decision on the developer's part."8 Marca, S.A. is a drastic example
of how the need for immediate additional revenue is caused by in-
creased development. The impact fee is a vehicle for supplying those
additional funds.
Other reasons for the fee have been given. They are:
1) new users should pay for the cost of the improvements their pres-
ence necessitates;
2) existing residents shouldn't pay for the needs of new residents;
3) an immediate need for expanded services for new residents is created
when they arrive, while there is a "time lag" before the increased tax
base they create becomes available to local officials;
4) developers, without such a fee, will almost never pay the full cost for
services they receive while reaping a windfall profit. 9
Conversely, the impact fee is not "lilly white." It has been viewed
as a hidden tax and an attempt by environmentalists to cause a con-
struction slowdown by adding on extra cost, resulting in a decreased
consumer ability to afford housing." This is especially significant in
view of the fact that 75% of the United States population cannot afford
a single family home.21 Certainly additional costs might help depress
the housing market, if, for example, the fees were as high as the
$13,000 fee in Newport Beach, California. However, the argument is
quite a bit weaker when the fee is $300, as in the case of Palm Beach
County, Florida.22 Whatever position individuals take in regard to this
fee, there is no escaping the fact that increased population growth will
require increased expenditures by local government to expand existing
facilities. New and expanded sources will most likely be a vital
necessity.
PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF FLORIDA IMPACT
FEE LAWS
Fees or dedication laws have been introduced in the Florida legis-
18. Miami Herald, July 23, 1979 at 6A, col. 1-2.
19. Report of Palm Beach County Commission Vice-Chairman Dennis Koehler
(June, 1979) at 1-3.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2.
22. Palm Beach County, Florida, Ordinance 79-7, supra note 9.
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lature or as local ordinances. Legislative intentions have centered
around the creation of enabling acts which would afford local govern-
mental units an opportunity to enact their own ordinances. House Bill
837,23 introduced in 1975, was the only bill ever to successfully pass the
scrutiny of one committee in the Legislature.24 Over the years, there
have been four (4) measures introduced,2 but to date the Legislature
has never passed an enabling act.2 House Bill 837 specifically recog-
nized "that growth imposes costs on local government in providing es-
sential services and facilities." ' The purpose of this bill was to allow
jurisdictions to meet their needs and accommodate orderly growth by
passing the cost of new facilities onto the developer and new re-
sidents.21 The bill's author apparently perceived that the bill might as-
sist developers by eliminating the need for the type of development or
construction moratoriums that had been experienced in the past to al-
low local entities to "catch up" in the provision of services.29
Local ordinances have had a greater success in Florida, since the
state supreme court approved a water and sewer impact fee concept in
Contractors and Builders Association of Pinellas County v. City of
23. Fla. H.B.-837, 1975 Sess. (1975) was introduced by former State Representa-
tive Charles Boyd (D-Pembroke Pines).
24. Fla. H.B.-837 passed the House Committee on Community Affairs on April
24, 1975 probably due to the fact that Representative Boyd was chairman of that com-
mittee. The bill subsequently died in the House Committee on Finance & Taxation.
25. Fla. H.B.-3126, 1974 Sess. (1974) by Representative Boyd died in the
House Committee on Community Affairs. Fla. H.B.-743, 1975 Sess. (1975) intro-
duced by Representative Mary Ellen Hawkins (R-Naples) died in the House Commit-
tee on Community Affairs. Fla. S.B.-1263, 1975 Sess. (1975) by Senator K. "Buddy"
MacKay (D-Ocala) died in the Seante Commerce Committee. The bill was similar to
H.B.-837, supra note 24.
26. There are many reasons why the Legislature has never enacted an enabling
act to permit local governments to enact an impact fee. The International City Man-
agement Association notes that state officials are skeptical about local ability to man-
age local financial resources, and states like to preserve revenue sources for their own
use. See INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, MANAGEMENT POLICIES IN
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE (1976) at 12.
27. Fla. H.B.-837, supra note 24, sec. 2.
28. Specifically exempted from the bill's effect were private, municipal, and rural
utility systems.
29. During 1974 Representative Boyd's home county, Broward County, enacted
a temporary moratorium on the issuance of new building permits in an effort to give
the county a chance to "catch up" with development in the provision of new facilities
for new subdivisions. The moratorium also gave planners and environmentalists an
opportunity to effect a new county land use plan.
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Dunedin.3" Prior Florida efforts had all been dismissed by Florida
courts for one reason or another." The most notable effort which was
frustrated by the courts was in the form of a road construction impact
fee enacted by the Broward County Commission in 1973.11 The purpose
of the ordinance was to lessen traffic congestion, provide funds for road
construction, and promote the public health, safety, and general wel-
fare.? Although the County Commission did not elaborate on the pur-
pose of its enactment, as did State Representative Charles Boyd in
House Bill 837, it was apparent that the fee was aimed at new residents
who would generate an increased need for roads.
The latest impact efforts are taking place in Broward and Palm
Beach Counties in the form of road construction fees. 4 The most con-
troversial ordinance is the Palm Beach County ordinance which is cur-
rently being litigated. 5 This ordinance38 states that the County Com-
mission has determined a need for a $2.5 billion road construction
program just to maintain the status quo in road services. This is exclu-
sive of road right-of-way acquisition necessary to widen roads. The
legislative intent notes that it is only a part of a master finance plan,
and that it will generate only a portion of the necessary funds for road
construction. 7 The drafter placed language in the ordinance that spe-
cifically limits its effectiveness to pay the cost of road construction ne-
cessitated by new residents who pay the fee."8 Because of the recent
30. 329 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1976) reh den. This fee was affirmed using a water/
sewer regulatory statute as authority. Fees for other purposes will not be able to rely
on this statute as authority.
31. See Carlann Shores, Inc. v. City of Gulf Breeze, 26 Fla. Supp. 94 (Santa
Rosa Cir. Ct. 1966), Admiral Development Corp. v. City of Maitland, 267 So.2d 960
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972), Venditti-Siravo, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 39 Fla.
Supp. 121 (17th Cir. Ct. 1973), and Broward County v. Janis Development Corp., 311
So.2d 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975). See also note 255, infra..
32. See Broward County v. Janis Development Corp., 311 S.2d 371, supra.
33. Id. at 372 n. 1, sec.2.
34. Palm Beach County, Florida, Ordinance 79-7 (1979), supra note 9.
35. Home Builders & Contractors of Palm Beach County, Inc. v. Palm Beach
County, No. 79-3281 CA(L)01 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct., filed Aug. 15, 1979).
36. Palm Beach County, Florida, Ordinance 79-7, supra note 9.
37. This appears to subtly suggest a tie to economic planning which is called for
in FLA. STAT. § 163.3177 (2), (3) (1977).
38. See Dunedin, 329 So.2d at 321. The Court noted that fees collected from
new residents could only be used to benefit those new residents by the expansion of
public facilities to serve those new residents. Compare the Palm Beach County concept
to the language in Broward County, Florida Ordinance 73-2, § 5 (May 7, 1973) which
was invalidated in and may be observed in Janis, supra at 373.
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growth in Palm Beach County, the purpose of the ordinance contained
language geared to bolster the need for such an ordinance; "All land
development is deemed to create a traffic impact and therefore create
a demand for increased road capacity."39 In addition, the intent of the
ordinance indicates a strong reliance on the county's police power, as
legislative authority to enact the "fair share contribution"4 or impact
fee ordinance. The measure provides that increasing road capacity will
make transportation safer and more efficient, thus promoting the pub-
lic health, safety, and welfare.
This appears to mirror the concepts behind House Bill 837, since
both pieces of legislation indicate that the public health, safety, and
welfare will be promoted by regulating land development in order to
facilitate orderly growth. Because of this reliance on the police power,
it appears to the author that the fee could be a type of regulatory de-
vice used to hold back growth and development rather than provide for
well planned growth. Additionally, review of various pieces of legisla-
tion introduced in the Florida Legislature and a sampling of local ordi-
nanes indicate there are three publicly stated purposes behind impact
exactions.4 Primarily, they attempt to hold down local taxes by mak-
ing new residents pay for expanded facilities that they cause to be
needed.42 Secondarily, they are land use control mechanisms, in that
they assure at least a portion of the capital expansion funds needed for
new facilities will be available to local government.43 Thirdly, due to
such language as appears in House Bill 837, there is evidence that im-
pact ordinances are geared to manage the economy in such a way as
to avoid construction moratoriums which cause severe unemployment
in the construction industry while local government attempts to "catch
up" with the growth that has already occurred."
REZONING: CONTRACTS AND EXACTIONS
While various jurisdictions have struggled with mandatory dedica-
39. Palm Beach County, Florida, Ordinance 79-7, supra note 9.
40. The Palm Beach County ordinance is actually referred to as a "fair share
contribution fee," but it is an impact fee. See Palm Beach County, Fla., Ordinance
79-7, § I.A., supra note 9.
41. See note 25 and Palm Beach County, Florida, Ordinance 79-7, supra, note 9.
42. Fla. H.B.-837, § 2, 1975 Sess. (1975).
43. Palm Beach County, Florida, Ordinance 79-7, § 2 (g), supra, note 9.
44. Fla. H.B.-837, § 2, 1975 Sess. (1975).
J m
144
Nova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol4/iss1/1
144 Nova Law Journal 4:1980 1
tions and impact fees, others have attempted to exact certain guaran-
tees and dedications from developers as a prerequisite to adopting a
rezoning ordinance which the proposed construction project requires.
There are problems with this approach because it involves "dicker-
ing" 45 between planning and zoning officials and developers. "Dicker-
ing" has been judicially restrained because it is a key element in con-
tract zoning, which involves rezoning of land by zoning officials in
exchange for the filing of restrictive covenants by developers and land
owners that affect the subject property." Accordingly, an attack on the
validity of the rezoning measure may be made in the courts on the
basis that the measure was a form of contract zoning. This means that
any agreement reached between the zoning officials and the developer
would be totally invalid. Approximately twelve state tribunals, includ-
ing Florida, have ruled against this practice. 7 In Hartnett v. Austin48
the Burdines Department Store chain attempted to purchase Austin's
land for a new department store. A Dade County, Florida municipality
refused to rezone the land, unless the store would agree to a number
of conditions. 9 Florida's highest court said this constituted contract
zoning.
A municipality has no authority to enter into a private contract with a
property owner for the amendment of a zoning ordinance subject to vari-
ous terms, covenants, and restrictions in a collateral deed or agreement
to be executed between the city and the property owner."
While expanding on the Hartnett opinion, a Florida appellate court
indicated that a governmental entity which does contract with a land-
45. "Dickering" is a term used in the vernacular. It means to carry on lively
negotiations leading to a deal, agreement, or contract.
46. 2 ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 9.21 (2nd ed. 1976).
47. See State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, (46 Wis. 2d 22, 174 N.W. 2d 533,
537 (1970), Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270, 277 (1963),
and City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 196 Tenn. 1, 263 S.W.2d 528 (1953).
48. 93 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
49. The conditions included: 1) building a wall to seaprate the proposed center
from a nearby residential area, 2) protection of the residential area from any glare or
other disturbances, 3) providing a 40 foot set back, 4) landscaping the setback, and
5) paying for police protection.
50. Hartnett, 93 So.2d at 89.
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owner will find its contract to be invalid as an ultra vires act.51 Thus,
the landowner's restrictions will be void, but the rezoned land will not
be returned to its original zoning. The courts allow this since the rezon-
ing never could have occurred in the first place, if it weren't done for
the public health, safety, and welfare of the community."2
In essence, the general national rule is that "a municipality cannot
contract away the exercise of its police powers . . . .In the exercise of
this governmental function a city cannot legislate by contract."53 Simi-
larly, other arguments have been leveled against contract zoning.54 For
example, Scrutton v. County of Sacramento" attacked this form of
zoning as spot zoning. Spot zoning has been defined as "the process of
singling out a small parcel of land for a use classification totally differ-
ent from that of the surrounding area, for the benefit of the owner of
such property and to the detriment of other owners. 'Spot zoning' is
the very antithesis of planned zoning."5 The apparent view in Scrutton
is that, if the neighborhood changed, then the isolated rezoned use is
spot zoning. The California Supreme Court stated that, "that kind of
zoning is valid when long term changes in the neighborhood have cre-
ated conditions compatible with the proposed new use." 57 However,
Goffinett v. County of Christian,8 an Illinois appellate court opinion,
notes that there is a correlation between the size of the rezoned tract
and spot zoning.
In Goffinett, a 236-acre tract was rezoned and found not to be a
case of spot zoning, even though the rezoning seemed peculiarly out of
place for the area (a gas works facility located in the midst of an Illi-
nois agricultural area). The court cited an example of a rezoning in an
unnamed case in which 14.6 acres in Illinois probably represented the
largest tract in the nation judicially declared to be a case of spot zon-
51. See New Products Corp. v. City of North Miami, 241 So.2d 451 (Fla. 3rd
Dist. Ct. App. 1970) reh den.
52. Id.
53. 93 So.2d at 89.
54. See Kennedy, Contract and Conditional Zoning: A Toolfor Zoning Flexibil-
ity, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 825 (1972).
55. 275 Cal. App.2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).
56. 2 ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 5.08 (2d ed. 1976). In Florida,
see: Bd. of County Commissioners v. Lowas, 348 So.2d 13 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App.
1977) and Miles v. Dade County, 260 So.2d 553 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
57. Scrutton, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
58. 30 Il1. App.3d 1089, 333 N.E.2d 731, 737 (1975).
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ing.59 Therefore, spot zoning is usually viewed as a small tract rezoned
in a highly unusual way in comparison to the rest of the neighborhood
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the appellate deci-
sion,60 and reaffirmed an old standard by stating:
that although it did not encourage inconsistent zoning of small parcels of
land, it would not declare every reclassification of a single tract void ipso
facto. The test was to determine whether the change was in the property
in that locality, and the size of the parcel would only be one factor to
consider."
The Hartnett decision points out another problem with contract
zoning in that a municipal ordinance must be "clear, definite, and cer-
tain in terms;" otherwise it is invalid. In Hartnett, Justice Thornal ex-
pressed the view that "the provisions of a municipal ordinance which
conditions its effectiveness upon the necessity for the subsequent execu-
tion of a contract with private parties . . . cannot be held to provide
the degree of clarity and certainty required of municipal legislation."6 2
However, there appears to be a different method to accomplish the
same result as contract zoning without actually violating the rule
against contract zoning. It has been suggested that the actual rezoning
ordinance should not incorporate any restrictive agreements or condi-
tional promises to rezone. Rather, the landowner prior to the rezoning
should record the necessary restrictive covenants and create a domi-
nant estate in the municipality.3
Another approach that governments have utilized to skirt the rule
against contract zoning is the vehicle of conditional zoning. One au-
thority defines conditional zoning as an amendment to a zoning ordi-
nance which "permits a use of particular property in a zoning district
subject to restrictions other than those applicable to all land similarly
classed. ... "" The notable difference between this approach and con-
tract zoning is that there is no agreement by the governmental body to
rezone the subject property. 5 The express bilateral agreement between
59. See 333 N.E.2d at 737.
60. 65 Ill. 2d 40, 2 I11. Dec. 275, 357 N.E.2d 442 (1976).
61. Id. at 449.
62. 93 So.2d at 88.
63. Note, Contract Zoning, 24 ME. L. REv. 263, 272-73 (1972).
64. 2 ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 9.20 (2nd ed. 1976).
65. Land Use-Goffinett v. County of Christian: New Flexibility in Illinois Zon-
ing Law, 8 Lov. L. J. 642 (1977).
• ° ^ ^ .
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the governing body and a landowner is not only the cornerstone of con-
tract zoning, but it is the key point that differentiates contract zoning
from conditional zoning. 6 The idea of conditional zoning is similar to
a method of circumventing the no contract rule approved in Zupancic
v. Schimenz.67 Here, the Wisconsin Supreme Court approved a rezon-
ing in which the land developers and surrounding property owners ne-
gotiated and entered into an agreement limiting the use of the devel-
oper's land and vesting enforcement rights in the City of Milwaukee.
The court viewed the city as merely a third party beneficiary of the
agreement. The significant point in this case is that the court echoed
the Hartnett restrictions against contract zoning while approving the
above plan.6"
Since the use of any of the methods discussed above results in the
local governmental entity obtaining the type of restrictions it wants,
this author believes that any of these arrangements act as an induce-
ment to a local governing body to rezone the subject property. One
commentator notes that such an "agreement has blurred the legislative
judgment of the municipality or that such a process is likely to lead to
official misconduct."69 However, the same commentator goes on to
point out that this proposition is unfounded, because the rezoning ordi-
nance is passed with the same police power and is subject to the same
reasonableness test as other zoning ordinances." Notably, it appears
that the key distinguishing point in Florida under the Hartnett decision
between illegal contract zoning and a legal rezoning arrangement may
be reached if the developer files his restrictive covenants prior to the
official rezoning action.7 1
The concept of filing restrictive covenants to induce local officials
to rezone a-piece of property will probably survive an attack based on
illegality due to contract zoning. This viewpoint is arguably based on
Broward County v. Griffey. 2 The Griffeys owned a large tract of land
west of Fort Lauderdale, Florida on which they wished to construct a
high density 1700 unit apartment complex. To construct the complex
the property needed to be rezoned. The County Commission deferred
66. Id. at 643.
67. 46 Wis. 2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970).
68. Id. at 537.
69. Kennedy, supra note 54 at 834.
70. Id.
71. 93 So.2d at 88-89.
72. 366 So.2d 869 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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action on the rezoning proposal pending a number of stipulations
which included dedication of land for right-of-way for road construc-
tion. The Griffeys dedicated the land, and the Commission approved
the rezoning shortly thereafter. However, due to contractor problems
the project was never constructed. Years later the Commission decided
to "down-zone" 7 3 the land pursuant to a new land use plan. The Grif-
feys attached this by arguing that the whole rezoning was illegal as
contract zoning. They sought the return of their previously dedicated
right-of-way. The trial court agreed, but the appellate court reversed
by stating that the dedication was merely an inducement to receive
favorable county action on the rezoning proposal." The court appar-
ently ignored any negotiationg between the Griffeys and the County
Commission that culminated in an oral agreement to rezone the land in
consideration of a right-of-way dedication. The court even cited Hart-
nett as authority, noting that no written contracts were negotiated;
therefore, the County did not bargain away its police power.75 Thus, it
appears that it is possible for developers to negotiate the rezoning of
land in exchange for dedications of land78 and presumably for aid in
financing the construction of public facilities.
AUTHORITY FOR IMPACT FEE ORDINANCES
The pitfalls of conditional and contract zoning can be overcome
by a newer approach involving mandatory land dedications or impact
fees. An advantage of the impact fee ordinance is that developers will
pay for the growth that they generate, and in planning for their new
developments, developers will be able to compute the fees or dedica-
tions that local government will require in exchange for approval to
develop. While it is readily apparent that such an ordinance will allow
73. "Downzoning" as used in this text means to lower the overall permitted use
and/or density of a particular piece of land.
74. 366 So.2d at 870.
75. Id. at 871.
76. While Florida has one of the strongest policies in the nation against contract
zoning, there appears to be one curious deviation from the rule. It is suggested that this
deviation would not be a reliable citation to support a cause in a Florida courtroom. In
Herr v. City of St. Petersburg, 114 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1959) reh den, the Florida Su-
preme Court approved the City's contract to rezone without even mentioning Hartnett.
The City contracted to exchange railroad land (tracks) running though the downtown
area that the City obtained by eminent domain. Part of the bargain called for new land
to be rezoned for the railroad in exchange for the downtown land.
Y
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local government to expand its basic resources without an increase in
ad valorem taxes or without bonding,77 developers have been successful
in avoiding enactment of these ordinances in many instances. 78 This
trend appears to be changing based on various theories, such as the
Voluntary Dedication and Economic Benefit Theories and various
Relationship Tests, that have -been adopted by various jurisdictions
governments in Florida for two reasons. Merely obtaining the land as
A. Voluntary Dedication
Closely related to the covenanting and conditional zoning con-
cept 0 is the idea of exchanging plat approvals for the dedication of
land by a developer for school, park or road facilities. Historically, this
concept has been upheld by virtue of the leading case: Billings Proper-
ties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County."' The Montana Supreme Court ruled
that this concept could be based on the zoning police power, 2 assuming
that the dedication was judicially viewed as voluntary on the part of the
developer. 3 However, this approach would not serve the needs of local
governments in Florida for two reasons. Merely obtaining the land as
a dedication for roads, schools or parks would never meet the costs
necessary for park or school development, much less road construction.
Therefore, the dedication would have to be coupled with some other
type of financing program. Also, because of the manner in which Flor-
ida has been developing, large tracts of undeveloped land have already
been platted. Thus, dedication on a voluntary basis would be virtually
nonexistent in many areas. This situation will surely continue, because
77. An example of the need for bonding is attributable to the lack of an impact
ordinance in Broward County, Florida. In 1975, a 1973 road impact fee ordinance
was invalidated in Janis, supra, note 31. The County's political structure was unable to
raise its ad valorem tax rate to raise capital needed for new facilities due to fear of
political fallout, since the county had a conservative political structure. On September
12, 1978, county voters were compelled to approve a $125,000,000 road bond and
$73,000,000 parks and recreation bond package, as part of a $256,000,000 bond propo-
sal. This was due to the severe lack of recreational and road facilities.
78. Almost all suits challenging impact ordinances in Florida have been brought
by developers.
79. Florida may be one of those states. See text accompanying notes 107-1 12,
258, and 259.
80. 394 P.2d at 186.
81. 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964).
82. Id. at 186.
*83. Id.
4:1980
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it is part of the cyclical nature of land speculation that has become
firmly implanted in Florida.4
B. Economic Benefit Theory
This theory is based on the concept that development of one's land
is a privilege and not a right.85 While this argument may be faulty,"6 the
land taken under a mandatory dedication or impact exaction will be
utilized for the public health, safety, and welfare. The public facilities
that will be available will enhance the value of the develoer's project.
Cases have supported this concept, most notably Jordan v. Me-
nomonee Falls.87 The Wisconsin Supreme Court approved an impact
exaction in which the Village of Menomonee Falls sought a land dedi-
cation from a developer before granting approval for development. The
Court noted that the dedication would be used for public facilities and
thus enhance the development making it more valuable." Also, the
dedication was found to assist in satisfying the demands created by the
developer's activities, namely increasing the need for public facilities
cause by the related population growth.
Another representative case is Associated Home Builders of
Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek.8" This case is particu-
larly notable, because the developer attached a local ordinance enacted
by Walnut Creek, California pursuant to a state impact fee enabling
act. 0 Associated Home Builders"1 involved an attempt by local authori-
ties to force a land dedication for park purposes, which resulted in an
action for inverse condemnation. Both the police power and the eco-
nomic benefit theory were cited by the California Supreme Court in its
84. See Maloney, Frank E.; Fernandez, Dan; Parrish, Anthony R., Jr.;
Reinders, James M., Public Beach Access: A Guaranteed Place to Spread Your Towel,
29 U. FLA. L. REV. 853, 872 (1977).
85. See Landau, Eliot A., Urban Concentration and Land Exactions for Recre-
ational Use: Some Constitutional Problems in Mandatory Dedication Ordinances in
Iowa, 22 DRAKE L. REv. 71, 81 (1972).
86. Id. at 81-82.
87. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 42 442 (1965) appeal dismissed 385 U.S. 4, 17
L.Ed.2d 3, 87 S.Ct. 36 (1969).
88. 137 N.W. 2d at 448.
89. 4 Cal.3d 633, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606 (1971) appeal dismissed 404
U.S. 878, 30 L.Ed.2d 159, 92 S.Ct. 202 (1971).
90. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 66477 and 66479 (West, 1975).
91. 484 P.2d 606.
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opinion approving Walnut Creek's action. While it appears that there
is authority supporting the use of this theory to substantiate impact
exaction ordinances, no Florida Court has approved the economic ben-
efit theory to date. However, the late Judge Nathan, in an appellate
opinion, did make a remark that at least appears to be receptive to the
theory when he stated, ". .. [a]nd in a very real sense, the subdivider
profits from the conditions imposed on him, since the provision of
safety and health requirements benefits potential buyers, thus rendering
the lost of the subdivision more attractive."
C. The Relationship Tests
Three tests have been developed by various judicial authorities to
review and substantiate impact fees and/or mandatory land dedica-
tions. The foundation of all three concepts lies in the police power. The
particular statutory authority delegating the police power in Florida
will be examined below, but first, it is essential to understand the three
relationship tests that determine to what extent the police power may
be applied as an exaction. The essence of the three tests rests on the
view that the developer will be compelled to provide public systems as
a cost of developing. This will occur only when the developer's project
causes a need for new systems. Thus, the tests relate to the amount a
governmental unit may exact from a developer for new facilities to the
amount of need created for those new facilities from the developer's
activities. The three tests range from pro-municipality to pro-developer
in their application.
1. THE REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TEST
The reasonable relationship test is the oldest of the three tests. In
Ayres v. City Council of the City of Los Angeles," a developer was
ordered to dedicate an eighty foot strip of land for an extension of a
street in exchange for approval of the development. The developer at-
tacked the mandatory dedication as an unreasonable taking without
compensation. However, in 1949, the California Supreme Court ruled
92. Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So.2d 863, 867 (Fla. 3rd
Dist. Ct. App. 1976) cert den 348 So.2d 955 (Fla. 1977).
93. 34 Cal.2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
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that the eighty foot dedication was reasonable even though the street to
be extended only had a width of sixty feet.94 The Court noted that a
municipality may substantiate its taking when it shows that the taking
is "reasonably related" to the needs of the community. 5 This test
allows a local governmental entity such flexibility in its exaction that a
court would have to uphold the taking "short of gross abuse," ac-
cording to a Florida court. As a result this approach is unacceptable
in Florida, since this concept places the burden of proof totally upon
the developer to prove that the exaction is reasonable. The Wald
decision notes that:
while such wide latitude is routinely accorded in other areas of police
power regulation, required dedication as a condition for approval for
subdivision plats stands in derogation of constitutionally protected
property rights. Thus, it is imperative that some sort of standard be
imposed which will not allow virtually unbridled interference with pri-
vate property.97
2. THE SPECIFICALLY AND UNIQUELY ATTRIBUTABLE TEST
The second test which developed is essentially an intension of the
reasonably related test. The test is rooted in a pair of Illinois deci-
sions. In the first decision, Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove,9" two
plaintiffs, Herman Rosen and Firestone Realty, wanted to subdivide a
tract of land into fifty-two lots. The Village Planning Commission ap-
proved the plat only after the company agreed to pay $325 per lot into
an escrow account for future construction of schools in the Village.
The Court cited the Ayres" test, but instead of using the term "reason-
ably related", the Court utilized a new terminology to describe the
proper application of the police power. That term was "specifically and
94. 207 P.2d at 6.
95. For a current example of the reasonably related test in action see Frisco
Land & Mining Co. v. State, 74 Cal. App.3d 736, 141 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1977). In this
case the court indicated that a dedication could be forced by a municipality, even if
that dedication was not related to a need created by the subdivision. The dedication
need only be designed to benefit the public. The case involved dedications of easements
to beach property for the use of the public.
96. Wald, 338 So.2d at 865.
97. Id. at 866.
98. 19 Ill.2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960).
99. 207 P.2d 1.
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uniquely attributable." ' The enactment of the fee ordinance in Down-
er's Grove was found to be broader than the authority delegated by the
Illinois Legislature. The Illinois Supreme Court focused on this con-
cept a year later in Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of
Mount Prospect.'0 ' In this case, the plaintiff sought to develop a tract
of land with two-hundred fifty residential units. The Village of Mount
Prospect used a platting ordinance to compel dedication of 6.7 acres of
land for an elementary school. The Court referred to the Rosen deci-
sion and invalidated the application of the ordinance by indicating that
the developer should not be forced to pay the fee, since the construc-
tion would not generate the need for a new elementary school. The
need for the new school would apparently be generated only to a
smaller degree by the developer. Thus, community needs were not
"specifically and uniquely attributable" to the developer's activities.0 2
Under this test, it appears that a court will validate an exaction only if
the increased need is solely attributable to the activities of the devel-
oper. The test is considered to be so stringent that the local govern-
mental entity has the entire burden of proving that the exaction is
valid. Therefore, this test has an effect that is opposite to that of the
reasonably related test.'
Florida court decisions have been somewhat inconsistent so far,
but some of the earlier decisions approve the specifically and uniquely
attributable test. In Carlann Shores, Inc. v. City of Gulf Breeze, °4 a
Florida Circuit Court first took note of this test and approved it. The
City of Gulf Breeze enacted an ordinance which required land subdi-
viders to dedicate 5% of their land or pay a fee equal to 5% of the
valuation of the land in their project to the City for park purposes.
Since the plaintiff refused to abide by the ordinance, the City voted to
reject the plan for development. The Court found for the plaintiff and
approved the specifically and uniquely attributable test by citing Pio-
neer Trust. °5 In Admiral Development Corp. v. City of Maitland' a
100. 167 N.E.2d at 233-34.
101. 22 Ill.2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961) reh. den.
102. Id.
103. 338 So.2d 863.
104. 26 Fla. Supp. 94 (Santa Rosa Cir. Ct. 1966).
105. Id. at 96.
106. 267 So.2d 860 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972) reh den.
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dedication ordinance that was virtually identical to the Gulf Breeze or-
dinance came into question. Although the Fourth District Court of
Appeals referred to the Carlann Shores case, it did not approve or even
mention the specifically and uniquely attributable test. It did, however,
invalidate the Maitland ordinance. 0 7
The Third District Court of Appeal has indicated in Wald"0 8 that
this test is not appropriate in Florida, stating that the
... approach advocated by Pioneer Trust disallows a formidable
method of subdivision control, which is an integral part of comprehen-
sive planning. And while it is important to guard against unbridled mu-
nicipal discretion, it is equally important that those who propose to sub-
divide may be subjected to rational dedication requirements. 9
Nonetheless, the specifically and uniquely attributable test has survived
and remains the rule in Illinois."' The test is viewed as being so strict
that one commentator has noted that "if anything is acceptable in Illi-
nois, this usually means that it is not likely to run into great trouble
elsewhere." '
3. THE RATIONAL NExus TEST
The case of Wald Corporation v. Metropolitan Dade County' 2 in-
107. The court found that the city could only rely on its charter, as an enabling
statute for authority to secure exactions.
108. 338 So.2d 863.
109. Id. at 867.
110. In Board of Education of School District No. 68, DuPage County v. Surety
Developers, Inc., 63 I1l.2d 193, 347 N.E.2d 149 (1975) reh den (1976) the defendant
developer constructed a development which contained 1400 new resident elementary
school children. DuPage County was able to predict the growth in the number of ele-
mentary school children based on the proposal for the subdivision. The county impact
fee required a $50,000 construction contribution, land dedication, and an additional fee
of $200 per unit home for development of a new school. The court approved this fee by
pointing out that 98% of the students in the new school would be from the new devel-
opment. The "specifically and uniquely attributable" test had been satisfied. See also
the latest approval in Illinois of this test in Krughoff v. City of Napierville, 68 Ill.2d
352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977).
111. 3 ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 156.08a (Supp. 1977).
112. 338 So.2d 863.
o
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dicates that Florida is probably a rational nexus state."' The author
feels that Wald is one of the two most significant cases n the nation
that deals with this test. Here, a developer sought approval of a plat
from the Dade County Commission. The subdivision was in the
"glades" area of West Dade County. Apparently, the land was low-
lying and subject to flooding unless proper drainage facilities were
available. The County agreed to approve the plat only if the developer
would dedicate land for a drainage canal and an easement for canal
maintenance purposes. The developer refused and claimed that the
forced dedication was an unconstitutional taking. Noting the absence
of any appellate cases on point in Florida, the Court, in an outstand-
ing opinion, discussed all three relationship tests."' However, the tribu-
nal used an analogy between the use of the police power in impact
exactions and in regulating outdoor advertising by citing the Florida
Supreme Court decision in Eskind v. City of Vero Beach.", Eskind
stands for the proposition that private business could not be subjected
to police power restrictions where there was no reasonably identifiable
rational relationship between the demand of public welfare and the re-
straint upon private business.""' It is this decision's reference to a "ra-
tional relationship" that the Wald Corporation Court analogized to the
rational nexus test. The Court binds the "rational relationship" con-
cept to subdivision control through a discussion by a leading commen-
tator.
The subdivider is a manufacturer, processer[sic], and marketer of a
product; land is but one of his raw materials. In subdivision control dis-
putes, the developer is not defending hearth and home against the king's
intrusion, but simply attempting to maximize his profits from the sale
of a finished product. As applied to him, subdivision control exactions
are actually business regulations." 7
The Court attempted to indicate that there must be an identifiable rela-
tionship between the demands of the public welfare and the restraint
113. Id. at 867-68.
114. Id. at 867.
115. 159 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1963).
116. Id. at 212.
117. Johnston, John J., Jr., Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions:
The Quest for a Rationale, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 871, 923 (1967).
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placed upon the developer who merely represents private business. In a
very real sense, this is the moderate approach to the application of the
police power. It is nestled somewhere between the extremes of the rea-
sonably related test and the specifically and uniquely attributable test.
"It allows the local authorities to implement future-oriented compre-
hensive planning without according undue dererence to legislative judg-
ments. It requires a balancing of the prospective needs of the commu-
nity and the property rights of the developer."18
While Wald derives its importance from the fact that it compares
the three relationship tests, the other case of national significance is the
case of Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield."9 In this
case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court adopted the rational nexus
approach and carefully dissected the test. Land/Vest Properties, Inc.
owned two tracts of land in Plainfield, New Hampshire. The company
proposed to subdivide the land into lots ranging in size from fifteen to
ninety-six acres. The town planning board agreed to approve the pro-
posal provided that the developer improve two poorly paved roads into
quality highways. Two points were particularly notable about these
roads. Both of the roads were primarily outside the town limits, and
both served a few other lot owners and residents, although the roads
did lead to and terminate inside the Land/Vest property. The town
planning board was rebuffed by Land/Vest, and the town attempted to
uphold its plan for exacting the road improvements from the developer
by utilizing a "but-for" type of test."' The roads in their improved
state would not be needed "but-for" the Land/Vest subdivision, ac-
cording to the Town. The Supreme Court noted that the roads did need
to be improved, because "an emergency would create a hazard for ac-
cess due to their present condition. Increased traffic from the plaintiff's
proposed . . . lots would also increase the present danger."12' How-
ever, the Court noted that other property owners and residents in the
area would be benefiting at the expense of Land/Vest. This contrasts
with the Wald project, because it appears that only the Wald Corpora-
tion and the public as a whole would benefit by having the drainage
system available. The New Hampshire Court then applied the rational
118. 338 So.2d at 868.
119. 117 N.H. 817, 379 A.2d 200 (1977).
120. Id. at 203.
121. Id. at 202.
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nexus approach by noting that a balancing of factors was essential. The
Court stated that the Town of Plainfield only balanced the "burden
imposed on the town by the subdivision against the burden imposed on
the subdivider by the town's precondition for subdivision approval."',
It was absolutely essential to give consideration to the benefits in such
a balancing of factors, according to the Court's interpretation of the
rational nexus test.'?
Citing a section of the New Hampshire Constitution that had been
construed to allow the taking of a person's property only "on the im-
plied condition . . . that (the landowner) is to receive a just compensa-
tion,"124 the Court compared the situation to a case of special assess-
ments which are highly analogous to impact exactions.'2 "Special
assessment upon property for the cost of public improvements are in
violation of our Constitution, if they are in substantial excess of the
(equivalent in special) benefits received." 12 In essence, then, the Court
states that the benefits must be considered in the balancing test and
"the subdivider can be compelled only to bear that portion of the cost
which bears a rational nexus to the needs created by, and (special) ben-
efits conferred upon, the subdivision."1
Thus, the rational nexus test attaches the burden of proof to both
the developer and the local governmental entity. The local government
will have to substantiate that the developer's activities are causing a
need for expanded facilities while the developer will have to prove the
municipality or county wrong. 12 The author feels that it may well be
122. Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
123. Id. (euiphasis added).
124. Id. citing Great Falls Manufacturing Co. v. Fernald, 47 N.H. 444, 445
(1867).
125. Id. at 204.
126. Id. citing Manchester v. Straw, 86 N.Y. 390, 169 A. 592, 593 (N.H. 1933),
citing White v. Gove, 183 Mass. 333, 67 N.E. 359, 360 (1903).
127. Id. citing Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Princeton Twp., 52
N.J. 348, 245 A.2d 336, 337 (1968).
128. Contrast this with the wording in Home Builders Ass'n. v. City of Kansas
City, 555 S.W. 2d 832, 835 (Mo. 1977) reh den approving a test sounding like the
rational nexus test and finding that the burden of justification of an impact fee ordi-
nance was not on the governing body. The point here is that a developer's objection to
an impact fee can take two forms: 1) the ordinace is unreasonable or 2) the amount of
exaction caused by the formula in the ordinance is unreasonable. The rational nexus
test apparently allows the developer to put the burden of substantiating the amount of
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implicit in the developer's proof of what is wrong that the developer
should be required to prove what is right. This is because some type of
dedication or payment of a fee will eventually be required. However,
the test is also crucial in that a developer will be compelled to dedicate
land or pay cash for improvements only to the extent that his develop-
ment will generate a need for those new facilities. The idea that the
needs must be solely attributable to the developer under the specifically
and uniquely attributable test is rejected, because the developer will
pay for only what he causes to be needed. This concept is apparently
embodied in the Wald decision and explained in Land/Vest. However,
it can be contrasted with the Florida Supreme Court's holding on exac-
tions in Dunedin."' Without mentioning the rational nexus approach,
the Court viewed the City of Dunedin's hike in water and sewer system
connection charges under an approach that sounds arguably like the
rational nexus test.
Raising expansion capital by setting connection charges, which do not
exceed a pro rata share of reasonably anticipated costs of expansion, is
permissible where expansion is reasonably required ..... The cost of
new facilities should be borne by new users to the extent new use requires
new facilities, but only to that extent. 30
It should be reiterated that the Dunedin decision also limits the "use of
the money collected . . . to meeting the costs . .. , of the particular
project.
a. The Excessive Hardship Corollary to the Rational Nexus Rule
The rational nexus rule appears to have a strange twist in the form
of what the author believes may be termed the excessive harship corol-
exaction but not the reasonableness of the ordinance on the governing body. This case
shows the confusion over this issue. The majority viewed the trial court as in error
because it tried to make the City justify the overall reasonableness of the ordinance. In
Kansas City, Id. at 836 (Finch, J., dissenting) the dissent found that very possibly the
trial court was trying to force the governing body to justify the amount of exaction.
Contrast this perception as to burden of proof with Wald, supra note 92.
129. 329 So.2d at 314.
130. Id. at 320-21.
131. Id. at 320.
_ .
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lary. This concept is rooted in dicta in the Land/Vest Properties1 2
case, and it points out why this case is one of two rational nexus cases
of national significance. In this case, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court cited a state planning statute"' which is very similar to a Florida
planning statutelu in that both laws look forward to comprehensive
land use planning in a financially stable and cost effective way.'- The
Court then went on to discuss the interrelation between this statute and
the rational nexus test by indicating that the test was flexible enough to
deal with "a town . . . faced with such an 'excessive expenditure',
(that) its otherwise 'fair share' of the cost may be adjusted to accom-
modate the municipality's ability to pay."'' The Court seems to be
saying that a developer, under the rational nexus test, might be re-
quired to pay for a greater amount of public facilities than his subdivi-
sion might be causing a need for. The rationale is that "without this
limitation, a private developer could single-handedly require an in-
crease in the municipal tax burden."' 37
Why does the rational nexus test lead to this conclusion? This is
apparently because a small community with a small tax base and lim-
ited public facilities might experience enough growth from a large de-
velopment to generate the need for expanded facilities. However, the
practical and cost efficient method for the community to expand its
facilities might be to build larger facilities than would be immediately
needed. An example will help to illustrate this fact. Assume a develop-
ment's projected growth within a seven (7) year period might indicate a
need for a new water plant that could pump 1,000,000 gallons of water
daily. However, the plan for this development calls for it to be con-
structed in phases or segments. The first phase to be built is to be as-
sessed under the rational nexus test for funds that will enable the mu-
nicipality to build a plant that will pump 200,000 gallons of water
daily. Platting or pulling of building permits for additional phases of
the project might not be planned for a few years under the development
132. 379 A.2d 200.
133. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36:21 (supp. 1975).
134. See FLA. STAT. Ch. 163 (1977).
135. Compare the New Hampshire statute in note 126 with FLA. STAT. §§
163.260 (2) (b), (d), and (i) (1969).
136. 379 A.2d at 205.
137. Id.
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plan. At this point the municipality has three options. The first option
is to assess the developer for what can be legally exacted: funds for the
200,000 gallon per day plant. Then the city would build the plant. As
the developer plats later phases of his development and pulls building
permits on those phases additional rational nexus assessments would
be made. The water plant would be expanded to serve those new seg-
ments or phases. However, the plant will be more expensive when built
in this manner. Costs will increase due to inflation. Also, it may be
more expensive in constant dollars to expand the facility than it would
have been to construct the complete 1,000,000 gallon per day facility in
the first place from an architectural and engineering standpoint. This
means that the developer who is being assessed for this construction
will end up paying more in the end in impact fees.
The second option would have been simply to assess the fee for the
200,000 gallon plant and raise the taxes of local residents or bond (with
accompanying interest costs) to build the entire 1,000,000 gallon per
day plant. This method would be cheaper, but it runs afoul of the ratio-
nale for impact fees, as expressed above in Dunedin.3 8 Simply put the
rationale asks why older residents should pay for new facilities that are
needed to serve new residents. The third -option is to apply the Landl
Vest "excessive hardship corollary." Under this theory the developer
would pay more than might normally be permitted under the rational
nexus test. Obviously, such an assessment might be rare and would be
totally dependent on the facts.
It is significant to note that while no Florida court has mentioned
the "excessive hardship" concept, the Dunedin"' decision has alluded
to it by sustaining a fee and relying, in part, on the same rationale as
the New Hampshire Court utilized in sustaining the "excessive hard-
ship corollary.""14 In Dunedin, Justice Hatchett stated that, "we see no
reason to require that a municipality resort to deficit financing, in or-
der to raise capital by means of utility rates and charges. On the con-
trary, sound public policy militates against such inflexibility."'4 In ap-
proving an impact fee in this case, it appears that the Florida Supreme
Court ruled out the alternative of compelling a municipality to raise its
138. See note 130.
139. 329 So.2d 314.
140. 379 A.2d at 205.
141. 329 So.2d at 319-20.
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ad valorem taxes in order to avoid deficit financing."' This is in effect
precisely what the New Hampshire Court did in arguing for the exces-
sive hardship corollary.
Furthermore, it is arguable that there is statutory authority in
Florida to authorize this corollary. A section of the Intergovernmental
Programs Chapter in the Florida Statutes states:
(2) The regulation of the subdivision of land is intended: . . . (i) To
insure that the citizens and the taxpayers of incorporated municipalities
and counties will not have to bear the costs resulting from haphazard
subdivision of land and the lack of authority to require installation by
the developer of adequate and necessary physical improvements."'
In any event the New Hampshire Supreme Court indicates that this
approach should be (one) used sparingly and only in an effort "to pre-
clude 'danger or injury to health, safety, or prosperity . . ., ",.
Without this caveat or corollary to the rational nexus rule, a private
developer might compel an increase in the municipal tax burden.
b. The Balancing Test Factors
While both the Wald Corporation"5 and the Land/Vest Proper-
ties46 cases call for a careful balancing test "of the prospective needs
of the community and the property rights of the developer," only
Land/Vest suggests any specific factors to be considered in the balanc-
ing. The Land/Vest case involved two roads that led to the developer's
tract of land. In fact, only 950 feet out of 10,000 feet of roadway
fronted on the developer's land. The trial court applied a so called
"proportionality" test which assessed the developer based only on his
proportionate share of front footage on the road (9.5%). 14 The New
Hampshire Supreme Court rejected this test as too narrow to be con-
sidered by itself. Instead, the Court considered a "nonexhuastive cate-
gorization of such factors," including: 1) the standard of maintenance
142. See note 130.
143. FLA. STAT. § 163.260 (2) (i) (1969).
144. Id.
145. 338 So.2d at 868.
146. 379 A.2d at 204-05.
147. 338 So.2d at 868.
148. 379 A.2d 200.
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of similar roadways in the town; 2) the potential traffic increase that
would result due to the new development; 3) the character and poten-
tial for development of the neighborhood served by these access roads;
and, 4) the number of residents living or or normally trafficking these
roads.' In essence, "no single factor can be determinative of the ap-
propriate mode of apportionment . . of costs under the rational
nexus test.
D. Application of Florida's Police Power
While the rational nexus test appears to be favored in Florida,
another key problem is finding statutory authority for enacting an im-
pact ordinance. The Florida Supreme Court, in Dunedin, 15 had little
problem, since the water and sewer fees exacted in that case were en-
acted under a Florida law that permitted rates or charges for water/
sewer hookups."' It appears that the police power is the most viable
authority that has been delegated to the local level which could be re-
lied upon to support an impact fee. A review of this authority should
be viewed from the perspective of three types of local governmental en-
tities. The basic outline of power for charter 53 and non-charter 54 coun-
ties and municipalities'55 is noted in the Florida Constitution. Municipali-
ties are guided by their charters which allow them full governmental,
corporate, and proprietary powers not inconsistent with state law.'56
Municipalities may carry out any "municipal purpose."' 57 A "munici-
pal purpose" is any "activity or power which may be exercised by the
state or its political subdivisions."'5 Thus, a municipality has the pow-
ers of the state's political subdivisions and its own corporate powers. A
charter county has extensive local self-government powers including
149. Id. at 205.
150. Id.
151. 329 So.2d at 319.
152. FLA. STAT. § 180.13 (2) (1973).
153. FLA. CONST. of 1968 art. VIII, § 1 (g). See also FLA. STAT. § 125.86 (7), (8)
(1974) and FLA. STAT. § 163.210 (1969).
154. FLA. CONST. of 1968 art. VIII, § 1 (f).
155. FLA. CONST. of 1968 art. VIII, § 2 (b). See also FLA. STAT. §§ 163.031,
163.210, and 166.021 (1969).
156. See note 155.
157. FLA. STAT. § 166.021 (1969).
158. Id.
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power to enact special, local laws with the approval of the particular
county's electorate. 5 It has the power to alter its structure by abolish-
ing certain elective constitutional county offices.6 0
Perhaps the most restrictive entity of the three is the non-
charter county. The reason for this restraint was expressed most
clearly by the Florida Supreme Court in Keggin v. Hillsborough
County.61
A county is a political subdivision of the state. Article 8, secs. 1, 2,
Const. 1885. It is not a corporation. It may be created by the state with-
out the solicitation, consent, or concurrence of the inhabitants, of the
territory, thus setting it apart; it is created for administrative purposes; it
is the representative of the sovereignty of the state, auxiliary to it, an aid
to the more convenient administration of the government. It is purely
political in nature, constituting the machinery and essential agency by
and through which many of the powers of the state are exercised . 2
The non-charter county is totally subservient to the Legislature, and
its only "functions relative to the health, convenience, and welfare of
the public" is "in the county, particularly outside of municipalities." '
County functions may only be under express or implied statutory au-
thority, assuming there are no contrary provisions of law.'" As a result
of this restraint, the remainder of this section will focus on the power
of the non-charter county.
Chapters 125 and 163 of the Florida Statutes appear to be key
chapters that delegate sufficient police power for local efforts in enact-
159. See note 153.
160. FLA. CONST. of 1968 art. VIII, § I (d).
161. 71 Fla. 356, 71 So. 372 (1916).
162. Id. at 372.
163. Duval County v. Bancroft, 96 Fla. 128, 129, 117 So. 799, 800 (Fla. 1928).
1928).
"164. Id., but see Amos v. Mathews, 126 So. 308, 321 (Fla. 1930) which states:
While a county in the performance of certain functions is an agency or arm of
the state, it is also something more than that . . . .While the county is an
agency of the state, it is also under our Constitution to some extent at least, an
autonomous, self-governing, political entity with respect to exclusively local af-
fairs, in performance of which functions it is distinguished from its creator, the
state, and for its acts and obligations when acting in purely local matters the
state is not responsible. (emphasis added).
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ing an impact ordinance utilizing the rational nexus approach.'65 In
some cases, other jurisdictions have approved impact fee ordinances
based on statutory authority that is remarkably similar to language in
the Florida Statutes. 6' Underlying this entire discussion is the fact that
zoning power and statutory zoning schemes of most states are similar
because a majority are based on the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act.167
Florida Statutes Chapter 125.01 is entitled "Powers and Duties"'6
of counties. This section states that: "(1) The legislative and governing
body of a county shall have the power to carry on county government.
To the extent not inconsistent with general or special law, this power
shall include, but shall not be resricted to the power to: . . . ." This
preamble to the enumeration of county powers seems sweeping, but a
look at the manner in which Florida courts have interpreted it does not
reflect its plain meaning.66
1. STRICT CONSTRUCTIONIST vs. THE PERMISSIVE VIEW
The interpretation of this clause has been the subject of coritinuing
litigation.70 According to the permissive viewpoint, the clause seems to
indicate that, if the Legislature hasn't usurped the subject area by legis-
lating or prohibiting it by law, it is a permissible county function.' 7' On
the other hand, strict constructionists might argue that a non-charter
county is merely a child of the state and can only derive specific
powers through legislative delegation of authority.172 The strict con-
165. Interview with Warren Dill, Deputy County Attorney, Palm Beach County,
Florida, in West Palm Beach, Florida (August 9, 1978).
166. See, 379 A.2d 200 and Jordan, 137 N.W.2d 442, infra note 213.
167. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 26.01 (1968).
168. (emphasis added) This section provides the basic power for all counties. It is
the foundation of power for the charter, as well as the non-charter counties. Approxi-
mately sixty of Florida's sixty-seven counties are non-charter counties.
169. See note 172, infra.
170. Id.
171. Individuals such as the county attorneys or county commissioners would
probably support this view.
172. See such cases as Davis v. Gronemeyer, 251 So.2d I (Fla. 1971); State ex
rel. Volusia County v. Dickinson, 269 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1972); Gessner v. Del-Air Corp.,
17 So.2d 522 (Fla. 1944).
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structionist view has its roots in many cases,' but it is typified by the
dissent of Justice Hal Dekle in Orange County V. State."' This case
involved the power of Orange County, a non-charter county, to issue
capital improvement bonds without approval of the electorate. The
case discussed two key sections of the Florida Constitution.'75 One of
the sections, Article VIII, sub-section 1 (f), is virtually identical in lan-
guage to the preamble of Chapter 125.01 (1). It states that non-charter
governments "have such power of self-government as is provided by
general or special law . *"... '" However, the same section limits that
power such that the non-charter government may enact "county ordi-
nances not inconsistent with general or special law."'77 Justice Dekle
persuasively argues that the permissive viewpoint taken by county offi-
cials is not really an interpretation of power but actually an enlarge-
ment of power."7 "It not only wipes out the obvious distinction be-
tween the two forms of government (charter and non-charter govern-
ment) but in one fell swoop it authorizes all counties over the state
to proceed arbitrarily . . . as they see fit, without voter or legislative
approval, but as a virtual independent sovereign, which they are
not."'79
However, it can be argued that, even if non-charter power is "in-
terpreted" or "enlarged" to encompass the permissive viewpoint, the
differences between charter and non-charter counties would not be to-
tally obliterated. For example, a charter county's duly enacted ordi-
nances may prevail over any municipality's ordinances, depending on
the wording of the particular county's charter. 8 However, if the ordi-
nances of a non-charter county and a municipality are in conflict, the
173. Id.
174. 281 So.2d 310 (Fla. 1973) (Dekle, J., dissenting).
175. FLA. CONST. OF 1968 art. VIII, § l(f) and (g).
176. FLA. CONST. OF 1968 art. VIII, § I (f).
177. This section was placed in the 1968 Constitution to expand local govern-
ment home rule. During the mid-sixties, record numbers of local bills were being filed
in the Florida Legislature, culminating in 1967 with hundreds of bills. The Legislature
was becoming so bogged down with local legislation that home rule had to be granted.
Note that this section is very similar in verbage to Fla. Stat. § 125.01 (1) (1977).
178. 281 So.2d at 314.
179. Id.
180. FLA. CONST. OF 1968 Art. VIII, § I (g).
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municipality's ordinance shall prevail within its corporate limits.,', In
fact, in Palm Beach County, a recently enacted impact fee was nullified
within the corporate limits of a number of municipalities which decided
to "opt out" of the ordinance."' Another crucial difference that re-
mains between the charter and non-charter counties is the ability of the
former to restructure their government.1' 3 An e:xample is Broward
County, Florida. Under its charter, it made the post of tax collector an
appointive position which is an elected constitutional officer in most
other counties. Broward County also increased its five (5) person
County Commission to a seven (7) member body.'84
Justice Dekle, in Orange County, clearly states that, "it is not a
matter of proceeding unless precluded but is a matter of proceeding
provided by law, as to a non-charter county . . . ."11 He noted that
the Florida Constitutional section (and apparently the section quoted
above in F.S.§ 125.01 (1) ) is merely an implementing power for ordi-
nances when a particular power has been specifically granted by the
Legislature. 8 Oddly enough a counter-argument to this position can
be found by looking at the enumerated powers under Chapter 125.01
(1). One of the powers states that a county may "perform any other
acts not inconsistent with law which are in the common interest of the
people of the county, and exercise all powers and privileges not spe-
cifically prohibited by law."'8 7 Thus, the Legislature has specifically
granted a power to proceed unless precluded under the specifically
enumerated powers of this general law. Nonetheless, authority can be
181. Id. at § 1(f).
182. The cities of West Palm Beach, Lake Worth, Pahokee, Belle Glade, Lake
Clarke Shores, and North Palm Beach have all opted out of the fee. Palm Beach Post,
.July 16, 1979 at 4-5B, col. 4.
183. FLA. CONST. OF 1968 art. VIII, § I(d).
184. Cf. Broward County Charter (1973).
185. 281 So.2d at'314.
186. Id.
187. FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (1) (w) (1977). Justice Dekle in Orange County, supra
note 111, at 315 points to commentary by the Honorable Talbot D'Alemberte, a
drafter of the 1968 Constitution, as further authority for his arguments that Fla.
Const. of 1968 art. VIII, § 1 (f) was merely intended to allow non-charter counties to
enact ordinances pursuant to specifically granted powers by the Legislature. However,
the Legislature in FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (1)'s introductory clause and in FLA. STAT. §
125.01 (1) (w) seems to have specifically granted the power for non-charter counties to
proceed, so long as a law does not preclude their action.
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found in Janis Development Corp. v. City of Sunrise"s to argue that
this enumerated power does not grant the power to proceed unless pre-
cluded for a non-charter county, especially in enacting an impact fee.
This trial court opinion discusses a road impact fee that was enacted
under the authority of this particular enumerated power."8 9 The Court
noted in dicta that the fee or tax did not fall within the police power.
There was no other reason given as to why an impact fee could not
have been enacted under this particular enumerated power.
Perhaps the theory of ejusdem generis might arguably limit the
"proceed unless precluded" or permissive viewpoint of this enumerated
power."" This theory limits general words or phrases following an enu-
meration of specific things or powers to things of powers of the same
class or genus, as those comprehended by the preceeding specific
terms.' However, even this argument would be poor because the list
of county powers includes the power to zone and regulate business.'92
As will be discussed below, there is a direct tie between these powers
and impact fees. The struggle between the so-called permissive view
(proceeding unless precluded) and the strict constructionist argument
(typified by Justice Dekle's dissent in Orange County)' has encoun-
tered another battle, but this particular battle may have signalled the
end of the conflict. On March 5, 1979, the Florida Attorney General's
Office released an opinion that dealt with the powers of a non-charter
county.'94 Lee County (Fort Meyers), Florida had requested an opinion
on the legality of its plan to set up a human relations commission
based on Chapter 125 of the Florida Statutes. 9 ' The Attorney Gen-
eral's Office took the position enunciated by Justice Dekle and indi-
cated that the county has no authority to proceed, since there was no
express or implied statutory authority under any general or special law.
188. 40 Fla. Supp. 41, 59 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 1973).
189. FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (1) (w) (1975).
190. This assumes that one must also adopt the view of Justice Dekle in the
Orange County case that the similar wording of FLA. CONST. of 1968 art. VIII, § I (f)
and the introductory clause to FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (1) are not a specific authorization
of power but rather merely an implementing power for specifically enumerated powers.
191. See 70 Op. Att'y. Gen. 19 at 4 (1979).
192. FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (1) (h) (1975).
193. 281 So.2d 310.
194. 79 Op. Att'y Gen. 19 (1979).
195. See also FLA. CONST. OF 1968 art. VIII, § 1 ().
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However, only one month earlier, the Florida Supreme Court had
issued an opinion adverse to the Attorney General's viewpoint in the case
of Speer v. Olson.9 ' Pasco County, Florida, a non-charter county, a
municipal service taxing district under the County Commission,
attempted to issue general obligation bonds for water and sewer facilities
by pledging future net revenues derived from the operation of the
facilities, as well as certain ad valorem taxes. Taxpayers brought suit
claiming there was no authority under state law for this action. The
County then sought to have the bonds validated. The Court noted that
there is no specific authority that authorizes or restricts a non-charter
county to issue general obligation bonds to acquire water and sewer
facilities and pledge system revenues and ad valorem taxes. 9, Justice
Adkins, writing for the majority, specifically noted that the first full
sentence of Chapter 125.01 (1) of the Florida Statutes ". . . therefore
empowers the county board to proceed under its home rule power to
accomplish this purpose." '98 He indicated that, "unless the Legislature
has pre-empted a particular subject relating to county government by
either general or special law, the county governing body, by reason of
this sentence, has full authority to act through the exercise of home
rule."'9 By virtue of this decision it appears that a non-charter county
can engage in virtually any county function, so long as there is no
preclusion in the Constitution or statutes. It is apparent that the
Attorney General's Office continues to maintain a different stance in this
matter, and thus, it is probable that we have not seen the last of the
continuing struggle of non-charter county powers.
2. OTHER ARGUMENTS
There are other arguments that might be raised concerning the
introductory clause of Chapter 125.01 (1) of the Florida Statutes.
These arguments seem to parallel the trend of thought embraced by the
permissive view. The clause states that county government "shall have
the power to carry on county government. To the extent not inconsis-
tent with general of special law . . . ."I What is meant by the two
196. 367 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1978) reh den (1979).
197. Id. at 211.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. (emphasis added) FLA. STAT. § 125.01(1) (1977).
_ o
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tent with general or special law .... ."0 What is meant by the two
terms "county government" and "inconsistent"? One might argue that
"county government" is defined by the twenty-five (25) enumerated
powers listed in Chapter 125.01 (1). However, the introductory clause
of that very section also states that the power to carry on county gov-
ernment shall not be restricted to the enumerated powers."0' Thus, at
most, the enumerated powers merely provide examples or typify the
meaning of the term "county government." Another argument can be
found in Cable-Vision, Inc. v. Freeman."°' In this case, when Monroe
County sought to provide cable TV service," 3 the Court specifically
found that the County had the requisite power to do so, based on the
case of State v. Brevard County."' The Cable-Vision Court stated that,
"determination of what is a county purpose may be express or implied
in the provision of the ordinance (setting up the new county program).
The Courts will not interfere with such determination, unless it has no
legal or practical relationship to a valid county purpose. ' 205
Thus, according to Cable-Vision, a county may define what a
county governmental power is by ordinance. However, this 1975 opin-
ion by the Third District Court of Appeal may have overly enlarged
what the Florida Supreme Court actually stated in the Brevard County
case.201 The Florida Supreme Court found that, "what is a county pur-
pose may be determined by the express or implied provisions of a stat-
ute . . ." and not an ordinance.m Since statutes are enacted only by
the Legislature, it would appear that the Court meant that only the
Legislature could determine a county purpose. However, the use of the
word "may" in the above quotation doesn't necessarily indicate that
200. (emphasis added) FLA. STAT. § 125.01(1) (1977).
201. See also FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (3) (a) (1969).
202. 324 So.2d 149 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1975) reh den (1976) appeal dis-
missed 429 U.S. 1032, 50 L.Ed.2d 743, 97 S.Ct. 723 (1976).
203. The Florida Keys stretch for 113 miles to the South and West from the
Florida mainland. The nearest television station is approximately 150 miles from the
furtherest populated Key, and cable TV is a virtual necessity for television reception.
204. 99 Fla. 226, 126 So. 353, 355 (1930).
205. 324 So.2d at 154.
206. 126 So. 353.
207. (emphasis added) See Brevard County, supra note 204, at 355. In Dade
County v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 275 So.2d 505, 511 (Fla. 1973) reh den
the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed the right of the Legislature to define a county
purpose.
1 4:1980
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the Supreme Court foreclosed a body other than the Legislature from
determining what is a county purpose.0 8 If the Cable-Vision view is
followed, a county could simply define that impact fees were a county
purpose, so long as that purpose was not "inconsistent" with state
law." 9 The term "inconsistent" was defined by the Florida Supreme
Court in Dade County v. A.R. Brautigam, 21  as meaning "contra-
dictory in the sense of legislative provisions which cannot exist." 21'
Since there seems to be no law dealing with impact fees specifically,
there is apparently no statute for an impact fee ordinance to
contradict.
A final argument concerns the reading of the enumerated powers.
The Florida Statutes indicate that reading of the powers is to be broad
with a liberal interpretation. 12 The question then arises, regarding im-
pact fee ordinances, how far might a tribunal go in construing the lib-
eralism clause in a police power statute? In Jordan v. Village of Me-
nomonee Falls213 a mandatory dedication ordinance was based on a
state statute that gave local governments the power to approve require-
ments for subdivisions. The statute authorized a municipality to ap-
prove the subdivision of parcels or ". . . provide other surveying,
monumenting, mapping, and approving requirements for such divi-
sion. 21 This statute is extremely similar to the regulating and zoning
authority in the Florida Statutes2 15 and was to be liberally interpreted,
208. Florida Power Corp. v. Pinellas Utility Bd., 40 So.2d 350, 354 (Fla. 1949),
reh den citing, State ex rel. Garrison v. Comm'rs of Putnam County, 23 Fla. 632, 3
So. 164 (1887).
209. See note 201 and accompanying text.
210. 224 So.2d 688, 692 (Fla. 1969).
211. The Court actually defined the term as used in FLA. CoNsr. OF 1968 art.
VIII, § 6 (f) which is analogous to FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (1) (1977): "(0-DADE
COUNTY-POWERS CONFERRED UPON MUNICIPALITIES: To the extent
not inconsistent with the powers of existing municipalities or general law.
212. FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (3) (b) (1969).
213. 28 Wis.2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965) appeal dismissed 385 U.S. 4, 17
L.Ed.2d 3, 87 S. Ct. 33 (1966).
214. 137 N.W.2d at 446.
215. FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (1) (h) (1975):
(h) Establish, coordinate, and enforce zoning and such other business regula-
tions as are necessary for the protection of the public.
Recall the discussion in Wald, supra note 92, at 867 concerning impact fees being
analogous to a form of business regulation. See also FLA. STAT. §§ 163.165, 163.260
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according to state law.21 The Wisconsin Supreme Court permitted im-
pact exactions to be included within the local power to approve re-
quirements for subdivisions217 and indicated that the Wisconsin Legisla-
ture had delegated sufficient police power to allow municipal enactment
of an impact fee. A similar situation occurred in Frank Ansuini v. City
of Cranston21 1 when a developer, who owned a tract of land in Cran-
ston, Rhode Island, sougnt to improve his land. The City attempted to
exact a mandatory land dedication of land equal to 7% of the size of
the development .21 Although the Court overruled the dedication as
arbitrary,2 0 it did approve the concept of an impact exaction based on
implied authority from the statute,22' which delegated the police power
to municipalities to "adopt, modify, and amend rules and regulations
governing and restricting the platting or other subdivision of land in
such city or town. ' ' 2 2 Despite the fact that this statute appears to focus
on platting, it is quite analogous to Florida law.2 2
Another source of authority is Part II of Chapter 163 of the Flor-
ida Statutes which deals with comprehensive planning and land use
planning. This section appears to be more far reaching than Chapter
125 due to its concepts of cutting across city and county boundaries,
although they both are to be liberally viewed. 24 It provides authority to
both counties and cities, whereas Chapter 125 deals only with county
powers. There are numerous sections in Chapter 163 that appear to
give implied authority that verges on expressed authority for impact
exactions, some of which will be examined below. The legislature in-
tended the authority of Part II of Chapter 163 to be very broad in an
(1977).
216. 137 N.W.2d at 446.
217. Id. at 446-48.
218. 107 R.I. 163, 264 A.2d 910 (1970).
219. See Carlann Shores, supra note 104, and Admiral Development, supra note
106, for Florida cases with a similar factual situation.
220. 264 A.2d at 914.
221. R. I. GEN. LAWS § 45-23-2 (1956).
222. 137 N.W.2d at 446-48.
223. This is true, if the powers are liberally construed as is required by FLA.
STAT. § 125.01 (3) (b) (1969).
224. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 163.310 (1969): 163.310 Construction "This part shall be
liberally construed to promote the purposes for which it is intended except for the
penalty provisions, which shall be strictly constued against the commission or gov-
erning body."
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effort to give counties and municipalities the power to prevent or mini-
mize future problems, enhance present advantages in the community,
and overcome present handicaps in dealing with the growth that
Florida is undergoing."' Furthermore, the Legislature intended that
the express provisions of Part II of Chapter 163 are to be the minimum
requirements to promote the public health, safety, and welfareY
Notably, the scope of this chapter allows "the several counties and in-
corporated municipalities of this state . . . to . . .adopt, and enforce
subdivisionm regulations." 8 As part of the subdivision regulation pro-
225. FLA. STAT. § 163.165 (1) (1969): 163.165 Legislative intent
(1) In order to preserve and enhance their present advantages, overcome
their present handicaps, and prevent or minimize future problems, it is the intent
of this part to enable the several counties and incorporated municipalities to
plan for future development and to prepare, adopt and amend comprehensive
plans to guide future development, to implement the comprehensive plans, the
several counties and incorporated municipalities may adopt and enforce zoning
regulations, adopt and enforce subdivision regulations, and adopt and enforce
building, plumbing, electrical, gas, fire, safety, and sanitary codes.
Using Chapter 163 as a resource will require the non-charter counties to either adopt a
comprehensive plan or a resolution electing to operate under the provisions of that
chapter pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 163.315 (1969). See J.O. Townley v. Marion County,
343 So.2d 1312 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977) reh. den.
226. Id. at 163.165 (2):
(2) The provisions of this part in its interpretation and application are de-
clared to be the minimum requirements necessary to promote, protect, and im-
prove the public health, safety, comfort, good order, appearance, convenience,
morals, and general welfare; to conserve the value of land, buildings, and re-
sources; and to protect the character and maintain the stability of residential,
agricultural, business, and industrial areas and to promote the orderly develop-
ment of such areas.
227. FLA. STAT. § 163.170 (7) (1969) defines a subdivision (apparently for devel-
opment purposes) as "the division of a parcel of land, whether improved or unim-
proved, into three or more contiguous lots or parcels of land .
228. FLA. STAT. § 163.160 (1) (1969):
163.160 Scope of part II
(1) The several counties and incorporated municipalities of this state may
plan for future development, adopt and amend comprehensive plans to guide
future development, adopt and enforce zoning regulations, adopt and enforce
subdivision regulations, adopt and enforce building, plumbing, electrical, gas,
fire, safety, and sanitary codes, and establish and maintain the boards and com-
missions herein described for carrying out the provisions and purposes of this
part. The powers authorized by this part may be employed by counties and in-
corporated municipalities individually or jointly by mutual agreement in accor-
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cess, planning commissions are to be set up.29 One of the powers and
duties of these planning commissions is to "(3) Establish principles and
policies guiding action in the development of the area."' ' 0 Local gov-
ernments are given authority to enact various subdivision regulations to
assist in guiding development.?' The statutory language used seems to
be based on thoughts similar to Representative Charles Boyd's House
Bill 837 regarding impact fees.?23 The police power delegated in this
section provides for "the harmonious, orderly, and progressive develop-
ment of land within Florida." The section of Chapter 163 which de-
dance with the provisions of this part in such combinations as their common
interests may dictate.
229. FLA. STAT. § 163.180 (1) (1969).
230. FLA. STAT. § 163.185 (3) (1969):
163.185 Functions, powers, and duties of commissions
The functions, powers, and duties of the commission shall be, in general and
in addition to any functions, powers and duties set forth in the body of this part,
to:
(3) Establish principles and policies for guiding action in the development
of the area.
231. FLA. STAT. § 163.260 (1) (1969):
163.260 Regulation of subdivisions; purposes
(I) The public health, safety, comfort, economy, order, appearance, conve-
nience, morals, and general welfare require the harmonious, orderly, and pro-
gressive development of land within Florida and its counties and incorporated
municipalities. In furtherance of this general purpose, counties and incorporated
municipalities, individually or in combination as authorized by this part, are au-
thorized and empowered to adopt, amend, or revise and enforce measures relat-
ing to land subdivision.
While an impact fee or mandatory land dedication ordinance could be enacted as
a subdivision regulation it appears, that the fee could be enacted as a pre-condition to a
plat approval. See FLA. STAT. §§ 177.011-.151 (1979). In fact "every plat of a subdivi-
sion filed for record must contain a dedication by the developer." FLA. STAT. § 177.081
(1979). The problem with using the plat approved-impact fee method is that land that
has already been platted will be able to be developed without payment of the fee. Also,
if the developer decided not to plat his land, the developer would not have to pay the
fee. A landowner can't be compelled to plat his land and to perform pre-conditions to
platting, as a pre-condition to sale or use, if the land is to be sold without reference to a
plat. This means the land would have to be sold with a legal description in metes and
bounds. Kass v. Lewin, 104 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1958). Nonetheless, Broward County, Florida
has a model impact fee ordinance exacting an impact fee as a pre-condition to a plat
approval. See Broward County Ordinance, § 5-192 (1979).
232. See notes 23, 24, and 27.
233. FLA. STAT. § 163.260 (1) (1969).
173]114:1980
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fines the term "regulation of subdivision of land" includes eleven ele-
ments of which ten are particularly closely related to impact exactions,
depending upon the type of fed (e.g., school, road, water/sewer, etc.).
They are:
(a) To aid in the cooperation of land development in counties and in-
corporated municipalities in accordance with orderly physical patterns;
(b) To discourage haphazard, premature, uneconomic, or scattered
land development;
(c) To insure safe and convenient traffic control;
(d) To encourage development of economically stable and healthful
communities;
(e) To insure adequate utilities;
(g) To provide public open spaces for recreation;
(h) To insure land subdivision with installation of adequate and neces-
sary physical improvements;
(i) To insure that the citizens and taxpayers of incorporated municipal-
ities and counties will not have to bear the costs resulting from haphaz-
ard subdivision of land and the lack of authority to require installation
by the developer of adequate and necessary physical improvement;
(j) To insure to the purchaser of land in a subdivision that necessary
improvements of lasting quality have been installed, and
(k) To serve as one of several instruments of comprehensive plan im-
plementation authorized by this part.
Sub-sections (b) and (c) are particularly notable when viewed in
the overall text of this law. In Land/Vest Properties,231 the New
Hampshire Supreme Court approved the rational nexus test while re-
viewing a state law that provided town planning boards with the au-
thority to promulgate regulations which: "provide against such scat-
tered or premature subdivision of land as would involve danger or
injury to safety . . . by reasons of lack of. . .transportation . ..or
other public services, or necessitate an excessive expenditure of public
funds for the supply of such services."1 This section implied sufficient
authority for the New Hampshire Court to approve an impact exac-
234. FLA. STAT. § 163.260 (2) (1969); See also FLA. STAT. § 163.3161 (3) (1977).
235. 379 A.2d 200.
236. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 36:21 (Supp. 1975). See also and contrast FLA.
STAT. § 163.260 (2) (i) (1969).
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tion, yet it is not nearly as sweeping as sub-sections (b) and (c)
above.Dl Perhaps the best authority in Florida for an exaction is the
Wald Corporation case.28 Florida's Third District Court of Appeal not
only approved an exaction under the rational nexus test, but it found
authority based on concepts of comprehensive planning. The Court
noted that the rational nexus approach "allows the local authorities to
implement future-oriented comprehensive planning without according
undue deference to legislative judgments." 9
OPERATIVE ASPECTS OF IMPACT FEE
ORDINANCES
A. Tax vs. User/Regulatory Fees
While there arguably is authority under planning and various lo-
cal power acts to enact an impact fee there is still another problem that
may be encountered. The answer hinges on thf manner in which the
ordinance is drafted. The author believes that this may be one area in
which a fee could be successfully attacked, since the proper form of
implementation from an administrative standpoint has not been fully
litigated. In other words, if the fee is poorly implemented, it could be
overturned in court as a tax24 which raises two problems. First, the
Florida Constitution authorizes taxation by ad valorem tax or by gen-
eral law authorization only. 41 There are no general laws covering im-
237. But see City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So.2d 363 (Ala.
1978) specifically stating that Alabama municipalities do not have the power to exact a
fee or land dedication for parks from developers. (Id. at 365. There apparently is au-
thority permitting only dedication for recreational purposes inside a subdivision.) The
statute in question, ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 798 (Recomp. 1958), states a planning com-
mission shall adopt regulations governing land subdivision, inluding the provision of
open space for traffic, utilities, recreation, etc. Compare this with FLA. STAT. § 163.260
(2) (c) and (g) and 163.265 (1) (1969).
238. 338 So.2d 863.
239. Id. at 868. For a restrictive view of a planning statute that provides an
interesting contrast, see Cimarron Corp. v. Bd. of County Commissioners of the
County of El Paso, 563 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1977).
240. See Janis Development, supra note 31, and Venditti-Siravo, supra note 31.
241. See FLA. CONST. OF 1968 art. VII, § I (a) and 9 discussed in City of Tampa
v. Birdsong Motors, 261 So.2d I (Fla. 1972).
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pact taxation at the present time.242 A Florida Appellate Court in
Broward County v. Janis Development Corporation243 viewed the fee
as a tax. The Court found that impact fees were being collected from
new residents and placed into a general road construction fund, despite
some rather vague wording in the ordinance. Although the funds could
have been used to construct roads or improve existing roads by widen-
ing them in the areas where the fee-paying residents lived, there was no
restriction or definition of the size of the area to be served by the fees
collected. Apparently the Court viewed this fee as a tax because there
was not adequate assurance that the fee-payers would actually be the
true beneficiaries of the fee. Thus, the fee was held to be a tax; a levy
paid simply to raise revenue2 4 which caused the "fee" to be invali-
dated.24
In Haugen v. Gleason,ue a mandatory land dedication for parks
was enacted to exact land for park purposes from developers. Develop-
ers could pay a fee in lieu of a dedication, and this methodology was
also found to be a tax.247 While the case is not particularly timely, the
underlying rationale is still very valid. The Court found that the pri-
mary purpose of the ordinance was revenue generation rather than sub-
division regulation. This is apparently the dividing line between fees
and taxes; fees directly benefit those individuals who pay them while
taxes generate revenues that are used for the benefit of all. Both Janis
and Haugen objections were countered in Dunedin 4 where the Florida
Supreme Court determined that if the revenue is restricted to the use of
benefiting new residents for the purpose of expanding public facilities,
242. See notes 23 to 25. Bills discussed in those notes were introduced to give
specific authority for the enactment of impact fees.
243. 311 So.2d 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
244. Id. at 375. In Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Commission of
Danbury, 27 Conn. Supp. 74, 230 A.2d 45 (1967), an impact fee was found to be a
tax, since the revenues were not specifically restricted to benefit new residents who
paid the fee.
245. It will be recalled that no tax can be implemented without a specific grant
of power from the Legislature. See FLA. CONST. OF 1968 art. VII, § I (a). There is no
grant of power to enact an impact "tax."
246. 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
247. The fee was enacted on the basis of the police power, as a function of a
comprehensive planning statute.
248. 329 So.2d 314.
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it is a fee rather than a tax. Yet, if new residents are charged a fair
pro rata share of the cost to benefit them directly by the expansion of
public facilities and without generating additional revenue, the exaction
is viewed as a fee.20
The second problem that is generated by viewing the exaction as a
tax is illustrated from another Broward County, Florida case. In
Venditti-Siravo, Inc. v. City of HollywooaF1 the City passed an ordi-
nance compelling payment of a fee, amounting to 1% of the cost of
construction of a project, to secure a building permit. The fee was to
be used for parks and recreation. Ten builders filed a class action suit
and a circuit court judge found the fee to be a tax on property. =2
Herein lies the second problem. Once the tax is viewed as an ad
valorem tax its effect would have to be added to the existing millage
rate. If the combined effect of the fee and the normal ad valorem tax
exceeded Florida's ten mill cap, Florida law would be violated. The tax
would have to be invalidated or at least reduced so as not to exceed the
ten mill levy.2 .1 Therefore, it is absolutely essential that the exaction be
viewed as a fee, and the Dunedin=' case appears to present the rule for
differentiating fees from taxes. However, that case does not tell us how
to properly implement the fee from an administrative viewpoint so that
the fee will not be viewed as a tax. For example, how do we know that
funds being paid are, judicially speaking, being used to directly benefit
the payors? If roads are built to serve a subdivision, but they are sel-
dom used by residents of that subdivision, are those new residents re-
249. Id. at 320-21.
250. Id. at 319-20. The Court appears to have noted that an exaction is a fee
rather than a tax when the exaction is not more than the cost of accommodating new
users. Local governments are simply seeking "to shift to the user expenses incurred on
his account. A private utility would presumably do the same thing in which event
surely even petitioners would not suggest that the private corporation was attempting
to levy a tax on its customers." Id. at 318-19. At 319 further on in the case, the court
stated that: "We see no reason to require that a municipality resort to deficit financing
in order to raise capital by means of utility rates and charges."
251. 39 Fla. Supp. 121 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 1973).
252. Id. at 123.
253. Florida has had its own California-style Proposition 13 property tax limi-
tation for years. See FLA. STAT. § 200.071 (1969) which imposes a maximum
possible tax levy of no more than 10 mills for any county or district. FLA. STAT.
§ 200.081 (1969) enforces the same rule for municipalities.
254. 329 So.2d 314.
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ceiving a direct benefit from the roads that they paid impact fees for?2s
B. Trust Accounts
To insure that the revenues from an impact fee are not only col-
lected but spent for the expansion of public facilities to benefit those
individuals who contributed the funds, Dunedin" ' appears to require
that the funds be subjected to careful internal control by governmental
authorities. Justice Hatchett, writing for the majority, stated:
The failure to include necessary restrictions on the use of the fund is
bound to result in confusion, at best. City personnel may come and go
before the fund is exhausted, yet there is nothing in writing to guide their
use of the moneys, although certain uses, . . would undercut the legal
basis for the fund's existence. There is no justification for such casual
handling of public moneys . . .
The answer appears to be a trust fund."'8 The Palm Beach County
roadway impact fee utilizes this approach.us The ordinance envisions
the use of forty separate trust funds. Each fund will be used for road-
way work in forty separate geographical districts in the county. While
this may create an accountant's nightmare, it appears manageable, and
it will probably satisfy the Dunedin test for internal control of funds
after they are collected. This also might meet the test for distinguishing
between a tax and a fee, since the funds will be spent to benefit those
255. Florida governing bodies have excelled at drafting failures when it comes to
impact fees. These fees have all failed, because they were merely taxes. Cf Home
Builders and Contractors Assoc. of Palm Beach County, Inc. v. Village of Royal
Palm Beach, No. 78-2374 CA(L) OlD (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. May 25, 1979); Home Build-
ers Ass'n. of Brevard County, Inc. v. City of Indian Harbor Beach, No. 75-2977 CA-
01-A (Fla. 18th Cir. Ct. July 2, 1976); City of Coral Springs v. Florida National
Properties, Inc., No. 76-11522 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. January 12, 1977) affd 358 So.2d
97 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978) cert den 366 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1979). Note that the
appellate decision is especially instructive concerning the propriety of granting a tem-
porary restraining order to restrain further fee collections during the pendency of the
lawsuit.
256. 329 So.2d 314.
257. Id. at 321.
258. This method was used for fiscal internal control in Janis Development,
supra note 31, and in Palm Beach County, Florida Ordinance 79-7, supra note 9.
259. Palm Beach County, Florida Ordinance 79-7, supra note 9.
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individuals who have contributed revenues in the form of fees. The
funds will be spent to build roads only in the contributing residents'
particular neighborhood. Of course, all this is dependent on how local
authorities define the size of the so-called "neighborhood."
C. Who Shall Pay The Fee?
1. PURCHASERS OF UNIMPROVED AND COMMERCIAL LAND
It is apparent that a large scale subdivision after a short time will
have three (3) basic classes of land: improved residential property, un-
improved residential property, and other types of property that will be
mostly in a commercial or industrial type of zoning classification. Is it
fair to utilize a formula that will assess an impact fee against commer-
cial or industrial properties for construction of new facilities, such as
schools? Certainly no factory or store ever increased the number of
children in the public school system. Thus, they do not benefit from
these particular types of facilities. The concept of benefiting from the
fees paid is crucial in differentiating a fee from a tax, and it is crucial,
as a factor to be weighed under the rational nexus test.
An answer to this problem is posed in the case of Home Builders
Association of Greater Salt Lake v. Provo.20 The City of Provo en-
acted a $100 surcharge on water and sewer connection fees designed to
provide funds for the expansion of such a system. A homebuilders
group contested the fee on the basis that it was discriminatory, since it
assessed only a single class of people. That class consisted of new sys-
tem users. The Utah Supreme Court did not agree with this
contention.
The properties actually using the sewer system should alone pay the cost
of operation and maintenance, since expenditures for such purposes
arise soley from that use. On the other hand, all properties where ser-
vice was available, whether actually using the service or not, should pay
for the construction and installation expense from which every property
has received some benefit and increase in value.21
260. 28 Utah 2d 402, 503 P.2d 451 (1972).
261. Id. at 452 citing Airwick Industries, Inc. v. Carlstadt Sewerage Authority,
57 N.J. 107, 270 A.2d 18 (1970).
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It can be argued that commercial and industrial properties don't di-
rectly add children to the school system but their employees do add
children to the school district. Commercial and industrial properties
pay school ad valorem taxes and presumably, impact fees would be
assessed on the same theory. The Court in the Provo City case went on
to express the view that improved properties should not be saddled
with the burden of providing something that would be of future benefit
to presently unimproved land. This would not be "equitably," a stan-
dard that the Florida Supreme Court found to be essential in the fee
assessment of Dunedin.212 The unimproved property was benefitted by
the improvement, and more specifically, the unimproved property
would benefit unfairly in respect to capital costs and interest thereon,
as may have been paid in the past by users of the improvement. 63
Therefore, it appears that some basis can be found for arguing that
even unimproved land in a subdivision or planned unit development
should be assessed something. However, it appears that most govern-
mental entities prefer to assess impact fees at the time that a building
permit is pulled. Thus, the unimproved land's fee is deferred.
2. DEVELOPERS WHO PAY ONLY To HAVE THEIR DEVELOPMENTS FAIL
Another sewerage system case that involved impact assessments
affirmed the concept of assessing the fee from developers before con-
struction of the development or of the public facility commenced. In
S.S. &O. Corporation v. Township of Bernards Sewerage Authority,26
the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that "as between the utility and
the developer, the developer may be required to provide initial financ-
ing for the (sewerage) laterals to cover the risk that the development
will fail or not bear its proper share of the costs."2 5 However, if the
development fails and is not constructed, it appears that there may be a
need to refund the money that the developer has paid to the govern-
ment for facility expansion. One reason might rest on the fact that the
need for new facilities has disappeared, since the proposed development
is never built. In Wright Development v. City of Mountain VieW266 a
262. 329 So.2d 314.
263. 484 P.2d 606.
264. 62 N.J. 369, 301 A.2d 738 (1972).
265. Id. at 747.
266. 53 Cal. App.3d 344, 125 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1975). See also 484 P.2d 606.
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fee was collected in exchange for the right to develop a group of condo-
miniums. In California a state law 7 provided that new residential unit
developments shall be required to dedicate land, pay impact fees in lieu
of dedication or dedicate land in part and pay fees in part for park or
recreational development as a condition to approval of the develop-
ment. The development was never constructed in this case, and the de-
veloper sued to obtain a refund. The California Appellate Court or-
dered the funds returned. 68
The order was apparently based on the idea that a need for new
public facilities was never created. Thus, no impact assessment was
necessary. The author believes that, if the developer had donated land
rather than paid the fee, the Court probably would have ordered it
returned on the lack of need argument. At the very least the govern-
mental entity would have been required to pay -a fair market value for
the land. The unanswered question that has not been addressed by the
courts involves the situation in which the fee is paid and the develop-
ment virtually completed when a failure occurs. Conversely, the local
governmental entity might assess the fee and enter into financial pub-
lic facility construction commitments that would have to be honored.
What happens, if the development fails? Will the courts force the fees
to be returned? A close look at the Bernards Sewerage Authority case
above might indicate otherwise, because of the requirement that the
developer must provide impact funds prior to public facility construc-
tion "to cover the risk that the development will fail .... ,1
3. FEES COLLECTED UNDER A TECHNICALLY DEFICIENT ORDINANCE
During the period between 1972 and 1974, the City of Dunedin,
Florida operated under an impact fee ordinance that permitted the City
to collect funds from its developers for the City's water and sewer facil-
ities. When it became apparent that this ordinance would not survive
the scrutiny of Florida's courts, the City enacted a revised impact fee
267. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 66477 (West, 1977). The code section indicates that the
amount and location of land to be dedicated or fees paid shall bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to facility use by future residents of the proposed development. Note the use
of the term "reasonable relationship" which was used by the California Supreme Court
in both Ayres, supra note 93, and Frisco Land, supra note 95.
268. 125 Cal. Rptr. 723.
269. See note 265 supra.
I
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ordinance270 in 1974. It provided that impact fees collected from devel-
opers could only be used to expand the City's water and sewer system.
Trust funds were established as a method. of effecting this concept. In
its landmark decision, the Florida Supreme Court approved the basic
concept enacted in 1972 by the City.211 However, the Court held the
ordinance covering the petiod between 1972 and 1974 to be technically
deficient because of its failure to properly restrict the impact fee funds
collected for public facility expansion. The Court remanded the case to
the trial court to determine the question of refunds due the various
contractors who paid impact fees under the technically deficient ordi-
nance.2 2 While the remanded case was pending, the City enacted an-
other new ordinance213 mandating that the funds collected during the
period between 1972 and 1974 would be utilized under the methodol-
ogy delineated in the 1974 ordinance. Citing Forbes Pioneer Boat Line
v. Board of Commissioners,zz4 the trial court ruled that the funds col-
lected between 1972 and 1974 had to be returned to the developers. The
Forbes case involved a Florida drainage district's efforts to collect
tolls from anyone using a canal lock controlled by the district. The
Florida Legislature realized that there was no authority for this ac-
tion, and consequently, the Legislature passed a law ratifying the toll
system. In the Forbes decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
ratification of an act is void, if the ratifying authority had no power to
do the act in the first place.275 Since the drainage district was without
authority to collect tolls the ratification was plainly impossible. 26
Florida's Second District Court of Appeal distinguished the
Forbes case and reversed the trial court ruling by noting that Dunedin
had authority to collect the fees during the 1972-1974 period . 77 The
City erred in effecting an impact fee in an operation aspect. The Court
substantiated its view by citing the Florida Supreme Court version of
270. See 358 So.2d 846 and Florida Ordinance 74-19 (1974).
271. Contractors and Builders Association of Pinellas County v. City of Dune-
din, 329 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1976).
272. Id. at 322.
273. See 358 So.2d 846 and Florida Ordinance 76-16 (1976).
274. 258 U.S. 338, 66 L.Ed. 647, 42 S. Ct. 325 (1921).
275. City of Dunedin v. Contractors and Builders Ass'n of Pinellas County, 358
So.2d 846, 848 (Fla. 2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1978) cert den 370 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1979).
276. Id.
277. Id.
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the Dunedin impact fee case. In that case Justice Hatchett noted: "...
Nothing we decide, however, prevents Dunedin from adopting another
sewer connection charge ordinance, incorporating appropriate restric-
tions on the use of revenues it produces. Dunedin is at liberty, moreo-
ver, to adopt an ordinance restricting the use of moneys already col-
lected . . . ." The distinguishing point therefore was the passage of
an ordinance that restricted the funds retroactively based on the col-
lection and utilization methods specified by the Court. Since Dunedin
has passed a restrictive ordinance retroactively restricting past collec-
tions, the Appellate Court permitted the City to keep its earlier ille-
gally obtained fees.
Finally, what happens, if the requisite authority is not found to
exist? Apparently, the fees would have to be returned on somewhat the
same type of idea as expressed in Wright Development.279 However, for
litigation of this nature to wind its way through the courts could take
years during which time a developer might sell the land on which the
fees have been paid. If the property has been deeded to a new land-
owner, should the fee be returned to the developer who paid the fee or
the new owner of the land on which the fee was paid? It appears that
this question was answered some years ago in Perlmutter's, Inc. v.
Ancell.28 ° In that case a school impact fee was found to be unconstitu-
tional. Perlmutter's, Inc. had paid a fee of $125 per dwelling unit on
each of 120 units under protest. All of the units had been deeded to
new residents. Their warranty deeds made no mention of the grantees
of the owners succeeding to any rights in the fees upon a court ordered
reimbursement.21 The Court determined that the refund should be
made to the developer/grantor.
4. ExiSTING STRUCTURES AND LANDOWNERS
It seems likely that a subdivision might be approved which in-
278. 358 So.2d at 848, citing 329 So.2d at 322.
279. 125 Cal. Rptr. 723.
280. 153 Colo. 149, 385 P.2d 123 (1963).
281. It appears that it would be wise to reference any succession of rights to a
reimbursement in the warranty deed. References in a sales contract would be insuffi-
cient in most cases due to the doctrine of merger of the sales contract into the war-
ranty deed. See Volunteer Security Co. v. Dowl, 159 Fla. 767, 33 So.2d 150, 151
(1947) and Fraser v. Schoenfeld, 364 So.2d 533, 534 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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cludes one or two existing structures. Since an impact fee might be
assessed at the time that a building permit is issued or a subdivision
plat approved, it is conceivable that an argument might be made as to
the invalidity of the fee. Since the owners of the existing structures
would not be assessed, it could be argued that the Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution had been violated. This is because dif-
ferent landowners in the same subdivision were both being treated
differently while benefiting from the facility expansion. Precisely this
same argument was presented in Ivy Steel and Wire Co., Inc. v. City
of Jacksonville.8 2 The City of Jacksonville enacted an :ordinance com-
pelling those users in the downtown area of the city to pay a special
sewer system surcharge for water pollution control. The surcharge was
made effective only for new users connected to the system after August
24, 1971. A group of taxpayers brought a class action suit seeking in-
validation of the charge, as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court upheld the city ordinance by stating:
The Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a statute or regulation
from having a beginning and thus discriminating between rights of an
earlier and later time . . . plaintiffs have not been denied equal protec-
tion so long as they are being treated the same as those similarly situ-
ated at the same time.23
Thus, it is conceivable that new structures could be assessed and
existing structures not assessed without violating the Equal Protection
Clause. However, from a policy standpoint, one could argue that all
property owners who seek to build on their land be assessed. It would
seem apparent that there is a big difference between a small land own-
er and a large scale developer. Certaintly the difference in effect on the
community insofar as a need for public faciities is concerned will be
great. The developer is the one who causes the major impact on the
community. The Equal Protection argument might permit an exemp-
tion for those small property owners who wish to build and reside on
land they own. It is conceivable that the impact formula might assess
those who build on their land for profit but not to reside. The Wald
282. 401 F. Supp. 701 (N.D. Fla. 1975).
283. Id. at 703 citing Russo v. Shapiro, 309 F. Supp. 385 (D. Conn. 1969).
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Corporationz' case presents judicial authority for distinguishing be-
tween the small landowner and the developer.
A critical distinction. . . must be drawn between the ordinary property
owner and the subdivider. Unlike one who merely reserves his property
for personal use of sale as a single tract, the subdivider profits from the
sale of lots withi subdivision The local government must consider the
welfare of the families who will be filling the development. 2 5
The Court went on to indicate that it is only reasonable to assess the
developer. This seems to leave some leaway to exempt the small prop-
erty owner from the impact fee, if he intends to reside on the land.
PREDICTION
It appears, based on the track record of the Florida Legislature,
that no impact fee enabling act will be passed in the near future. In
fact, there has been no interest in even introducing such a piece of leg-
islation within the last few years. However, the Legislature has left
statutory authority that appears to be sufficient to allow local govern-
ments to enact a fee. Such a fee would be enacted as an extension of
the police power or comprehensive planning powers. Also, based on
Wald, it appears that a fee which provides a good balance between
the desires of developers and local government would be upheld, since
Florida is a rational nexus test state.
It is clear that any local governmental entity will not have an
"easy road to hoe," because Florida Courts have not been overly re-
ceptive to the impact fee concept. However, many of the impact "fees"
that have been subjected to the scrutiny of the judiciary have actually
been taxes. Thus, the courts have been correct in invalidating these so-
called "fees." Local governmental entities that wish to enact an impact
"fee" will have to take great care to make certain that the revenues
collected are of direct benefit to the individuals paying them.
It also appears that the fees will have to be increased to an
amount of assessment far above what. has been the rule in Florida.
Small collections of impact fees only provide a small supplement to
local governmental budgets. These supplements are pitifully insufficient
284. 338 So.2d at 867.
285. Id.
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to build the type of expanded facilities that will be needed to serve the
tidal wave of new residents coming to Florida. Therefore, local officials
will not only have to bite the bullet by opposing the real estate and
construction industry, one of Florida's biggest industries, in enacting
impact fees, but local officials will have to set the fee assessment
formula high enough to collect sufficient revenues to make a meaning-
ful impact on the community.
Dramatic expansions in public facilities will be needed in all areas
of Florida from the Panhandle to the Gold Coast as Florida moves
into the 80's. In the end, developers, the Legislature, the courts, local
officials and the public will have to make the policy decision, as to
whether or not the impact fee is the proper vehicle for funding the
public facility expansion that must and will be built for new residents.
Paul Gougelman
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I.R.C. Section 2518 and the Law of Disclaimers
The Tax Reform Act of 19761 introduced code section 2518,2 which
created definitive standards for a disclaimer to be valid for Federal Tax
purposes. As a result of its recent passage, lack of interpretive regula-
tions and absence of court interpretation,' its application in many areas
is unclear; consequently, much uncertainty surrounds the law of dis-
claimers. In an attempt to show the virtues, uncertainties and short-
comings of section 2518, this article will analyze section 2518 on two
different planes: (1) whether it carries out the intent of Congress and
(2) whether it can be improved to enhance the use of disclaimers as an
estate planning tool (a somewhat idealistic notion).
To discuss section 2518 meaningfully the reader must understand
the use of disclaimers as an estate planning tool, the common law of
disclaimers and the events which led to the enactment of section 2518.
Therefore, the article begins with several sections designed to acquaint
the reader with these areas. The remainder of the article is devoted to a
discussion of section 2518's effectiveness and suggestions to enhance its
effectiveness.
1. DISCLAIMERS AS AN ESTATE PLANNING TOOL
A disclaimer is the refusal to accept the ownership of property or
rights with respect to property.' The major importance of disclaimers is
the flexibility they provide for estate planning. Disclaimers can be used
to correct errors in an estate plan after it would ordinarily be too late
I. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 STAT. 1893, added I.R.C.
Sec. 2518.
2. I.R.C. See. 2518 (hereinafter referred to as 2518).
3. But see Ingham v. Hubbell, 462 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Iowa 1978). In Hubbell,
the court was asked to decide a class action under the declaratory judgement act. The
issue was whether the plaintiffs disclaimer of a portion of a contingent interest was a
qualified disclaimer. The case was dismissed for lack of an actual controversy.
4. WAYS AND MEANS COMMITrEE REPORT accompanying HR 14844 H.R. REP.
No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976) (hereinafter cited as WAYS AND MEANS
CoMMITTEE REPORT).
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(for example after the testator's death), adjust the estate plan to ac-
count for changed circumstances, avoid the creditors of a beneficiary
and allow post mortem estate planning. The following examples will
demonstrate the use of disclaimers as a method of achieving tax sav-
ings; assume each of the following disclaimers are qualified.
A disclaimer may be used to save gift tax.5 A devises Whiteacre to
B. B has no need for Whiteacre and would prefer it to pass to his son
C. If B accepts Whiteacre and transfers it to C for less than adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth, B has made a taxa-
ble gift to C.6 Whereas, if B disclaims Whiteacre which thereby passes
to C, no gift tax will be imposed on B.7 There is no gift from B to C
because B will be treated as never having owned Whiteacre.
A disclaimer may be used to save estate tax A devises Whiteacre
to B who is terminally ill. B would prefer to give Whiteacre to his son
C in a manner that will not have any tax ramifications. If B accepts
Whiteacre and then dies, Whiteacre will be included in B's gross es-
tate."0 If B disclaims Whiteacre, which thereby passes to C, there will
be no inclusion in B's gross estate, because B will again be treated as
never having owned Whiteacre. 1
A disclaimer may be used to prevent an overfunding or an un-
derfunding of a marital bequest for purposes of achieving the maxi-
5. I.R.C. Sec. 2518 (a); WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT AT 65.
6. I.R.C. Secs. 2501 and 2511; Treas. Reg. Sec. 25.2511-1(c), T.D. 6334, 1958-2
C.B. 643. See Hardenbergh v. Comm'r, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), aff'd. 17 T.C. 166 cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952); Bishop v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Miss.
1970), afi'd per curiam, 26 AFTR 2d 1653 (5th Cir. 1972); Krakoff v. United States,
313 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd. 439 F. 2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1971); William L.
Maxwell v. Comm'r, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952).
7. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 65.
8. "(a) General Rule - For purposes of this subtitle, if a person makes a qualified
disclaimer with respect to any interest in property, this subtitle shall apply with respect
to such interest as if the interest had never been tranferred by such person." I.R.C.
Sec. 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 65.
9. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 65. For pur-
poses of estate-tax, I.R.C. Sec. 2045 says 2518 applies.
10. "The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the
extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death." I.R.C. Sec.
2033; Treas. Reg. Sec. 20.2033-I.
11. Brown v. Rautzahn, 63 F. 2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641
(1933); I.R.C. Sec. 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 65.
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mum marital deduction." If an amount greater than the maximum
marital deduction allowable"3 passes to the surviving spouse, the excess
will be taxed in the estate of each spouse. 4 If the surviving spouse dis-
claims the excess'5 over the maximum marital deduction allowable, the
disclaimed property will not be included in the surviving spouse's gross
estate. 6 If an amount less than the maximum marital deduction allow-
able is provided for the surviving spouse, a disclaimer by another can
increase the property passing to the spouse and allow use of the full
marital deduction. 7 In much the same way, a disclaimer by one heir
can be used to increase an estate's charitable deduction.'" Thus, a dis-
claimer can be an important post mortem estate planning tool.
A disclaimer will prevent the imposition of a generation skipping
tax. 9 A devises to his son B a life estate in Whiteacre with remainder
to B's son C. Assuming that the value of the property at B's death is
greater than $250,000, a generation skipping tax will be imposed at
12. I.R.C. Secs. 2518(a) and 2056; WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at
65. In the following discussion it is assumed that achieving the maximum marital de-
duction allowable is desired. For the law prior to 2518 see generally I.R.C. Sec. 2056
(d) and Treas. Reg. See. 20.2056(d)-i (1958).
13. The maximum marital deduction allowable is the greater of $250,000 or 50%
of the decedent's adjusted gross estate as defined in I.R.C. Sec. 2056(c)(2), less the
I.R.C. Sec. 2056(c)(1)(B) adjustment.
14. It will be included in both estates as an I.R.C. Sec. 2033 inclusion, since the
decedent owned the property at death. This property is not subject to the marital de-
duction since it exceeds the maximum deduction allowable. When the spouse receives
the property under the marital bequest, it will be included in the surviving spouse's
gross estate under I.R.C. Sec. 2033 when the survivor dies. However, the double taxa-
tion may be reduced by I.R.C. Sec. 2013.
15. The issue of partial disclaimers will be discussed later in this article as part
of an analysis of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. See text accompanying notes 74-87.
16. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMMiTTEE REPORT at 65. The pos-
sibiltiy of a surviving spouse disclaiming an interest in a marital trust and taking a
portion of the disclaimed interest under a non marital trust will be discussed later in
this article. For purposes of this example assume the property passes to the issue of the
surviving spouse.
17. Id.
18. Id. For an excellent discussion and example of disclaimers with respect to
charitable deductions, see Newman and Kalter, The Need For Disclaimer Legislation-
An Analysis of The Background and Current Law, 28 TAX LAW 571, 577 (1975).
19. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 65. See sec-
tion 2614(c) and S. Rep. No. 94-1236, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 607 (1976).
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that time.2 If B disclaims his life estate, no generation skipping tax
will be imposed because B will be treated as never having owned a life
estate in Whiteacre.2 1
A disclaimer may shift the income tax consequences of a trust.2 A
devises to B, a wealthy individual with a large income, the power to
designate who shall be the recipient of an income interest in the trust
res (the power excludes designation of the grantor's spouse). B will be
taxed on the income of the trust because he has the power, exercisable
solely by himself, to vest the income in himself. 3 If B disclaims his
power he will not be taxed on the income." Assuming B disclaims and
the income is payable to B's son C (an individual with very little in-
come) income tax will be saved as a result of the graduated tax rates.
2. COMMON LAW
It is important to understand the common law history of disclaim-
ers because, prior to the enactment of section 2518, the federal income,
estate and gift tax consequences of a disclaimer were dependent upon
state law." In this period, many states lacked disclaimer statutes and
were dependent upon their own common law. Moreover, the disclaimer
statutes that had been enacted2 1 lacked sufficient uniformity to provide
20. See generally I.R.C. Secs. 2601-2614.
21. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMMITrEE REPORT at 65. I.R.C.
Sec. 2614(c) says for the effect of a qualified disclaimer see Sec. 2518.
22. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 65.
23. I.R.C. Sec. 678(a)(1); Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.678 (a) -1 (1956).
24. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(c)(2) treats a power with respect to property as an interest in
such property. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(a) will treat B as never having the power if he dis-
claims it. In Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F. 2d 218 (10th Cir. 1954), rev'g. 119 F. Supp.
360 (D.C. Pa. 1953) a widow disclaimed a portion of her interest in a-trust. The court
held she was only taxable on the income of the portion she retained.
25. Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F. 2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933); Kenaith v. Comm'r, 480 F.
2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g. 58 T.C. 352 (1972); Estate of Rolin v. Comm'r, 68 T.C.
919 (1977), aff'd. 588 F. 2d 368 (2nd Cir. 1978); Jewett v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 430 (1978);
Treas. Reg. Secs. 25.2511-1 (c), T.D. 6334, 1958-2 C.B. 643; 20.2041-3 (d)(6) (1958);
WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 65.
26. ARIZ. REV. STAT. Sec. 14-2801 (1973); CAL. PROB. CODE Sec. 190.1 (Deer-
ing 1972); COLO. REV. STAT. Sec. 15-11-801 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. Sec. 45-300
(1972); FLA. STAT. Sec. 732.801 (1977); HAW. REV. STAT. Sec. 538-1 (repealed 1974
and Uniform Probate Code was adopted 560:2-801); IDAHO CODE SEC. 15-2-801
(1971) repealed 1973 by ch. 173 Sec. 1 S.L. 1978; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 /2, Sec. 2-7
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a standard law of disclaimers at the federal level.27 Therefore, federal
courts were frequently using common law rules in deciding controver-
sies involving disclaimers. The next portion of this article will briefly
outline the pertinent points of the common law: that is, who may dis-
claim, what may be disclaimed and when to disclaim.
A beneficiary under a will was permitted to disclaim his interest,"
whereas, an heir was not permitted to disclaim an intestate share be-
cause it passed by operation of law.29 A disclaimed interest in property
was treated as if it was never made."0 Therefore, a disclaimer became
an effective way to avoid the claims of creditors and/or to reduce
taxes.
3 1
One issue which arose at common law involved the question of
whether a disclaimer of part, but not all, of an interest in property .was
valid. The courts took varied positions. Some courts would not recog-
(Smith-Hurd 1976); IND. CODE Sec. 29-1-6 (1971); IOWA CODE ANN. Sec. 633.704
(West 1972); KAN. STAT. Sec. 59-2291 (1968); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. Secs.
554.501-520 (1972); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW Sec. 4-1.3 (Consol. 1966);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Sec. 1339.60 (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84 Sec. 22
(West 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. Sec. 34-5-1 (1956); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
Sec. 43-29 (1968); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. art. 37A (Vernon 1971); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. Secs. 11.86.03-05 (1973); W. VA. CODE Sec. 42-4-3 (1959). The above listing of
state disclaimer statutes is intended to be illustrative and is not exhaustive.
27. Id.
28. For a collection of cases illustrating this point, see 6 BOwE-PARKER, PAGE
ON WILLS; 39, n.1 (sec. 49.2) [hereinafter cited as PAGE ON WILLS]; See also, New-
man and Kalter, Disclaimers of Future Interests: Continuing Problems and Suggested
Solutions, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW 827 (1974).
29. For a collection of cases illustrating this point, see PAGE ON WILLS 36, n. I
(sec. 49.1); see In re Meyer's estate, 107 Cal. App. 2d 799, 238 P. 2d 597 (2nd Dist.
1951); Watson v. Watson, 13 Conn. 83 (1839); Payton v. Monroe, 110 Ga. 262, 34
S.E. 305 (1899); Estate of Bliven, 236 N.W. 2d 366 (Iowa 1975); Central Fibre Prod-
ucts Co. v. Lorenz, 66 N.W. 2d 30 (Iowa 1954); Seeley v. Seeley, 45 N.W. 2d 881
(Iowa 1951).
30. For a collection of cases illustrating this point, see PAGE ON WILLS 41, n. 1
(sec. 49.4).
31. If fraud, collusion or estoppel is involved, the court will treat the disclaimer
as a conveyance. In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P. 2d 401 (1940); Goodman v.
Jannsen, 234 Iowa 925, 14 N.W. 2d 647 (1944); Coomes v. Finegan, 233 Iowa 448, 7
N.W. 2d 729 (1943); Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 187 N.W. 20 (1922); In re
Hodge's Estate, 20 Tenn. App. 411, 99 S.W. 2d 561 (1936). However, the motive of
the disclaimant is irrelevant. Keniath v. Comm'r, 480 F. 2d 57 (6th Cir. 1973); Camp
v. United States, 16 AFTR 2d 6154 (M.D. Ga, 1965).
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nize a partial disclaimer,"2 while other courts would recognize a partial
disclaimer if the gift was severable. 3 No court, however, permitted a
partial disclaimer of a nonseverable gift absent a statute.3 4 Even before
section 2518 was enacted, many states changed the common law by
statutes which allowed the partial disclaimer of an interest in
property.3
At common law, the right to disclaim was not personal to the dev-
isee unless the testator evidenced a contrary intent.3 This. meant that
the representatives of a deceased devisee could disclaim in the name of
the devisee. 7 The power of a representative to disclaim is a significant
estate planning tool and will be discussed in more detail later in the
article.
To be effective, a disclaimer must have been made within a rea-
sonable time.3 On its face, this requirement seemed logical and under-
standable; however, the reasonable time requirement became an un-
workable standard for determining the federal tax consequences of a
disclaimer .3  The primary problem in using such a standard was the
fact that it had to be applied on a case by case basis.40 Prior to the
32. For a collection of cases illustrating this point, see PAGE ON WILLS 51, n. 1
(sec. 49.10).
33. Id. at 52, n. 4 (Sec. 49.10).
34. Id. at 51, n. 3 (Sec. 49.10).
35. See note 27 supra.
36. For a collection of cases illustrating this point, see PAGE ON WILLS 42, n. 1
(Sec. 49.5).
37. See Perkins v. Phinney, 7 AFTR 2d 1753 (D.C. Tex. 1967); Estate of Rolin
v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 919 (1977); Estate of Dreyer v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 275 (1976) acq.
1978-12 I.R.B. 6; Estate of Hoenig v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 471 (1976) acq. 1978-12 I.R.B.
6.
38. For a collection of cases illustrating this point, see PAGE ON WILLS 46, 46-47
nn. 5-9 (sec. 49.8). There was both a common law requirement of reasonable time and
a federal law requirement of reasonable time. However, in many cases they were
treated as a single standard. See Keniath v. Comm'r, 480 F. 2d at 61; Estate of Rolin
v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. at 927; Estate of Dreyer v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. at 291; Contra,
Jewett v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. at 436.
39. WAYS AND MEANS COMMITrEE REPORT at 66-67. Notes 39-50, infra., illus-
trate many of the difficulties in determining whether a disclaimer was made within a
reasonable time.
40. See Estate of Dreyer v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 275 (1977). Therein the court held:
"What is the reasonable time varies with the circumstances of each case. The time may
be very long if injury to others will not result." Id. at 293.
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enactment of section 2518, it was nearly impossible to decide with cer-
tainty whether a disclaimer was made within a reasonable time. This
uncertainty was displayed in Brown v. Routzahn4 and the many cases
that followed. In Brown, the plaintiff (Brown) disclaimed an interest in
the property of his deceased wife eight years after her death but prior
to settlement and distribution of her estate. The circuit court held that
the disclaimer was effective for federal tax purposes because Ohio law
did not require a donee to accept or reject a gift within a specified
time; therefore, a rejection made prior to distribution was held valid.
Brown is the first case to recognize that a disclaimer is not a transfer
for tax purposes. After Brown, regulations were added requiring that
disclaimers be made within a reasonable time period after receiving
knowledge of the existence of the transfer.'2
In Estate of Rolin v. Commissioner,43 the decedent created a revo-
cable trust on April 28, 1958. He died on September 30, 1968, and his
spouse, the beneficiary of an interest in the trust, died on January 31,
1969. The executors of the deceased spouse disclaimed her interest
eleven years after its creation, but within eight months of its becoming
indefeasibly fixed. The timeliness of the disclaimer was at issue. The
court held that a reasonable time commences when the interest is in-
defeasibily fixed both in quality and quantity which, in this case, oc-
curred at Mr. Rolin's death. Thus eight months was held to be a rea-
sonable time.,"
In Kenaith v. Commissioner,5 the disclaimant had a vested
remainder subject to devestiture. The disclaimer was made nineteen
years after the creation of the interest but only six months after the
death of the life beneficiary. The court was faced with the difficult
question of determining when the period of reasonable time com-
mences. The Tax Court6 held that a reasonable time should be inter-
41. 63 F. 2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933).
42. Treas. Reg. Secs. 25.2511-1(c) (1958), 20.2041-3(d)(6) (1958).
43. 68 T.C. 919 (1977).
44. Id. at 927. Accord, In re Estate of Mixter, 372 N.Y.S. 2d 296, 83 Misc. 2d
290 (N.Y. County Sur. Ct. 1975). In Rolin, the court was dealing with the disclaimer
of a general power of appointment. See Treas. Reg. Sec. 20.2041-3(d)(6) (1958), which
requires the disclaimer of a general power of appointment to be valid under local law
and to be made within a reasonable time after learning of its existence.
45. 480 F. 2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
46. 58 T.C. 352 (1972).
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a federal standard; 7 nineteen years was held not to be a reasonable
time. The Eighth Circuit reversed the tax court saying:
In determining 'reasonable time' and the related issue of when the rea-
sonable time commences, we perforce, absent a federal statute or regula-
tion defining reasonable time, must look to the law of the states. We are
not conclusively bound by the state law, but this is the only field to
probe for legal decisions and discussions on the phrase 'reasonable time'
as used in the context of making valid disclaimers.48
After examining many authorities the court concluded that, when a
vested interest subject to divestiture is involved, the reasonable time
period commences after the death of the life beneficiary; not at the
time the interest was created.49 The result in Keniath was that a dis-
claimer made nineteen years after the creation of the interest, but six
months after the death of the life beneficiary, was within a reasonable
time. At that point, it became clear that allowing local law to dictate
what a "reasonable time" is presented an inadequate method of deter-
mining the federal tax consequences of a disclaimer.
47. The Tax Court relied on Fuller v. Comm'r, 37 T.C. 147 (1961) which held a
disclaimer 25 years after the creation of the interest was not within a reasonable time.
These tax court decisions create a federal standard, which measures a reasonable time
from the creation of the interest whether the interest is, a present interest or a future
interest, and whether it is vested or contingent.
48. 480 F. 2d at 61.
49.
We hold that under the prevailing common law and in particular, the
jurisdiction of the state of Minnesota the holder of a vested remainder subject
to divestiture has a reasonable time within which to renounce or disclaim the re-
mainder interest after the death of the life beneficiary and that an unequivocal
disclaimer filed with six months thereof is made within a reasonable time.
Id. at 64. Contra, Jewett v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 430 (1978). In Jewett the court disagreed
with Keniath and held that state law does not necessarily provide an adequate guide to
the resolution of the federal tax question presented. The court measured the time from
the creation of the interest, rather than from the time the interest became indefeasibly
fixed, and concluded 33 years was not reasonable. The court relied on Keniath v.
Comm'r, 58 T.C. 352 (1972); Estate of Hoenig v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 471 (1976); Fuller
v. Comm'r, 37 T.C. 147 (1961); Treas. Reg. Sec. 25.2511-1 (c) (1958). See also, Estate
of Halbach v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 141 (1978).
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3. THE ADVENT OF 2518
As a result of the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the law
of disclaimers in the years following the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Keniath, considerable discussion of ways to clarify the law surfaced. °
It was suggested that the law of disclaimers be federalized and specific
disclaimer requirements be imposed." The widespread dissatisfaction
with the pre 1977 state of the law brought about the enactment of sec-
tion 2518.52
A disclaimer of an interest in property created after 1976 will be
effective for federal tax purposes only if it is a qualified disclaimer,
which is defined as:
[A]n irrevocable and unqualified refusal by a person to accept an interest
in property but only if-
(1) such refusal is in writing,
(2) such writing is received by the transferor of the interest, his
legal representative, or the holder of the legal title to the property
to which the interest relates not later than the date which is 9
months after the later of-
(A) the day on which the transfer creating the interest in
such a person is made, or
(B) the day on which such person attains age 21,
(3) such person has not accepted the interest or any of its bene-
fits, and
(4) as a result of such refusal, the interest passes without any di-
rection on the part of the person making the disclaimer and passes
either-
(A) to the spouse of the decedent, or
(B) to a person other than the person making the
disclaimer.0
If the recipient of an interest in property makes a qualified disclaimer,
50. 49 NOTRE DAME LAW at 837 (1974); COMMITTEE ON ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXES, TAX SECTION RECOMMENDATIONS No. 1974-2, 27 Tax Law 818 (1974).
51. Id. WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 66.
52. Id. The dissatisfaction stemmed from the fact that prior to 2518 disclaimers
were handled under many different code sections and in many different regulations and
were dependent upon local law. See Treas. Regs. Secs. 25.2511-1(c), 20.2041-3(d)(6),
20.2056(d)-I(a) (1958).
53. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(b).
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the property will be considered as having never been transferred to
such person.54
The intent of Congress in enacting section 2518 was the creation
of a federal standard for disclaimers, thus ending reliance upon state
law in determining the federal tax consequences of a disclaimer. 5
Therefore, it was hoped that section 2518 would create a safe harbor.
However, section 2518 (b) (4) (A) and (B) requires that the interest
must pass to a person other than the disclaimant or the spouse of the
decedent" (the decedent being the testamentary transferor). The ab-
sence of a federal rule or regulation determining who will receive the
disclaimed property"' prevents section 2518 from acting as a safe har-
bor, for the courts are now forced to look to local law in making this
determination. Consequently, if local law does not recognize the dis-
claimer, section 2518 (b) (4) cannot be satisfied. This can be illustrated
by the following example. In state X an intestate share could not be
disclaimed. B, an heir of A, satisfying all the requirements of section
2518 (except b(4) because the disclaimer was not recognized under
state law) disclaimed his intestate share. If section 2518 is to act as a
safe harbor, B's disclaimer should be a qualified disclaimer. It would
appear B's disclaimer is not, because the property, as a result of the
disclaimer not being effective under state law, did not pass to someone
other than the disclaimant. Therefore, the only way to be certain a
54. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(a).
55. "If the requirements of the provision are satisfied, a refusal to accept prop-
erty is to be given an effect for federal estate and gift tax purposes even if the local law
does not technically characterize the refusal as a disclaimer." WAYS AND MEANS COM-
MITTEE REPORT at 67. For a critical analysis of 2518 see Frimmer, Using Disclaimers
in Post Mortem Estate Planning: 1976 Law Leaves Unresolved Issues, 48 J. OF TAX.
322 (1978).
56. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(b)(4). A peculiar result is reached when a power is dis-
claimed. Section 2518(c)(2) treats a power with respect to property as an interest in
such property. Equating the power with an interest seems to indicate that powers may
be disclaimed. A problem is encountered when we apply 2518(b)(4) to the disclaimer of
a power. As a result of the disclaimer, the power is generally dissolved and conse-
quently does not pass to a person other than the disclaimant. It would appear that
section 2518(b)(4) was not intended to be literally applied to disclaimers of powers. See
Frimmer, 48 J. OF TAX 322 (1978).
57. There are no federal rules or regulations which deal with who the recipient of
the property will be after the property has been disclaimed. Therefore, local law must
be consulted.
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disclaimer will be a qualified disclaimer is to satisfy both state and
federal requirements.5
To rectify section 2518's apparent reliance upon state law and, in
turn, to fulfill the intent of Congress, section 2518 should be amended
to read: As a result of such refusal, the interest passes without any
direction on the part of the person making the disclaimer as if the dis-
claimant predeceased the transferor.9 Although the proposed amend-
ment would be reliant upon state law to determine the taker, it would
not be dependent upon the state's recognition of the disclaimer.
The most significant change brought about by section 2518 was
the establishment of a definitive time in which to disclaim. 0 Section
2518 changes the common law requirement (that a disclaimer be made
within a reasonable time) to a nine month period, adding much needed
certainty to the law of disclaimers. The only remaining question con-
cerns the determination of when this nine month period commences.
The Conference Report61 states the nine month period commences
with reference to each taxable transfer.1 Therefore, the disclaimant has
nine months after the taxable transfer in which to disclaim.
If the transfer is considered made when it is treated as a com-
pleted transfer for gift tax purposes, 3 with respect to inter vivos trans-
fers, or upon the decedent's death, with respect to testamentary trans-
fers, the use of disclaimers will be seriously impaired. The above
58. The above example assumes that an intestate share can be disclaimed under
Sec. 2518. This issue is discussed later in this article. In many cases, satisfying both
state and federal law will not create a hardship; however, in other cases, due to an
unreasonably strict state statute, it may prevent a disclaimer from being qualified only
because of the state law which governs.
59. See 49 NOTRE DAME LAw 839. The Uniform Probate Code also treats the
disclaimant as predeceasing the transferor. See Uniform Probate Code Sec. 2-801(c).
The mechanics of such a standard would entail the conveyance, by the disclaimant, to
the person who would receive the property as a result of the disclaimant being treated
as predeceasing the transferor. This would divest the disclaimant of title under state
law and vest title in the one who was treated as receiving it for tax purposes.
60. I.R.C. See. 2518(b)(2).
61. CONFERENCE REPORT ACCOMPANYING HR 14844 H.R. REP. No. 94-1515,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 623-24 (1976).
62. "The conferees intend to make it clear that the 9-month period for making a
disclaimer is to be determined in reference to each taxable transfer." Id. at 623.
63. A gift is complete forgift tax purposes when the transferor has reqlinquished
dominion and control over the property. Treas. Reg. Sec. 25.2511-2(b) (1958).
LR.C Section 2518 197 14:1980
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definition of transfer will make the disclaimer of certain interests in
property almost impossible. One such interest in property is created by
the exercise of a special power of appointment. Where a donee is given
a special power the gift (or devise) is a taxable transfer; the donee has
nine months from that date in which to disclaim for it to be considered
"qualified". If the donee chooses not to disclaim and subsequently ex-
ercises the power, the appointee's disclaimer, for it to be qualified,
must be made within nine months of the transfer of the power to the
donee. The nine months do not begin when the power is exercised since
the exercise of a special power is not a taxable transfer;64 consequently,
theo transfer creating the appointee's interest is the transfer of the
power to the donee. In many cases, the donee of the power may refrain
from exercising it for a period in excess of nine months. In such cases,
the appointee will be precluded from making a qualified disclaimer in-
sofar as he is unaware of his interest until it is too late.
In addition to making the qualified disclaimer of some interests
impossible, Congress' definition of transfer - taxable transfer - would
allow some "qualified" disclaimers to be made many years after the
interest was created. If we assume that a special power of appointment
can reach the hands of the holder of the power without the occurrence
of a taxable transfer (which can easily happen where the holder ac-
quired it for full and adequate consideration in money or money's
worth, for example, section 2516), when will the nine month period
begin for the appointee under the special power? This question can best
be answered in the negative. We know it does not begin when the
holder acquired the power since that was not a "transfer". We know it
64. The exercise of a special power of appointment is not a transfer (completed
transfer for gift tax purposes). See I.R.C. Sec. 2514, and Self v. United States, 142 F.
Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1956). The death of B with a special power of appointment is not a
taxable transfer. See I.R.C. Sec. 2041; Clauson v. Vaughan, 147 F. 2d 84 (1st Cir.
1945); Janes v. Reynolds, 57 F. Supp. 609 (D. Minn. 1944). The reason the exercise of
a special power of appointment is not a transfer is because powers of appointment are
not interests in property. The following cases, although prior to I.R.C. Sec. 2041, are
useful to demonstrate that a power of appointment (general or special) is not an inter-
est in property. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942), rev'g. 121
F. 2d 307, afld. 42 BTA 145; United States v Field, 255 U.S. 257 (1921). The exercise
of a general power of appointment is a transfer because of I.R.C. Sec. 2514 and a
general power of appointment is included in a decedent's gross estate because of I.R.C.
Sec. 2041 (not I.R.C. Sec. 2033).
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does not begin when the power was exercised since the dxercise of a
special power is not a "transfer". Insofar as no other events occurred,
we must conclude that the period never commenced; basic logic tells us
that a period which never commenced can never end. Therefore, in cer-
tain situations, the appointee can disclaim many years later (assuming
he has not accepted the interest or its benefits) and have it qualify.
The result in the above discussion would be vastly different if the
donee is given a general power as opposed to a special power. Since the
exercise of a general power is a taxable transfer, 5 the appointee will
have nine months from the exercise of the power in which to disclaim.
Thus, an appointee under a general power will always have nine
months to disclaim;6 whereas, the appointee under a special power (es-
pecially if it is a testamentary power) will rarely have such an
opportunity.
The obvious question that arises regarding the commencement of
the nine month period, is whether a disclaimer of property passing by
the exercise of a special power should be treated differently than a dis-
claimer of property passing by the exercise of a general power. If we
focus upon the disclaimant's right to disclaim, there is no justification
for such a distinction. The appointees under both a general and a spe-
cial power are similarly situated: they have no way of knowing if they
will be appointed, when they will be appointed or what they will receive
if apppointed. In each case, their ownership arises as a result of the
exercise of the power. Therefore, it is of little concern to the appointee
65. See I.R.C. Secs. 2514 and 2041. See also Treas. Reg. Sec. 25.2514-1(a)(1)
(1958). Section 2514 treats the exercise (or lapse) of a general power of appointment as
a gift. Section 2041 includes in the decedents gross estate property subject to a general
power of appointment. Note there is no code section which treats the exercise or lapse
of a special power of appointment as a gift. Similarly, there is no code section which
causes the property subject to a special power of appointment to be included in the
holder's gross estate unless the exercise of the special power is used to create another
power.
66. CONFERENCE REPORT ACCOMPANYING HR. 14844 H.R. REP No. 94-1515,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 623-24 (1976). The report gives the following example:
[I]n the case of a general power of appointment where the other requirements
are satisfied, the person who would be the holder of the general power will have
a nine month period after the creation of the power in which to disclaim. The
person to whom the property would pass by reason of the exercise-or lapse of the
power would have a nine month period after a taxable exercise, etc., by the
holder of the power in which to disclaim.
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what type of power the holder exercised.
The sole distinction between a general and a special power is with
respect to the federal taxation of the holder of the power. The holder of
a general power is taxed upon its exercise; the holder of a special
power is not.67 The imposition of a transfer tax upon the holder of the
power is an inadequate basis to justify disallowing the disclaimer by an
appointee under a special power (if made within nine months of the
exercise of the power), since the tax is unrelated to the rights of the
appointee. Therefore, it is unreasonable to require the disclaimer, by
an appointee under a special power, be made within nine months of the
transfer creating the power (which may be prior to the exercise of the
power), when an appointee under a general power is permitted to dis-
claim nine months after the exercise of the power. To remedy this un-
warranted distinction, as well as to cure the situation where no tranfer
occurs, section 2518 should be amended or regulations promulgated de-
fining transfer in a manner which treats the appointee under a geneal
and a special power similarly in all cases. Florida Statutes Section
732.801 provides an excellent example of when an interest must be dis-
claimed to assure that the recipient of any interest in property has a
fair opportunity to disclaim:
(5) Time for filing disclaimer-A disclaimer shall be filed at any time
after the creation of the interest, but in any event within 9 months after
the event giving rise to the right to disclaim, including the death of the
decedent; or, if the disclaimant is not finally ascertained as a beneficiary
of his interest has not become indefeasibly fixed both in quality and
quantity at the death of the decedent, then the disclaimer shall be recorded
not later than 6 months after the event that would cause him to become
finally ascertained and his interest to become indefeasibly fixed both in
quality and quantity. 8
The requirement that the disclaimant not accept any interest in the dis-
claimed property provides an adequate safeguard to prevent any abuse
that may arise as a result of allowing additional interests to be
disclaimed.
Many of the difficult questions raised by Keniath and Dreyer are
answered by section 2518, the most important of which is that contin-
67. See I.R.C. Secs. 2514 and 2041. Treas. Reg. Sec. 25.2514-1(a)(1) (1958).
68. FLA. STAT. Sec. 732.801(5) (1977).
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gent interests and vested interests subject to divestiture must be dis-
claimed within nine months of the transfer creating the interest. 9 How-
ever, section 2518 leaves many unanswered questions. It is not clear if
the right to disclaim is personal to the disclaimant or may be exercised
by his representatives after his death. The power of a representative to
disclaim in the name of the decedent can be very significant where the
recipient of an interest in property dies before he becomes aware, of
such interest or before he has accepted the property or its benefits. If a
representative is permitted to disclaim, the property will not be taxed
in the decedent's gross estate.70 If a representative is not permitted to
disclaim, the property will be taxed both when it is tranferred to the
decedent (gift or estate tax) and also upon the decedent's death.71 Thus,
to enhance the use of disclaimers as an estate planning tool, regulations
should be issued which make it clear that the right to disclaim is not
personal. In the absence of such regualtions, it would appear that the
right to disclaim is not personal since section 2518 does not address
this question, and furthermore, common law permitted it.
Another unresolved question is whether section 2518 changes the
common law by allowing the disclaimer of an intestate share. It would
appear that if section 2518 (a) is taken literally- ". . . disclaimer with
respect to any interest in property . . ." - a disclaimer of an intestate
share would be allowed. However, the congressional intent was to fed-
eralize the law of disclaimers, not to expand the common law; hope-
fully, regulations will be issued clarifying this point.
Similarly, it is unclear whether the disclaimer of an interest in
jointly held property will be effective for federal tax purposes. If the
right of each joint tenant vests at the creation of the tenancy (which is
a question of local law), a jointly held interest in property may not be
disclaimed for federal tax purposes, even if it is a valid disclaimer
under local law, since the disclaimant has accepted the interest in prop-
erty or its benefits.72
69. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(b)(2).
70. See I.R.C. Secs. 2033 and 2518(a).
71. For cases in which representatives of a decedent were permitted to disclaim
the decedent's interest in property; see Estate of Rolin v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 919; Estate
of Dreyer v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 275; Perkins v. Phinney, 7 AFTR 2d 1752; Estate of
Hoenig v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 471; Contra, Uniform Probate Code Sec. 2-801(a). How-
ever, the double taxation may be reduced by I.R.C. Sec. 2013.
72. I.R.C. Sec. 2518(b)(3). See Ltr. Rul. 7911005. In the ruling, the service said
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Section 2518 changes the common law by allowing the partial dis-
claimer of certain interests in property. There is a conflict between sec-
tion 2518 (a) and section 2518 (c) (1) as to what may be partially dis-
claimed. Section 2518 (a) appears to permit the partial disclaimer of
any interest in property; whereas, section 2518 (c) (1) only allows the
disclaimer of "an undivided portion of an interest". Consequently, it is
uncertain what interests may be partially disclaimed.73 However, it ap-
pears that the congressional intent was only to allow the partial dis-
claimer of an undivided portion of an interest.74
The meaning of "an undivided portion of an interest" is unclear.7
Consequently, a devisee is faced with the dilemma of whether the dis-
claimer of any of the following interests will be a qualified disclaimer:
a fractional interest in property (an undivided one half interest), a por-
tion of a devise ($25,000 of a $50,000 devise or five acres of a ten acre
tract) or a carve out of an interest (a life estate or a remainder from a
fee). It is disturbing that Congress used the term without any further
elaboration. 7 This term, however, has been used in other code sec-
tions77 and interpreted in the regulations.7 1 It has been intepreted as:
"A person owns an 'undivided interest' in all substanial rights to a pat-
that if a joint tenant is vested with an undivided interest in the property at the creation
of the joint tenancy (a matter of local law), the disclaimant has accepted an interest in
the property or its benefits and the disclaimer will not be effective. This ruling, how-
ever, is based on law existing prior to section 2518's effective date. The conclusion
reached seems to apply to section 2518 as well, insofar as both section 2518 and the
prior law have the same requirement that the disclaimer must be made prior to accept-
ance. See also Krakoff v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1970); Bishop
v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Miss. 1970), for the nonacceptance require-
ment which presumably remains unchanged by section 2518. In Letter Ruling 7922018,
the service ruled that a widow, who was the sole beneficiary and executrix under dece-
dent's will, did not accept its benefits where she segregated decedent's property and
income from it and admitted the will to probate for the sole purpose of her qualifica-
tion as independent executrix.
73. See I.R.C. Sec. 2518(c)(1); Frimmer, 48 J. OF TAX. 322.
74. THE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 67 says: "Under the bill, a
disclaimer with respect to an undivided portion of an interest is to be treated as a
qualified disclaimer of the portion of the interest if the requirements are satisfied as to
the undivided portion of an interest."
75. See Frimmer, 48 J. OF TAX. 322 (1978).
76. Id.
77. I.R.C. Secs. 170(f)(3) an 1235(a).
78. Treas. Reg. Secs. 1.170A-7(b)(1) (1972); 1.1235-2(c) (1965).
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ent when he owns the same fractional share of each and every substan-
tial right to the patent". 7 The above interpretation of an undivided
interest clearly allows partial disclaimers when a fractional interest is
involved."0
Another and more expansive meaning given to an undivided por-
tion of an interest is illustrated by an example in the regulations where
a taxpayer owns 100 acres of land and makes a contribution of 50
acres to a charity.8' Based on this contribution, the regulations con-
clude that the donor contributed an undivided portion of his entire in-
terest and a deduction would be allowed. If we apply the service's inter-
pretation of an "undivided portion of an entire interest" (as used in the
above regulation interpreting section 170 () (3) (B) (ii)) to section
2518, we find that the service should, and in all likelihood will, recog-
nize that there is little difference for federal tax purposes between a
fractional disclaimer (one half undivided interest) and a disclaimer of a
portion of a devise (five acres of a ten acre tract or $25,000 of a
$50,000 devise).12 Consequently, they both will be considered disclaim-
ers of an undivided portion of an interest. If the service rejects the
application of the above regulation (which is highly unlikely) as an in-
terpretation of section 2518(c)(1), and attempts to narrowly define
"undivided portion of an interest," the use of disclaimers to prevent the
overfunding of a marital bequest will be seriously impaired.83
No interpretation of an undivided portion of an interest has ever
encompassed the "carve out" of an interest. The carve out type of dis-
claimer can be distinguished from the other types of disclaimers previ-
ously discussed because of is effect on the disclaimant's estate. If a
79. Eickmeyer v. Comm'r, 580 F. 2d 395 (10th Cir. 1978). Eickmeyer applied
I.R.C. See. 1235(a) as interpreted by Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.1235-2(c) (1957). Treas. Reg.
Sec. 1.170A-7(b)(1) (1972).
80. See Frimmer, 48 J. OF TAx. at 324 (1978).
81. Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.170A-7(b)(1) (1972).
82. Both types of disclaimers are similar insofar as the disclaimed property will
be excluded from the disclaimant's gross estate (I.R.C. Sec. 2033) and the retained
property will be included (I.R.C. Sec. 2033). The following example demonstrates their
similarities. A is devised Whiteacre, a ten acre tract of land. If A disclaims an undi-
vided one half interest, the disclaimed property will not be included in his gross estate
at his death; the undivided one half he retained will be included in his gross estate. If A
disclaims five of the ten acres, the disclaimed five acres will not be included in his gross
estate at his death; the five acres he retained will be included in his gross estate.
83. See the text accompanying notes 13-18 supra.
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remainder is disclaimed from a fee, all the property (not just that
which is disclaimed) will be excluded from the disclaimant's gross es-
tate, since the retained interest is nondescendable.Y Conversely, where
a fractional disclaimer or a disclaimer of a portion of a devise is made,
only the disclaimed property will be excluded from the disclaimant's
gross estate, because the retained interest is descendable. The forego-
ing distinction indicates a possible justification for Congress' use of the
term undivided portion of an interest as opposed to some other term
i.e. to prevent the carve out of an interest from being a qualified dis-
claimer. Therefore, it would appear, although it is still uncertain, that
such a disclaimer cannot be a qualified disclaimer. In the interest of
clarity, regulations should be promulgated which specifically define the
interests that may be partially disclaimed. Florida Statutes Section
732.801 provides an excellent delineation of those interests that may be
partially disclaimed:
(d) An 'interest in property' that may be disclaimed shall include:
1. The whole of any property, real or personal, legal or equitable, pre-
sent or future interest, or any fractional part, share or portion of prop-
erty or specific assets thereof.
2. Any estate in the property.
3. Any power to appoint, consume, apply, or expend property, or any
other right, power, privilege, or immunity relating to it."
The most important and possibly the most interesting issue raised
by section 2518 is the federal tax consequences of a disclaimer which is
valid under state law but is not a qualified disclaimer as defined by
section 2518. It should be noted that state law, in certain situations,
may be used as a basis for imposing a federal tax 7 and/or to define
84. I.R.C. Sec. 2033. In Ltr. Rul. 7922018, a widow disclaimed the remainder of
a fee. The widow asked for a ruling as to whether such a disclaimer could be a quali-
fied disclaimer. The service declined to rule on this question since the I.R.S. does not
rule on issues that cannot be reasonably resolved before the issuance of regulations. An
interesting question raised is whether the disclaimer of a remainder of a fee will cause
inclusion under I.R.C. Sec. 2036. It seems clear that it may cause a transfer, not ordi-
narily a generation skipping transfer, to become one.
85. I.R.C. See. 2033.
86. FLA. STAT. Sec. 732.801(1)(d)1-3 (1977).
87. See, e.g., I.R.C. Sec. 2053(a) where the amount of the deductions allowed
are " . . . allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without the
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one's rights or interests with respect to property for purposes of apply-
ing a federal tax.m In this discussion, we will focus on the former. Con-
sider the following situation: B dies intestate with A his only heir; A
orally disclaims his entire intestate share. With regard to this example,
state law allows oral disclaimers; whereas, it is not a qualified dis-
claimer under section 2518. What is the federal tax effect of A's dis-
claimer? There are only two possible ways to answer this question
(neither of which is entirely satisfactory): (1) to give conclusive effect to
state law or (2) to give conclusive effect to federal law. If state law is
conclusive, the effectiveness of section 2518 will be thwarted since the
purpose of section 2518 was to eliminate the dependence upon state law
in determining the federal tax consequences of a disclaimer. s9 If federal
law is conclusive, A will be taxed on the transfer of property he never
owned; A never owned the property because state law determines the
ownership of property and rights with respect to property. 90
The beginning point to the solution of this question is Burnet v.
Harmel.91 In Harmel, the respondent, the owner of Texas oil lands,
executed oil and gas leases of the lands. On his income tax return, he
treated the gain from the leases as capital gain because the law of
Texas considered an oil and gas lease a sale. The commissioner argued
that regardless of its characterization under state law, the lease was not
a sale; therefore, the higher tax rate applicable to ordinary gain ap-
plied. Holding that federal law controls the federal tax consequences of
the lease, the court set forth the relationship between state and federal
law saying
United States, under which the estate is being administered".
88. See the cases cited in note 91 infra. In these situations, state law is only used
for the purpose of determining whether the federal law has been satisfied. The distinc-
tion between the uses of state law can be shown by using section 2518; the first use is
where a state disclaimer statute conflicts with a federal law (2518), and the second is
where section 2518 requires the determination under state law as to where the property
passes as a result of the disclaimer.
89. See WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT at 67.
90. See Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960); Leyth v. Hoey, 305 U.S.
188 (1938); Wentworth v. Comm'r, 510 F. 2d 883 (6th Cir. 1975); Estate of Peyton v.
Comm'r, 323 F. 2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963); Estate of Polster v. Comm'r, 274 F. 2d 358
(4th Cir. 1960); Estate of McNichol v. Comm'r, 265 F. 2d 667 (6th Cir.) cert. denied,
361 U.S. 829 (1959).
91. 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
I.R.C. Section 2518 205 114:1980
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Here we are concerned only with the meaning and application of a
statute enacted by Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power under
the Constitution to tax income. The exertion of that power is not subject
to State control. It is the will of Congress which controls, and the ex-
pression of its will in legislation, in the absence of language evidencing a
different purpose is to be interpreted so as to give a uniform application
to a nation-wide scheme of taxation . . . State law may control only
when the operation of the Federal taxing act, by express language or
necessary implication, makes its operation dependent upon State law.92
The Supreme Court reiterated this point in Morgan v. Commis-
sioner.93 In Morgan, state law characterized a power of appointment as
a special power; the service argued it was a general power. The court
held that, notwithstanding its charcterization under state law, the
power was general within the meaning of the revenue act.94
The holdings of Harmel and Morgan can be summarized into the
following rules:
92. Id. at 110. The Supreme Court went on to apply the law to the facts of the
case, saying:
But section 208 neither says nor implies that the determination of 'gain
from the sale or exchange of capital assets' is to be controlled by state law. For
purposes of applying this section to the particular payments now under consider-
ation, the act of Congress has its own criteria, irrespective of any particular
characterization of the payments under local law [citation omitted]. The state
law creates legal interests, but the federal statute determines when and how they
should be taxed.
But see United States v. White, 311 F. 2d 399 (10th Cir. 1962) and the service's disa-
greement and nonacquiesence in Rev. Rul. 63-120 1963-1 C.B. 141.
93. 309 U.S. 78 (1940).
94.
State law creates legal interests and rights. The federal revenue acts designate
what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed. Out duty is to ascertain the
meaning of the words used to specify the thing taxed. If it is found in a given case
that an interest or right created by local law was the object intended to be taxed,
the federal law must prevail no matter what name is given to the interest or
right by the state law.
Id. at 80-81.
Many later cases have applied the rules enunciated in Morgan and Harmel to
varied situations. See, United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971) (liability
of spouse for income tax in community property state); Maytag v. United States, 493
F. 2d 995 (10th Cir. 1974) (whether a power of appointment was general or special);
Kean v. Comm'r, 469 F. 2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1972) (shareholder's status for subchapter S
election); Estate of Miller v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 699 (1972) (incdme earned by estate
during administration).
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(1) If federal law does not expressly or impliedly depend upon the
characterization of an interest in property or a transaction under state
law, its characterization under state law is not controlling for federal tax
purposes.
(2) If federal law does expressly or impliedly depend upon the char-
acterization of an interest in property or a transaction under state
law, its characterization under state law is controlling for federal tax
purposes.
Depending upon which rule is applicable, state disclaimer statutes
may or may not control the federal tax consequences of a disclaimer.
In Doll v. Commissioner,95 the court set forth several tests which have
been used to determine whether Congress intended state law to control.
They are: (1) whether the purposes of the taxing act would be avoided
or defeated by applying state law, (2) whether the language or neces-
sary implication of the revenue statutory provision so requires, and (3)
whether through such application a uniform nationwide scheme of tax-
ation would be thwarted.98 If we apply these tests to section 2518, we
find that Congress did not expressly or impliedly intend for state dis-
claimer statutes to control.9" Therefore, regardless of whether a dis-
95. 149 F. 2d 239 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 326 U.S. 725 (1945).
96. Id. at 242. The tests have been developed through case law. See Estate of
Putman v. Comm'r, 324 U.S. 393 (1945); Rogers v. Helvering, 320 U.S. 410 (1943);
Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 151, 161 (1942); United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399,
402 (1941); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Estate of Sanford v. Comm'r, 308
U.S. 39 (1939); Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937);
97. It may be helpful to refer back to the text accompanying notes 51-59. See
Estate of Halbach v. Comm'r 71 T.C. 141 (1978). In Halbach, the petitioner contended
that because the decedent's disclaimer of her remainder interest was both timely and
effective under New York law, such interest should not be included in her gross estate.
The Service conceding the fact that the disclaimer was valid under state law, but took
issue with the timeliness of the disclaimer for federal tax purposes. The court held that
the disclaimer was not timely for federal tax purposes saying:
Herein, we have no authority or desire to quarrel with the state court's decision
that the disclaimer was timely for probate purposes. The issue before that court
was the validity and effect of the renunciation in relation to a determination of in
which party legal title to the property would vest. That court had no need to take
into account, as this court must, the Congressional desire to impose a tax on the
transfer of a property interest. Therefore, what is a reasonable time for probate
purposes, any time prior to the vesting of title in the party renouncing the inter-
est, is not necessarily reasonable for our purposes, determining whether a trans-
fer of the property interest has occurred.
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claimer satisfies state law, its federal tax consequences are determined
solely upon its satisfaction of the requirements of section 2518.98 In
resolution of the situation presently under consideration, A's dis-
claimer, although valid under state law, will not be a disclaimer for
federal tax purposes.
State law, however, may play a role in determining whether the
federal requirements for a disclaimer have been satisfied. The operation
of section 2518, as previously discussed, is in some ways dependent
upon state law (recall the discussion of 2518 (b)(4)). The application of
state law in this situation raises the problem of whether a federal court
hearing a federal tax case is bound by a state court interpretation of
state law. In Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch," the Supreme Court
was faced with this very issue. The Supreme Court held that a federal
court applying state law is not bound by a state court decision unless it
is the decision of the highest state court.'
5. REVENUE ACT OF 1978
A 1978 amendment to section 2518 made it possible for property
to pass to a decedent's spouse as a result of a disclaimer even if the
surviving spouse was the disclaimant.'"1 This amendment is important
because it allows a surviving spouse to disclaim an interest in a marital
trust and take the property under a non-marital trust assuming the de-
98. This is not to say that state law will not have to be consulted. It may be used
to determine one's property rights if such a determination is necessary. This point is
discussed, infra, at notes 100 and 101.
99. 387 U.S. 456 (1967). For a more detailed analysis of Bosch see Sobeloff, Tax
Effect of State Court Decisions-The Impact of Bosch, 21 TAx LAw 507 (Spring
1968).
100.
This is not a diversity case but the same principle may be applied for the
same reasons, viz., the underlying substantive rule involved is based on
state law and the state's highest court is the best authority on its own law.
If there be no decision by that court then federal authorities must apply
what they find to be the state law after giving 'proper regard' to relevant
rulings of other courts of the state. In this respect, it may be said to be, in
effect, sitting as a state court.
387 U.S. at 465.
101. Tax Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2934 (1978), Sec. 702
(M) amended I.R.C. Sec. 2518(b)(4) (hereinafter referred to as Tax Reform Act of
1978).
4:1980 1
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cedent's will is set up properly.12 A spouse will only make such a dis-
claimer when the marital bequest exceeds the optimal marital deduc-
tion i.e. an overfunding has occurred."0 ' The spouse will disclaim the
excess; thus raising the issue of whether it was the disclaimer of an
undivided portion of an interest' (except in the very rare case where
the total marital bequest will be disclaimed because the optimal mari-
tal deduction is zero). Consequently, the interpretation given to an un-
divided portion of an interest will determine the effectiveness of the
amendment.
The benefits to be derived by such a disclaimer are achieving the
optimal marital deduction and excluding the disclaimed property from
the disclaimant's gross estate. In theory, such a disclaimer is an effec-
tive post mortem estate plainning device, but before a spouse makes
such a disclaimer, he or she will have to be convinced that it is a bene-
ficial course of action. These benefits become apparent when the spouse
realizes that the property interests he or she will receive in a properly
102. The decedent's will must contain a marital bequest (one which qualifies for
the marital deduction) and a non-marital bequest (one which does not qualify for the
marital deduction and does not cause the property to be included in the spouse's gross
estate), with the decedent's spouse named as the beneficiary under each trust. The non-
marital bequest should be drafted in a manner so as to give the spouse all the incidents
of ownership consistent with its exclusion from the spouse's gross estate (see footnote
104 infra). In addition, it would be wise to include in the decedent's will a clause which
provides that any property disclaimed shall pass to the non-marital trust (see appendix
A).
103. The optimal marital deduction is not necessarily the maximum marital de-
duction allowable (for example, where the decedent's adjusted gross estate is less than
$425,000). The reason the spouse will not disclaim, unless the marital bequest exceeds
the optimal marital deduction, is because when considering the value of tax deferral,
the estate tax burden will be at a minimum when the optimal deduction is used; conse-
quently, nothing will be achieved by such a disclaimer aside from increasing the burden
of estate taxes.
104. Congress intended the amendment to apply to partial disclaimers where the
spouse disclaims property passing under a marital trust. See The Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation, 96th Cong. 1st Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TAX RE-
FORM Acr OF 1978 at 443 (1979) where it states:
The Congress believes that, where the decedent's spouse refuses to accept all
or a portion of his or her interest in property passing from the decedent and, as a
result of such refusal, the property passes to a trust in which the spouse has an
income or other interest, such disclaimer should be recognized as a qualified
disclaimer.
210
Nova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol4/iss1/1
2 10 Nova Law Journal 4:1980 1
drafted non-marital trust are substantially equivalent to those dis-
claimed.105 Therefore, once the spouse understands the situation, there
is no logical reason why he or she will refuse to disclaim.
The following example demonstrates the importance of this
amendment. B (A's spouse) dies, his will created a marital trust and a
non-marital trust. A is the beneficiary of each trust. Due to an error in
the marital deduction formula clause in B's will, the marital trust was
overfunded. The optimal martial deduction for B's estate is $500,000
(one half of B's gross estate of $1,000,000); $600,000 was devised to the
marital trust. B's will provided that any property that is disclaimed
shall become part of the non-marital trust (see appendix A for the
form of such a clause).'m A disclaims $100,000 of the $600,000 marital
trust. As-,a result of A's disclaimer the property passes to the non-
marital trust (pursuant to the clause in decedent's will). Prior to the
1978 amendment it was unclear whether A's disclaimer was a qualifed
disclaimer since the disclaimed property did not pass to a person other
than the disclaimant. This amendment would treat A's disclaimer as a
qualified disclaimer, thus allowing the optimal marital deduction and
excluding the disclaimed property from A's gross estate.
Carrying the above example one step further, assume A has an
estate of $100,000 at her death. If A does not disclaim and dies ten
years after B (not having disposed of any of the property), A's gross
estate will be $700,000 ($100,000 of A's property plus $600,000 from
the marital trust); if A disclaims the $100,000 excess, A's gross estate
will be $600,000 ($100,000 of A's property plus $500,000 from the
marital trust). If we assume A has no deductions, credits, or adjust-
105. The property interests the spouse receives under a marital and a non-mari-
tal trust are not all that different in substance. The spouse can receive, under a non-
marital trust, the following: a life estate, a special power of appointment, a five and
five general power of appointment, a general power of appointment subject to an ascer-
tainable standard, and a trustee can be given the power to invade the corpus for the
spouse's comfort or maintenance.
106. Rev. Rul. 76-156, 1976-1 C.B. 292 seems to allow such a clause to deter-
mine the taker of the disclaimed property. This ruling dealt with an issue which arises
where the decedent's will gives the disclaimant a special power to appoint his dis-
claimed interest. The service ruled that a disclaimer coupled with a power to appoint is
not a disclaimer but is a taxable gift. The service implied that where the decedent's will
disposes of the disclaimed property in an ascertainable manner, the disclaimer will then
be recognized. See Newman and Kalter, Disclaimers By Surviving Spouse 181
N.Y.L.J. I (Jan. 15, 1979),
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ments to her gross estate, an additional $100,000 will be taxed on A's
death if she does not disclaim. The tax rate on the additional $100,000
in A's estate is 37%; the value of the disclaimer is $37,000 in this case.
A $37,000 tax savings should not be treated lightly.
6. CONCLUSION
The enactment of section 2518, as demonstrated above, changed
the common law in many respects. It improved the prior law by creat-
ing a definitive period in which to disclaim i.e. nine months, requiring a
writing, and most importantly, creating uniform rules governing the
law of disclaimers. Although it was not the intent of Congress to
greatly expand the interests that may be disclaimed, section 2518, al-
though unclear, appears to permit the disclaimer of both an intestate
share and also some partial interests in property. Hopefully, regula-
tions will be able to clear up this uncertainty in a manner that will
enhance the uses of disclaimers. Section 2518's shortcomings are its
dependence upon state law and its disallowance of the disclaimer of
certain interests because of its definition of transfer. To cure the above
shortcomings section 2518 should be amended.
It is obvious that section 2518 is a long way from being perfect. It
is a beginning and, as this article has demonstrated, section 2518, if
liberally construed and properly amended, can be made into an effec-
tive law of disclaimers.
Donald J. Jaret
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APPENDIX A
The following disclaimer forms were taken from P-H Wills forms
3875 New Forms and Ideas.
FORM FOR A DISCLAIMER "QUALIFIED" UNDER THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976
I, , beneficiary under the will of
deceased, do hereby unqualifiedly and unconditionally and completely
disclaim, reject and refuse to accept the legacy/devise made to me
in the Last Will and Testament of said , who died
on the - day of , 19 -, said Last Will and Testa-
ment having been resident of City/County,
State/Commonwealth of I have received and
retain no interest in the property I herein disclaim and this disclaimer
is completely irrevocable, regardless of any occurrences either pior
to or subsequent to its execution.
Signed
The - day of
19-.
FORM FOR A STANDARD DISCLAIMER CLAUSE
If any devisee and/or legatee named in this Will should renounce and
disclaim in whole or in part, any property I have herein devised and/or
bequeathed to him or to her, then in that event I give, devise and be-
queath the property so renounced and disclaimed to
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Open Season on Ancient Shipwrecks:
Implications of the Treasur Salvors Decisions in the
Fields of Archaeology, History, and Property Law
Does a recent federal district court decision license a new open season
on ancient shipwrecks off the Florida coast? Did the court in its zeal to
uphold the American traditions of free enterprise and rugged individu-
alism bargain away an irreplaceable cultural heritage? Are these tradi-
tions still viable, or more myth than reality in the functioning of the
United States social and economic system?1 If not viable, is the judicial
system justified in perpetuating these myths in the public conscious-
ness? Or, has the United States judicial system again demonstrated its
ability to act as a bulwark in defense of individual liberties? All of
these questions, and more, are raised by the most recent decision2 in a
series of Florida cases' that revolve around the discovery and salvage
1. The rise of the welfare state and the concomitant emergence of the military-
industrial complex has wrought vast changes in the social and economic life of the
nation. In reviewing two recent analyses of this phenomenon, A.S. MILLER, MODERN
CORPORATE STATE; PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1976)
and J.M. BUCHANAN, LIMITS OF LIBERTY (1976), W.J. SAMUELS made the following
observation:
The study of American constitutionalism requires scrutiny of the total flow
of relevant decisions whenever made, including private decision making having
constitutional consequences, for example as made by political parties, large cor-
porations, and unions. Received theory justaposes natural persons and the state,
whereas in reality group action has grown in significance, and the individual in-
creasingly is important only as a member of a group(s) The system has
been transformed into one of nonindividual, nonstatist, nonpossessary economic
and social power.
SAMUELS, Myths of Liberty and the Realities of the Corporate State: A Review Arti-
cle, 10 ECON. ISSUES 923,924 (1976).
2. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Ves-
sel, 459 F Supp. 507 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
3. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Ves-
sel, 408 F Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1976) [hereinafter Treasure Salvors, No. 1]; Treasure
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of an ancient Spanish shipwreck believed to be the Nuestra Sehora de
A tocha, sunk in 1622 in a storm off the Florida coast.
Treasure Salvors, Inc., under a contract with the Florida Division
of Archives and History and Records Management (DAHRM), ex-
plored a site thought to be in state waters. It was believed to be the
location of the Neustra Sehora de A tocha and artifacts were recovered
beginning in 1971.
In May, 1976 the validity of the contractual relationship between
Treasure Salvors, Inc. and Florida became questionable as a result of
United States v. Florida4 wherein the Supreme Court delineated the
territorial waters of the State of Florida.5 The Court's holding precipi-
tated much litigation6 as the site of the salvage operation of Treasure
Salvors, Inc., a shoal near the Marquesas Keys, was in an area desig-
nated as international waters. On the basis of this declaration, Trea-
sure Salvors, Inc. instigated what was to be the first7 of several suits to
obtain title to all artifacts salvaged under its contract with the State
Division of Archives and History. Eventually, the contract between the
state and Treasure Salvors, Inc. was declared void for mutual mistake.'
Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F. 2d 330
(5th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter Treasure Salvors, No. 2]; Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Uniden-
tified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 459 F. Supp. 507 (S.D. Fla. 1978)
[hereinafter Treasure Salvors, No. 3].
4. United States v. Florida, 425 U.S. 791 (1976).
5. This decision followed a Special Masters Report designating the territorial
waters of the State of Florida as opposed to claims of the United States in a suit filed
to determine ownership of oil leasing rights on the outer continental shelf. Florida had
claimed all of Florida Bay as an inland sea and therefore part of Florida territorial
waters. The decree, however, designated Florida Bay as part of the Gulf of Mexico,
and rather than using a straight line, drew three-mile closing circles around the lower
Florida Keys, the Marquesas Keys, and the Dry Tortugas, and designated these areas
as territorial waters of the State of Florida.
6. See, The Treasury Zone, 4 NOVA L. J. 237 (1980) for analysis of the
Treasure Salvors line of cases.
7. 408 F. Supp. 907.
8. 459 F. Supp. 507. Was recision an equitable remedy? Since the law of finds
rather than the law of salvage was applied, the contract with the state effectively
shielded the site from all other possible finders for many years. In effect, Treasure
Salvors, Inc. was declared finder before the search ever began. Also, employees of the
State Division of Archives and History cleaned and treated the artifacts in their posses-
sion for preservation and the state provided storage for a period of years. Since public
funds were expended for this purpose, should not the state have been reimbursed for
1 214 4:1980 1
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Open Season on Ancient Shipwrecks
The obvious struggle in these Florida treasure ship cases is be-
tween the archaeologists and the treasure hunters. The implications of
the Treasure Salvors decisions, however, reach far beyond the question
of who owns the particular antiquities from this particular wreck site.
The decisions touch upon legal and policy issues m the areas of balanc-
ing individual and group rights, the right to property, forms of owner-
ship, and the role of the United States and its citizens in the legal and
illicit antiquities market. Property rights, as allocated between society
as a whole and individual citizens, are involved in all of these issues. A
look at what "property" is may help illustrate why the intense struggle
has ensued.
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SHIPWRECK LAW
The concept of property is a social construct-a description of re-
lationships between people and things, both corporal and incorporal.
Involved are not only rights, but obligations, individual and collective.'
"Property can be, and routinely is, created from whole cloth, since its
existence resides in the realm of social facts and not empirical
reality.""
The two essential criteria for objects of property are value and
transferability." Individuals within a society create the value compo-
nent; transferability is that which makes the property capable of inde-
pendent existence, separate from any one individual. Within any given
society "[tihere is reasonable agreement that definitions of property
cover appropriate objects, include appropriate rights and sanctions and
that ownership is vested in the entity appropriate to the case in ques-
tion. 12 The allocation of objects to individual or collective ownership
and the rights and responsibilities attached to this ownership is a socie-
tal decision, defined by its political and legal institutions.
this expense? It is doubtful that the parties were actually restored to their original
positions.
9. "Whoever owns property is responsible for its administration to some
authority or group." Schneider, Pragmatism and Property, I J. LEGAL & POL. SOC. 5,
8-9 (1943).
10. Stein, Collective Ownership, Property Rights, and Control, 10 ECON. ISSUES
298, 302 (1976).
11. Id. at 301.
12. Id.
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The modern history of Florida shipwreck law presents an interest-
ing illustration of the political and legal institutions m Florida attempt-
ing to define, or re-define, these property rights and allocations. The
people of Florida have decided, through their elected representatives
and the Archives and History Act,"3 that the State of Florida is the
appropriate entity in which to entrust protection and ownership of ob-
jects of cultural and historical importance, including sunken and aban-
doned ships. This allocation of ownership has been challenged by the
treasure hunters who believe these objects are more legitimately subject
to private ownership.
There seems to be no societal concensus at the present time to
answer the question of who owns a sunken derelict ship and its cargo.,
The allocation of this property right has varied from society to society
over time. Even within the common law system there is no unanimity.
Under the admiralty laws of salvage, there are two rules, diametrically
opposed: the English rule and the American rule. 5 The English rule
declares the rights of the sovereign in all derelict property found at sea,
whether flotsam (goods from shipwreck but still floating), wreck (goods
from shipwreck washed ashore), jetsam (goods cast overboard and
sunk), or langan (ligan) (goods cast off and sunk but marked by a
buoy). This rule is derived from the concept that all property rights
reside in the sovereign and all other owners "hold of the king," an
indirect acknowledgement of the social consensus which creates "prop-
erty" in the first place. Practically, the rule was used to produce more
revenue for the Crown. Over time the harshness of the rule was tem-
pered by allowing the owner a year and a day to claim the abandoned
property before it reverted to the sovereign. The American rule gener-
ally awards ownership of a sunken derelict ship and/or its cargo to
whomever first reduces it to possession. Rights vary according to the
13. FLA. STAT. ch. 267 (1979).
14. Altes, Submarine Antiquities: A Legal Labyrinth, 4 SYR. J. INT. LAW &
COM. 77 (1976). This is an excellent survey of the state of the law regarding ancient
sunken abandoned ships, covering public international law, existing bilateral agree-
ments between nations, and specific national laws.
15. For an extensive discussion of the evolution and details of the English and
American rules on the salvage of seabourne derelict property see: Fee, Abandoned
Property: Title to Treasure Recovered in Florida's Territorial Waters, 21 UNIv FLA.
L. REv 360 (1969); and Kenny and Hrusoff, The Ownership of the Treasures of the
Sea, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV 383 (1967).
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category: flotsam, wreck, jetsam, or langan, and a salvage award is
usually made from the proceeds of public sale of the property. 6
Prior cases which have established precedent for the American
rule all have decided ownership of ships and cargos which had a purely
commercial value. 7 Ownership of the disputed cargos presented no
conflict with a demonstrated public interest and would have benefited
the sovereign only as a source of revenue. United States courts have
for the most part followed the American rule. Recent cases in Flor-
ida,"8 Texas,19 and North Carolina,2 however, have upheld sovereign
ownership of abandoned shipwrecks in state territorial waters. In all
three instances sovereign ownership has been asserted in an effort to
protect the interest of the public in the sunken vessel.
The Florida case, State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 21 re-
solved a dispute over ownership of a United States battleship purposely
sunk and abandoned in Escambia Bay in 1922. Over the years the dere-
lict functioned as an artificial reef and became a favored fishing and
diving spot for the public, and the superstructure which protruded
above the water, served as a navigational aid. In 1956 the Massachu-
setts Co. set out buoys in accordance with salvage law and announced
its intention to salvage the ship. Spurred by conservation and recrea-
tion groups, the state filed suit to enjoin salvage operations. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court, sitting en banc, declared ownership in the sover-
16. During the heyday of wrecking in Key West, fifty-five ships that had wrecked
on the Florida Reef were brought into port at Key West in one year, 1846, and street
auctions of the salvaged goods were a daily occurrence. C. TEBEAU, A HISTORY OF
FLORIDA 142 (1971).
17. United States v. Tyndale, 116 F. 820 (Ist Cir. 1902), money found on a body
floating on the high seas; Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, 186 F. Supp. 452 (E.D. Va. 1960), a
cargo of marble; Murphy v. Dunham, 38 F. 503 (E.D. Mich. 1889), a cargo of coal
lying at the bottom of a lake; Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499 (1861), a cargo of lead;
Howard v. Sharlin, 61 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1952), contemporary abandoned vessel; Deklyn
v. Davis, I Hopk. Ch. 135 (N.Y. 1824), a British frigate sunk in the East River in New
York, located and raised thirty years later.
18. State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1956), cert.
den. 355 U.S. 881 (1956).
19. Platoro, Ltd. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 371 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.
Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 508 F. 2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1975).
20. Bruton v. Flying "W" Enterprises, Inc., 273 N.C. 399, 160 S.E. 2d 482
(1968).
21. 95 So. 2d 902.
1 4:98
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eign (the State of Florida) of the wrecked vessel based upon the
English statutory and common law of 1775 as adopted by Florida when
it joined the Union.
The Texas case, Platoro, Ltd. v. Unidentified Remains of a Ves-
sel,22 involved a Spanish galleon sunk in 1555 off Padre Island. A sal-
vage company, operating under contract with the State of Texas,
claimed ownership of recovered artifacts as first finder and shipped the
artifacts out of state. Suit was filed in federal court and the court up-
held the Texas claim based upon sovereign ownership by the Spanish
Crown after a year and a day from the date of abandonment, in accord
with the Spanish law of that time. Ownership was traced through a
succession of governments to the State of Texas. The decision was
overturned by the appellate court on other grounds.
The ships in dispute in the North Carolina case, Bruton v. Flying
"W'" Enterprises, Inc.,21 were an ancient Spanish ship and several ships
that dated from the time of the Civil War. The North Carolina courts
awarded ownership to the sovereign (the State of North Carolina)
based upon a state antiquities statute 4 similar to that enacted in Flor-
ida and upon the precedent of the Florida decision in Ervin.25
Treasure Salvors No. 1,21 and Treasure Salvors No. 2,21 in which
the United States was an intervenor, specifically reject United States
claims of sovereign rights traced to the English Crown. The Fifth Cir-
cuit noted, however, that these rights could be declared by legislative
action: "While it may be within the constitutional power of Congress
to take control of wrecked and abandoned property brought to shore
by American citizens (or the proceeds derived from its sale) legislation
to that effect has never been enacted. ' 28
The State of Florida has made this type of legislative declaration
through the Florida Archives and History Act.2 Theoretically, owner-
22. 371 F. Supp. 356.
23. 273 N.C. 399.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-22.
25. 95 So. 2d 902.
26. 408 F. Supp. 907.
27. 569 F. 2d 330.
28. Id. at 341.
29. The Florida Archives and History Act declared the public policy of the state
ini FLA. STAT. § 267.061 (1979):
(a) It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the state to protect and
1 218 4:1980 1
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ship of all sunken derelict ships on state owned submerged territorial
waters (within three miles) resides in the State of Florida because con-
trol of the seabed within the three mile territorial limit was relin-
quished by the federal government to the states under terms of the
Submerged Lands Act in 1953.0 As the Florida Archives and History
Act was the first modem state antiquities law in the United States,
subsequent antiquities laws passed by sister states have been patterned
after it."'
The Florida statute declares the public policy of the state with re-
gard to antiquities to be the protection and preservation of historic
sites and properties and objects of antiquity which have "scientific or
historical value or are of interest to the public. '3 2 A detailed list of
covered items is in the statute along with the statement that the policy
of protection and preservation is not limited to this list. Sunken or
abandoned ships are specifically included. In addition, the Act declares
ownership in the sovereign (the state) of all "treasure trove, artifacts
and objects of historical or archaeological value" which have been
preserve historic sites and properties, buildings, artifacts, treasure trove, and ob-
jects of antiquity which have scientific or historical value or are of interest to the
public, including, but not limited to monuments, memorials, fossil deposits, In-
dian habitations, ceremonial sites, abandoned settlements, caves, sunken or
abandoned ships, historical sites and properties and buildings or objects, or any
part thereof relating to the history, government and culture of the state.
(b) It is further declared to be the public policy of the state that all treasure
trove, artifacts and such objects having intrinsic or historical and archaeological
value which have been abandoned on state-owned lands or state-owned sover-
eignty submerged lands shall belong to the state with the title thereto vested in
the Division of Archives, History and Records Management of the Department
of State for the purpose of administration and protection.
(2) It shall be the responsibility of the Bureau of historic sites and properties
to:
(a) Locate, acquire, protect, preserve, and promote the location, acquisition,
and preservation of historic sites and properties, buildings, artifacts, treasure
trove, and objects of antiquity which have scientific or historical value or are of
interest to the public, including, but not limited to monuments, memorials, fossil
deposits, Indian habitations, ceremonial sites, abandoned settlements, caves,
sunken or abandoned ships, or any part thereof . . ..
30. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976).
31. Beall, State Regulation of Search for and Salvage of Sunken Treasure, 4
NAT. REs. LAW. 1 (1971). Dated but useful.
32. FLA. STAT. § 267.061
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abandoned on state owned land and state owned submerged lands.3
Title is vested in the Division of Archives and History, which is given
the responsibility to "locate, acquire, protect, preserve, and promote
the location, acquisition, and preservation" of the articles listed.34
There now appears to be, however, some question as to the consti-
tutionality of the Florida Archives and History Act as reference to it
was made in Treasure Salvors No. 3,1 along with the Ninth Circuit
case of United States v. Diaz,3" wherein the federal antiquities statute37
was declared vague and the conviction under it an unconstitutional vio-
lation of due process for lack of notice. The Ninth Circuit objected to
the lack of definitions in the federal statute of the terms "ruin," "mon-
ument" and "object of antiquity," and noted that the Indian masks
appropriated from a cave on Indian lands, although used in a cere-
mony of great antiquity, were only three or four years old. 38 The court
found additional lack of notice in the fact that there had been no prior
prosecutions under the federal statute although the Act was passed in
1906. Despite the fact that the Florida district court found some simi-
larities in the Florida statute, the comparison is strained. The federal
law39 is encompassed in one paragraph, with two additional paragraphs
covering the procedure for declaring national monuments. The Florida
law"0 is highly detailed with lists and definitions and contains sixteen
separate sections and numerous subsections, paragraphs, and
subparagraphs.
The detailed list which the district court in Treasure Salvors No. 3
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 459 F. Supp. at 525.
36. 499 F. 2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
37. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1976).
38. 499 F. 2d at 114.
39. 16 U.S.C. § 433 provides that:
Any person who shall appropriate, eicavate, injure, or destroy any historic or
prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of antiquity, situated on lands
owned or controlled by the Government of the United States, without the per-
mission of the Secretary of the Department of the Government having jurisdic-
tion over the lands on which said antiquities are situated, shall, upon conviction,
be fined in a sum of not more than $500 or be imprisoned for a period of not
more than ninety days, or shall suffer both fine and imprisonment, in the discre-
tion of the court.
40. FLA. STAT. ch. 267 (1979).
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found objectionable included, but was not limited to "monuments, me-
morials, fossil deposits, Indian habitations, ceremonial sites, aban-
doned settlements, caves, sunken or abandoned ships, historical sites
and properties and buildings or objects, or any part thereof relating to
the history, government and culture of the state."" Under most cir-
cumstances this would seem to be sufficient and far from vague. The
definition section of the Act further defines "historical sites and proper-
ties" as "real or personal property of historical value. '" ' The statute
could be made more explicit, however, by adding a term of years, for
example, "50 years or older," or "100 years or older." In addition,
there has been no lack of notice in the State of Florida; the Florida
Archives and History Act is a revision of the Florida Antiquities Act
of 196513 and has been aggressively enforced since its inception.
The court also objected to the definition of "treasure trove" as
"gold, silver bullion, jewelry, pottery, ceramics, antique tools and
fittings, ancient weapons, etc.,"" because this definition is at variance
with the traditional common law definition of "treasure trove" as "any
gold or silver, plate or bullion, found concealed in the earth, or in a
house or other private place, but not lying on the ground, the owner of
the discovered treasure being unknown." 45 This definition of treasure
trove is not in the Act itself. It exists by administrative regulation but
41. 459 F. Supp. at 525.
42. FLA. STAT. § 267.021 (6).
43. FLA. STAT. §§ 267.01-267.08 (1965). The original statement of policy ap-
peared in § 267.01:
It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the State of Florida to protect
and preserve historic sites, buildings, treasure trove, objects of antiquity which
have scientific or historic value or are of interest to the public, including but not
limited to fosqil deposits, Indian habitations or ceremonial sites, coral forma-
tions, sunken, abandoned ships or any part thereof, maps, records, documents,
and books relating to the history, government, culture of the State of Florida.
For the revised statement see note 29, supra. Two significant changes were made: the
establishment of the Division of Archives, History and Records Management, with
title to materials vested in the division; and the deletion of § 267.07, which authorized
the awarding of salvage contracts based upon a 75%-25% split with the salvager of the
value of objects recovered. The awarding of contracts has continued by custom, how-
ever, and is covered by administrative regulations.
44. 459 F. Supp. at 525. The court appears confused at this point in its opinion
as it is objecting to a definition that is not in the Act.
45. Id.
221 11 4:1980
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is compatible with thp overall intent of the legislation. Since the defini-
tion sections of any piece of legislation are designed to clarify the in-
tent of the framers, the definitions in their present form are a legiti-
mate use of words to establish meaning and reflect the changing value
of items through time. Some of the artifacts of the type listed are not
only "worth their weight in gold," but indeed, worth far more." It
should be a simple matter, however, to legislatively change the appela-
tion to a less controversial term, one devoid of the romantic and
swashbuckling connotations surrounding the word "treasure."
The argument, sustained by the court, that the association of the
Nuestra Senora de A tocha with Florida is "tangential at best and cer-
tainly is not integral to the heritage and development of the State,"47 is
controverted by the language of the Act which declares public policy to
be "to protect and preserve historic sites and properties . . . relating to
the history, government and culture of the state."4 With over 2000
miles of coast line, Florida and its entire history is intimately con-
nected with its surrounding waters. Florida was Spanish territory at the
time of the A tocha shipwreck. Spanish salvage operations were con-
ducted from a Florida land base. Wrecking and salvage, and tales of
shipwreck and survivors have been a part of Florida history from the
beginning. 9
46. The Euphronios Krater was purchased by the Metropolitan Museum of Art
for a reported one million dollars. K.E. MEYER, THE PLUNDERED PAST; THE STORY OF
THE ILLEGAL INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN WORKS OF ART (1973). This volume presents
an extensive and well documented survey of the problem from all points of view.
47. 459 F. Supp. at 512.
48. Fla. Stat. § 267.061 (1) (a).
49. The first descriptive account of Florida and its people was written by a survi-
vor of a Spanish shipwreck who lived with the Florida Indians for seventeen years
before being rescued near Tampa Bay by either Ribault or Menendez. MEMOIR OF Do.
D'ESCALANTE FONTANEDA RESPECTING FLORIDA 12-13 (Miami 1944) (1st ed. B. Smith
trans. 1854). Fontaneda reported in 1575 that the riches of the Floridians came not
from the land but from the sea:
[I] desire to speak of the riches found by the Indians of Ais, which perhaps were
as much as a million dollars, or over, in bars of silver, in gold, and in articles of
jewelry made by the hands of Mexican Indians, which the passengers were bring-
ing with them. These things Carlos divided with the caciques [chiefs] of Ais,
Jeaga, Guacata, Mayajuaco, and Mayacca, and he took what pleased him, or
the best part. These vessels, and the wreck of the others mentioned, and of cara-
vels . . . were taken by Carlos. . ..
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One of the first acts of the federal government after Florida be-
came a United States possession in 1821 was the establishment of a
naval base in Key West to deter the wrecker-pirates operating in the
Florida Straits." Rum runners, cocaine cowboys, submarines that
stalked the shipping lanes offshore during World War II, oceanogra-
phers and treasure hunters are all a part of an historical heritage de-
creed by the configuration of reefs, islands, and peninsula that is
known as the State of Florida.
Although the opinion in Treasure Salvors No. 3 notes with some
asperity that state employees "reacted as though Treasure Salvors were
attempting to steal the old Capital Building as well as the great Seal of
the State,"-" the difference is only in degree. The Division of Archives
and History, charged with the responsibility of preserving and protect-
ing the cultural heritage of the state and specifically given ownership of
sunken and abandoned ships on state owned submerged lands, arguably
was acting under a legislative mandate, and not as an officious
intermeddler. 2
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP OF SALVAGE
The image invoked by the courts in handing down the Treasure
Salvors decisions, an image of hardy modern day pioneers comparable
to those who opened the American West, is seductive, but incongruous
upon close examination. Treasure Salvors is a corporation engaged in a
multi-million dollar operation, acquiring capital by the sale of stock to
shareholders. Although the Fifth Circuit noted that the justices "can
find no authority in law or in reason to countenence interference with
plaintiffs' activities simply because they are American citizens...,"o
the court did not address the problems that are presented by corporate
ownership.
Id. at 34-35. Since Carlos was cacique of the large community of Calusa Indians which
dominated South Florida at this period, it would appear that the right of the sovereign
in wrecks of the sea was established very early in Florida history as a principle of
customary law.
50. Smiley, Pirates and Wreckers, BORN OF THE SUN, 158-59 (Gill and Read ed.
1975).
51. 459 F. Supp. at 512.
52. 408 F. Supp. 907.
53. 569 F. 2d at 343.
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The corporation as it has evolved" into its modern form in the
United States has been regulated in its activities. The degree of regula-
tion has varied over the years, usually in direct proportion to the eco-
nomic strength of the industries being regulated.55 Indeed, a traditional
mistrust of corporations is as integral a part of American history as the
traditions of free enterprise, rugged individualism, and the right to pri-
vate property."
One of the reasons for regulation is that ownership .of property
under the corporate structure has become a very "different sort of
animal" from private ownership of property, and the responsibility side
of the ownership coin tends to be lost. This is of special concern when
the responsibility aspect of ownership is placed at the forefront, as it
inevitably is when public rights and interests are inextricably entwined
with the object that is "owned." Objects of scientific or historical value
obviously fall into this category.
The atom of corporate ownership has been split between stock-
holders, managers, employees, and the collectivity which appears in the
courtroom as a fictional person.57 Split ownership presents complica-
54. The corporation with an unlimited life, almost unlimited powers, and a legal
entity as an artificial person emerged in England in the sixteenth century through the
peace guilds when local governments were authorized to operate as corporations under
Royal Charter. As the British empire expanded, the merchantile companies utilized the
same device to acquire rights over foreign territories and resources. These merchantile
companies, "absentee owners" with most stockholders domiciled in England, fostered
and perpetuated a subservient economic and political status in the colonies, in North
America as well as throughout the world, and effectively regulated international trade.
The economic and political reality of this subservient status provided impetus to the
American Revolution. In the colonies, distrust of the corporate form was legion and
led some states to ratify the Constitution under protest because it did not prohibit the
formation of "companies." The Corporation as Legal Entity, 55 CANADIAN FORUM 16
(1975); W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, (rev.
perm. ed. 1975).
55. "The removal by the leading industrial states of the limitations upon the size
and powers of business corporations appears to have been due, not to their conviction
that maintenance of the restrictions was undesirable in itself, but to the conviction that
it was futile to insist upon them .... " Louis K. Ligett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517,557
(1933) (Brandeis J., dissenting).
56. For an excellent source tracing the development of the business corporation
in the United States see J. W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORA-
TION (1970).
57. See note 10 supra. This article presents an overview of the social base for the
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tions when the law of finds is applied as it was in the Treasure Salvors
cases. Who, in this instance, is the true finder? The stockholders, to
whom the property would be distributed if the corporation were dis-
solved? The management, which has actual possession? The individual
diver employed by the corporation, who actually picked the artifact
from the sand and carried it to the surface? Or the fictional person
recognized by thd court? Whichever choice is made as to the true finder
leaves unanswered the problem of responsibility for safeguarding the
interests of society as a whole, in this instance, the protection of the
cultural heritage. Which person or group holding a fragment of the
fissioned atom of ownership is charged with the "obligation" that has
always been an element of ownership?58
Numerous authorities59 have commented upon the blurring of
ownership rights and obligations that have occurred with the evolution
of the corporate structure in the United States. The result is a separa-
tion of ownership and control and a narrowing of the options for ac-
tion by "owners."
To speak of the corporation as owner . . . is merely to make a meta-
physical separation of the corporation from the men whose decisions and
deeds constitute the corporate activity. It merely conceals the fact that
we are in the presence of something which has little in common with the
traditional concept of ownership."
Via the corporate structure private ownership has been injected with a
a large dose of a public element through investment by institutions and
through its major role in the production of wealth.61 Some legal au-
thorities see the law of res in this instance "slipping altogether out of
concept of "property" and an extensive discussion of the evolution of distributive and
collective ownership.
58. "[A] pragmatist might conclude ... there are improper owners of property
whenever (1) the owner has no specific obligations to specific groups, (2) the owner
does not labor, or (3) the owner owns only persons." Schneider, supra note 9 at 9.
59. See note 9 and note 10, supra; Moore, The Emergence of New Property
Conceptions in America, J. LEGAL & POL. Soc. 34 (Apr. 1943); Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964); Jones, Forms of Ownership, 22 TUL. L. R. 82
(1947).
60. Jones, Forms of Ownership, 22 TUL. L. R. 82,86-87 (1947).
61. Id. at 89.
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the ius privatum into the ius publicam."'62
The omnipresence of the public element is as true of a corporation
engaged in treasure hunting as of any modern corporation. Most trea-
sure hunters have an ongoing indirect source of public funding; most
use methods and tools developed by publicly funded national and inter-
national underwater research and exploration projects and frequently
use surplus government equipment and government trained employees.
SOCIAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF TREASURE
HUNTING
The obligations and responsibilities inherent in ownership of antiq-
uities is underscored by new recognition of the fact that archaeological
activity in and of itself is destructive. That which the excavators are
not equipped to discover or learn from the site is effectively destroyed
at the time of excavation. It is now widely recognized that as much or
more can be learned from the context within which an artifact is found
as from the artifact itself, and most famous archaeologists of the past
century would be looked upon today as mere "pot hunters." Modern
archaeologists have developed sophisticated methods of dating materi-
als, complicated record keeping to facilitate computer analysis of
provenence and proportional occurrence,63 pollen sampling which
62. Id. at 93.
63. Provenence and proportional occurrence are a description of the location in
which the artifact is first discovered and an analysis of the relative numbers and types
of surrounding objects. Gathering this type of information presented special difficulties
for the archaeologist who worked for Treasure Salvors, Inc. D. Mathewson, Method
and Theory of Marine Archaeology (1978) (unpublished thesis in Fla. Atlantic Univer-
sity Library).
In the case of commercial salvage on the one hand, there is usually little or no
effort made to collect and record archaeological information systematically. On
the other hand, an archaeological excavation is a scientific operation which de-
mands a fully developed theoretical basis upon which a research design is formu-
lated for the cultural explication of the site. Resources for conducting archaeo-
logical research from within the salvage company had to be balanced against the
priorities and expectations of the commercial operation. Under such a situation,
it was impossible to develop a proper excavation program. . . . Excavation of
burial mounds has demonstrated that associations and sequences of associations
are ultimately of more value than the artifacts, structures, or burials themselves.
Underwater sites are no different. Archaeological explanation of a wreck site is
just as dependent upon spatial interpretation of artifact clusters as it is in any
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reveals plants that grew in that location and in what proportion, fecal
studies which reveal eating patterns, etc. In light of present technology,
it is possible that clues which might have revealed the secret of how the
Great Pyramids of Egypt were constructed may have been destroyed
by those who first entered the sealed tombs. For this reason, the whole
thrust of modern archaeology is away from excavation of sites and re-
covery of artifacts toward preservation; the discovery and identification
of such can then be preserved for future generations of scientific
technology. 4
This emphasis on preservation is spurred by the increasingly rapid
destruction of sites. 5 Clemency Coggins, prominent Precolumbian
terrestrial site.
• . . Field procedures had to be developed so that the answers to the archaeo-
logical questions would not be destroyed by the commercial operations.
Id. at 32-33 (emphasis added).
[D]uring exploratory phases of archaeological research on historic wreck sites,
goals often overlap and coincide with those of a profit-motivated commercial
operation. When this occurs some success can be achieved by working with com-
mercial salvors in solving archaeological problems[,I . . . dependent upon the
ability of the researcher to personally motivate and guide individual members of
the company through mutual trust and respect.
Id. at 107.
Beyond the exploratory phases (involving wreck site identification and descrip-
tion) it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain the progressive build-up on
contextual data. . . . Once archaeological investigations go beyond the descrip-
tive stage and turn toward processual analysis of trying to answer questions deal-
ing with patterns of human behavior, the trend of the research no longer pro-
vides immediate tangible feedback to assist the salvage company in achieving its
operational goals. When this happens, the company soon loses its interest in
supporting such research. At this point archaeological research of acceptable
standards is only possible if it is independently supported and administered
through a sponsoring educational or scientific institution.
Id. at 108.
64. King and Lyneis, Preservation: A Developing Focus of American Archaeol-
ogy, 80 AMER. ANTHROPOLOGIST 873 (1978).
65. Of forty-five major archaeological occupation sites known to have
existed on the Oregon coast between 1900 and 1950, today only one re-
mains intact and only twenty percent of the others survive in part. Of the
forty sites known in the Portland area in 1971, ten have been vandalized
or entirely destroyed, four have been covered by industrial developments,
three have been flooded or badly eroded, twelve others have been ruined
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scholar associated with the Peabody Museum, Harvard University, has
commented: "[T]he over-riding and unalterable fact is that evidence of
ancient civilization on this planet is nearly lost just as we have become
most sophisticated in its interpretation. Future generations will look
back with horror on the profligacy with which their past has been
squandered."6
Most underwater archaeological sites remained undisturbed until
recently. Difficulty of access to these sites was a major factor. An aux-
iliary factor-is the difficulty of preservation once objects of bone, wood,
and metal are exposed to the air. The beautifully carved and painted
wooden masks and animal forms recovered from the mud of Key
Marco off the southwest Florida coast in 1896 are today deteriorated
to the point of being almost unrecognizable because of careless storage
in someone's attic. Their original beauty of form and color, fortu-
nately, has been preserved in a series of paintings made for the Smith-
sonian Institution at the time of discovery. Artifacts which have been
immersed in salt water for a period of time are best preserved under-
water because of salt penetration. On land or in the air, deterioration is
rapid unless all salt is removed, a time consuming, expensive, and not
always successful process, usually only justified for small objects. Arti-
facts left in the salt water and especially if protected by an overburden
of sand will probably remain "as is" for hundreds of years. The old
Spanish cannons coveted by many amateur divers and a common sight
in front of homes and commercial establishments throughout Florida
have a very brief life span.
The need for preservation of the remaining underwater archaeo-
logical sites is underscored by the fact that all of the ancient shipwreck
sites in the Mediterranean Sea have been destroyed within the past
fifteen years. The impetus for such senseless destruction can be attrib-
by the work of inexpert amateurs, six have been paved over or built upon
in a similar fashion, and two are presently scheduled for excavation by
amateur groups; this leaves, on balance, only three sites undisturbed. In
Arkansas (the statistics are less grim, but similar), twenty-five percent of
that state's known sites have been destroyed in the past ten years. I am
sure that analogous figures would also apply to other parts of the country.
Pletsch, Antiquities Legislation and the Role of the Amateur Archaeologist, 27 AR-
CHAEOLOGY 260,260 (1974).
66. Coggins, New Legislation to Control the International Traffic in Antiquities,
29 ARCHAEOLOGY 14,15 (1976).
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uted to the high demand and high prices in the current antiquities mar-
ket, lax import/export laws, advances in diving technology and under-
water surveying methods, the expansion of sport diving and the blue
water (clear) diving conditions in the Mediterranean. As the same. con-
ditions exist in Florida waters off the Florida coast, and throughout the
Caribbean, a concerted and mutual effort is required so that this cul-
tural heritage will not be despoiled within a few years. This is a very
real threat as the treasure hunters have already moved to the Silver
Shoals off the Dominican Republic, to the Turks and Caicos Islands,
and elsewhere. Artifacts from an ancient Spanish ship wrecked on Sil-
ver Shoals were recently imported into the United States by salvors
working under contract (50-50 split) with the Dominican Republic. A
Dominican Republic patrol boat was stationed at the salvage site
throughout the salvage operation to protect the site from claim
jumpers."'
In an effort to preserve part of the underwater archaeological heri-
tage for future generations, the Florida Division of Archives and His-
tory in mid-1979 made plans to move most of a 1715 wreck from wa-
ters near St. Lucie County to the protected waters of John Perinekamp
State Park. Treasure Salvors, Inc., on the basis of the decision in Trea-
sure Salvors No. 3,11 proceeded to salvage a cannon as first finder, de-
spite the fact that the wreck was located only a few hundred feet from
shore and well within the three mile limit of state territorial waters.6"
The principals were arrested by state agents pursuant to the provisions
of the Archives and History Act, but the grand jury refused to return
an indictment.
The methods used by modern treasure hunters also are of concern
in coastal zone management and conservation. The large blowers used
to remove the sand overburden on a suspected wreck site are a poten-
tial hazard to surrounding sea life. As a result, environmental damage
from unlicensed and unmonitored treasure hunting activity in Florida
waters is as much of a threat to commercial and recreational fishing
and diving" as it is to the preservation of antiquities. Dredging of sand
67. The Miami News, Oct. 31, 1979, at 5A, col. 2.
68. 459 F. Supp. 507.
69. The Miami Herald, Aug. 23, 1979, at 13-D, col. 1.
70. Sport diving on the wrecks accounts for an important segment of the Florida
tourist industry. During the summer of 1979, for example, amateur divers paid $975 a
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in other activities is now closely monitored by the State Internal Im-
provement Fund Trustees and the Army Corps of Engineers in order to
limit silt damage to coral and other sea life in and about the reefs.
In 1978 a treasure hunter was convicted of damaging a reef and
fined $2000 by the United States Department of the Interior which is
charged with responsibility for monitoring activities on the outer conti-
nental shelf under terms of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.7'
The conviction was recently overturned on appeal by the Fifth Circuit,
ruling that the salvors can be regulated only by admiralty law.72 This
decision, coupled with the Treasure Salvors decisions,73 appears to have
created a class of people engaged in an activity which is effectively be-
yond the reach of any law, especially if operations are conducted be-
yond the three mile territorial limit. If so, another era of wrecker-buc-
caneers operating in the Straits of Florida is a real possibility.
A spur to treasure hunters off Florida shores is the result of the
recent high value placed upon objects of antiquity and their investment
potential in an inflationary economy. As might be expected under these
conditions, the illicit market in antiquities has reached the proportions
of international scandal; a pollution of international commerce fueled
by money, principally from United States museums and private collec-
tors.74 Private collectors have found antiquities a lucrative investment
as a hedge against inflation and tax shelter, so much so that within the
past year investment vehicles specializing in collectibles have been
made available to investors on Wall Street. Most private collections
are, in time, donated to a museum or other tax exempt group and the
cost of acquisition taken by the collector/donor as a tax writeoff or
deduction. This puts the American taxpayer in the incongruous posi-
tion of subsidising the illicit trade in antiquities while at the same time
buying back his cultural heritage, or someone else's cultural heritage
perhaps illegally transported to this county, at grossly inflated prices.
The majority of United States museums are privately funded, un-
piece for the privilege of participating for two weeks in a professional archaeological
expedition to document an underwater shipwreck site at Looe Key, off the lower Flor-
ida Keys. Historic Shipwrecks at Looe Key, EARTHWATCH RESEARCH EXPEDITIONS, 27
(Summer & Fall 1979).
71. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976).
72. United States v. Alexander, 602 F. 2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1979).
73. See note 3 supra.
74. See note 46 supra.
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like museums in other countries, and therefore, are not subject even to
the loose control of public scrutiny." In 1972, a controversy that still
rages was sparked by the Metropolitan Museum of Art when it ac-
quired the Greek vase known as the Euphronios Krater. Numismatists
were understandably outraged when the outstanding Metropolitan col-
lection of ancient coins was sold, and dispersed, in the search for funds
to acquire the Krater, illegally exported from Italy.71
Publicity, and the cloud on the legal title to the Euphronios
Krater, caused the Metropolitan Museum to back off when the Lysip-
pus bronze statue appeared on the international art market, also ille-
gally spirited out of Italy. Dating from the fourth century B.C., the
statue was purchased in 1977 for $3.9 million by the Getty Museum in
Los Angeles where it is currently on display. Meanwhile, Italy is nego-
tiating with the United States government for the return of the statue.7
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ANTIQUITIES
LEGISLATION & POLICY
The role of the United States in the illicit market for antiquities is
decisive for the most restrictive legislation has been passed in those
nations least able to enforce it. A comparative look at national legisla-
tion in the field of antiquities reveals the isolated stance of the United
States, especially in this hemisphere, but also worldwide."
In the Western Hemisphere five countries have national laws
which declare that all cultural properties are ultimately the property of
the state: Bolivia, Brazil, British Honduras, El Salvador, and Mexico.
Six countries have laws protecting all cultural property: Canada, Co-
lumbia, Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Peru. Worldwide, ten
countries have placed ownership of cultural properties in the state: Na-
tionalist China, Peoples Republic of China, Greece, Iraq, Jordan, Leb-
anon, Nigeria, Turkey, USSR, and Yogoslavia. Nine countries protect
all cultural properties: India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Pakistan,
Philippines, Spain and Syria. Most of the other countries allow export
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Roston, Smuggled, SAT. REV., Mar. 31, 1979, at 25; Edwards, The World's
Richest Museum Stands Aloof on Its Olympus, The Miami Herald, Aug. 12, 1979, at
I L, col. 3.
78. See note 14 and note 46 at Appendix B, supra.
231 1
232
Nova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol4/iss1/1
1 232 Nova Law Journal 4:1980
of cultural materials only by permit. In contrast, the United States
protects only those antiquities which are located on public lands.
Australia passed an Historic Shipwreck Act in 1976 which pro-
tects all shipwrecks on the Australian continental shelf and it has a
bilateral agreement with the Netherlands to negotiate ownership of
wrecks which, belonged to the Dutch East India Company. 9 Wrecks of
archaeological interest in French waters belong to the state. 0 In Spain,
the state now acquires ownership after three years. 1 Great Britain,
Norway and Denmark have wreck protection statutes. 82
The "treasures" involved in the Treasure Salvors controversy have
been declared by the court to be in international waters and effectively
beyond the control of either the United States or the State of Florida.
Even if these decisions are upheld on appeal, the questions are not
stilled. Should some protection be afforded the shipwrecks which re-
main? If so, in what way and by whom? If, according to the reasoning
of the court, the only sovereign with a legitimate interest in the arti-
facts is Spain, should Spanish regulations apply? The logistics of dis-
tance and control would preclude this solution, but do emphasize the
problem of attempting to make antiquities protection and concern only
a parochial problem. This is a stance which becomes increasingly un-
tenable as the interdependance and mobility of world populations con-
tinues unabated.
The policy of extending the protection of the sovereign to those
objects and sites deemed important to the national heritage is one that
is now seemingly embraced in the United States by a concensus of the
whole society, a justified assumption based upon passage of the Federal
Antiquities Act of 1906,3 the Historic Sites Act of 1935,11 the Reser-
voir Salvage Act of 1960,8 the Historic Preservation Act of 1966.86
However, since both the national and the Florida antiquities laws are
under attack in the courts, new legislation would seem to be essential.
This could be accomplished on the national level by legislation declar-
79. Lumb, Law of Wrecks in Australia, 52 AuST. L. J. 198 (1978).
80. Supra, note 14 at 88-89.
81. Id. at 87.
82. Id. at 89,91.
83. 16 U.S.C. § 433.
84. 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467.
85. 16 U.S.C. §§ 469-470.
86. 16 U.S.C. §§ 462-468, 470.
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ing the rights of the sovereign in those items important to the national
heritage. A revision of the 1906 Antiquities Act has just been passed by
Congress,"7 and separate legislation that would control underwater sites
is pending.8"
A measure of control could be placed in the United States govern-
ment if the protection and control over the continental shelf were, by
legislative declaration, extended to "cultural resources" as well as
"natural resources."89 Anything lying beyong the continental shelf
probably would be unsalvagable today, but that undoubtedly would not
be true in the future as underwater engineering techniques are further
developed.
Precedent for an extension of United States jurisdiction in a mari-
time context was established by a recent decision involving the board-
ing of a vessel in international waters that was suspected of carrying
illegal drugs. In United States v. Cadena,90 the Fifth Circuit stated:
That the vessel was outside the territorial waters [of the United
States] does not, of course mean that it was beyond United States juris-
dictional limits or the operation of domestic law. Jurisdictional and ter-
ritorial limits are not co-terminous. . . .[The jurisdiction of the United
States] extends to persons whose acts have an effect within the sovereign
territory even though the acts themselves occur outside it0'
The opinion in one of the Treasure Salvors cases noted that an
extension of sovereignty over the outer continental shelf might provoke
an international controversy,92 but such a controversy already exists re-
garding the acquisition policies of United States museums and the im-
port-export policies of the United States government with regard to
antiquities. 3 That the role of the United States is pivotal is under-
87. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. 471 (1979).
This act restricts coverage to cultural resources found on public lands.
88. H. R. 1195. This bill declares ownership in the United States of any aban-
doned historic shipwreck located on the outer continental shelf.
89. 569 F. 2d at 339.
90. 585 F. 2d 1252 (5th cir. 1978).
91. Id. at 1257.
92. 408 F. Supp. at 911.
93. See note 46 and note 77 supra. The United States places few restrictions on
the importation of cultural objects and there is no import duty on items that are more
than one hundred years old. Some attempts have been made to curb the illicit trade in
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scored by the fact that the signing of a treaty with Mexico94 and the
passage of a law affecting twelve other Latin American countries in
197111 prohibiting the import of Precolumbian murals and monumental
sculpture has been a major factor in stemming the illicit trade in those
items. 8
The only international convention that might apply, the Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf, 7 by interpretation through Inter-
national Law Commission commentary, excludes shipwrecks. Bilateral
treaties covering situations similar to that which exists in the United
States with regard to ancient shipwrecks have been negotiated between
England and Spain and between several countries and the
Netherlands."
A UNESCO resolution in this area recommends allowing member
states to regulate property rights on its territory, but suggests:
Finds should be used, in the first place, for building up, in the museums
of the country in which excavations are carried out, complete collections
fully representative of that country's civilization, history, art, and archi-
tecture. . . [T]he conceding authority, after scientific publication, might
consider allocating to the excavator a number of finds from his
excavation. .... 1
The United States has ratified the UNESCO Convention, but has not
passed enabling legislation. The Florida Archives and History Act,
antiquities by using the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314-2315 (1976).
See Art Theft: National Stolen Property Act Applied to Nationalized Mexican Pre-
Columbian Artifacts: United States v. McClain, 10 N.Y.U. J. INT. LAW & POL. 569
(1979); Art Law, Protection of Foreign Antiquities Using Domestic Statutes, 10 CONN.
L. REV. 727 (1978).
94. Treaty of Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United
Mexican States Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, His-
torical and Cultural Properties, July 17, 1970, [1971] 22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S. No.
7088.
95. Regulation of Importation of Pre-Columbian Monumental or Architectural
Sculpture or Murals (Pre-Columbian Act), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095 (Supp. III 1973).
96. Legal Restrictions on American Access to Foreign Cultural Property, 46
FORD. L. R. 1177, 1181 (1978). See also Art Theft, supra note 93.
97. CONVENTION ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, done April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
471 [1964], T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
98. Supra note 14.
99. 9 UNESCO, U.N. Doc. 9C/PRG/7, paras. 23(b) and (c) (1956).
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however, would appear to be in substantial compliance.
CONCLUSION
In the early 1970s awarding property rights to the excavators even
in coastal waters was thought to be the best way "to encourage and
stimulate the legitimate exploration for and excavation of evidence of
past civilizations contained in the sea."' 1 From the vantage point of
1980, and with a new awareness of the need for preservation, the facts
would seem to controvert this viewpoint. As amateur and professional
organizations, museums, and scholars have become increasingly
alarmed by the loss of sites, they have passed policy resolutions relat-
ing to collecting and collections.1"' Perhaps the treasure hunters can be
100. 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 668 (1972). An extensive discussion of the field of
marine archaeology noted:
[W]herever coastal state jurisdiction over marine archaeology ends, it seems
clear that the property rights to archaeological material found beyond that juris-
diction would currently vest in the marine archaeologist reducing it to posses-
sion, based on a characterization of the finds as abandoned property. While such
rights are warranted in view of the investment of time and money by the finders,
there is also a definite interest in protecting such property and the information
about past civilizations it represents from eluding public and scientific interest.
Id. at 689.
101. The gravity of the situation has prompted a number of museums associated
with educational institutions to issue policy statements on acquisition and collecting.
For example, the following statement was issued by the University of California,
Berkeley, in 1973:
Preamble: For the past several years, reputable museums throughout the world
have been concerned with the scientific, legal, ethical, and diplomatic problems
involved in the acquisition of art, antiquities, and archaeological materials.
Large quantities of primitive and ancient artifacts, as well as occasional old-
master paintings and prints, are being stolen, illegally excavated, or smuggled
out of their countries of origin and illegally imported into the United States.
This is particularly shocking in the area of archaeological materials, which are
being clandestinely excavated in direct contravention of the laws of the countries
of their origin, to such an extent that resentment against this illicit trade is run-
ning high in many countries, threatening to disrupt the legitimate and highly
desirable reserach of American archaeologists abroad. If this market were to
continue at its present systematic rate, it could obliterate large segments of the
cultural heritage and national treasures of many countries.
Hence, we believe that the museums of the University of California, Berke-
ley, must join other museums throughout the world in formulating a policy
235 1
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persuaded to change the form of the souveniers that they carry home
from the hunt, just as the African big game hunters switched from
stuffed heads to photographs. Even Mel Fisher, president of Treasure
Salvors, Inc., has admitted, "The search, the hunt is the real
reward."11 2
The decision in Ervin,103 and the Florida Archives and History
Act, rather than being aberrations, appear to be at the forefront of
progressive antiquities law in the United States. It is unconscionable to
allow the protective cloak of a free enterprise ideology to shelter or
obscure the systematic destruction of an irreplaceable cultural heritage.
It is staggering to learn that all known underwater sites in the Florida
Keys formerly protected by state law were totally or partially de-
stroyed within two years of the United States v. Florida04 decision.
New law, both judicial and legislative, is imperative, on all levels: local,
national, and international.
Beth Read
which will regulate, reduce, and control the illicit traffic in art and antiquities.
Policy: Therefore, on behalf of the Lowie Museum of Anthropology and the
University Art Museum, the University of California, Berkeley, will use its best
efforts to ensure that any object to be accessioned to their respective collections
has not been (1) excavated without permit, where such permits are required,
whether in the United States or abroad; (2) stolen from a private collection, a
dealer in art and/or antiquities, a museum, or a nationally designated monu-
ment; -or (3) exported from its country of origin in violation of the laws of that
country and/or the country where it was last legally owned.
Moreover, should either of these museums of the University of California,
Berkeley, come into possession of any object in violation of these principles, the
University will, if practicable, return it to the rightful owner.
Dixon, More Policy Statements on the Acquisition of Art and Antiquities, 15 CJRR.
ANTHROPOLOGY 197,197 (1974).
IMS TO DIVEST ITSELF OF COLLECTIONS:
At a special meeting of the IMS Board of Directors, held on July 12, 1979, it
was resolved that the IMS will in the future decline donations of all artifacts
from private or individual sources, unless they are on loan with express permis-
sion of the country of origin. It was further resolved that a Committee be ap-
pointed to study ways and means of divestiture and make its recommendations
known to the Board within six months.
Newsletter, Institute of Maya Studies, Inc., August 15, 1979 at 1. See also note 46
supra at Appendix D.
102. Nova Law Center, Perspective, Fall, 1979 at 3.
103. 95 So. 2d 902.
104. 425 U.S. 791.
..
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Admiralty Law: Trial of a Treasure Hunter
Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Nuestra Sefiora de Atocha
Treasure hunters today are forced to battle not only the perils of the
sea, but also the powers of government. This note examines whether
ownership of an abandoned "derelict" and its treasure found by a trea-
sure hunter outside the territorial limits of a state should be awarded to
the treasure hunter or to the state. A trilogy of cases in the United
States courts have recently held that the treasure hunter owns the trea-
sure.' A closely related question arises if the derelict and its treasure
are located within state territorial waters (the so-called three-mile
limit). The Florida Supreme Court has held that the treasure is owned
by the state if located within its jurisdiction,2 but the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida has recently raised
doubts about the validity of the supreme court's conclusion.3 This latter,
issue is certain to be hotly contested in the near future.4
In the midst of this controversy, federal legislation has been pro-
posed. A bill pending in Congress, if passed, would vest title to certain
shipwrecks and their treasure in the United States Government.1 The
future of this bill could have a significant impact on the current litiga-
tion and mark significant changes in existing treasure law.
1. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked And Abandoned Sailing
Vessel Believed To Be The Nuestra Sefiora de Atocha, 408 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla.
1976), modified, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Treasure Salvors
#1]. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked And Abandoned Sailing Ves-
sel Believed To Be The Nuestra Sefiora de Atocha, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978) [here-
inafter cited as Treasure Salvors #2]. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified
Wrecked And Abandoned Sailing Vessel Believed To Be The Nuestra Sefiora de
Atocha, 459 F.Supp. 507 (S.D. Fla. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Treasure Salvors #3].
2. State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1956), cert. de-
nied. 355 U.S. 881 (1957).
3. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 509.
4. Cobb Coin Co. v. The Unidentified Wrecked And Abandoned Sailing Vessel
Believed To Be The Almirante, No. 79-8266-CIV-JLK (S.D. Fla., filed August 17,
1979) [hereinafter cited as Cobb Coin Co. v. The Almirante].
5. H.R. 1195, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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BACKGROUND: NUESTRA SEf4ORA DE ATOCHA
In the year 1622, Spain was supreme. Her economy was soaring
with the wealth of gold and silver being mined in the "New World."
King Philip IV regularly dispatched two fleets to transport this wealth
safely home over seas teeming with buccaneers and pirates. The vice-
flagship of the fleet which sailed between Spain and northern South
America was named Nuestra Sehora de A tocha.
On the moring of September 4th, the A tocha and her twenty-eight
sister ships sailed out of Havana, homeward bound. The Atocha was
hauling a magnificent treasure in gold, silver and jewelry-perhaps, in
present worth, a treasure exceeding a half-billion dollars.' Two days
later, helplessly situated in the Straits of Florida, the ships were be-
sieged by a hurricane which hurled them mercilessly back onto the
coral reefs near the Florida Keys. Aground and awash, the fleet was
battered and broken. Five hundred and fifty drowned, and the immense
treasure was lost.7
In early June, 1971, Mel Fisher, founder and president of Trea-
sure Salvors, Inc., discovered the first clue in his five-year search for
the Atocha; a single lead musket ball was retrieved from the ocean
floor. Two weeks later, mid-June, a diver found a lone silver coin; later
that day, another discovered a piece of a huge ancient anchor. Then,
incredibly, a diver surfaced with gold-eight long feet of delicate gold
chain. And with that, at last, a tiny part of Nuestra Sehora de Atocha
glittered again in the warm rays of the tropical sun.8
But almost before having had a chance to dry upon the ship's
deck, the treasure was seized by Florida's Division of Archives. Previ-
ously, under threats of arrest, Fisher had been coerced into signing a
6. According to records kept by the House of Trade in 1622, the A tocha carried
901 silver bars (70 lbs. ea.), 250,000 pieces of eight, and 161 items in registered gold
(216.5 lbs.). It is estimated that a similar amount was stowed away in contraband. R.
DALEY, TREASURE 23 (1977). Current estimated value has reached $600,000,000. Lyon,
The Trouble With Treasure, 149 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 787 (June, 1976).
7. The A tocha was located two weeks after the disaster, but subsequent salvage
attempts failed. Three attempts were launched during the following three years, but the
Atocha was never located again. See Lyon, supra note 6, at 84-90.
8. Other items retrieved shortly thereafter were: swords, daggers, cannonballs,
matchlock muskets, spoons, cups, pewter plates, rings, medallions, a delicate rosary,
cannons, an astrolabe, and navigational dividers. See Lyon, supra note 6, at 787.
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"salvage contract" with the state.' The contract provided that in ex-
change for Treasure Salvors' right to explore certain underwater areas
(assumed,to be state-owned lands), the state would be allowed to keep,
and, at its pleasure divide, all cargo or wreckage salvaged by Treasure
Salvors, the state retaining twenty-five percent and Treasure Salvors
eventually getting the rest. l°
For the next four years, until early 1975, Fisher's company contin-
ued salvaging the Atocha, entirely at its own expense;" and the state
continued, in "bad faith," seizing and hoarding the treasure.'2 Then, in
March of 1975, the United States Supreme Court, in an unrelated
case, determined that Florida's boundaries did not encompass the site
of the A tocha.13 It thus became clear that the "salvage contract" be-
tween Treasure Salvors, Inc. and Florida was unenforceable since the
Atocha lay in international waters" leaving Florida with no claim to
9. Pursuant to Florida Archives and History Act, FLA. STAT. § 267.031 (1975):
"(5) The division may make and enter into all contrcts and agreements. . ....
"The coercive acts of the Division of Archives in threatening arrest and confisca-
tion voids the contract under the general maritime law." Treasure Salvors #3 459
F.Supp. at 520.
10. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 511.
11. Other than placing an agent on Fisher's boat to oversee the work, the State
of Florida made no contribution in money or personnel to the salvage expedition. See
R. DALEY, supra note 6, at 131.
12. It is basic to a maritime contract that the parties act in good faith. The
state's use of coercion to acquire contractual rights, refusal to divide the salvaged trea-
sure, compounded by the Division of Archives' arrangement with the United States
Government to obtain an antiquities permit if the United States was successful in its
claim against the treasure is strong evidence of the "bad faith scheme" devised by the
State of Florida. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 521-22.
13. Following a report of the special master, the Supreme Court set forth "the
respective rights of the United States and the State of Florida in lands, minerals and
resources underlying both the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico." United States
v. Florida, 425 U.S. 791 (1976).
14. The contract failed on several gounds:
(1) Mutual mistake of fact - both parties believed the Atocha was located
within state territorial waters.
(2) Lack of consideration - Florida tendered nothing since it lacked authoriza-
tion to contract regarding the salvage of a vessel outside the state's territorial
sovereignty.
(3) Bad faith - on behalf of the state rendering the maritime contract void.
(4) Contract terms - provision to render the contract void if the state's title
failed.
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the treasure. Accordingly, Fisher promptly filed suit in federal district
court against the A tocha, claiming Treasure Salvors, Inc. owners as
against the entire world.1 5 The Florida Department of Archives, power-
less to stop Fisher, requested the United States Department of Justice
to intervene, urging them to claim ownership of the treasure. The
United States obliged; and the fundamental issue of this paper was laid
before the court: Whether ownership of an abandoned "derelict"' 6 (the
A tocha) and its treasure, found by a treasure hunter (Treasure Salvors,
Inc.) outsi-le the territorial limits of the state (the United States),
should be awarded to the treasure hunter or to the state.17
TREASURE SALVORS #1
On what grounds could the United States possibly claim the trea-
sure? After all, Treasure Salvors had found the treasure and salvaged it
entirely at its own expense without any help from the government. 8
Furthermore, the A tocha and her treasure lay in international waters,
outside the reach of any government. Admittedly, a United States At-
torney quipped, "We've got to hustle around and see if we can find
enough law to get our guys in."' 9
The United, States eventually based its claim on the doctrine of
Immediately following oral argument in United States v. Florida, Treasure Salvors
notified Florida of the contract's nullity. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 513.
15. Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F.Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1976), modified, 569 F.2d
330 (5th Cir. 1978).
16. Special terminology is applied in maritime law to property "lost" at sea. The
term "wreck" refers to property lost at sea which has washed ashore. "Flotsam" refers
to the same property which remains afloat. "Jetsam" refers to property purposely
thrown overboard in an attempt to save a foundering vessel. When buoyed in order to
be retrieved at a later time, this property is labelled "ligan." Vessels lying at the bot-
tom of the sea, as the A tocha, are called "derelicts." Kenny and Hrusoff, The Owner-
ship Of The Treasures Of The Sea, 9 WM. & MARY L.REv. 383, 384 (1967). See also
Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1360, 1365.
17. Both the United States and Treasure Salvors, Inc. agreed "the site of the
wreck is on the continental shelf but outside the territorial waters of the United
States." Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F.Supp. at 909.
18. It took six years of research and diving expeditions and an expenditure in
excess of $2,000,000 to locate the Atocha. Unfortunately, the cost was measured not
only in time and money; it emcompassed four lives, including Fisher's son and daugh-
ter-in-law. Lyon, note 6 supra.
19. 189 SCIENCE 1070 (September 26, 1975).
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"sovereign prerogative,""0 "a common law notion derived from the
right of the King of England to objects recovered from the sea by his
subjects."'" The government contended the doctrine of sovereign pre-
rogative had been legislatively asserted by Congress through the enact-
ment of the Antiquities Act2 and the Abandoned Property Act. 23 The
district court in subsequent litigation, Treasure Salvors #3, character-
ized this claim as "flimsy. ' 24
Dealing first with the Abandoned Property Act, which applies to
property "which may have been wrecked, abandoned, or become dere-
lict,"" the court noted that it had long been decided that the Act re-
ferred only to property"strewn about the country and its harbors dur-
ing the Civil War. ' 26 Clearly, the Atocha was not within its purview.
The Antiquities Act, in similar fashion, purports to apply to "any
historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or to any object of antiq-
uity. 127 But this Act, the court pointed out, "has been held to be un-
20. Also known as the "English Rule." For an in-depth analysis of the develop-
ment of the English Rule, see 9 WM & MARY L.REv., note 16 supra.
21. Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F.Supp. at 909.
22. Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 432, 433 (1970). See note 27 infra.
23. Abandoned Property Act, 40 U.S.C. § 310 (1970). See note 25 infra.
24. "It would amaze and surprise most citizens of this country, when their
dream, at the greatest of costs, was realized, that agents of respective governments
would, on the most flimsy of grounds, lay claim to the treasure." Treasure Salvors #3,
459 F.Supp. at 509.
25. 40 U.S.C. § 310 (1970):
The administrator of General Services is authorized to make such contracts and
provisions as he may deem for the interest of the Government for the preserva-
tion, sale, or collection of any property, or the proceeds thereof, which may have
been wrecked, abandoned, or become derelict, being within the jurisdiction of the
United States, and which ought to come to the United States, and in such con-
tracts to allow such compensation to any person giving information thereof, or
who shall actually preserve, collect, surrender, or pay over the same, as the Ad-
ministrator of General Services may deem just and reasonable. No costs or
claim shall, however, become chargeable to the United States in so obtaining,
preserving, collecting, receiving, or making available property, debts, dues, or
interests, which shall not be paid from such moneys as shall be realized and
received from the property so collected, under each specific agreement.
26. Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F.Supp. at 909, discussing Russel v. Forty Bales
Cotton, 21 Fed.Cas. No. 12, 154 (1872).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 432 (1970). This section provides in part: "Permits for the exam-
ination of ruins, the excavation of archeaological sites, and the gathering of objects of
antiquity upon the lands under their respective jurisdictions may be granted by the
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constitutionally vague."2 Moreover, both the Antiquities Act and the
Abandoned Property Act apply only to property found within the juris-
diction of the United States. 9 The A tocha, lying on the outer continen-
tal shelf beyond territorial waters was plainly beyond the reach of the
United States; thus, neither Act could apply to it.3°
But the United States asserted the A tocha was within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States through the use of the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).3 ' The court rejected this argument since
"this statute [OSCLA] merely asserts jurisdiction over the minerals in
and under the continental shelf."' 32 Additionally, the court noted, even
Secretaries of the Interior . ... "
16 U.S.C. § 433 (1970). This section provides:
Any person who shall appropriate, excavate, injure, or destroy any historic or
prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of antiquity, situated on lands
owned or controlled by the Government of the United States, without the per-
mission of the Secretary of the Department of the Government having jurisdic-
tion over the lands on which said antiquities are situated, shall, upon conviction,
be fined in a sum of not more than $500 or be imprisoned for a period of not
more than ninety days, or shall suffer both fine and imprisonment, in the discre-
tion of the court.
28. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 524-25, citing United States v. Diaz,
499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974). Congress has recently passed legislation in an attempt to
cure the statute's vagueness problem. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of
1979, 16 U.S.C.A. § 470aa (Supp. 1979). Additionally, subsequent to the district
court's decision, the Antiquities Act did survive a vagueness attack in the Tenth Cir-
cuit. United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 84
(1974). See note 99 infra.
29. The pertinent part of the Antiquities Act states "situated on lands owned or
controlled by the Government of the United States." For complete text, see note 27
supra.
30. Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F.Supp. at 909.
31. Id. at 910. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (1953):
(a) It is declared to be the policy of the United States that the subsoil and
seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States and are
subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition as provided in this
subchapter.
(b) This subchapter shall be construed in such manner that the character as
high seas of the waters above the outer Continental Shelf and the right to navi-
gation and fishing therein shall not be affected.
See also Guess v. Read, 290 F.2d 622, 625 (1961), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1962) for
a more detailed analysis of this Act.
32. Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F.Supp. at 910.
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if OCSLA did extend the jurisdiction of the United States over
wrecked ships, it would be invalid because it would conflict with the
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.3 3 And, the court pointed
out, the International Law Commission, in its report on the Geneva
Convention stated: "It is clearly understood that the rights in question
do not cover objects such as wrecked ships and their cargoes (including
bullion) lying on the seabed or covered by the sand of the subsoil.' 4
Thus, having considered and rejected each aspect of the United
States' "hustled" sovereign prerogative theory, the district court
granted Treasure Salvors' motion for summary judgment, declaring it
the new owner of the Atocha and her treasure as against the whole
world.3
TREASURE SALVORS #2
The United States appealed. In addition to reasserting its claim
that Congress had legislatively asserted sovereign prerogative through
the Abandoned Property Act and the Antiquities Act, the government
also contended that a legislative assertion of the doctrine was not nec-
essary.3 The Fifth Circuit rejected these arguments (and others raised
by the government which are not pertinent here)3 7 and affirmed the
33. "The Convention on the Continental Shelf became effective as law in the
United States eleven years after passage of the Outer Continental Shelf LandsAct and
superceded any incompatible terminology in the domestic statute." Treasure Salvors
#2, 569 F.2d at 340, citing United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16, 21 (5th Cir. 1970).
Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, in force June 10, 1964. Article 2, subsection 1 states: "The coastal
State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring
it and exploiting its natural resources."
34. Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 340, citing I 1 U.S. GAOR, Supp. 9 at 42,
U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956).
35. Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F. Supp. at 911.
36. Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 341.
37. The United States Government raised three procedural arguments in addi-
tion to the substantive claims. The government claimed: (1) the federal district court
lacked jurisdiction since the wreck was outside the territorial waters; (2) summary
judgment was improper due to the existence of two unresolved factual questions; and,
(3) salvage law was inappropriately applied. The Fifth Circuit held jurisdiction was
proper since the government by intervening and by stipulating to the court's admiralty
jurisdiction had waived the usual requirement that the res be present. The issues un-
resolved were not questions of fact, but concerned administrative or legislative action,
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district court's decision, though modifying it slightly.
As to the purported assertion of sovereign prerogative through the
Antiquities and Abandoned Property Acts, the Fifth Circuit adopted
the reasoning of the district court; the Acts clearly applied only to cer-
tain property within the jurisdiction of the United States."8 Any exten-
sion of United States' jurisdiction beyond the three-mile limit by the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act was obviously only "for the pur-
pose of exploring the area and exploiting its natural resources."39 Since
the A tocha was outside the three-mile limit and, obviously, not a "nat-
ural resource," the Antiquities and Abandoned Property Acts were
again held inapplicable.
The court also rejected the government's claim that sovereign pre-
rogative need not be legislatively asserted." The government had ar-
gued that sovereign prerogative was a part of American maritime law
because "a number of the royal colonies" had asserted "certain prerog-
ative rights" to abandoned property found within their jurisdiction.4"
The court disagreed: "[T]he notion of sovereign prerogative never took
root in America."" To substantiate its ruling, the court went on to cite
cases and authorities for the inapposite "American Rule," which has
been "widely recognized by courts and writers."4
therefore, summary judgment was appropriate. Finally, the lower court had applied the
law of finds rather than salvage law which was appropriate. Salvage law only differs to
the extent the court sells the vessel and pays the salvor from the proceeds. The law of
finds awards title to the finder. It is not unusual under salvage law, however, for the
salvor to receive "the entire derelict property." Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 335-
37.
38. Id. at 341.
39. Id. at 339. See note 31 supra regarding the Convention on the Continental
Shelf. See also President Truman's proclamation of September 28, 1945 stating in
part: "IT]he Government of the United States regards the natural resources of the
subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the
coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States . . . ." Presidential
Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945).
40. Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 343.
41. Id. at 342.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 343, citing United States v. Tyndale, 116 F. 820, 822-23 (1st Cir.
1902), Russel v. Proceeds of Forty Bales Cotton, 21 Fed. Cas. No. 12,154, pp. 42, 45-
50 (S.D. Fla. 1872), affd. 21 Fed. Cas. p. 50; In re Moneys in Registry, 170 F. 470,
475 (E.D. Pa. 1909), and Thompson v. United States, 62 Ct. Cl. 516, 624 (1926).
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This American Rule was Treasure Salvors' ally to the end. In di-
rect conflict with the "English Rule" (sovereign prerogative), the
American Rule vests title to lost or abandoned goods in the finder."1
The case law in America overwhelmingly adopts this rule."5 Only a mi-
nority of the state courts, most notably the Florida Supreme Court,"
have ever purported to adopt the English Rule of sovereign preroga-
tive. The highly criticized Florida decision will be dealt with below. At
this point, it is only important to note that Fisher's ownership of the
A tocha and her treasure was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. The only
modification of the district court's decision was that Treasure Salvors'
title to the Atocha was not binding on those not parties or privies to
the suit." Remarkably, the Florida Division of Archives took this mod-
ification as an invitation to lay yet another claim to the treasure."
TREASURE SALVORS #3
The Division of Archives had never released the treasure it had
seized and collected from Treasure Salvors since the day of the first
musket ball. Accordingly, to effectuate the Fifth Circuit's mandate, the
District Court for the Southern District of Florida issued an ancillary
warrant to compel the Division of Archives to release Fisher's
treasure. 9
The Division of Archives alleged that the district court lacked ju-
risdiction to issue the warrant," and, additionally claimed sovereign
44. For the history and a discussion of the American Rule, see 9 WM & MARY
L.REv., note 16 supra.
45. See cases cited in note 43 supra.
46. State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1956), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 881 (1957).
47. This modification was necessary since only "constructive possession" was at-
tained over the wreck site and the treasure yet undiscovered. "The district court prop-
erly adjudicated title to all those objects within its territorial jurisdiction and to those
objects without its territory as between plaintiffs and the United States." Treasure Sal-
vors #2, 569 F.2d at 335-36.
48. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. 507 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
49. "In order to effectuate the mandate of the Fifth Circuit, and carry out the
judgment of this Court, a warrant for arrest was issued to seize certain salvaged arti-
cles in the possession of the Division of Arichives, History and Records Management,
Department of State, State of Florida .... " Id. at 508-09.
50. Id. at 509.
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immunity under the elventh amendment.5' Furthermore, it claimed not
to have been in privity with the United States in the two previous law-
suits, and asserted ownership of the treasure on two grounds: the old
"salvage contract" with Fisher; and like the United States before it,
Florida maintained it had a sovereign prerogative to the treasure which
had been legislatively asserted by section 267.061 of the Florida
Statutes .52
The jurisdictional and sovereign immunity arguments were
brushed aside by the district court;53 but the Division of Archives' priv-
ity argument, an attempt to "paint itself as a total stranger to the liti-
gation,"54 drew scathing criticism from the court. Citing Florida's high
degree of participation in the previous litigation," the court wrote: "It
ill behooves the Division of Archives to play such a fast and loose
game with the courts. For all practical purposes, the Division of
Archives was a party in fact, although not technically in name, to the
litigation." 5 Thus, since Florida was in privity to the previous litiga-
tion, it followed that, as between Treasure Salvors, Florida, and the
United States, Treasure Salvors' claim to ownership of the A tocha and
her treasure was supreme. And that should have been the end of it; but,
gratuitously, the court went on to consider Florida's contract claim and
sovereign prerogative theory."
51. Id. The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
52. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 522.
53. The Division of Archives challenged the Southern District Court's authority
to issue a warrant of arrest against items removed to the Northern District. The war-
rant was ancillary to the court's established jurisdiction over the res originally arrested
in the Southern District and, therefore, a valid exercise of jurisdiction. Further, the
State claimed sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment, claiming this was an
independent action against the state. Senior District Judge Mehrtens was 'swift to state
that the eleventh amendment "is not a sword whereby agents of the State can take and
appropriate the property and lives of its citizens without due process." Id. at 528.
54. Id. at 513.
55. Florida had loaned an attorney to the federal government to work on the
case, and the Division of Archives had begun preliminary negotiations with the United
States regarding the disposition of the treasure if the government won. Id. at 514.
56. Id. at 513.
57. Having established the State was in privity, the Division of Archives was
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The court's rationale for rejecting any possible claim to the trea-
sure which the State may have had via its "salvage contract" with
Treasure Salvors has been discussed above. 8 The State's further con-
tention, that section 267.06111 gave it a sovereign prerogative to the
A tocha, was refuted by the court on three grounds:
(1) Like the Abandoned Property Act and the Antiquities Act, sec-
tion 267.061 applies only to property located on "sovereignty lands of
the state;""0
(2) 0 Like the Antiquities Act, the statute is unconstitutionally vague;"'
and
(3) Most significantly, the statute unconstitutionally purports to give a
state jurisdiction over maritime matters-a subject under exclusive fed-
eral control. 2
Since Florida Statute section 267.061 is also the primary authority
under which the state asserts its claim to wrecks and derelicts found
within its territorial waters, this dictum is certain to be raised in
future litigation.
However, the controversy over the A tocha's treasure is not yet set-
tled. Despite the district court's finding that the Division of Archives
was bound by the Fifth Circuit's earlier decision, and its rejection of
bound by the prior judgment and could no longer assert any claim to the treasure. The
judge, however, continued to evaluate the State's arguments. Id.
58. For a discussion of the contract's flaws, see note 14 supra.
59. Archives and History Act, FLA. STAT. § 267.061 (1975) reads in part:
(1)(a) It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the state to protect and
preserve historic sites and properties. . . sunken or abandoned ships. . . or any
part thereof relating to the history, government and culture of the state.
(l)(b) It is further declared to be the public policy of the state that all treasure
trove, artifacts and such objects having intrinsic or historical and archeaological
value which have been abandoned on state-owned lands or state-owned sover-
eignty submerged lands shall belong to the state with the title thereto vested in
the Division of Archives, History, and Records Manageient of the Department
of State for the purpose of administration and protection.
60. "state-owned lands or state-owned sovereignty submerged lands . . . ." id.
61. "In the alternative, Ch. 267.061 Fla. Stat. is unconstitutional based upon the
holding in United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974) noted with apparent
approval of the Fifth Circuit in this case. 569 F.2d at 340." Treasure Salvors #3, 459
F. Supp. at 524. But see note 99 supra.
62. "The application of Chapter 267, Florida Statutes, to wrecked and aban-
doned vessels is beyond the state's power as it is maritime in nature."Id. at 525.
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the state's claim under section 267.061, the state appealed this decision
to the Fifth Circuit. 3 The treasure remains in the possession of the
Division of Archives.
After seven years of litigation, it appears that Senior District
Judge Mehrtens was indeed correct when he wrote: "As grave as the
perils of the sea are and were, the gravest perils to the treasure itself
came not from the sea but from two unlikely sources. Agents of two
governments, Florida and the United States ....""
UPCOMING LITIGATION: TREASURE WITHIN
FLORIDA'S THREE-MILE LIMIT
Florida has traditionally claimed title to all "sunken or abandoned
ships" on "state-owned sovereignty submerged lands." 5 That is why
Fisher, when searching for the A tocha, originally entered the salvage
contract with the State; both parties had erroneously assumed he was
exploring state-owned submerged lands. Having apparently won owner-
ship of the A tocha, Fisher has now gone back into court to play "a
new game of hardball with state officials."" Fisher's new corporation,
Cobb Coin Company, Inc., is claiming title to the Almirante, a 1715
shipwreck which it claims it discovered. The Almirante, unlike the
A tocha, is just a quarter mile off Florida's coast in about eighteen feet
of water, well within the three-mile territorial limit."
If Florida lbses this suit, it would lose the right to protect hun-
dreds of treasure ships which officials have been preserving for study by
state institutions when money can be found to fund the treasure
hunts. 6 According to Sonny Cockrell, Florida's outspoken underwater
archeologist, a loss in this suit would "signal an end to all shipwreck
law in our State."" Fisher countered, "I don't think the State has any
right to be in the treasure salvage business. That should be left to pri-
63. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked And Abandoned Sailing
Vessel Believed To Be The Nuestra Senora de Atocha, No. 78-2950 (5th Cir., Argued
December 4, 1979).
64. Treasure Salvors #2, 459 F.Supp. at 511.
65. FLA. STAT. § 267.061, (1975) note 59 supra.
66. The Fort Lauderdale News, August 16, 1979, § A, at 5, col. 1.
67. Id.
68. The Miami Herald, August 24, 1979, § D, at 1, 10, col. 2.
69. The Fort Lauderdale News, note 55 supra.
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vate enterprise. '70
Accordingly, Fisher has filed suit against the Almirante in the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida.71 Almost
certainly, both Florida and the United States will intervene and claim
ownership. As previously mentioned, doubt has been cast on the valid-
ity of Florida's claim, even to sunken ships well within its territorial
waters, as a result of the dictum contained in the district court's deci-
sion in Treasure Salvors #3, and general principles of maritime law.
Florida's claim to "sunken or abandoned ships" within state terri-
torial waters must be based primarily on section 267.061 of the Florida
"Statutes. 2But, according to the district court in Treasure Salvors #3,
"the application of chapter 267, Florida Statutes, to wrecked and
abandoned vessels is beyond the state's power as it is maritime in na-
ture. '73 This dictum is apparently an accurate characterization of the
present state of admiralty law in this area.
While states certainly have the authority to enact laws which may
have some effect on maritime affairs; no state can enact laws which
"contravene any acts of Congress, nor work any prejudice to the char-
acteristic features of the maritime law, nor interfere with its proper
harmony and uniformity in its international and interstate relations. '74
The application of this tripartite analysis to Florida Statute section
267.061, presents a strong argument against its constitutionality.
The first question proposed by the tripartite test is whether the
state statute conflicts with any federal statute. This paper has already
discussed the federal Abandoned Property Act and Antiquities Act.75
Obviously, only the Antiquities Act could apply to the Almirante, since
the Abandoned Property Act is limited to Civil War artifacts.76 Does
Florida Statute section 267.061 conflict with the Antiquities Act? This
is a question of statutory interpretation to be decided by the courts;
but, to the extent that each statute would purport to vest control over
the Almirante in different governments, it seems clear the statutes do
70. The Miami Herald, note 57 supra.
71. Cobb Coin Co. v. The Almirante, note 4 supra.
72. For the text of FLA. STAT. § 267.061, see note 59 supra.
73. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 525.
74. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 339 (1973);
The Friendship II, 312 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
75. See notes 22 through 29 and accompanying text supra.
76. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
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conflict." If so, the Florida statute would be invalid; and the State's
claim to the Almirante would fail. 78
A recently enacted bill, H.R. 1825, the "Archaeological Resources
Protection Act of 1979," is an amendment to the "vague" Antiquities
Act.7 This new law vests title in the United States to all "archaeologi-
cal resources" found on "public lands." For an abandoned shipwreck
to fall within the Bill's broad terms it would have to be viewed as "ma-
terial remains of past human . . . activities which are of archaeological
interest" and be "at least one hundred years of age."" ° Arguably, even
with this amendment, the Antiquities Act is still unconstitutionally
vague as applied to shipwrecks. The law also ambiguously defines
"public lands," inter alia, as "all other lands the fee title to which is
held by the United States other than lands on the outer Continental
Shelf.""
The second point to consider is whether the state statute conflicts
with the "characteristic features of the maritime law."82 As previously
77. Compare the Antiquities Act at note 27 supra to FLA. STAT. § 267.061 at
note 59 supra.
78. This analysis presupposes the Antiquities Act is itself a valid statute. But the
Antiquities Act may be unconstitutionally vague. See note 99 infra. Thus, perhaps the
Florida statute does not conflict with a valid federal statute. The point is moot, how-
ever, since the next "test" indicates that the Florida statute unquestionably conflicts
with the principles of general maritime law. Moreover, if the Antiquities Act is vague
so is the Florida statute. See note 91 and note 99 and accompanying text infra.
79. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 470aa et
seq. (Supp. 1979).
80. Id.
81. It is interesting to note the ambiguity found in the definition of "public
lands," which reads in part: "(B) all other lands the fee title to which is held by the
United States other than lands on the Outer Continental Shelf." 16 U.S.C.A. § 470bb
(3) (Supp. 1979). Does this exclude the Outer Continental Shelf entirely, or does it
include it with the exception of only requiring fee title to the other lands mentioned?
82. "The Constitution of the United States, Art. 3, Sec. 2, has been interpreted
to include a grant to the courts to declare the general maritime law auid to supplement
it-a true legislative role." Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 529. Or, as explained
by Professors Black and Gilmore,
The "general" maritime law in the United States, insofar as it remains unmodi-
fied by statute, contains . . . two parts. First, is the corpus of traditional rules
and concepts found by our courts in the European authorities . . . . Second are
rules and concepts improvised to fit the needs of this country, including, of
course, modifications of the first component.
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explained, the general maritime law in this matter is the "American
Rule," i.e., the finder is entitled to the ownership of his discovery.83
Florida's statute clearly conflicts with this rule, and would, therefore,
appear to be invalid by this analysis. 4
The final consideration is whether the state statute interferes with
the "harmony and uniformity" of maritime law in its interstate or in-
ternational relations.8" Were this the sole test for determining the status
of Florida's statute, it would probably be valid. The statute applies
only to "sunken or abandoned ships" sedentarily situated within the
state's territorial waters.88 It is not the kind of statute which may affect
commercial shipping, or ships sailing from port to port among the
states. The statute is inherently local in nature." As such, it does not
lend itself to disrupting the harmony of maritime law in its interstate
relations. Nevertheless, this issue need not be further discussed since
the statute appears to conflict with general principles of maritime law,
and is probably in conflict with the federal Antiquities Act. Thus, as
the district court noted in Treasure Salvors #3, Florida Statute section
267.061, is probably invalid, and an unconstitutional usurpation of fed-
eral power by the state.8
In addition to chapter 267, two other Florida statutes also argua-
GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 47 (2d ed. 1974).
83. See notes 43 and 45 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the
American Rule and the inapposite English Rule, see Kenny & Hrusoff, The Ownership
of the Treasures of the Sea, 9 WM. & MARY L.REv. 383 (1967).
84. Florida's statute would award title of the Almirante to the state. General
maritime law would award the Almirante to Treasure Salvors, its finder.
85. This desire for national uniformity is the underlying reason for the existence
of federal admiralty law. See Stevens, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Uniform Gen-
eral Maritime Law, 64 HARV. L.REv. 246, 247-57 (1950).
86. See note 59 supra.
87. "[S]tates may legislate freely on shipping matters that are of predominantly
local concern, but. . . they may not so act as to interfere with the uniform working of
the federal maritime legal system." GILMORE & BLACK, see note 82 supra, at 50. For
an example of a Florida statute which was upheld by the United States Supreme Court
on similar grounds, see Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941). Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes, writing for the Court, observed: "It is also clear that Florida has an interest in
the proper maintenance of the sponge fishery and that the statute so far as applied to
conduct within the territorial waters of Florida, in the absence of conflicting federal
legislation, is within the police power of the State." Id. at 75.
88. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 525.
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bly vest title in the state to abandoned vessels found within its territo-
rial waters, sections 2.019 and 705.01.11 To the extent that they too
purport to govern maritime matters, they, like section 267.061, may
be unconstitutional. Notwithstanding their potential invalidity in this
respect, each of the three statutes also suffers at least one potential de-
fect on other grounds. 1 Thus, a claim by the state based on its legisla-
tion may not be successful.
However, the Florida Supreme Court has held that title to an
abandoned vessel located in state territorial waters vests in the state,
not in the salvor." In State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., the
89. FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1975) provides:
Common law and certain statutes declared in force.- The common and statute
laws of England which are of a general and not a local nature, with the exception
hereinafter mentioned, down to the 4th day of July, 1776, are declared to be of
force in this state; provided, the said statutes and common law be not inconsis-
tent, with the constitution and laws of the United States and the acts of the
legislature of this state.
This statute was applied in State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So.2d 902 (Fla.
1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 881 (1957).
90. FLA. STAT. § 705.01 (1978) provides: County court judge to order sale.-
(1) Whenever any wrecked derelict goods or abandoned motor vehicle, or other
personal property shall be found in any county in this state, the county judge
shall ascertain the amount and situation of the same and by his written order
shall cause the sheriff to take charge thereof and sell the same at public outcry,
after giving a reasonable public notice of the time and place of such sale. (em-
phasis supplied).
91. FLA. STAT. § 267.061 was declared unconstitutionally vague in Treasure Sal-
vors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 525.
FLA. STAT. §2.01, which incorporates the English common law as of 1776, should
not apply to "derelicts." While this chapter was used by the Florida Supreme Court in
the case of State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co. to apply sovereign prerogative to a
derelict, it should be noted that England had not extended this doctrine to derelicts
until 1798 in the Aquila, 165 Eng. Rep. 87 (Adm. 1798). 9 Wm. & MARY L.REv.,
supra note 16, at 390.
FLA. STAT. §705.01 authorizes the sale of wrecked derelict goods found within a
county. This provision may conflict with section 715.01 which vests title in the finder of
personal property found "in or upon public conveyances, premises at the time used for
business purposes . . . and other places open to the public . . . unless the same be
called for or claimed by the rightful owner thereof within 6 months after the finding
thereof." FLA. STAT. § 715.01 (1975). State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95
So.2d at 908 (dissenting opinion).
92. State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So.2d at 908.
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supreme court adopted the doctrine of sovereign prerogative. A battle-
ship, the Massachusetts, had been sunk and abandoned by the United
States in 1922, approximately 1.2 miles off the Florida coast. Thirty-
four years later in 1956, the defendant Massachusetts Co. began sal-
vaging the remains of the ship. The state sought to enjoin the salvage
operations by claiming ownership of the Massachusetts. The injunction
was denied, but the supreme court reversed on appeal. In addition to
granting the injunction, the court held that the state owned the ship in
its capacity as sovereign. 3
Whether the supreme court ever had jurisdiction to decide the is-
sue of ownership, a maritime matter, is questionable. Although federal
admiralty jurisdiction is not exclusive, it is exclusive "to those mari-
time causes of action begun and carried on as proceedings in rem
... 1" "It is this kind of in rem proceeding which state courts can-
not entertain. '9 5 Thus, it is probable that the Florida Supreme Court
did not have jurisdiction to decide the issue of ownership. Regardless,
to the extent that this case purports to be law which determines the
ownership of abandoned vessels, it too may be invalid, like Florida
Statute section 267.061, as an unconstitutional usurpation of federal
power by the siate.11 Thus, Florida's claim to the Almirante is, at best,
tenuous, based on potentially invalid legislation and questionable case
law.
If Florida's claim fails, what of the United States' claim? 7 The
United States will probably rely on the Antiquities Act; 8 this Act,
93. "[W]e hold that the State of Florida, in its sovereign capacity, has a posses-
sory right or title to the wreck of the Massachusetts superior to that of the Company
." Id. at 908.
94. Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560 (1953). The question then
becomes: Was the cause of action in State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co. a pro-
ceeding in rem? The state sought an injunction, thereby acquiring valid state court
jurisdiction. The court, however, granted not only this relief, but declared title in the
State of Florida. The state could enjoin all subsequent salvagers and, in essence, ac-
complish the same result as an in rem action.
95. Id. at 560. Federal court jurisdiction is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976).
96. See notes 74 through 88 and accompanying text supra.
97. This assumes the United States will intervene. Certainly, Florida will assert a
claim.
98. Since the Almirante is located within territorial waters the Antiquities Act
may apply. See note 27 supra.
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however, is arguably unconstitutionally vague."9 The Abandoned Prop-
erty Act has been held to be limited to Civil War matters; and, there-
fore, is inapplicable.' Presently, no other federal legislation exists
which might apply to this case. Clearly, since there is a lack of applica-
ble federal legislation, Fisher has a good chance of prevailing against
the federal government, too. Also in his favor is a large body of federal
case law which repeatedly has adopted the American Rule of awarding
title to the finder.10
It is important to note that a bill is pending in Congress which, if
passed, could certainly change the course of this litigation, and treasure
law in general. H.R. 1195 provides that "any abandoned historic ship-
wreck located, in whole or in part, on the outer continental shelf...
is the property of the United States."' Inasmuch as this bill purports
to control shipwrecks outside the three-mile limit, it is in direct conflict
with the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.0 3 Thus, unless
modified, it is unlikely this bill will become law.
This bill and the pending case of the Almirante are certain to be
crucial factors as the law of treasure is reconsidered in the coming
years. Whether the bill should become law or Fisher's company be
awarded the Alnirante, are questions involving competing social poli-
99. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F.Supp. at 524-25, citing United States v. Diaz,
449 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974):
Nowhere here do we find any definition of such terms as "ruin" or "monument"
(whether historic or prehistoric) or "object of antiquity." The statute does not
limit itself to Indian reservations or to Indian relics. Hobbyists who explore the
desert and its ghost towns for arrowheads and antique bottles could arguably
find themselves within the Act's proscriptions. 499 F.2d at 114. In our judgment
the statute, by use of undefined terms of uncommon usage, is fatally vague in
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. 499 F.2d at 115.
However, the Tenth Circuit recently rejected this reasoning and explicitly upheld the
constitutionality of the Act. The court held the law was not vague as applied. United
States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 84 (1979).
Moreover, Congress has recently passed legislation in an effort to cure the statute's
vagueness problem. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C.A. §
470aa (Supp. 1979).
100. Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F.Supp. at 909.
101. See cases cited note 43 supra.
102. H.R. 1195, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
103. Convention on the Continental Shelf, see note 29 supra. Note: the passage
of this bill would legislatively overrule the Fifth Circuit's decision in Treasure Salvor's
#2.
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cies and conflicting legal principles. The outcome will be interesting to
observe.
CONCLUSION
At the present time, case law supports the rights of a treasure
hunter to ownership of all the treasure he finds outside the jurisdiction
of the state. This principle embodies the American tradition of a fair
reward for an individual's work, and endeavors to restrain an ex-
panding modern bureaucracy from intruding into an area where per-
sonal property rights have traditionally prevailed. We approve of this
fair principle. Accordingly, we disapprove of the legislation proposed
by H.R. 1195 to the extent it gives the United States unwarranted own-
ership and improper jurisdiction over shipwrecks and treasure in inter-
national waters. Treasure hunters should be free to pursue their de-
manding and risky profession without government meddling.
Should a treasure hunter own the treasure he finds if it is within
the state's jurisdiction? We think so. A wreck lost and undiscovered is
the same whether it be one or five miles from the beach. The state
should not be enriched unjustly by the industry of the few who devote
themselves to the vicissitudes of search and recovery merely because a
discovery is near to the shore. The English notion of a sovereign pre-
rogative is misplaced in this context. If Fisher and his company found
the Almirante, they should own it.
Archaeological considerations also must be examined."0 4 Congress
has the power to regulate maritime matters, and more enlightened leg-
islation than that now pending should be created to strike a balance
between the need of the people to know their past and the right of
every person to a fair compensation for his or her chosen labour. In the
final analysis, however, we believe the American tradition of a just re-
ward is too important to be subordinated to any secondary
considerations.
104. For a discussion of these considerations, see Open Season On Ancient Ship-
wrecks preceding this comment.
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"A wise and frugal government .. . shall leave men otherwise
free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and
shall not take from the mouth of labour the bread it has earned - this
is the sum of good government.""1 5
Robert Kelley
Melanie May*
105. THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS.
Note: In regard to a frugal government, it is interesting that over $36,000,000 was
spent, not including the cost of litigation, during the course of the A tocha situation.
According to David Paul Horan, attorney for Treasure Salvors, Inc. $20,000,000 was
spent in the establishment of a Department of Underwater Archeaology through the
Department of the Interior. An additional $16,440,000.87 was spent in amending off-
shore oil leases to include a stipulation by which the federal government can require
the "lessee to conduct a cultural resources survey based on the probability zone maps"
prepared by the government. (This cost includes that of the lessees in compliance.)
Brief for Appellant, Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978), at 20.
* The authors would like to express their appreciation to Mr. Paul Horan,
attorney for Treasure Salvors, Inc., of Key West, Florida for his help in obtaining
information on the current status of this litigation.
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Death with Dignity and the Terminally Ill:
The Need for Legislative Action
Satz v. Perlmutter
The advances in the field of medical science during the past several
decades have been significant. The benefits society has received from
those medical advances are not, however, without serious conse-
quences.' Today, with the physician's vast array of weapons to combat
sickness and death, terminally ill patients who no longer wish to live,
but who desire a natural death with dignity, may have their lives artifi-
cially prolonged for months or even years.2 There is growing national
concern over the use of advanced medical technology to artificially pro-
long the lives of terminally ill patients. These concerns are echoed by
the patient who expresses a desire to face death on his own terms; the
health care profession who must provide medical facilities and treat the
terminally ill patient; family members who are exposed to an emo-
tional and financial strain; and the state which has an interest in the
preservation of life and the protection of other aspects of our society.
Recently, the Florida judiciary was faced with balancing the inter-
ests of the state against the rights of the individual to refuse extraordi-
nary medical treatment. Abe Perlmutter, a retired New York taxi cab
driver, was diagnosed in January, 1977 as suffering from amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis, a condition more commonly known as "Lou Gehrig's
disease." 3 This illness is progressive with life expectancy being approxi-
mately two years from the time of diagnosis.' Prior to his affliction,
Mr. Perlmutter was active in community affairs and enjoyed his retire-
I. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
2. Friedman, Rejection of Extraordinary Medical Care By A Terminal Patient:
A Proposed Living Will Statute, 64 IowA L. REv. 573, 576, 577 (1979). [hereinafter
cited as Friedman].
3. Miami Herald, Jan. 18, 1980, § A at 1. Amyotropic lateral sclerosis "is a
disease of the nervous system in which, as a result of degeneration of nerve cells in the
spine and brain, there is a progressive wasting of the muscles of the body, with spastic
paralysis." BLACK'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 37 (31st ed. 1976).
4. 362 So.2d at 161.
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ment in Lauderdale Lakes, Florida.5 In May, 1978, his condition had
deteriorated to the extent that extraordinary medical treatment was re-
quired to prolong his life. Even with the mechanical respirator attached
to a breathing hole in his trachea, death was expected within a short
period of time.' In addition to the respirator, Mr. Perlmutter required
a private hospital room, the continuous presence of skilled care, and
constant attention from doctors and other hospital staff members.7 On
more than one occasion, Mr. Perlmutter attempted to remove the res-
pirator. His attempts were thwarted by hospital and medical personnel
who were alerted by the sounding of an alarm.8
Mr. Perlmutter filed a complaint in Broward County Circuit
Court asking that he be given the right to determine whether to con-
tinue the extraordinary medical treatment that was artificially prolong-
ing his life.? On July 11, 1978, Judge Ferris granted Mr. Perlmutter's
request. 0 The decision was immediately appealed to the District Court
of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, which on September 13, 1978,
affirmed the circuit court order granting Mr. Perlmutter's right to re-
fuse life-prolonging medical treatment." On October 4, 1978,'1 Mr.
Perlmutter called his family to his bedside. 3 His son unplugged the
5. Mr. Perlmutter ". . . was described as a physical fitness advocate who
shunned junk food and led an exercise class at his condominium." Fort Lauderdale
News, Jan. 17, 1980, § A at 7.
6. Perlmutter v. Florida Medical Center, Inc., 47 Fla. Supp. 190, 191, 192 (Cir.
Ct. 1978).
7. Id. at 192.
8. Id. Additionally, in his complaint, Mr. Perlmutter alleged that the hospital
placed restraints upon his hands and arms to prevent his continued attempts to remove
the respirator. See complaint. 47 Fla. Supp. 190.
9. Case number 78-9747, filed June 8, 1978, in the 17th Judicial Circuit, in and
for Broward County, Florida.
10. 47 Fla. Supp. 190. The judge rendered his decision after conducting a bedside
hearing with Mr. Perlmutter at Florida Medical Center. During this hearing, Mr. Perl-
mutter told Judge Ferris that he would prefer to lead a normal life, but absent this
possibility, death as a result of the removal of his respirator, could not "... be worse
than what I'm going through now." 362 So.2d at 161.
11. Id. at 160.
12. A petition for rehearing was denied on September 27, 1978, as well as a
motion to withhold mandate and extend the stay pending Florida Supreme Court re-
view. The Fourth District Court of Appeals issued the mandate October 3, 1978.
13. Mr. Perlmutter was a widower with adult children.
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respirator and Mr. Perlmutter removed the tube from his throat.14 Mr.
Perlmutter died forty hours later. 5
The state appealed the district court decision to the Florida Su-
preme Court." On January 17, 1980, the Florida Supreme Court unan-
imously upheld the right of a competent, but terminally ill adult, who
has no minor dependents and who has unanimous family approval, to
refuse the artificial prolongation of his life and die with dignity. 7
The initial suit, filed in Broward County Circuit Court by Abe
Perlmutter, named a hospital, two physicians, and the State of Florida
as defendants. 8 In his suit, Mr. Perlmutter asserted that he had the
constitutional right to make the decision to terminate the use of life-
prolonging medical treatment. 9 The defendants denied Mr. Perlmut-
ter's asserted right to die with dignity, and the state warned of possible
criminal violations of Florida law for anyone assisting in Mr. Perlmut-
ter's effort to terminate the life-prolonging medical treatment."
Judge Ferris, in granting the relief sought by Mr. Perlmutter,
ruled that he could: 1) leave the hospital, or 2) remain, free of the
respirator and 3) that one designated by Mr. Perlmutter to assist in the
removal of the respirator would be without civil and criminal liability.2'
The circuit court relied on the landmark case, In Re Quinlan,2 to hold
that Mr. Perlmutter's constitutional right of privacy included the right
to accept or to refuse artificial life-prolonging medical treatment. 23 The
constitutional right of privacy, in cases where patients wish to decline
life-prolonging medical treatment, was succinctly stated in Quinlan:
"We think that the State's interest contra weakens and the indivi-
dual's right of privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases
14. Miami Herald, Jan. 18, 1980, § A at 1.
15. Id.
16. This appeal was taken pursuant to FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 3(b)(3).
17. Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
18. The suit, case number 78-9747, filed June 8, 1978, named Florida Medical
Center, Inc., Nelson Liss, M.D., Marshall J. Brumer, M.D. and Michael Satz, State
Attorney for Broward County as defendants.
19. 47 Fla. Supp. at 192.
20. Id., FLA. STAT. § 782.08 (1979) - Assisting self-murder - "Every person delib-
erately assisting another in the commission of self-murder shall be guilty of man-
slaughter, a felony in the second degree.
21. 47 Fla. Supp. at 194.
22. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. den. 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
23. 47 Fla. Supp. at 193.
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and the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the
individual's rights overcome the State interest." 4
In In Re Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided that a
terminally ill young woman, whose life was being artificially prolonged,
could elect to discontinue the extraordinary medical treatment. The
court went further and declared that because Ms. Quinlan was incom-
petent, a court-appointed guardian could make that decision for her. 2
In distinguishing Perlmutter" from Quinlan, 2 Judge Ferris found
that Mr. Perlmutter was conscious and mentally competent28 to make a
decision concerning his medical treatment.29 The judge stated that
neither the judgment of the medical profession nor that of the courts
should be substituted for that of Mr. Perlmutter.30
The court also relied on Superintendent of Belchertown v.
Saikewicz3l in finding that Mr. Perlmutter's decision to refuse further
life-prolonging medical treatment outweighed the state's public policy
considerations.12 In Saikewicz, the court was concerned with an incom-
petent, terminally ill patient. 3  The Massachusetts court balanced the
right of the individual to refuse medical treatment against the public
policy interests of the state,34 and held that the state's interest was in-
sufficient to overcome the individual's right to refuse life-prolonging
medical treatment. 35
Lastly, the circuit court held that anyone who might assist Mr.
Perlmutter in the removal of his respirator would incur no criminal
24. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 664.
25. Id.
26. 47 Fla. Supp. 190.
27. 70 N.J. 10.
28. See note 10, supra. This hearing was conducted, in part, to determine Mr.
Perlmutter's competency.
29. 47 Fla. Supp. at 191.
30. Id. at 193.
31. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
32. 47 Fla. Supp. at 193.
33. 370 N.E. 2d 417. Mr. Saikewicz was sixty-seven years old, profoundly re-
tarded, having an I.Q. of 10 and a mental age of approximately thirty-two months. He
was also suffering from an acute leukemic disorder. Id. at 420.
34. Id. at 425. The interests of the state included the preservation of life; protec-
tion of the family; maintenance of the integrity of the health care profession; and the
prevention of suicide.
35. Id. at 435.
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liability under Florida law. The court reasoned that death resulting
from the removal of the device would be a natural one, and therefore,
an individual aiding Mr. Perlmutter would not be committing an un-
lawful act.37 In addition, the court held that anyone assisting Mr. Perl-
mutter would incur no civil liability. 8
The State of Florida, represented by the State Attorney for Brow-
ard County, appealed the trial court's order to the District Court of
Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, emphasizing its obligation to pre-
serve life by enforcing state statutes which prohibit both murder 39 and
manslaughter. The Fourth District Court of Appeal unanimously af-
firmed the trial court's order. 1
In permitting Abe Perlmutter to end the painful, artificial prolon-
gation of his life, the court relied primarily on the reasoning in
Saikewiczl2 and the line of cases cited therein.43 However, the court in
Perlmutter" stated that the adoption of the reasoning employed in
Saikewiczl" was limited to the specific facts involving a legally compe-
tent, but terminally ill adult who had expressed a desire to refuse or
discontinue medical treatment." Judge Letts, writing for the majority,
noted: "The problem is less easy of solution when the patient is incapa-
ble of understanding and we, therefore, postpone a crossing of that
more complex bridge until such time as we are required to do so." 47
It should be noted that Saikewicz and the cases relied upon in that
decision concerned patients who were terminally ill or who had refused
medical treatment because of religious considerations. Several of these
patients were also legally incompetent due to profound retardation,
36. FLA. STAT. § 782.08 (1979).
37. 47 Fla. Supp. at 194.
38. Id.
39. FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1979).
40. FLA. STAT. § 782.08 (1979).
41. 362 So.2d 161, 164 (1979).
42. Id., citing 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977). See note 33, supra.
43. Id. A few cases cited in Saikewicz include: In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355
A.2d 647, cert. den. 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc.2d 27, 252
N.Y.S.2d 705, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962); In Re Estate of Brooks, 32 111.2d 361, 205
N.E.2d 435 (1965).
44. 362 So.2d 160.
45. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
46. 362 So.2d at 162.
47. Id.
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age, or in an irreversible comatose condition.48 In Saikewicz, the ma-
jority determined that the right of the individual to refuse life-prolong-
ing medical treatment must be balanced against important public pol-
icy considerations.49 The four public policy considerations include:
1) Interest in the preservation of life;
2) Need to protect innocent third parties;
3) Duty to prevent suicide;
4) Requirement that it maintain the ethical integrity of medical
practice.5"
The Fourth District Court acknowledged the state's interest in the
preservation of life. However, the court found that "where the condi-
tion is terminal, the patient's situation wretched, and the continuation
of life temporary and totally artificial," this consideration would be
insufficient to override Abe Perlmutter's desire to die a natural death
with dignity. 5'
The court also found that the state may have an interest in the
protection of the family.5 This interest is based on two considerations:
1) the state's role as parens patriae in guarding the best interests of the
children; and 2) its desire to prevent family members from becoming
wards of the state.53 The court pointed out that Mr. Perlmutter and his
family were adults, well aware of the consequences of Mr. Perlmutter's
contemplated action, and that they were all in agreement with his ex-
press wish to discontinue his life-support system.54
Mr. Perlmutter's refusal to continue life-prolonging medical treat-
ment would not, according to the court, constitute suicide. 55 In reach-
ing this decision, the court considered Mr. Perlmutter's basic desire to
live without total dependence on artificial life-support, and the fact that
his illness was not self-induced.5" In refusing to classify Mr. Perlmut-
48. 370 N.E.2d at 424, 425.
49. Id. at 425, 435.
50. Id. at 425.
51. 362 So.2d at 162.
52. Id.
53. Friedman at 607.
54. 362 So.2d at 162.
55. Id. at 163.
56. Id. at 162, 163.
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ter's contemplated action as suicide, the court distinguished between a
patient choosing to forego medical treatment such as surgery or chem-
otherapy, and an affirmative act such as disconnecting a life-support
system.5 7 It stated: "[n]otwithstanding, the principle is the same, for in
both instances the hapless but mentally competent victim is choosing
not to avail himself of one of the expensive marvels of medical
science.""s
The court also distinguished between cases which involved court
ordered medical treatment for incompetent patients or minor chil-
dren," and those cases which have upheld the right of competent adults
to refuse medical treatment.'" The majority agreed that competent
adults had the right to refuse medical treatment, and concluded by not-
ing that ". . . because Abe Perlmutter has a right to refuse treatment
in the first instance, he has a cocomitant right to discontinue it." 1
In considering the threat that the right to refuse medical treatment
may pose to the ethical integrity of the medical profession, the major-
ity in specifically adopting the language of Saikewicz, agreed that the
maintenance of the ethical integrity of the health care profession does
not "... demand that all efforts toward life prolongation be made in all
circumstances. 6 2 The court also recognized that the dying patient is
often in need of comfort rather than treatment, and that the patient's
right to self-determination must co-exist with the interests of the health
care profession. 3 Again, adopting the language of Saikewicz, the court
recognized that the right to bodily integrity, inherent in the doctrines of
informed consent and the right of privacy, is superior to the interests of
the health care profession. 4
After weighing the individual's right to refuse medical treatment
and die a natural death with dignity against the state's public policy
considerations, the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded:
57. Id. at 163.
58. Id.
59. 362 So.2d at 163, n. 1.
60. Id. at 163, n. 3. It should be noted that of the eight cases listed,
three-Saikewicz, Schiller, and Quinlan-concerned incompetent parties.
61. Id. at 163.
62. Id., citing 370 N.E.2d at 426.
63. 362 So.2d at 162, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
64. Id.
264
Nova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol4/iss1/1
264 Nova Law Journal 4:1980
It is our conclusion, therefore, under the facts before us, that when
these several public policy interests are weighed against the rights of Mr.
Perlmutter, the latter must and should prevail. Abe Perlmutter should be
allowed to make his choice to die with dignity, notwithstanding over a
dozen legislative failures in this state to adopt suitable legislation in this
field. It is all very convenient to insist on continuing Mr. Perlmutter's
life so that there can be no question of foul play, no resulting civil liabil-
ity and no possible trespass on medical ethics. However, it is quite an-
other matter to do so at the patient's sole expense and against his com-
petent will, thus inflicting never ending physical torture on his body until
the inevitable, but artificially suspended, moment of death. Such a
course of conduct invades the patient's constitutional right of privacy,
removes his freedom of choice and invades his right to self-determine. 5
Although the court determined this issue to be of great public in-
terest, the majority affirmed the trial court's judgment without certify-
ing the question to the Florida Supreme Court for review.6 Judge An-
stead, specially concurring, agreed with the majority opinion, but
stated that this issue was of such significant importance as to warrant
certification to the supreme court for a thorough review."
The Florida Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the decision of
the Fourth District Court of Appeal.68 The supreme court adopted the
district court's opinion as its own ". . . because of the clarity of the
reasoning and articulation of the applicable principles of law contained
in the District Court's opinion.""9 The court did, however, limit its af-
firmation of the lower court's decision to include only competent, but
terminally ill adults with no minor dependents, who have the unani-
mous approval of all affected family members. 0
In order to clarify certain policy positions contained in the appeal,
the court addressed the question of which governmental branch, the
legislature or the judiciary, should respond to the issue of death with
dignity for terminally ill patients.71 Due to the complex nature of the
issue, the various interests involved and the need to provide a forum for
65. 362 So.2d at 164.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
69. Id. at 360.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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the airing of public opinion, the court expressed a preference for legis-
lative action in this area. 2 The preference for a legislative resolution of
this controversial issue does not, however, preclude the courts from re-
sponding when ". . . legally protected interests are at stake. ' 73 Justice
Sundberg summarized the court's position by stating: "[L]egislative in-
action cannot serve to close the doors of the courtrooms of this state to
its citizens who assert cognizable constitutional rights. 74
The court conceded that there were certain limitations in the judi-
cial resolution" of this complex issue, and until the legislature re-
sponds, the courts will continue to balance the public policy considera-
tions against the rights of the terminally ill patient to refuse medical
treatment on a case by case basis.76
In the Perlmutter77 decision, the Florida Supreme Court recog-
nized the constitutional right, with specific limitations, of an individual
to refuse or discontinue extraordinary medical treatment. The decision
was narrowly limited to include only those adults who are competent,
terminally ill, without minor children, and whose family members
unanimously consent to the patient's decision. 71
The strict limitations imposed by the court may seriously hinder
many, if not most, terminally ill patients from exercising their rights to
refuse medical treatment. This constitutional right may be restricted
because many terminally ill patients will fail to meet what may be
termed the stringent Five-Prong Perlmutter test.79 Other courts that
have grappled with this difficult and controversial issue have expanded
this constitutional right to allow all terminally ill patients, regardless of
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. The courts generally require a great deal of time to resolve an issue and
occasionally fail to resolve some issues. There is also an increased strain on the emo-
tional and financial resources of the family.
76. 379 So.2d 359, 361 (Fla. 1980).
77. 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
78. Id. at 360.
79. Id. In order to meet the Five-Prong test, the patient must be:
1) an adult
2) legally competent
3) terminally ill
4) without minor dependents
5) able to obtain the unanimous consent of affected family members.
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competency, to die with dignity."0 This expanded right may be subject,
however, to the general public policy considerations in Saikewicz.8
The Perlmutte82 decision poses an ominous threat to those op-
posed to death with dignity. Some opponents claim that this and other
similar decisions constitute an "opening wedge" 3 that will imperil the
sanctity and preservation of life. This theory rests on the proposition
that certain factions within society would begin with the elimination of
terminally ill patients and eventually include elderly citizens and se-
verely deformed children. 4
As the court pointed out, there are distinct limitations on the abil-
ity of the judicial system to adequately resolve problems in the area of
death with dignity. s5 Resolving the problems of the terminally ill who
wish to refuse medical treatment on a case by case basis may result in
an additional burden on an already overburdened court system. This
additional litigation could involve enormous amounts of time and ex-
80. The following cases illustrate the expansion of the right to die with dignity by
allowing third parties to order the termination of medical treatment for incompetent,
terminally ill patients: In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A. 2d 647, cert. den. 429 U.S.
922 (1976). See text accompanying notes 24, 25 supra. Superintendent of Belchertown
v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E. 2d 417 (Mass. 1977). See note 33 supra. In Dockery v. Dock-
ery, No. 51439 (Chattanooga, Tenn. Chancery Ct., Part 2, filed Jan. 5, 1977), the
court allowed the husband of a comatose (incompetent) patient to order the removal
of her respirator, despite the fact that the patient had consented to the use of the
respirator before becoming incompetent. In In Re Eichner, No. 21242-4-79 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Dec. 12, 1979), affd - N.Y.S. - (App. Div. March 27, 1980). The court
ruled, in New York's first right to die case, that a respirator could be removed from an
imcompetent, eighty-three year old Roman Catholic priest. The decision was based not
on the express approval of the patient, but partially upon statements he had made in
the past concerning the Quinlan decision. In Oharek v. Orlando Regional Medical
Center, 79-1653 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 9, 1979), a circuit judge in Orlando ruled that
the son of an incompetent, seventy-one year old man suffering from severe, irreversible
brain damage could, as guardian for his father, order the cessation of "heroic" medical
procedures. According to the judge's order, extraordinary measures of life support
included respirators, antibiotics, or other drugs.
81. 370 N.E. 2d 417. See note 34, supra.
82. 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
83. Kamisar, Euthanasia Legislation: Some Non-Religious Views Against
Proposed Mercy-Killing Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 969, 1030 (1958).
84. Friedman at 604-606.
85. 379 So.2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980).
267
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1980
4:1980 Satz v. Perlmutter 267 1
pense for all concerned parties. Also, the imprecise language used in
the decision may produce uncertainty and lead to future litigation.8 1
Finally, the problems created by requests for death with dignity
are broad questions of public policy which should and must be resolved
by the legislature: "While it is true that legislative inaction has created
a vacuum in this difficult area of the law, the ability of the judiciary to
fill the void should be seriously questioned." 7 This decision places the
responsibility for resolving the problems associated with death with
dignity back to the legislature, where it belongs.
Ten states have enacted death with dignity legislation. This legisla-
tion establishes guidelines for the patient, family, and medical profes-
sion to follow when a terminally ill patient elects to discontinue medi-
cal treatment."8 Existing death with dignity legislation is not a panacea
86. E.g., the court never defined such basic terms as "terminally ill," "extraordi-
nary medical treatment," "competent," and "family members".
87. W. Hyland, In Re Quinlan: A Synopsis of Law and Medical Technology, 8
RUTGERS L. J. 37, 58 (1976).
88. The state statutes generally provide guidelines whereby an individual may
elect to refuse extraordinary medical treatment. Included in the guidelines are forms to
be followed by qualified individuals (qualifications are specified in each statute). The
form an individual uses to make his wishes known and legally recognized is called a
directive or living will. Also included in the statutes are provisions for the protection of
the health care profession from civil and criminal liability; procedures for the execution
and revocation of the directive; penalties for the concealment, falsification, or destruc-
tion of the document; and definitions of statutory terms.
The following state statutes, together with selected requirements of each law, are
listed in the chronological order of their enactment:
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7185-7195 (Deering Supp. 1979) - California's
Natural Death Act, enacted in 1976, was the first statute to recognize an individual's
right to die with dignity. The statute, while acknowledging this right, provides more
stringent procedural safeguards than most other death with dignity statutes. These in-
clude the requirements that: 1) a directive be executed at least fourteen days after an
individual has been diagnosed as terminally ill; 2) two physicians must certify that the
patient is terminally ill; 3) a physician must determine the validity of the directive; and
4) a "patient advocate" designated by the state must witness a directive executed by an
individual in a nursing home. Other statutory safeguards include: 1) the invalidity of
the directive during a patient's pregnancy; 2) penalties for physicians who do not com-
ply with the statute; and 3) the requirement that a directive be re-executed every five
years.
IDAHO CODE § 39-4501 to 4508 (Supp. 1979)-This 1977 statute is similar to Cali-
fornia's statute. The individual must be terminally ill, but the diagnosis may be made
by only one physician. The terminally ill patient must be able to communicate with the
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for problems associated with death with dignity, but it does offer a
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doctor, and there is no requirement that a patient execute the directive fourteen days
after being diagnosed as terminally ill. Also, the directive is invalid during a patient's
pregnancy.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3801 to 3804 (Supp. 1979)-Arkansas' statute, enacted in
1977, is the briefest, but most comprehensive statute enacted to date. This statute does
not provide a specific form to follow when preparing a directive, procedures for revok-
ing a directive, or penalties for tampering with a document. It does contain a provision
which allows a directive to be executed on behalf of an individual who is physically or
mentally incompetent. This statute is unique because it includes a provision which al-
lows an individual to request that extraordinary life-prolonging procedures be
employed.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-35-1 to 35-11 (1977)-This 1977 statute allows a directive
to be executed on behalf of a terminally ill minor by family members or guardian. An
individual may execute the document prior to the diagnosis of terminal illness; how-
ever, a specific form is not included in the statute. The immunity from civil and crimi-
nal liability for health care personnel is not as extensive as in other statutes.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.540-690 (1977)-In order to execute a directive, an indi-
vidual's terminal illness is not required. A physician is not bound by a directive if the
patient is unable to communicate with the attending physician. However, the physician
shall consider the directive along with other factors in reaching his decision.
ORE. REV. STAT. Ch. 211 (1979)-Oregon's 1977 statute requires the directive to
be re-executed every five years. It is invalid unless executed at least fourteen days after
a patient has been diagnosed as having a terminal illness. This statute provides for a
"patient advocate" for nursing home patients, but does not provide for pregnant
patients.
TEX. REV. CIV. CODE ANN. § 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1980)-A directive, executed
in Texas under the 1977 statute, is effective until revoked. An individual must be diag-
nosed as having a terminal illness prior to executing a document. The physician has the
responsibility for determining the validity of the directive and the patient's mental
competency.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320-323 (Supp. 1979)-This 1977 statute combines the
usual right to die provisions with those setting forth the definition of brain death. The
statute provides, subject to specific conditions, procedures for the termination of ex-
traordinary medical treatment in the absence of a declaration. The declaration must be
proved by a clerk of the court or notary public.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. Ch. 112 (Supp. 1979)-This statute requires the physi-
cian to determine the validity of the directive. The directive is required to be placed in
the patient's medical file. The document is void during a patient's pregnancy.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 101 to 28,109 (Supp. 1979)-This is the most recent
right to die statute to be enacted. Under the statute, physicians are liable for charges of
unprofessional conduct for failing to abide by the statute. The declarant has the re-
sponsibility of notifying the physician of the existence of the document.
The relative success of the existing death with dignity legislation (a total absence
1 268 4:1980 1
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reasonable and practical solution to a complex problem.
It is the responsibility of the legislature to respond to this complex
social issue in a manner that will meet the needs of all of the citizens. 9
Death with dignity legislation has been proposed in the Florida Legis-
lature every year since 1968.11 It is time, especially in light of the Perl-
mutter decision, for Florida legislators to shoulder their responsibility.
Michael T. Hand
F. Brandon Chapman
of litigation and no reported abuse) has had a significant impact on legislators in other
states. In 1979, bills were introduced in eighteen additional state legislatures. It would
appear that the chances, in the 1980's, are excellent for the enactment of additional
death with dignity legislation. "News from Society for the Right to Die", New Right-
To-Die Laws Influence Medical Treatment of Dying Patients, at 1, 2 (April, 1979)
(Press Release).
89. Fort Lauderdale News and Sun-Sentinel, Jan. 20, 1980.
90. Sun-Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Jan. 18, 1980, § A at 14. It is of inter-
est to note that the first bill was proposed by Walter Sackett, a Miami doctor and
former state legislator.
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Forfeiture of a Vehicle: Search For a Nexus
Griffis v. State'
Enroute from Tallahassee to Stuart in his 1973 Dodge pick-up truck,
Griffis was stopped by a Florida Inspector of Agriculture and Con-
sumer Services and ordered to return to an inspection station. At the
station, the inspector searched Griffis and his vehicle and seized an un-
ascertained amount of cocaine and marijuana. Griffis pled nolo con-
tendere to the charge of possession of marijuana, and the state dis-
missed the companion cocaine charge. Shortly thereafter, the state
moved for forfeiture proceedings of the seized truck pursuant to the
Florida Uniform Contraband Transportation Act [hereinafter cited as
the UCTA]. 2
When Griffis failed to show cause why his pick-up truck should
not be forfeited under the Florida UCTA, the trial court ordered its
forfeiture.3 Griffis' subsequent appeal of this order raised significant
1. Griffis v. State, 356 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1978).
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 943.41-44 (Supp. 1974). The Florida Uniform Contraband
Transportation Act consolidated the narcotics contraband and illegally sold food and
beverages forfeiture statutes. FLA. STAT. Y 943.42 states that:
It is unlawful: (1) To transport, carry or convey any contraband article in, upon
or by means of any vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft. (2) To conceal or possess
any contraband article in or upon any vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft. (3) To
use any vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft to facilitate the transportation, car-
riage, conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession, purchase, sale, barter, ex-
change, or giving away of any contraband article.
FLA. STAT. § 943.44 then provides for forfeiture proceedings:
The state attorney within whose jurisdicton the vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft
has been seized because of its use or attempted use in violation of any provisions
of law dealing with contraband . . . may proceed against the vessel, motor vehi-
cle, or aircraft by rule to show cause . . . and may have such vessel, motor ve-
hicle, or aircraft forfeited to the use of, or to be sold by, the law enforcement
agency making the seizure, upon producing due proof that the vessel, motor ve-
hicle, or aircraft was being used in violation of the provisions of said law.
3. Griffis at 298. One of the unique features of a forfeiture provision is the bur-
den of proof. The State Attorney submits a rule to show cause motion to the court. At
that point, the burden shifts to the defendant to show why the vehicle should not be
forfeited. A recent successful forfeiture contest in the Second District Court of Appeal,
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questions concerning the constitutionality and scope of Florida forfei-
ture proceedings.
In Griffis,4 the Supreme Court of Florida held that the state must
demonstrate a "nexus" between a vehicle seized'and illegal trafficking
of contraband, to justify a forfeiture order. No longer is mere posses-
sion of contraband within a vehicle sufficient to sustain a forfeiture
order.
The ultimate issue left unanswered in Griffis remains the nature of
the nexus which supports forfeiture of a vehicle. Should the quantity of
contraband be determinative of a finding that a vehicle is being used
illegally? For example, does possession of a substantial quantity of con-
traband in a vehicle justify forfeiture proceedings, presuming posses-
sion with intent to sell and concurrent use of that vehicle in facilitating
the sale? Will using a vehicle as transportation to the point of the
transfer or sale of contraband articles be sufficient to justify forfeiture
proceedings? Will the mere act of selling contraband in a vehicle justify
its forfeiture? The Griffis court looked beyond Florida cases and con-
sidered federal authority in arriving at its opinion.' As did the Griffis
court, we must examine precedent from many sources to describe the
nexus criteria.
FEDERAL CASE LAW
The Florida UCTA was written in 1974 with the express legisla-
tive intent to "achieve uniformity between the laws of Florida and the
laws of the United States, which was necessary and desirable for effec-
tive drug abuse prevention and control."' The history of forfeiture pro-
ceedings under federal case law, therefore, bears directly on any in-
One 1973 Cadillac v. State, 372 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), attacked the
trial court forfeiture order on the burden of proof issue. The appellant, Mr. Jack Ag-
new, Sr., explained that the car forfeited was the property of the corporation, and he
did not know that his son, in whose possession the car was seized, was involved in any
illegal enterprise. In its holding the court stated that: "The seizing agency may release
said vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft to the innocent party or lienholder upon the filing
of a sworn affidavit by said innocent party or lienholder that he had no knowledge of
the alleged violation causing such seizure and upon then producing a valid certificate of
titie." Id. at 104.
4. Id. at 297.
5. Id. at 297, 300-02.
6. Chapter 73-331, Laws of Florida (1974), introductory language to act.
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tepretation of the Florida statute.
Under the federal contraband statute,7 two federal district courts
ordered the forfeiture of motor vehicles where the driver possessed nar-
cotic substances. In United States v. One 1975 Mercury Monarch,8 the
appellate court upheld the magistrate's order of forfeiture of the Mer-
cury even though there was minimal showing as to any significant
amount of contraband within the car. This case involved an automobile
owner who was arrested after he left his building where marijuana
crates were stored.9 Subsequent to his arrest, the officers searched him
and the car, finding cocaine on him and a suitcase containing mari-
juana residue in the trunk of the car.1" The court held that the facts
were sufficient to sustain a forfeiture order although it was indicated
that more than mere possession of contraband by a driver of a vehicle
was necessary to uphold a forfeiture under the forfeiture act.,' The
court found that the similarity in appearance of the marijuana in the
suitcase with that in the crates took the case beyond mere possession,' 2
the suitcase providing the sufficient nexus to justify forfeiture.
The same district court, in United States v. One 1973 Jaguar
Coupe,1 3 sustained a forfeiture order where the forfeitee's car was being
driven by her boyfriend who was searched and subsequently charged
with possession of cocaine." The court rejected her contention that the
vehicle had no substantial connection to drug trafficking because she
was not present nor had she any knowledge concerning the seized co-
7. 49 U.S.C. § 781 (1976) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful (1) to transport, carry, or convey any contraband arti-
cle in, upon, or by means of any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft; (2) to conceal or
possess any contraband article in or upon any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft; or (3)
to use any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft to facilitate the transportation, carriage,
conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession, purchase, sale, barter, exchange,
or giving away of any contraband article.
Also see 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1976) which requires that, "[a]ny vessel, vehicle, or aircraft
which has been used in violation of any provision of section 781 of this title, or in,
upon, or by means of which any violation of said section has taken or is taking place,
shall be seized and forfeited ....
8. 423 F. Supp. 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
9. Id. at 1030.
10. Id. at 1032.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 431 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
14. Id. at 129.
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caine. 15 Hence, the owner was deprived of her property with a minimal
showing of a link between her actions and the contraband in question.
Both of these cases upheld forfeiture where the driver was arrested in
the vehicle and was charged with, at least, possession of narcotics.
The district court sitting in New Hampshire, in United States v.
One 1972 Datsun,8 reversed a magistrate's order forfeiting an automo-
bile after government agents followed the owner in his Datsun to two
locations where they purchased approximately 5,000 doses of lysergic
acid diethylamide. 17 In reversing the order, the court said that "to be
forfeited, a vehicle must have some substantial connection to, or be
instrumental in the commission of, the underlying activity which the
statute seeks to prevent.""8
The result in Datsun, when compared to the results in Mercury
and Jaguar, can be distinguished in that there was no showing of pos-
session of contraband by the driver of the vehicle. However, Datsun
appears closer to the threshold requirement set out in Mercury, as
there was a direct relationship between the use of the automobile in the
facilitation of the sale of contraband and the forfeiture.
Criteria for the forfeiture of contraband involved vehicles are
emerging from circuit court cases reviewing forfeiture orders on ap-
peal. United States v. One 1971 Chevrolet Corvette,9 reversed a dis-
trict court forfeiture order granted on grounds that appellant had
driven the Corvette in an alleged drug transaction. In this case, the
suspect was arrested when he attempted to purchase cocaine from a
person already in police custody at the Miami International Airport.
2 0
The vehicle was the second of three cars the suspect used to get to the
airport. In fact, he drove the forfeited car only five blocks before
switching to another car which he parked at the airport.2' The Fifth
15. Id. at 130.
16. 378 F. Supp. 1200 (D.N.H. 1974).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1205.
19. 496 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1974). According to the facts on record in the case,
Hilda Landeo, the Corvette owner, had returned to Miami, from Peru, only a few
hours before her arrest. Met at the airport by her husband, in a borrowed Cadillac,
they drove to visit her father-in-law and then drove to the couple's apartment where
they transferred from the Cadillac to the Corvette. They then parked the Corvette at
the father-in-law's house and took his Ford to the airport. Id. at 211.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 210.
.... ^
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Circuit Court of Appeal held that, at best, the Corvette was marginally
used to facilitate a contraband related offense. No nexus had been
demonstrated since there must be a showing beyond marginal connec-
tion before a vehicle forfeiture order will be sustained.22
Facts sufficient to meet the criteria for forfeiture were found in
United States v. One 1972 Pontiac GTO, 2-Door Hardtop,3 wherein a
government agent initiated a heroin purchase while sitting in the Pon-
tiac. Although the drug itself had not been delivered in the automobile,
the court justified forfeiture, finding "that the sale was consummated in
the car. ' '2 Here, the vehicle was involved in facilitating a drug transac-
tion, and forfeiture was clearly warranted.
A forfeiture order was also upheld in a federal court where mari-
juana and cocaine were found inside the car and where the owner was
charged with smuggling marijuana in the vehicle.25 Therefore, federal
courts seem to require a showing that the vehicle has been instrumental
in an act which violates drug or contraband statutes in order to justify
its forfeiture. In interpreting the intent of federal forfeiture statutes,26
most federal courts require this connection, holding mere possession of
contraband insufficient grounds for forfeiture.27
22. Id. at 212.
23. 529 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1976). Aside from the argument concerning the suffi-
ciency of nexus, the appellant also raised the questions of whether the forfeiture provi-
sions unconstitutionally impose the burden of proof upon the claimant and whether the
government must prove probable cause by clear and convincing evidence. These claims
were both rejected. Id. at 66.
24. Id.
25. 423 F. Supp. 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
26. 49 U.S.C. §§ 781, 782. An interesting note is that many of the federal cases
discussing the statutory intent of the Congress in authorizing forfeiture did not cite
United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971) which elevated
certain requirements for forfeiture to the level of constitutional requisites. The Court
reversed a forfeiture order sustained upon a conviction for failing to register as a gam-
bler and in their holding, they stated that, "When the forfeiture statutes are viewed in
their entirety, it is manifest that they are intended to impose a penalty only upon those
who are significantly involved in a criminal enterprise." Id. at 721. While many courts
have used the language of "significant involvement" none have cited or attributed this
phrase to the case.
27. See note 13 supra, for a decision requiring minimal connection.
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HISTORY OF FORFEITURE IN FLORIDA
The forfeiture of vehicles related to seizures of contraband in Flor-
ida has been primarily governed by two statutes. The Uniform Nar-
cotic Drug Laws [hereinafter cited as UNDL], 28 first authorized forfei-
ture, giving all "authorized state officers the power to arrest any
persons violating the narcotic laws of the State and to seize all vehicles,
boats and aircraft used in violation of such laws." In 1974, the forfei-
ture provision was excised from the UNDL and consolidated with
other contraband statutes in the Florida UCTA.29
The Florida UCTA provides for forfeiture of vessels, motor vehi-
cles or aircraft, by the State Attorney within whose jurisdiction the
vessel, motor vehicle or aircraft is seized. The forfeiture order requires
a showing that the vehicle seized has been used "to transport, conceal,
or possess, . . . or used . . . to facilitate the transportation, carriage,
conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession, purchase, sale, barter,
exchange, or giving away of any contraband article." 0
The Florida UCTA, broader than the UNDL, extends beyond
narcotics to include other contraband articles as well. For example,
"gambling paraphernalia, lottery tickets . . . and currency used or in-
tended to be used in violation of the gambling laws . . .",31 or "[a]ny
equipment, . . . which is being used . . . in violation of the beverage
or tobacco laws of the state . . ."I can subject the vessel, motor vehi-
cle or aircraft holding these items to be seized in forfeiture
proceedings.
The Florida UCTA broadens the grounds for forfeiture proceed-
ings in addition to expanding the types of articles subject to its rule. It
provides for forfeiture in the instances where vehicles are used, or
where there has been an attempt to use a vehicle to facilitate the traf-
ficking of contraband, as opposed to the requirement of actual use set
forth in the earlier act. Judicial interpretation of what acts constitute
28. FLA. STAT. § 398.24 (2) (1970).
29. FLA. STAT. §§ 943.41-44.
30. FLA, STAT. § 943.42.
31. FLA. STAT. § 943.41. A case involving reversal of a forfeiture order of cur-
rency seized in connection with gambling allegations is reported in Baker v. State, 343
So. 2d 622 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied 348 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 1977).
32. FLA, STAT. § 943.41.
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"use" or "attempted use" of a vehicle for illegal purposes under
either forfeiture statute has been inconsistent, and the language of
both acts has given rise to controversy.
Under the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1973, 33 the First District Court of Appeal, in Grimm v.
State, ' sustained a forfeiture order where it was the passenger, not the
owner of the vehicle, who was convicted of possession of marijuana.
The court saw a clear mandate in the statute to uphold the trial court's
action despite the fact that no charge was ever filed against the owner.
Under the same act, however, Florida's Third District Court of
Appeal, in In re 1972 Porsche 2 Door,15 refused to find grounds for a
forfeiture when the owner of the vehicle was arrested for possession of
drugs, but his car was not shown to further any drug trafficking. In
denying the forfeiture motion, the court said:
[T]o forfeit the person's ownership of the vehicle just because they are
arrested for having some quantity of drugs, whether it be hard drugs or
not, is not the intent of this statute. . . I think it is whether the vehicle
is being used to further a drug operation. That is the way I have always
interpreted the statute. 36
Grimm and Porsche, thus exemplify the judicial controversy as to
the statutory intent of the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Preven-
tion Control Act. It is hard to reconcile the fact that Grimm held that
the statutory intent allowed forfeiture of a vehicle where a passenger
possessed a mere 13 grams of marijuana whereas Porsche reached an
opposite interpretation of the statutory intent, requiring instead, a
33. FLA. STAT. § 893.12 (2) (1973). This act charges law enforcement agencies
with the responsibility of seizing contraband and vehicles, vessels and aircraft, and then
directs them to proceed with forfeiture pursuant to the Florida UCTA.
34. 305 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
35. 307 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975). The owner of a 1972 Porsche
had been arrested at the residence of another on charges of possession of cocaine and
marijuana. While conducting a post-arrest inventory of the vehicle, an officer found a
small amount of PCP under the seat of the car. It should be noted, however, that the
court based its decision on arguments that the PCP in the car was the subject of an
illegal search and that the state failed to show that "the individual was significantly
involved in a criminal enterprise." Id. at 452.
The criminal enterprise standard was established in United States v. United States
Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 722-23 (1971). See note 26, supra.
36. Id. at 452.
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showing of a criminal intent to justify an order of forfeiture.
Porsche was cited approvingly in In Re Chevrolet Camaro,"
wherein appellee's Camaro had been seized after he was arrested for
possession of marijuana while in the vehicle. The Third District Court
of Appeal upheld the trial court order of forfeiture, giving authority to
the dicta in Porsche. "[F]orfeiture statutes are intended to apply to
those individuals who are significantly involved in a criminal enterprise,
§ 943.43, Fla. Stat., . . . authorizing forfeitures, is discretionary, not
mandatory."3 The court in Camaro called for a showing beyond the
mere possession Grimm found sufficient, requiring significant involve-
ment in a criminal enterprise in order to justify a forfeiture; clearly this
is a more liberal interpretation of the contraband forfeiture statute.
In State v. Washington,39 wherein the defendant was awarded tow-
ing and storage costs that resulted from an overturned forfeiture order,
the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in dicta, reported the trial court's
finding that there were no grounds to support a forfeiture order where
the state declines to prosecute.
Helms v. One 1973 Chevrolet El Camino,4" introduced a require-
ment that there must be proof that links the vehicle to the offense
charged in order to justify forfeiture procedings. In this case, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court refused to find that the seized automobile was used
in connection with the offense charged.
These decisions interpreting the different forfeiture statutes suggest
that no forfeiture should be sustained where the state declines to prose-
cute on the charges giving rise to the seizure. Failure to do so would
also fail to link the automobile to the commission of the offense
charged. The controversy in the statutory interpretation of the acts
therefore arises from the district court decisions of Grimm, Porsche
and Camaro. These cases present the question of whether possession on
37. 334 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). The claimant "was arrested for
possession of marijuana while in his automobile. Mr. Costigliola pled guilty to the
charge and as a first offender was placed on probation." Id. at 82.
38. Id. at 83.
39. 352 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977). The reversal of the lower
court implied that an improper forfeiture may leave the city liable for storing, towage
and resultant damage to the vehicle.
40. 343 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1977). The Florida Supreme Court received this case on
transfer from the Third District Court of Appeal because of an apparent constitutional
issue. The supreme court found that there was "no need to address the asserted consti-
tutional issue." Id. ht 605.
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the person or in the vehicle constitutes sufficient cause for a forfeiture
order. This issue was addressed when the Florida Supreme Court
granted direct review in Griffis.
IMPACT OF GRIFFIS
The question of statutory interpretation remained in dispute until
the Florida Supreme Court reviewed a circuit court's order of forfei-
ture of a motor vehicle seized on the grounds that appellant possessed
marijuana and cocaine on his person and in the vehicle.4 The order of
forfeiture followed the entry of a plea of nolo contendere to possession
of marijuana, the cocaine charge having been dismissed by the state."
Before the supreme court, appellant again argued against the con-
stitutionality of the Florida UCTA, alleging that to "allow forfeiture
without evidence of trafficking would render the statutes void as viola-
tive of due process, equal protection, and double jeopardy provisions of
the Florida and United States Constitutions."4 The court agreed with
appellant's contention that forfeiture should require a showing of a
nexus between the vehicle and trafficking. However, in doing so, the
court found it unnecessary to reach any state or federal constitutional
issues, choosing instead to base its holding on an interpretation of both
the current statute and its predecessor.
In construing the Florida UCTA, the court held that the trial
court's literal reading of the statute was violative of the express legisla-
tive intent behind the enactment of the UCTA.44 Justice Karl, author
of the opinion, quoted the following language from the preamble to the
act: "Uniformity between the laws of Florida and the laws of the
United States was necessary and desirable for effective drug abuse pre-
vention and control."45 The court went on to find that this language
clearly evinced a legislative intent to achieve state and federal
uniformity."
After so concluding, the court analyzed the federal forfeiture stat-
41. 356 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1978).
42. Id. at 298.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 299.
45. Id. at 300.
46. Id.
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utes4" to determine whether a nexus is necessary under federal law. The
court specifically found the intent of Congress was to include such a
requirement. "The congressional committee report that accompanied
the amendment leaves no doubt that the congressional intent was not
to permit forfeiture for mere possession of a controlled substance but
to authorize forfeiture of those vehicles used in trafficking drugs in vio-
lation of the Internal Revenue laws." 48
As the federal forfeiture statute requires a showing of. a nexus, the
Florida UCTA must then also require a showing of trafficking before a
forfeiture action can be justified; the intent of the Florida Legislature
being to expressly achieve uniformity between the Florida and federal
forfeiture procedures.
In support of that proposition, the Griffis court noted language
from the decisiors in Datsun and Porsche. Datsun precluded forfeiture
where there was no clear relationship between the vehicle and posses-
sion or sale of drugs therein.49 The court therefore seemed to be inter-
preting statutory intent as requiring a showing beyond mere possession.
Griffis quoted similar language from Porsche: "forfeiture statutes...
are intended to apply to those persons significantly included in a crimi-
nal enterprise."' 0 Mere possession was not deemed sufficient to give
rise to a presumption of involvement in a criminal enterprise.
POST GRIFFIS
An examination of forfeiture appeals post-Griffis, reveals some
confusion at the trial court level as to the proper grounds for forfeiture.
Some trial courts still are ordering forfeiture in "mere possession" fact
situations.
A forfeiture order had to be quashed in Nichols v. State,5' after a
circuit court in Charlotte County, Florida, ordered the forfeiture of a
van because a search of it resulted in the discovery of a small quantity
47. Id. at 299.
48. Id. at 300.
49. 378 F. Supp. 1200 (D.N.H. 1974).
50. 356 So. 2d at 302.
51. 356 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978). The appellate court noted the
impact of Griffis, when it rejected a literal reading of the statute; "the teaching of the
Supreme Court of Florida in a very recent opinion, however, demonstrates that such
an approach is superficial." Id. at 934.
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of marijuana and the charging of the owner with possession. The Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal held that:
The trial judge applied the forfeiture statutes in a literal manner and
ordered forfeiture because a small amount of marijuana was found in the
vehicle while Nichols was legally in charge of it. Since, however, the
evidence before the trial court did not reveal any nexus between the con-
trolled substance found in the van and any illegal drug operation, this
appeal is directly controlled by the supreme court's opinion in Griffis v.
State, supra. Accordingly, the order of the trial court must be and is
hereby vacated."
In Brown v. State,5 3 appellant's car had been forfeited even though he
had not been charged with possession of marijuana. The evidentiary
hearing on the state's motion for forfeiture revealed:
A Jacksonville Beach police officer received information from a confi-
dential informant that Brown was in possession of marijuana. The officer
went to Brown's home where he saw Brown and two men get into the
car. The officer followed the car and when it stopped, identified himself
and asked if he could search the car. Brown consented to the search. The
officer found eight one-ounce baggies of marijuana in the trunk. Brown
denied they were his. 4
The trial court's forfeiture order was overturned because the district
court felt that there was no showing of a nexus. "[T]ransportation of a
controlled substance in a car which is only incidental to possession,
. . . is insufficient to invoke the forfeiture provisions of Sections
943.41-44. " Il
Other trial court decisions reveal confusion as to the sufficiency of
acts which will give rise to forfeiture. A trial court order denying for-
feiture was reversed and remanded by the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal in State v. Franzer.55 Franzer was arrested and pled nolo con-
tendere to charges of selling a large quantity of marijuana to Fort
52. Id. at 934.
53. 357 So. 2d 472 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Some of the evidence adduced
at the hearing included the fact "that Brown knew that thd marijuana was in the car."
Id. at 472.
54. Id. at 472.
55. Id. at 473.
56. 364 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
1
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Lauderdale police officers. He had delivered the drugs in his 1974 Cor-
vette. After a review of the statement of stipulated facts, the court held
that "the record reflects that the appellee's automobile was used as the
delivery vehicle in a scheme to promote the distribution of marijuana.
Use of a vehicle to deliver marijuana for sale is clearly sufficient to
bring into play the forfeiture provisions.""7
In line with its decision in Franzer, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal in Florida upheld a forfeiture order in Mosley v. State,"
wherein negotiations for the purchase of heroin, delivery, and payment,
were all accomplished in the forfeited vehicle. The appellant had at-
tempted to have the order vacated because the actual seizure of the car
took place eight days after the arrest. The court found the time delay
of no consequence and sustained the trial court order.
CONCLUSION
The holding in Griffis limits the ability of a State Attorney to
move for a forfeiture order in cases of mere possession of narcotics and
contraband. It seems clear from the opinion that due to the harshness
of forfeiture orders, Florida courts will, be required to find a clear
nexus between the use of the vehicle and the intent to traffic in drugs,
before an individual's property can be subjected to this penalty.
Griffis raises significant questions as to what constitutes a nexus,
as a nexus is deemed necessary to order forfeiture. While mere posses-
sion will not be sufficient, those facts which will permit forfeiture re-
main unclear.
Some of the criteria developed in federal case law may, however,
be applicable. For example, where the car is shown to be the location
of a narcotics transaction,59 and where the vehicle is used in facilitating
the smuggling of marijuana,"° sufficient rationale for forfeiture might
well lie within the limits contemplated by the legislature. However, fed-
eral criteria established through case law may not always be applicable
as in Jaguar, wherein the court was willing to order forfeiture upon a
showing of possession of cocaine by the driver.
57. Id. at 63.
58. Mosley v. State, 363 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
59. See note 23 supra.
60. See note 8 supra.
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In spite of occasional trial court forfeiture orders in cases of mere
possession, the impact of the Griffis decision appears to have been the
application of the legislature's intent to make clear that forfeiture is a
harsh penalty only to be ordered to curtail trafficking of narcotics and
contraband. Therefore, forfeitures seem non-applicable to casual con-
sumers of narcotic substances in a vehicle, nor to "mere possessors" of
small amounts of contraband. The federal and Florida forfeiture stat-
utes are meant to reach the tools of narcotics and contraband traffick-
ing in order to curtail those illegal activities, and the use of forfeiture
in instances of "mere possession" proves too harsh a penalty.
A recent examination of trial court forfeiture orders leads one to
conclude that many trial courts have not yet fully applied the guide-
lines established in the Grffis decision. Appellate review of improper
forfeiture orders provides some legal relief, however, the economic
costs of such review often exceed thb equity in the vehicle. In such
instances, an unfair penalty is wrought. There are criminal statutes
designed to govern acts of possession of drugs and contraband sub-
stances. To subject an individual to both criminal proceedings and for-
feiture orders, without a clear nexus between trafficking and the vehi-
cle, works an unfair double penalty. Griffis reaffirms the spirit of
fundamental fairness which we would hope to find in all statutes re-
quiring loss of individual property.
Victoria S. Sigler
A^--
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Forged Restrictive Endorsements: Does the Drawer of
a Check Have a Cause of Action Against the
Depository Bank? Underpinning and Foundation
Constructors, Inc. v. The Chase Manhatten Bank and
The Bank of New York.
Underpinning and Foundation Constructors, Inc.' employed in its ac-
counting department an employee by the name of Walker. Among
other things, Walker's primary duties placed him in charge of the cor-
poration's books. As such he was responsible for the rectification and
examination of any invoices or bills received by Underpinning for pay-
ment. Upon receipt of any such bill, Walker would prepare the checks 2
1. Underpinning and Foundation Constructors, Inc. is the appellee in the case
brought before the New York Court of Appeals. The Bank of New York is the appel-
lant. The Chase Manhattan Bank did not appeal the order of the Appellate Division.
See Underpinning and Foundation Constructors, Inc. v. The Chase Manhatten Bank
and The Bank of New York, 46 N.Y.2d 459, 414 N.Y.S.2d 298, 386 N.E. 2d 1319
(1979).
2. In reference to the checks in question, Underpinning and Foundation Con-
structors, Inc. is the "drawer." The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. or Code) ne-
glects to specifically define "drawer." However, a leading authority describes the
"drawer" as the "signer in the lower right hand comer on a check or other draft." See
J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE at 398 (1972).
A "draft" is defined as a negotiable instrument that is an order to pay and "a
check is a draft drawn on a bank and payable on demand." U. C. C. §3-104(1)(b) and
§3-104(2)(a) and (b).
A writing which is a negotiable instrument within Article 3 of the U. C. C. is
defined in U. C. C. §3-104(l)(a),(b),(c) and (d). See U.C.C. §3-104.
An order is "a direction to pay and must be more than an an authorization or
request. It must identify the person to pay with reasonable certainty. It may be ad-
dressed to one or more such persons jointly or in the alternative but not in succession."
U.C.C. §3-102(b).
The drawee bank pays to the party designated as payee only upon the order issued
by the drawer. Drawee bank is synonymous with "Payor bank."
"Payor bank" is defined as "a bank by which an item is payable as drawn or
accepted." U.C.C. §4-105(b).
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by filling in the pertinent information and presenting the checks to the
authorized officers or personnel for signature.3 After the necessary sig-
natures were obtained, the signed checks were then sent to the desig-
nated payees.
For approximately one year, either alone or in concert with
others, Walker embezzled over a million dollars from his employer,
Underpinning.4 This was achieved by falsifying invoices purportedly re-
ceived from suppliers with whom plaintiff had, in the past, done sub-
stantial business. Walker, as his duties normally required, wrote the
checks to pay these false invoices and obtained the necessary signatures
from Underpinning's authorized officers. Instead of forwarding the
checks to the parties designated as the named payees who, of course,
had no interest in them anyway,' Walker and his cohorts forged the
payees' indorsements and indorsed' the checks with signature stamps
Item is defined as "any instrument for the payment of money even though it is not
negotiable but does not include money." U.C.C. §4-104(g).
The payee is defined as "the individual who is intended by the drawer to be the
recipient of the money." Schweitzer v. Bank of America, N. T. and S. A., 109 P.2d
441 (Cal. App. 2nd 1941). U. C. C. §3-413(2) sets out the statutory contract of the
drawer.
U.C.C. §3-413 provides: "The drawer engages upon that dishonor of the draft and
any necessary notice of dishonor or protest he will pay the amount of the draft to the
holder or any indorser who takes it up. The drawer may disclaim this liability by draw-
ing without recourse."
3. Signature is defined in U. C. C. §3-401. U.C.C. §3-401(2) provides: "A signa-
ture is made by use of any name, including any trade or assumed name, upon an
instrument, or by any word or mark used in lieu of a written signature."
4. 414 N.Y.S. 2d 298.
5. The named payees of the checks were viewed as having no valuable interest
because the invoices were false and did not represent a valid debt.
6. " 'Indorsement' is a formal act which passes title to the indorser's transferee
and obligates the indorsee on the contract set forth in U.C.C. §3-414. U.C.C. §3-414
provides: 'Unless tle indorsement otherwise specifies (as by such words as "without
recourse") every indorser engages that upon dishonor and any necessary notice of dis-
honor and protest he will pay the instrument according to its tenor at the time of his
indorsement to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who takes it up, even though
the indorser who takes it up was not obligated to do so.' All indorsements fall into two
broad categories, special and blank. A special indorsement (pay to the order of Joe
Jones, John Peterson) makes the instrument into an 'order instrument' if it is not al-
ready one. A blank indorsement (Joe Jones) makes an instrument into a 'bearer instru-
ment.' Thus, §3-204(l),(2) and (3) provide:
(1) A special indorsement specifies the person to whom or to whose order it
285
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1980
Forged Restrictive EndorsementsS4:!980
thought to be similar to those used by the designated payees. 7 These
checks were indorsed "For Deposit Only," a type of restrictive indorse-
ment' often used in the check collection process.' Such an indorsement
makes the instrument payable. Any instrument especially indorsed becomes pay-
able to the order of the special indorsee and may be further negotiated only by
his indorsement.
(2) An indorsement in blank specifies no particular indorsee and may consist of
a mere signature. An instrument payable to order and indorsed in blank becomes
payable to bearer and may be negotiated by delivery alone until specially
indorsed.
(3) The holder may convert a blank indorsement into a special indorsement by
writing over the signature of the indorser in blank any contract consistent with
the character of the indorsement. Note that a blank or special indorsement may
also be a restrictive indorsement."
J. WHITE and R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 413.
7. 414 N.Y.S.2d at 299.
8. U.C.C. §3-205 states:
An indorsement is restrictive which either
(a) is conditional; or
(b) purports to prohibit further transfer of the instrument;
(c) includes the words "for collection," "for deposit," "pay any bank," or like
terms signifying a purpose of deposit or collection; or
(d) otherwise states that it is for the benefit or use of the indorser or of another
person.
9. A synopsis of the usual chain of events involved in check collection follows:
1. Payee deposits the check in the bank.
2. That bank of first deposit gives its depositing customer provisional credit pending
payment of the check by the payor bank.
3. The bank of first deposit prepares the check for machine processing by encoding in
magnetic ink the dollar amount of the check. The other information needed for ma-
chine processing-coded identifications of payor bank and drawer-has already been
preprinted in magnetic ink on the check.
4. The bank sorts the checks. If a check is drawn upon an account maintained in the
same bank where it has been deposited, it is considered by the bank as an on-us check,
and internal processing completes the transfer of the check amount from the drawer's
to the payee's account. But if the check is drawn on another bank, the funds must be
collected from that bank by the bank of the first deposit.
In some cases, as for local items drawn on a bank of first deposit and being sent
to a clearing house, the checks are fine sorted as to individual banks. For most out of
town (transit) items, however, the sort pattern is much broader, i.e., all items to one
Federal Reserve Bank might be sorted into only two general groups: immediate and
deferred credit items.
5. The bank prepares cash letters-the deposit tickets or computer printed lists-for
each sort category, showing the total dollar amount of the checks accompanying the
1 4:98
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strictly requires that value given or received for the check be depos-
ited 0 in the indorser's account."
letter.
6. The bank sends the checks to the appropriate collection intermediary, i.e., clearing
organization, Federal Reserve Bank, or correspondent bank or directly to the payor
bank.
7. One of the above intermediaries presents the check directly or indirectly (through
another intermediary) to the payor bank. This is the formal demand for payment.
8. The payor bank reviews the check:
(a) If for some reason, such as insufficient funds in the drawer's account
to cover the check amount, or a stop-payment order posted to the account,
the payor bank does not pay the check, it must return it to the presenting
bank within a specified period of time.
(b) If the bank discovers no reason to reject or dishonor the check and
refuse payment, it posts the check to the drawer's account and files it for
subsequent mailing to him; and the payor bank must pay to the presenting
bank for the amount of the check.
9. Each bank in the collection chain settles for the check with the previous bank until
the bank of first deposit has been paid. The credit that the bank had extended provi-
sionally to its depositing customer is now final. (In the case of a returned check, all the
credits that had been granted provisionally for the check as it passed through the col-
lection system must be reversed.).
For a more complete description see J. J. CLARKE, H. J. BAILEY, III, AND R. YOUNG,
JR., BANK DEPOsrrs AND COLLECTIONS, 2(1972).
10. U.C.C. §3-206 states:
(1) No restrictive indorsement prevents further transfer or negotiation of the
instrument.
(2) An intermediary bank, or a payor bank which is not a depositary bank, is
neither given notice or otherwise affected by a restrictive indorsement of any
person except the bank's immediate transferor of the person presenting for
payment.
(3) Except for an intermediary bank, any transferee under an indorsement which
is conditional or includes the words "for collection," "for deposit," "pay any
bank," or like terms [subparagraphs (a) and (c) of Section 3-205] must pay or
apply any value given by him for or on the security of the instrument consistently
with the indorsement and to the extent that he does so he becomes a holder for
value. In addition such transferee is a holder in due course if he otherwise complies
with the requirements of Section 3-302 on which constitutes a holder in due course.
(4) The first taker under an indorsement for the benefit of the indorser or another
person [subparagraph (d) of Section 3-2051 must pay or apply any value given by
him for or on the security of the instrument consistently with the indorsement and
to the extent that he does so he becomes a holder for value. In addition such taker
is a holder in due course if he otherwise complies with the requirements of Section
3-302 on what constitutes a holder in due course. A later holder for value is neither
given notice nor otherwise affected by such restrictive indorsement unless he has
1 288
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Walker and his confederates either cashed or deposited the checks
at several banks in accounts 2 with names different from the names of
the payee indorsers. 13 Each bank took the checks for collection, totally
disregarding the restrictive indorsements, and presented" them for pay-
ment by the payor bank, which honored and paid them and accord-
ingly charged 5 Underpinning's account."6
knowledge that a fiduciary or other person has negotiated the instrument in any
transaction for his own benefit or otherwise in breach of duty.
[subsection (2) of section 3-304].
11. 414 N.Y.S. 2d at 299.
12. U.C.C. §4-104(1)(a) defines account as "any account with a bank and in-
cludes a checking, time, interest, or savings account."
13. 414 N.Y.S. 2d at 299.
14. U.C.C. §3-504 explains how presentment is made. U.C.C. §3-504 provides:
(1) Presefitment is a demand for acceptance or payment made upon the maker,
acceptor, drawee, or other payor by or on behalf of the holder.
(2) Presentment may be made
(a) by mail, in which event the time of presentment is determined by the
time of receipt of the mail; or
(b) through a clearing house; or
(c) at the place of acceptance or payment specified in the instrument or if
there be none at the place of business or residence of the party to accept or
pay. If neither the party to accept or pay nor anyone authorized to act for
him is present or accessible at such place presentment is excused.
(3) It may be made
(a) to any one of two or more makers, acceptors, drawees, or other
payors; or
(b) to any person who has authority to make or refuse the acceptance or
payment.
(4) A draft accepted or a note made payable at a bank in the United States
must be presented at such bank.
(5) In the cases described in Section 4-210 presentment may be made in the
manner and with the result stated in that section.
15. See U.C.C. §4-401 infra note 31. U.C.C. §4-401 defines when the bank may
charge a customer's account and states that "as against its customer, a bank may
charge against his account any item which is otherwise properly payable from the ac-
count even though the charge creates an overdraft." What does properly payable in-
clude? U.C.C. §4-104(l)(i) states that "properly payable includes the availability of
funds for payment at the time of decision to pay or dishonor." While the payor bank
may pay all properly payable items, in the case of an unauthorized payment, the
drawer can insist that the payor bank credit his account with the amount of the pay-
ment. See J.J. CLARKE, H.J. BAILEY III, AND R. YouNrG, JR., supra note 8, at 104. A
check bearing a forged indorsement is not properly payable since the person receiving
289 114:1980
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When Underpinning finally realized that it had been embezzled, it
instituted suit against all of the depositary 7 banks involved in the
transactions for paying the checks with the restrictive indorsements. Is
One of the named defendants, The Bank of New York, 9 had paid ten
such checks for a total amount of $452,979.27. Instead of serving an
answer, The Bank of New York argued that the drawer of the check
could not sue the depositary bank and moved to dismiss the complaint,
claiming the drawer was limited to whatever claims it had against the
drawee.Y° This motion was denied by the Supreme Court and the Ap-
pellate Division sustained the lower court's determination.2 The order
of the Appellate Division was then appealed by The Bank of New
York. This brings us to the case at hand.22
According .to the Uniform Commercial Code,2D the governing
body of laW2 4 in check forgery cases,2 an unauthorized signature or
payment will not have title to the item. Jerman v. Bank of America National Trust
and Savings Association, 87 Cal.Rptr. 88, 7 Cal.App.3d 882 (1970). See also text ac-
companying note 31, infra.
16. 414 N.Y.S. 2d at 299.
17. "In Article 4 unless the context otherwise requires 'depositary bank' means
the first bank to which an item is transferred for collection even though it is also the
payor bank." See U.C.C. §4-105(a). A "depositary bank" may be a "collecting bank."
" 'C91lecting bank' means any bank handling the item for collection except the payor
bank." U.C.C. §4-105(d).
18. See U.C.C. §3-206(3), supra note 10.
19. The Bank of New York was the depositary bank. See U.C.C. §4-105(a)
supra note 17.
20. A payor or drawee bank will be liable to its customer (the drawer) for pay-
ment of a check bearing a forged indorsement absent some defense. See notes 38 and
39 infra and accompanying text.
21. See Underpinning and Foundations Constructors, Inc. v. The Chase Man-
hattan Bank and The Bank of New York, 61 A.D. 2d 628, 403 N.Y.S. 2d 501 (1978).
22. 414 N.Y.S. 2d at 298.
23. The Uniform Commercial Code may be abbreviated as U.C.C. or Code. The
1972 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code should be referred to for any
Code citations.
24. The Uniform Commercial Code, specifically Articles 3 and 4, is the gov-
erning body of law covering check forgery cases. The Code has been enacted in all
states except Louisiana, however, Articles 3 and 4 have been enacted in all fifty states.
Of all the Uniform Commercial Code these two sections probably depart least from
prior substantive law. R. BRAUCHER AND R. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS, at xxxvii (1977).
25. The bank collection provisions originally appeared as part of Article 3 on
.
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indorsement is "one made without actual, implied, or apparent author-
ity and includes a forgery."26 This applies not only to the unauthorized
signature of the payee, but also to the unauthorized signature of the
drawer. When the payee's signature is forged it is considered a forged
indorsement, and when the drawer's signature is forged it is considered
a forged check. Ordinarily, when items are "properly payable," z the
customer's u account may be charged by the bank.2 9 However, since no
person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears thereon,"
a check bearing an unauthorized signature does not transfer title31 and
cannot be considered "properly payable." Thus the customer's account
cannot be charged by the bank.
Commercial Paper. Eventually, however, as separate questions were raised peculiar to
the subject of bank collections, Article 4 was written. J. J. CLARKE, H. J. BAILEY III,
AND R. YOUNG, Jr., supra note 9, at 18.
26. U.C.C. §1-201 (43).
27. "Whether an item is properly payable is the crunch question in a variety of
conflicts between customer and bank. Translated into practical terms, if a court finds
that an item is properly payable, the bank will be entitled to charge the depositor's
account; conversly, if the Court finds that an item is not properly payable, the bank
may not charge the customer's account, and if it has done so, it must recredit the
account." See J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 558.
28. U.C.C. §4-104(e) states that "Customer means any person having an account
with a bank or for whom a bank has agreed to collect items and includes a bank
carrying an account with another bank."
29. U.C.C. §4-401 is as follows:
(1) As against its customer, a bank may charge against his account any item
which is otherwise properly payable from that account even though the charge
creates an overdraft.
(2) A bank which in good faith makes payment to a holder may charge the
indicated account of its customer according to:
(a) The original tenor of his altered item; or
(b) The tenor of his completed item, even though the bank knows the
item has been completed unless the bank has notice that the completion
was improper.
30. U.C.C. §3-401 is as follows:
(1) No person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears thereon.
(2) A signature is made by use of any name, including any trade or assumed
name, upon an instrument, or by any word or mark used in lieu of a written
signature.
31. 87 Cal. Rptr. 88, 7 Cal.App.3d882 (1970).
32. Since §4-401 (1) states that a bank may charge its customer's account for
any item properly payable, then it may be assumed that it may not charge its cus-
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Accordingly, it has been held33 that when the drawer's signature is
forged on a check, absent a defense,3 the drawee bank is liable to the
drawer whose name is forged for the amount paid on the check. Simi-
larly, when the payee's indorsement is forged, the drawee bank is liable
to its customer for the amount paid on the check." The major differ-
ence between forged checks and forged indorsements is that with the
latter, indemnification may be sought by the drawee bank from the
depositary bank, whereas in the former such an indemnification is not
allowed.
This liability of the depositary bank to the drawee bank for pay-
ment of a check bearing a forged indorsement is founded upon princi-
ples of warranty embodied in U.C.C. § 4-207(l)(a).3 1 As the check
passes from party to party on its way to final payment, its prior indor-
sements are guaranteed by each customer or collecting bank. For this
reason, the drawee bank may "recredit the customer's account and
then sue as far up the collection stream as is feasible" 37 to recover any
loss.
The general rule is that the drawee bank will be liable to its cus-
tomer, the drawer, for payment of a check bearing a forged signature
or indorsement. However, liability can be avoided if an exception to
the general rule exists. Of the available exceptions or defenses, the
tomer's account for a check paid which bore a forged signature or indorsement. Such a
check can not be considered properly payable.
33. Stone and Webster Engineering Corp. v. The First National Bank & Trust
Co. of Greenfield, 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E. 2d 358 (1962).
34. See notes 38 and 39 infra and accompanying text.
35. See Philadelphia Title Insurance Co. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 419
Pa. 78, 212 A.2d 222 (1965).
36. U.C.C. §4-207(1)(a) is as follows:
(1) Each customer or collecting bank who obtains payment or acceptance of an
item and each prior customer and collecting bank warrants to the payor bank or
other payor who in good faith pays or accepts the item that (a) he has good title
to the item or is authorized to obtain payment or acceptance on behalf of one
who has a good title.
The Official Comment 1 of U.C.C. §4-207 states that the warranties in §4-207
are more or less identical to the warranties in §3-417. For a more complete dis-
cussion of the slight differences in these two warranties see J. WHITE AND R.
SUMMERS, supra note 2, at pp. 510-512, notes 39 and 40.
37. J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 513.
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U.C.C. sets forth five explicitly38 and permits others by reference to the
common law. 9 Of these exceptions, two deal with negligence and can
be found in U.C.C. §3-406 and §4-406. U.C.C.§3-406 provides as
follows:
Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes to a material
alteration of the instrument or to the making of an unauthorized signa-
ture is precluded from asserting the alteration or lack of authority
against a holder in due course or against a drawee or other payor who
pays the instrument in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
commercial standards of the drawee or payor's business.
The Code does not attempt to define what constitutes "negligence" as
expressed in this section. However, Comment 7 of the Official Com-
ments of U.C.C.§3-406 states that the most obvious case is that of a
"drawer who makes use of a signature stamp or other automatic sign-
ing device and is negligent in looking after it."" o
Code §4-406,41 the other negligence defense, requires the customer
38. The five available statutory defenses are embodied in the following Code
Sections: §3-406; §4-406; §3-404; §4-103; and §3-405. This text will only discuss §3-406, §4-
406 and §3-405. For more information see generally J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, supra
note 2.
39. The common law exceptions to liability include receipt of payment by payee
and election of remedies. The Uniform Commercial Code adopts the common law in
U.C.C. §1-103. U.C.C. §1-103 provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of
this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative
to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement
its provisions." These common law exceptions will not be discussed in this text. For more
information see J. WHITE and R. SUMMER, supra note 2.
40. Official Comment 7 of U.C.C. §3-406 further states that "the section extends
however to cases where the party has notice that forgeries of his signatures have occurred
and is negligent in failing to prevent further forgeries by the same person" and "in the
case where a check is negligently mailed to the wrong person having the same name as the
payee."
41. U.C.C. Code §4-406 reads in full as follows:
(1) When a bank sends to its customers a statement of account accompanied
by items paid in good faith in support of the debit entries or holds the statement
and items purusant to a request or instructions of its customer or otherwise in a
reasonable manner makes the statement and items available to the customer, the
customer must exercise reasonable care and promptness to examine the state-
293 1
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to examine the statement and items sent to him by his bank and to
promptly notify the bank of any unauthorized signatures. Upon failure
to do so, the customer may be precluded from asserting against the
bank that the signatures were unauthorized and may be held responsi-
ble for all losses occasioned by such forgery. It should be stressed,
however, that §4-406(3)4" permits the customer to assert contributory
negligence as a counter defense when the bank itself has failed to exer-
cise ordinary care.
Another defense that the drawee bank may assert against its cus-
ment and items to discover his unauthorized signature or any alteration on an
item and must notify the bank promptly after discovery thereof.
(2) If the bank establishes that the customer failed with respect to an item to
comply with the duties imposed on the customer by subsection (1) the customer
is precluded from asserting against the bank
(a) his unauthorized signature or any alteration on the item if the bank
also establishes that it suffered a loss by by reason of such failure; and
(b) an unauthorized signature or any alteration by the same wrongdoer
on any other item paid in good faith by the bank after the first item and
statement was available to the customer for a reasonable period not ex-
ceeding fourteen calendar days and before the bank receives notification
from the customer of any such unauthorized signature or alteration.
(3) The preclusion under subsection (2) does not apply if the customer estab-
lishes lack of ordinary care on the part of the bank in paying the item(s).
(4) Without regard to care or lack of care of either the customer or the bank a
customer who does not within one year from the time the statement and items
are made available to the customer [subsection (1)] discover and report his unau-
thorized signature or any alteration on the face or back of the item or does not
within 3 years from that time discover and report any unauthorized indorsement
is precluded from asserting against the bank such unauthorized signature or in-
dorsement or such alteration.
(5) If under this section a payor bank has a valid defense against a claim of a
customer upon or resulting from payment of an item and waives or fails upon
request to assert the defense the bank may not assert against any collecting bank
or other prior party presenting or transferring the item a claim based upon the
unauthorized signature or alteration giving rise to the customer's claim.
"Section 4-406 differs from Section 3-406 in that it deals with the customer's behavior
after the fact, after the alteration or the forgery has already taken place. It is also a
much narrower provision than 3-406 in that it deals only with the liability between the
bank and its customer upon the customer's failure to examine and report 'his' unautho-
rized signature or any alteration." It may not be used as a defense by the collecting
bank although the other defenses would still be available. See J. WHITE AND R. Sum-
MERS, supra note 2, at 539.
42. See note 41 supra.
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tomer, the drawer, is that of U.C.C.§ 3-405. U.C.C.§3-405 has been
viewed as similar to §3-40643 and §4-406" "for it codifies the proposi-
tion that certain behavior is negligent and thus renders all signatures
resulting from that behavior effective against the negligent party. 5 In
other words, if §3-405 is considered applicable, the forgery will not be
recognized and the signature will be deemed to have effectively passed
title. U.C.C.§3-405 reads in full:
(1) An indorsement by any person in the name of the named payee is
effective if
(a) an imposter by use of the mails or otherwise has induced the
maker or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his confederate
in the name of the payee; or
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a maker or drawer intends
the payee to have no interest in the instrument; or
(c) an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied
him with the name of the payee intending the latter to have no
such interest.
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the criminal or civil liability of
the person so indorsing.
Two common problem areas are expressly dealt with in this Code
Section. U.C.C. §3-405(l)(a) covers the "imposter payee" with the
"imposter rule"46 and §3-405(l)(c) deals with the "padded payroll"47
situation.
Under §3-405(l)(a) the prevailing view is that if a drawer draws a
check payable to an imposter" who represents himself to be the payee,
43. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
44. See notes 41 and 42 supra and accompanying text.
45. J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 542.
46. See U.C.C. §3-405(1)(a).
47. See U.C.C. §3-405 (1)(c).
48. " 'Imposter' refers to impersonation, and does not extend to a false represen-
tation that the party is the authorized agent of ihe payee." U.C.C. §3-405, Comment 2.
"When the imposter falsely assumes the status of an agent and procures the issuance of
a check payable to a purported principal, the indorsement of the principal's name by
the imposter is a forgery, and the loss is shifted from the drawer of the check to the
drawee bank and ultimately to the one who took the check from the imposter. The
emphasis here is on the forgery instead of the method of fraud, the converse of the
'imposter rule.' The rationale is that the drawer of the check intends the check to be
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any signature in the name of the payee will result in an effective in-
dorsement. Therefore, liability for the loss will be placed on the
drawer. The position taken here is that the loss, regardless of the type
of fraud, whether it be face to face as opposed to imposture by mail,
should fall upon the drawer. 9 In effect, the drawer, under §3-405(1)(a)
is considered to be negligent for not determining the identity of the
payee."
The provision intended to cover the "padded payroll" cases,
U.C.C. §3-405(l)(c),51 also shifts liability to the drawer.
The principle followed is that the loss should fall upon the employer as a
risk of his business enterprise rather than upon the subsequent holder or
drawee. The reasons are that the employer is normally in a better posi-
tion to prevent such forgeries by reasonable care in the selection or su-
pervision of his employees, or, if he is not, then he at least can cover the
loss by fidelity insurance; and that the cost of such insurance is properly
an expense of his business rather than of the business of the holder or
drawee."
Like Code §§3-405(l)(a) and 3-405(1)(c), 3 Code §3-405(l)(b) is
the property of, and indorsed by, the payee-principal named therein who is not being
impersonated by anyone, rather than the property of the so-called agent whose fraud
relates merely to status and not to identity." See L. M. Hudak and P. MacPherson,
Jr., Forged, Altered, or Fraudulently Obtained Checks, 23 THE PRACTICAL LAWYER
73, 87 (No.3, 1977).
49. See U.C.C. §3-405, Comment 2.
50. J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 542.
51. See U.C.C. §3-405(l)(c).
52. U.C.C. §3-405, Comment 4. The Comment continues:
"The provision applies only to the agent or employee of the drawer, and only to
the agent or employee who supplies him with the name of the payee. The following
situations illustrate its application.
a. An employee of a corporation prepares a padded payroll for its treasurer
which includes the name of P. P does not exist, and the employee knows it, but
the treasurer does not. The treasurer draws the corporation's check payable to P.
b. The same facts as (a), except that P exists and the employee knows it but
intends him to have no interest in the check. In both cases an indorsement by
any person in the name of P is effective and the loss falls on the corporation.
53. See May Department Stores Co. v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 374 F.2d 109,
(3rd Cir. 1967). In May, an employee forged the indorsements of fictitious payees on
checks which were issued and prepared by his employer. The employer was supplied
the names of the fictitious payees by the defrauding employee. The drawee bank
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also a "bankers provision intended to narrow the liability of the banks
and broaden the responsibility of their customers."'" However, Code
§3-405(1)(b), which adopts the fictitious payee doctrine" of the Uni-
form Negotiable Instruments Act" (N.I.L.) allows for a more liberal
interpretation. Under §3-405(1)(b), an indorsement by any person in
the name of the named payee is effective if a person signing as or on
behalf of a maker or drawer intends the payee to have no interest in
the instrument.5' For example, if a dishonest corporate officer makes
the corporation's check payable to a payee with the intention that the
charged the employer's account, and the employer brought an action to recover the
amount paid on the forged indorsements raising §3-405(l)(c) as a defense. The court
agreed and held that §3-405(1)(c) did indeed bar any liability on the part of the bank.
54. J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 549. For instance, in Twellman
v. Lindell Trust Co., the court strictly construed the "in the name of the named payee"
language' and stated that "in order for §3-405(l)(c) to apply, the forged indorsement
must be in the exact name of the named payee.
55. Subsection (l)(b) restates the substance of the original subsection 9(3) of
the N.I.L. The test stated is not whether the named payee is 'fictitious' but
whether the signer intends that he shall have no interest in the instrument.
The following situations illustrate the application of the subsection.
(a) The drawer of a check, for his own reasons, makes it payable to P
knowing that P does not exist.
(b) The drawer makes the check payable in the name of P. A person
named P exists, but the drawer does not know it.
(c) The drawer makes the check payable to P, an existing person whom he
knows, intending to receive the money himself and that P shall have no
interest in the check.
(d) The treasurer of a corporation draws its check payable to P who to the
knowledge of the treasurer does not exist.
(e) The treasurer of a corporation draws its check payable to P. P exists
but the treasurer has frauduelntly added his name to the payroll intending
that he shall not receive the check.
(0 The president and the treasurer of a corporation both sign its check
payable to P. P does not exist. The tresurer knows it but the president
does not.
(g) The same facts as (0, except that P exists and the treasurer knows it,
but intends that P shall have no interest in the check.
U.C.C. §3-405, Comment 3.
56. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act (N.I.L.), a codification of the law
covering negotiable instruments, was the forerunner of the U.C.C. For a general his-
tory of the N.I.L. See R. BRAUCHER AND R. RIEGERT, supra note 23 at 4-31.
57. U.C.C. §3-405(l)(b).
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payee have no interest in it, forges the payee's indorsement, and re-
ceives payment on the check from a collecting bank which collects
from the drawee bank, the corporate drawee cannot claim that the
forged indorsement bars the bank from charging its account with the
amount of the check." The indorsement will be considered effective.
Absent a defense, the drawer may sue the drawee bank pursuant
to U.C.C. §4-4011 and the absolute contractual liability which exists.
The drawee bank may then seek indemnification from the collecting or
depositary bank pursuant to U.C.C. §4-207.6o Whether the drawer of a
check has a direct cause of action against the depositary bank which
wrongfully pays the check, however, is a question which has long di-
vided the courts.61
Under the N.I.L., 2 the pre-Code cases which considered the liabil-
ity of the depositary to the drawee have been far from unanimous in
either result or rationale. Some courts permitted recovery by the
drawer from the depositary bank on the theory of conversion 3 and
warranty.64 Others held that the drawer could only proceed against the
drawee bank and that any action against the depositary or collecting
bank would be barred.6 5
58. See First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co. v. Montgomery County Bank
and Trust Co., 29 Pa. D & C 2d 596 (1962).
59. See note 29 supra.
60. See note 36 supra and accompanying text. Ordinarily the drawee bank may
sue the collecting bank, however, such an action may be barred pursuant to U.C.C. §4-
406(5). U.C.C. §4-406(5) provides:
If under this section a payor bank has a valid defense against a claim of a cus-
tomer upon or resulting from payment of an item and waives or fails upon re-
quest to assert the defense the bank may not assert against any collecting bank
or other prior party presenting or transferring the item a claim based upon the
unauthorized signature or alteration giving rise to the customer's claim.
61. 414 N.Y.S. 2d at 299.
62. This issue had not been addressed to a Court prior to the N.I.L. (Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act). For a brief history of Negotiable Instruments prior to
the N.I.L. see Britton, William Everett, Handbook of the Law of Bills and Notes,
1943 p 1-22.
63. See Gustin-Bacon Mfg. Co. v. First National Bank, 306 Il1. 179, 137 N.E.
793 (1922).
64. See Farmers State Bank v. U. S., 62 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1932).
65. See also First National Bank of Bloomingdale v. North Jersey Trust Co., 18
N.J.Misc.449, 14 A.2d 765, (1940) and Lavanier v. Cosmopolitan Bank and Trust Co.,
36 Ohio 285, 173 N.E. 216 (1929).
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Case law under the Uniform Commercial Code is equally as un-
resolved and unsettled. 6 Since the Code neglects to make any specific
reference to any action by the drawer against the depositary or collect-
ing bank for payment of an item bearing a forged indorsement, one
could argue that such an action could not be maintained under the
Code. 7 For instance, in Massachusetts a drawer will under no circum-
stances be allowed to sue the depositary bank. The case standing for
this proposition and considered to be the majority view is that of Stone
and Webster Engineering Corp. v. First NationalBank and Trust Co."5
In Stone, an employee stole checks from his employer, the drawer, and
cashed the checks with forged instruments. Upon discovery of the for-
geries, the drawer, Stone and Webster, demanded that the drawee
recredit its account, but to no avail. An action was then brought by the
drawer against the depositary bank for the full amount of the checks
cashed with the forged indorsements, approximately $64,000.00, alleg-
ing that the depositary bank had not acted in accordance with reasona-
ble commercial standards as required in §3-419(3)."8 The court held §3-
66. See generally H. J. BAILEY, BRADY ON BANK CHECKS, (4th Ed. Supp. 1979)
at 409 n.76.
67. §3-406 is by its terms unavailable to depositary bank since a depositary bank
is not a holder in due course as defined in §3-302.
The depositary bank is not a holder pursuant to §1-201 (20) since the endorsement
is forged. Unavailability of this defense suggests that the code does not contemplate
such a suit.
68. 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E. 2d 358.
69. U.C.C. §3-419 is as follows:
(1) An instrument is converted when
(a) a drawee to whom it is delivered for acceptance refuses to return it
on demand; or
(b) any person to whom it is delivered for payment refuses on demand
either to pay or to return it; or
(c) it is paid on a forged indorsement.
(2) In an action against a drawee under subsection (1) the measure of the
drawee's liability is the face amount of the instrument. In any other action under
subsection (1) the measure of liability is presumed to be the face amount of the
instrument.
(3) Subject to the provisions of this Act concerning restrictive indorsements a
representative, including a depositary or collecting bank, who has in good faith
and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards applicable to the busi-
ness of such representative dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of
one who was not the true owner is not liable in conversion or otherwise to the
299 11 4:1980
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419(3) inapplicable and ruled the drawer had no cause of action against
the depositary bank. Relying on the pre-Code case law and on reasons
of Code policy, the court gave both a "traditional and pragmatic"7
rationale for its decision. The court held that the plaintiff-drawer had
no "valuable rights" in the checks stating that, the drawer has no right
to the proceeds of its own check to a third person, and not being a
holder, the drawer cannot present the check to the drawer for pay-
ment.71 The value of the checks was limited only to the physical paper
on which the checks were written. The court admitted that by allowing
direct suit, circuity of action might be avoided. However, the court
feared that a direct suit by the drawer would circumvent defenses avail-
able to the drawee bank and indirectly available to the depositary bank
in a suit by the drawee bank." To avoid violation of the draftsmen's
true owner beyond the amount of any proceeds remaining in his hands.
(4) An intermediary bank or payor bank which is not a depositary bank is not
liable in conversion solely by reason of the fact that proceeds of an item indorsed
restrictively (Sections 3-205 and 3-206) are not paid or applied consistently with
the restrictive indorsement other than its immediate transferor.
70. J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 500.
71. Id. The court in Stone further stated: Had the checks been delivered to the
payee, the defendant might have been liable for conversion to the payee. The checks, if
delivered, in the hands of the payee would have been valuable property which could
have been transferred for value or presented for payment; and, had a check been dis-
honored, the payee would have had a right of recourse against the drawer on the in-
strument under §3-413(2). See §3-413(2). Here, the plaintiff drawer of the checks, which
were never delivered to the payee (see Gallup v. Barton, 47 N.E. 2d 921 (1943)) had no
valuable rights in them. Since it did not have the right of a payee or subsequent holder
to present them to the drawee for payment, the value of the rights was limited to the
physical paper on which they were written, and was not measured by their payable
amounts. (Trojan Publishing Corp. v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 83 N.E.2d 465 (1948).
72. R. Brot, Forged Endorsements: Liability of Collecting and Drawer Banks,
from the ALI-ABA Course of Study, Bank Defense of Negotiable Instrument Cases,
73 (1976), at 79 and 83.
A direct cause of action asserted by the drawer against the collecting bank would
probably reduce the effectiveness of at least two of the defenses that the collect-
ing bank could assert against the drawee bank; laches under §4-207(4) and fail-
ure to assert the drawer's negligence under §4-406(5) ...... The problem of
circuity of action which is often cited as a prime reason to allow a cause of
action by the drawee against the collecting bank may be avoided to some extent
by the use of §3-803." "The U.C.C. allows a payor bank that is sued for pay-
ment of a check bearing a forged indorsement to 'vouch in' a collecting bank by
giving written notice of the claim and stating that the person notified may come
1 300
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apparent intention to require the drawer to bring an action against the
drawee, the court held that a suit by the drawer against the collecting
bank could not be maintained."
Nevertheless, at least one court has rejected the majority opinion
of Stone and permitted a direct suit by the drawer against the deposi-
tary bank based on an interesting albeit complicated rationale. In Al-
lied Concord Financial Corporation v. Bank of America, National
Trust and Savings Association,7' the drawer had not discovered the
forged indorsements until the statute of limitations had run pursuant to
§4-406(4) 71 so that any claim against the drawee bank was lost. The
action was brought against the depositary bank, but the complaint was
dismissed based on two Code sections. 'Under §§3-603(2)76 and 4-
207(l), 7 the warranties of title running to the depositary bank were
said to run to the drawer on third party beneficiary principles. The
court stated that "by allowing direct suit we reduce circuity of action
and make litigation easier between parties located in different jurisdic-
tions . . . .Settlement in one lawsuit of all aspects of a controversy
involving commerical paper is clearly one of the prime objectives of the
in and defend, and that if the person notified does not do so he will in any action
against him by the person giving the notice be bound by any determination of
fact common to the two litigations. See U.C.C. 3-803. If the person notified fails
to act seasonable after receipt of notice by so defending he will be bound in that
manner. The Official Comment to 3-803 indicates that the notification is not
effective until receipt. Substantial compliance with this procedure was found in
Bagby v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 491 F.2d 192 (8th Cir.
1974).
73. See V. COUNTRYMAN AND A. KAUFMAN, COMMERICAL LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS, at 141 (1971).
The defect in the court's opinion is that it may be contrary to the language of
Section 3-419(3) (which does not expressly exclude actions by drawers) and that
it ignores the Code policy of placing on the bank any loss which results in part
from the bank's failure to use ordinary care, even though the other party may
also have been at fault.
This policy is indicated in §§3-406, 3-419(3), and 4-406(3).
74. 80 Cal. Rptr.622, 275 Cal. App. 2d 1 (1969).
75. See U.C.C. §4-406(4) supra note 41.
76. U.C.C. §3-603(2) states: "Payment or satisfaction may be made with the
consent of the holder by any person including a stranger to the instrument. Surrender
of the instrument to such a person gives him the right of a transferee." (Section 3-201).
77. See U.C.C. §4-207(1) and supra note 36.
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Code. 78 The court ruled, however, that the drawee's defenses under
U.C.C.§4-406(4) 79 would be available to the depositary bank in any ac-
tion against it by the drawer. It was the availability of one of these
defenses, the statute of limitations, which saved the depositary bank.
The action was dismissed."
The conclusion reached in Stone and Webster" that the drawer
could in no situation sue the depositary bank has also been avoided by
finding that a drawer may become the assignee of a cause of action
against the depositary bank. In National Bank and Trust Co. of Cen-
tral Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania," an action was
brought against the collecting bank to recover on checks honored on
forged indorsements of the payees. The court in its analysis reviewed
the possible theories of recovery 3 but decided that "legal assignment
made it unnecessary to rely on any one." 4 The court stated:
Assignments are not prohibited by the Code and appellant here advances
no compelling argument which obviates their significance. The assign-
ments here related only to the legal rights of the drawee as against the
collecting bank. They do not affect the rights of defenses that may be
asserted by the drawer under §§3-40615 and 4-40618 of the Code. 1
The often litigated drawer versus depositary bank issue obviously con-
78. 80 Cal.Rptr. at 624. See U.C.C. §3-419(3) supra note 69. See also U.C.C.
§4-406 supra note 41; §3-803 and §3-417 Comment 8. The court also felt §3-419(3)
fortified its conclusion. "Code §3-419 by implication permits direct suit by the true
owner of a forged check against a representative, including a depositary or collecting
bank, to the extent of any proceeds remaining in the hands of the representative." Id.
79. See U.C.C. §4-406(4) supra note 40.
80. 80 Cal.Rptr. at 626. Cf. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Marine National Ex-
change Bank, 315 F.Supp.520 (E.D. Wis.1970), in which the drawer was allowed to sue
the collecting bank under a similar analysis.
81. 184 N.E. 2d 358.
82. 9 Pa. Cmwlth. 358, 305 A.2d 769 (1973).
83. The various forms of recovery available to the drawer of a check against the
collecting bank include actions in both contract for moneys had and received and in
tort, for conversion and for negligence by the defendant in cashing checks with the
forged indorsements.
84. 305 A.2d at 773.
85. U.C.C. 3-406 supra note 39 and accompanying text.
86. U.C.C. 3-406 supra note 40.
87. 305 A.2d at 773.
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fronts problems not solved by the Code and unfortunately, for the con-
cept of uniformity, this split of authority continues to exist.8
Much can be said for not allowing the depositary bank to be sued
by the drawer. If the drawer was negligent, a practical application of
the Code would require him to bring an action against his own bank,
the drawee bank. The drawee bank can more easily determine when the
items and statement were sent to the drawer and when the forgeries
were discovered and reported. The depositary bank, on the other hand,
has no previous contact with the drawer and therefore is considerably
disadvantaged. s9
Another reason why a drawer should be barred from bringing an
action against the depositary bank is that the depositary bank "is not
deemed to have dealt with any valuable property of the drawer.""
When the depositary bank pays over a forged indorsement, the indorse-
ment, since it is ineffective, does not authorized any payment from the
drawer's account. Absent such authority, no charge can be made on
the drawer's account and any payment made will be deemed paid by
the drawee.
On the other hand, much can also be said for allowing a direct
cause of action by the drawer against the depositary bank. The deposi-
tary bank is usually located in the plaintiff's forum, is usually solvent,
and often bears the ultimate loss anyway." If the drawer were only
permitted to sue the drawee, the drawee would then have to bring an
action against the depositary bank, resulting in two or more lawsuits
instead of one. If the indorsement is considered effective pursuant to
§3-405, other considerations also arise. In such cases the check is not
only a valid instruction to the drawee to honor the check and to charge
the customer's account, but it is also a valuable instrument which re-
sults in the payment of funds from the drawer's account. When the
depositary bank's failure to obey the restrictive indorsement results in
the wrongful acquisition of the drawer's funds, then such a situation
88. See Life Insurance Co. of Virginia v. Snyder, 358 A.2d 859 (1976); Interna-
tional Industries, Inc. v. Island State Bank, 348 F.Supp. 886 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Insur-
ance Co. of North America v. Atlas Supply Co., 172 S.E. 2d 632 (1970); Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Mauni National Exchange Bank, 315 F.Supp. 520 (E.D. Wisc. 1970); and
Jett v. Lewis State Bank, 277 So2d 37 (Fla. 1973).
89. J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 501.
90. 414 N.Y.S. 2d at 300.
91. J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 501.
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could logically provide a basis for an action against the depositary by
the drawer. It was this kind of situation which faced the court in
Underpinning.
In a rather complicated opinion by Judge Gabrielli of the Court of
Appeals for the State of New York, the court concluded that Under-
pinning had in fact stated a cause of action against The Bank of New
York, the depositary bank, sufficient to withstand the bank's motion to
dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. After discussion the
"traditional '9 2 reasons for not permitting the drawer to sue the deposi-
tary bank for paying a check with a forged indorsement, the court held
that the forgeries involved in this case fell within the purview of §3-
405(c) and therefore were to be considered effective. The court stated:
Naturally, in such case, since the indorsement is effective no action
would lie against a depositary bank for payment over the forged indorse-
ment. Moreover, if the check was tainted in some other way which
would put the drawee on notice, and which would make its payment
unauthorized and subject it to suit, then the above rationale would not
apply, since the payment would once again be from the drawee's funds
rather than the drawer's account; and thus no action would lie against
the depositary bank in favor of the drawer. Hence, it is only in those
comparatively rare instances in which 1) the drawee has acted properly
and 2) the depositary bank has acted wrongfully that the drawer will be
able to proceed directly against the depositary bank.93
The court in Underpinning determined that the drawee had acted
properly; the checks bearing effective indorsements did indeed author-
ize the drawer to charge its customer's account. It was also determined
that the depositary bank could be liable to the drawer for the loss since
it paid the checks in complete disregard of the restrictive indorsement,
something for which the Code holds only the depositary bank responsi-
ble94 pursuant to U.C.C. § 3-206.11 U.C.C. §3-206 effectively places Iia-
92. See notes 89-91 supra and accompanying text.
93. 414 N.Y.S. 2d at 301.
94. The Code holds the depositary bank responsible in such a situation pursuant
to U.C.C. §§3-419(4) and 3-206(2). U.C.C. §3-419(4) states: "An intermediary bank or
payor bank which is not a depositary bank is not liable in conversion solely by reason
of the fact proceeds of an item indorsed restrictively (Sections 3-205 and 3-206) are not
paid or applied consistently with the restrictive indorsement of an indorser other than
its immediate transferor."
95. U.C.C. §3-206(2) provides: "An intermediary bank or a payor bank which is
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bility solely upon the bank which first takes a check with the restrictive
indorsement. Since The Bank of New York had not acted consistently
with the restriction, it was responsible and could theoretically be liable
for the losses resulting from payment made in violation thereof. 6 The
court went on to distinguish the rationale in Stone and Webster and
concluded:
We note that one reason why several courts have been reluctant to allow
the drawer to proceed directly against the depositary bank has been the
belief that the drawee is normally in the best position as a practical mat-
ter to assert such defenses .. . .While this may be true, we do not
deem it sufficient to shield a depositary from all liability in a situation
such as this in which it would appear that the depositary bank'is the only
entity purposely not completely protected by the provisions of the Code
from liability for paying in disregard of a restrictive indorsement 7
This determination, however, is not absolute. Since the depositary
bank in Underpinning could have possibly asserted a valid defense, one
which would have been impossible to evaluate due to the procedural
posture of the case, the court decided that The Bank of New York
could not be held liable as a matter of law and refused to rule on the
specific question of liability stating:
We have previously held that in an action for money had and received a
depositary bank is entitled to any defenses which may be created by the
drawer's failure to use due care in examining his bank statements and
returned checks. (Federal Ins. Co. v. Groveland State Bank, 37 NY2d
252, 258-259). While it may be that the forgery could not have been
discovered by the use of reasonable care or that in any case the deposi-
not the depositary bank is neither given notice nor otherwise affected by a restrictive
indorsement of any person except the bank's immediate transferor or the person
presenting for payment."
96. Under New York's common law, collecting as well as depositary banks
presented with restrictive indorsements had a duty to inquire and their failure to do so
subjected them to liability. In Soma v. Handrulis, 277 N.Y. 223, 14 N.E. 2d 46 (1938),
it was observed that: "If inquiry would have disclosed the irregular transaction and
would have shown the theft of the check then failure to make this inquiry establishes,
in a legal sense and a commercial sense, bad faith on the part of the bank and makes it
liable to the plaintiff."
97. 414 N.Y.S. 2d at 302.
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tary bank's failure to use due care itself precludes such a defense, that
question is not now before us.9"
CONCLUSION
The Court's determination in Underpinning produced a result that
is not only practicable but is also harmonious with the principles of
equity and sound Code policy. The law of commercial paper ascertains
that when one of two innocent parties suffers a loss, that loss should be
borne by the party most able to prevent the same.99
In this case, had the forgery not carried the restrictive indorse-
ment, then the loss would have fallen upon the drawer alone. However,
the use of such indorsements in the Underpinning case resulted in a
transfer of the potential liabilities and obligations pursuant to U.C.C.
§§3-206 and 3-419.111 These sections attempt to insure the continuous
negotiability of an instrument restrictively indorsed. The result, how-
ever, is to offer no available remedy to the drawer against the drawee
for payment on instruments nogotiated in violation of the restrictive
indorsement. °10 When the unusual case such as Underpinning occurs,
the drawer then finds himself not only precluded from suing the drawee
on the restrictive indorsements, but also precluded from suing for pay-
ment over the forged, yet effective, indorsements pursuant to U.C.C.§3-
405.102 Such a situation results in the drawer's loss of all available
actions.
The drafters of the U.C.C. in §3-206(1) and (2)103 meticulously ex-
empted intermediary °4 banks and payor banks from liability for nego-
tiation of instruments containing restrictive indorsements. Similarly,
they provided for a special liability on the grounds of conversion when
a depositary bank does not pay or apply a check pursuant to the re-
98. Id. at 302.
99. Id.
100. 61 A.D. 2d at 633. See also U.C.C. §§3-206 at supra note 10 and 3-419(3)
and (4) at supra note 69.
101. Id. at 632.
102. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
103. See note 10 supra.
104. U.C.C. §4-105 defines "intermediary bank" as "any bank to which an item
is transferred in the course of collection except the depositary or payor bank."
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strictive indorsement as required in §3-419(3) and (4).105 It would be
difficult to understand the range and reason of the drafters of these
provisions if their purposes were to prevent any relief to a drawer of a
check who has a loss due to the depositary bank's failure to comply
with the restrictive indorsement. When the Code permits recovery by
the payee who has a loss resulting from the depositary bank's failure to
obey the tenet of a restrictive indorsement, then simple wisdom should
also permit recovery by the drawer. To prohibit such recovery by the
drawer from a depositary bank which inadvertently, yet inexcusably,
cashes a check with any restrictive indorsement, but especially the re-
strictive indorsement "For Deposit Only," would not only violate the
intentions of the Code drafters but would also do violence to logic and
common sense.
Georgene Gore
105. See note 69 supra.
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Retreat of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973:
Southeastern Community College v. Davis
The aftermath of the VietNam war found many disabled veterans inca-
pable of readjusting to civilian life. The obvious obstacles confronting
them seemed insurmountable and, perhaps, at times they were. Their
struggle reawakened the American conscience to the problems of inte-
grating persons with physical and mental impairments into the main-
stream of society's activities. In order to accomplish this, however,
drastic measures had to be taken to address the existing discriminatory
practices aimed at the handicapped.' Reacting to such practices, Con-
gress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.2 Far reaching ramifica-
tions are implied by the Act's removal of physical and social obstacles
to education and employment for the handicapped.3 More particularly,
Section 5041 of that act prohibits any recipient 5 of federal funds from
1. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1027 (1971), defines "handi-
cap" as a "disadvantage that makes achievement unusually difficult". When used ge-
nerically, "handicap" has a narrower meaning, referring to a particular type of disad-
vantage: a mental, physical, or emotional disability or impairment. Handicapped is
both the accepted everyday meaning and a common statutory term of describing per-
sons having such difficulties.
2. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 395, 29 U.S.C. §
794 (1976), as amended by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Amendments of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (1974), and the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Service,
and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat.
2955 (1978).
3. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is a financial problem for the nation's schools
and colleges who are concerned with the cost required to provide equal access for a
minority of handicapped students. For example, at the University of Minnesota, a
campus containing some 300 buildings and a student body of 55,600, it has been esti-
mated that compliance with § 504 will cost $7.2 million dollars. N.Y. Times, Dec. 4,
1977, at 1, col. I. The Department of HEW predicts that $2.4 billion dollars a year
will be required to end handicap discrimination. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1977, at 29, col.
i.
4. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 provides:
[N]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of
his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
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discriminating against handicapped individuals. With the ever increas-
ing number of applications being filed by the handicapped,6 college offi-
cials were forced to confront the issue of whether admission could be
denied on the basis of a physical impairment. In Southeastern Commu-
nity College v. Davis,7 a case of first impression, the Supreme Court
examined the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, specifically, Section 504, and
HELD: A college instituting reasonable physical admission require-
ments can exclude a deaf individual from entering a clinical nursing
program. Mrs. Francis B. Davis, a qualified, licensed practical nurse
(LPN) sought to advance her nursing career and, in March, 1973, ap-
plied for enrollment in Southeastern Community College's Associate
Nursing Program.8 The college accepted Mrs. Davis for the 1973-74
academic year with advancement to the Clinical Nursing Program con-
tingent upon satisfactory academic progress. The following year, the
college informed Mrs. Davis that despite successful completion of her
course, she did not qualify for the clinical portion of the Associate
Nursing Program. The college refused to accept Mrs. Davis solely be-
cause of a hearing impairment.9
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance . . . 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
5. Section 504 applies to every recipient of federal financial assistance regardless
of the amount or type of assistance received. This applies to recipients of federal
grants, contracts, and other forms of financial assistance. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (f) and (h)
(1979).
6. The problems of integrating handicapped individuals into society are com-
pounded by the lack of accurate statistics on the handicapped. "The difficulty in ob-
taining accurate and meaningful statistics is attributable to the inability of statisticians
to measure the effect of a defined handicap on the capacity of the handicapped to
function normally in society". Note, Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectu-
ate thfights of the Physi cally Disabled, 61 GEO. L.J. 1501 n.2 (1973). Estimates of
the number of handicapped Americans range from twenty million by the Department
of Labor to thirty-five million by the Department of HEW. See Statement of Joseph
A. Califano, Sec., Dept. HEW (Apr. 29, 1977).
7. 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979).
8. As part of Mrs. Davis' application, she submitted a pre-entrance Medical Re-
cord, in which the examining physician evaluated her as ". . . mentally and physically
able to undertake the program in professional nursing". Brief for Respondent at 5,
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979).
9. Id. at 6. Mrs. Davis was interviewed twice, once in April, 1973, and again in
March, 1974, as part of Southeastern's evaluation process. As a result of these inter-
views, the College requested that Mrs. Davis submit to a hearing examination. The
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Southeastern Community College v. Davis
Thereafter, Mrs. Davis requested that the college reevaluate her
application. After agreeing to do so, the college sought outside profes-
sional opinions as to the effect of a hearing impairment on Mrs. Davis'
prospective career. The college consulted the Executive Director of
North Carolina's Board of Nursing, who responded unfavorably to the
licensing of a deaf woman as a registered nurse (RN): "Mrs. Davis'
hearing impairment can preclude her from being safe for practice in
any setting allowed by a license as a[n] RN or by license as a[n]
LPN."'0 [emphasis added]. The Director of Nursing Services at South-
eastern General Hospital, where Mrs. Davis had previously been em-
ployed, stated, in contrast, that: "I would employ Mrs. Davis in our
Skilled Nursing Facility as an RN if I had a vacancy . . ."." Further-
more, the director remarked: "I do not believe that I can truthfully
state that she [Mrs. Davis] would not be able to function in any area of
nursing with her present determination to continue her education. '"'
After weighing the merits of each assessment, the college again
rejected her application. 3 In response, Mrs. Davis filed suit alleging,
inter alia,"4 a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.' 5 After
audiologist's report revealed that Mrs. Davis had a bilateral moderately severe sensori-
neural hearing loss. However, with a change in her hearing aid, it was expected that
Mrs. Davis would be able to detect sound ". . . almost as well as a person would who
has normal hearing." Id. at 6. Nevertheless, no new interviews were scheduled with
Mrs. Davis with her new hearing aid. Instead the College rejected Mr. Davis as not
qualified.
10. Id. at 7. The Executive Director of the North Carolina Board of Nursing,
evidently, did not know that Mrs. Davis had been licensed by the Board as an LPN
and had worked for many years.
11. Id. at 7.
12. Id. at 8.
13. Id.
14. Mrs. Davis filed suit based on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1976), and under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
Mrs. Davis alleged that Southeastern, in denying her admission solely on account of
her hearing impairment, denied her due process and equal protection of the law. The
district court disposed of the 1983 claim by noting that Mrs. Davis had failed to ex-
haust all administrative remedies. 424 F.Supp. 1341 (E.D.N.C. 1976). See also
Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment. The Qualifications of Handi-
capped Persons as a Suspect Class under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA
CLARA LAWYER 855 (1975).
15. Mrs. Davis claimed that the College, by denying her admission to the clinical
program on account of her hearing disability and by failing to make accommodations
311 11 4:1980
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a bench trial, the district court concluded that Mrs. Davis was not
within the class covered by Section 504 and ruled in favor of the col-
lege."6 Using the plain meaning approach to statutory construction, the
district court interpreted Section 504's "otherwise qualified handi-
capped person" to mean a person who is ". . . otherwise able to func-
tion sufficiently in the position sought in spite of the handicap, if
proper training and facilities are suitable and available.117 Thus, Mrs.
Davis was adjudged not "otherwise qualified" since she would not be
able to function sufficiently as an RN with her handicap.'8
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
lower court had erred in its judgment and reversed in part. 9 The panel
did not dispute the findings of fact by the district court but held that
the lower court misconstrued Section 504 since the district court did
not have the benefit of newly promulgated HEW regulations when it
rendered its opinion.2 1 In contrast to the district court's decision, the
for her disability, violated § 504. At trial, Southeastern's witnesses admitted that Mrs.
Davis could perform adequately in the clinical program with special training and indi-
vidual supervision. Brief for Respondent at 8, Southeastern Community College v. Da-
vis, 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979).
16. 424 F.Supp. 1341 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
17. Id. at 1345. From the decision, it is apparent that the factual context in
which this case arose determined the resolution of the statutory interpretation question.
The court pointed out, first, that Mrs. Davis' abilities would be inadequate to identify
patients' needs or even to pick up clues regarding a patient's vital signs. According to
the Executive Director of North Carolina's Board of Nursing, this fact standing alone
would preclude Mrs. Davis from being licensed. Second, this projected inability to be
licensed as a Registered Nurse in the state of North Carolina was the single major
factor in the College's refusal to allow admission. And third, according to the court, it
would have been difficult and even dangerous for Mrs. Davis, as a deaf student, to
attempt the clinical portion of the training program.
18. Id. The district court finalized its decision with an analogy that, while it
would be impermissable to exclude a blind or deaf person from admission to law
school, if academically qualified, it would nevertheless be permissible to exclude a per-
son without sight from a position as a truck driver.
19. 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978). The Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's opinion as to Mrs. Davis' claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976). However, the denial of Mrs. Davis' claim under the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 was vacated and remanded.
20. Id. at 1161. Approximately six months after the district court's decision, on
June 3, 1977, HEW Regulations implementing § 504 became effective. These Regula-
tions establish a mechanism for prohibiting discriminatory practices aimed at the hand-
icapped, as mandated by the Rehabilitation Act. The Regulations define a "qualified
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court of appeals gave due deference to such administrative
regulations.2'
The district court was consequently ordered to Teconsider Mrs.
Davis' application for admission without regard to her disability. The
panel asserted that the college might use academic performance as a
factor in evaluating an applicant's qualification; however, any factor
considered must be used uniformly regardless of its objective or subjec-
tive nature.2 Furthermore, the court noted that Mrs. Davis should not
be foreclosed from pursuing a nursing career merely because she is un-
able to function effectively in all aspects of the nursing profession. Al-
though Mrs. Davis' handicap might preclude her from working in a
hospital's operating theatre, where surgical masks would prevent any
reliance upon reading lips, there was no basis for prohibiting Mrs. Da-
vis from working in another setting, such as private industry.23 The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded and directed the lower
court to pay "close attention" to the HEW regulations 2 -requiring the
college to modify its program to accommodate Mrs. Davis-even
though such compliance may entail considerable expense.25 From this
ruling, Southeastern filed its petition for writ of certiorari to the Su-
preme Court. 26
handicapped person", with regard to post secondary education, as a "handicapped per-
son who meets the academic and technical standards requisite to admission or partici-
pation." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (k) (3) (1979). Technical standards are considered as "all
non-academic admissions criteria that are essential to participation in the program in
question." 45 C.F.R. App. A (1979).
21. Id. at 1161. Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969); Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66 (1975); Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974). Other courts of
appeals were required to vacate and remand cases, under § 504, to lower tribunals for
reconsideration in light of applicable regulations which postdated their decisions. See
United Handicapped Fed'n, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp.
Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
22. 574 F.2d at 1160.
23. Id. at 1161.
24. 45 C.F.R. § 84.42(a) (1979); as per §§ 84.43(c), 84.44(a), 84.44(d) and
84.12(a). See text accompanying notes 57-62, infra.
In its remand, the 4th Circuit Court, rather than ordering the implementation of
modifications mandated by the regulations, only recommended that the above regula-
tions be examined. See 574 F.2d at 1162, n. 8, 1163, n. 9. Arguably, this procedural
move weakened the lower tribunal's deference to such regulations.
25. 574 F.2d at 1162-63.
26. Id. at 1163. Southeastern filed a petition for rehearing and suggestion for
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Accepting the case for review, 7 the Supreme Court reversed the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and remanded.28 Writing for a unani-
mous court, Justice Powell, in an unusually short opinion, held that
Southeastern Community College did not violate Section 504 when it
denied Mrs. Davis admission to the Clinical Nursing Program.
As opposed to the controversy at the trial level, which involved the
determination of Mrs. Davis' status as "otherwise qualified," pursuant
to Section 504, the central issue facing the Supreme Court in the case
at bar was whether Section 504 ". . [forbade] professional schools
from imposing physical requirements for admission to their clinical
program".2 1
Since this was a case of first impression, the Supreme Court was
undoubtedly urged to grant review because of the need for a definitive
statement regarding the interpretation and scope of Section 504. Con-
flicting decisions had blurred the intent and impact of Section 504 on
both public and private educational institutions. Litigation to enroll a
handicapped child stricken with spina bifida 0 in the public schools con-
cluded with contrasting judgments in adjacent circuits.31 In the fourth
circuit, after the Davis district court decision, a different point of view
was taken by two district courts in holding that a college must provide
rehearing en banc. The suggestion failed despite a request for a poll of the judges. Two
judges dissented to the denial of rehearing en banc and would have affirmed the district
court's judgment.
27. 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S.Ct. 830 (1979).
28. 99 S.Ct. at 2371.
29. Id. at 2364.
30. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, 1451 (25th ed. 1974), de-
fines spina bifida as " . . . a developmental anomaly characterized by a defective clo-
sure of the bony encasement of the spinal cord through which the cord and meninges
may . . . protrude". In certain cases, this structural defect entails an inability to con-
trol the bladder and bowel. See also S. TUREK, ORTHOPAEDICS: PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION 869-73 (2d ed. 1967).
31. Compare Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F.Supp. 180 (S.D.W.Va. 1976), (exclu-
sion of child from regular classroom without a bona fide educational reason is a viola-
tion of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504); with Sherer v. Waier, 457 F.Supp. 1039
(W.D.Mo. 1978), (parents, individually, and on behalf of their daughter who suffered
from spina bifida, could not assert a private right of action under § 504 against school
officials for failure to provide special individual medical services to the child during
school).
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interpreter services under Section 504 for deaf students.2 Furthermore,
other areas of daily living were becoming embroiled in litigation as a
result of the Rehabilitation Act.3
The federal commitment to eradicating discrimination against dis-
abled persons had been piecemeal and sketchy, at best, until the enact-
ment of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Initial congressional interest
began with returning World War I veterans and their attendant reha-
bilitative needs. The concern for both disabled war veterans and their
civilian counterparts (primarily handicapped industrial workers) led to
the Vocational Rehabilitation Program enacted in 1920 when President
Woodrow Wilson signed into law the Smith-Fess Act.3 This act of-
fered limited vocational services .3 As the definition of "handicapped"
evolved from the foundation laid in the Smith-Fess Act, a definition
which did not include the mentally ill or mentally retarded, and as the
number of those eligible increased, the nature of services provided cor-
respondingly changed .3 This development, however, was negligible as
32. Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F.Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977); Crawford v.
Univ. of N.C., 440 F.Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
33. In the 7th and 8th Circuits, the purchase of public transportation buses with-
out hydraulic lifts and wheelchair securing devices was held to be handicap discrimina-
tion, in violation of § 504. Yet, in the 10th Circuit, similar handicap discrimination was
found not to be a violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Compare Lloyd v. Regional
Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre,
558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); with Atlantis Community, Inc. v. Adams, 453 F.Supp.
825 (1975).
Compare Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977), (students with vi-
sion in only one eye denied preliminary injunction to participate in contact sports) with
Borden v. Rohr, No. C2 75-844 (S.D.Ohio Dec. 30, 1975) (in an oral decision the court
granted a preliminary injunction to allow a state university student, blind in one eye, to
play intercollegiate basketball), and Evans v. Looney, No. 77-6052-CV-SJ (W.D.Mo.
1977), (refusal to permit plaintiffs blind in one eye the right to participate in college
football held to be both a denial of due process and equal protection).
34. Vocational Rehabilitation (Smith-Fess) Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-236, 29
U.S.C. §§ 31-42 (1970).
35. The Smith-Fess Act initially offered only services for the physically handi-
capped, such as counseling, some training, and placement services. The Vocational Re-
habilitation Program was considered a temporary measure which was loosely funded
until the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 42 U.S.C. §
301 (1976). Therein Congress allocated permanent funding. See [1973] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076, 2082.
36. Due to the impact of World War II, Congress amended the Vocational Re-
0
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the Act focused mainly on vocational rehabilitation training without
addressing the aspects of discrimination which confronted trained
handicapped individuals.
Initial recognition of social bias against the disabled began in 1948
when Congress enacted a law prohibiting the Federal Civil Service
from discriminating against any person due to a physical handicap."
Continuing with these efforts, in 1971, an attempt was launched to in-
corporate the handicapped within the provisions of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.38 However, not until early 1972, during the 92nd Congress, did
extensive debate begin on providing handicapped individuals with more
comprehensive rehabilitative services, including civil rights
protections. 9
That year, the House Committee on Education and Labor re-
sponded to problems inherent in the Vocational Rehabilitation Pro-
gram by submitting H.R. 8395,40 which passed both houses of Congress
by October, 1972. However, during that same month, President Nixon
announced his pocket veto of the bill. 1 Following the 1972-73 Christ-
mas recess, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare re-
vised a version of the previous house bill which passed both the Senate
and House. 2 On March 27, 1973, President Nixon vetoed bill S.7, de-
habilitation Act in 1943 to provide medical services for reducing or eliminating an
individual's disability and expanded the definition of "handicapped" to include the
mentally ill and retarded. Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1943, Pub. L.
No. 78-113. The 1954 amendments added new federal funding techniques for state re-
habilitative services (Pub. L. No. 83-565). In 1965, further amendments (Pub. L. No.
89-333) expanded the program and liberalized federal funding to encourage matching
state appropriations. The medicare provisions of the Social Security Act made funds
available for rehabilitative services for the elderly. In 1967, a major reorganization in
HEW developed the Bureau of Social and Rehabilitative Services. In 1968, Congress
extended the act to include follow-up services, services to families, construction of re-
habilitation facilities, and employment opportunities for the handicapped. (Pub. L. No.
90-341). See [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2076, 2082-84.
37. Civil Service Act, 22 Stat. 403 (1883) as amended by the Civil Service Act
Amendment of 1948, Pub. L. No. 48-617, 62 Stat. 351, 5 U.S.C. § 7153 (1970).
38. 119 Cong. Rec. 7114 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Vanik).
39. See S.REP. No. 318, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2076, 2078.
40. Id. at 2087.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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nouncing Congress as masking "bad legislation beneath alluding la-
bels.14 3 Although both presidential vetoes centered on the cost of the
proposed legislation, the President also objected to the legislation's di-
vergence from strictly vocational objectives.4
After a final attempt by the Senate to override the President's
veto,4" members of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee met with
administrative officials to work out a compromise. 6 An amended ver-
sion of the two previously vetoed bills was quietly adopted by both
House and Senate. Thus, with little debate or commentary,47 Congress
passed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.11
With the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Federal
Government undertook a comprehensive program, the effects of which
would ultimately open the door to equality for the nation's handi-
capped.49 The greatest impact for the handicapped lies within three sec-
tions of Title V of the Act: Section 501,50 mandating non-discrimina-
tion by the Federal Government in its own hiring practices; Section
503,51 prohibiting discrimination and requiring affirmative action on the
43. Id. at 2088.
44. Id. at 2088-89. See also 119 CONG. REC. 7107 (1973) (remarks of Rep.
Landgrebe).
45. On April 3, 1973, the Senate failed to override the President's veto. The vote
was sixty (60) in favor to override and thirty-six (36) against. 119 CONG. REC. 10822
(1973).
46. [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2082.
47 "[C]ongress enacted the legislation without legislative hearing and virtually
no floor debate in either house. There is thus little Congressional guidance on the host
of complex questions presented by § 504's far-reaching prohibition against discrimina-
tion." Statement of Joseph A. Califano, Sec., Dept. HEW (Apr. 29, 1977).
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976), as amended. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
repealed all the provisions and amendments of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act and
substituted its own provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 790 (1976). See also, A Legislative History
of Section 504, in 2 AMicus 34 (1977).
49. See, e.g., Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F.Supp. 982 (E.D.Pa. 1976), affd,
556 F.2d 184 (3rd Cir. 1977), (denial to a blind woman of employment as a school
teacher was discrimination in employment and contrary to § 504); Davis v. Bucher, 451
F.Supp. 791 (E.D.Pa. 1978), (the denial of public employment to applicants with histo-
ries of drug abuse held to violate § 504).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1976).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976). For a comparison of § 503 and § 504, see Ochoa,
Sections 503 & 504: New Employment Rights for Individuals with Handicaps, 2
AMIcus 38 (1977).
I
1 4:98
317 14:1980
315
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1980
part of federal contractors who receive more than $2,500 in contracts;
and Section 504,82 which prohibits discrimination against handicapped
individuals in any federally funded program or activity. Hence,
whereas previous legislation centered on the very limited goal of pro-
viding strictly vocational services, Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of-
fered, for the first time, specific civil rights protections by barring the
expenditure of federal funds in programs discriminating against the
handicapped.'3
As initially passed, Section 504 consisted of a single sentence, un-
accompanied by any explanation concerning its scope of coverage or
limitations. Congressional intent was simply to enact a provision
prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped in programs receiv-
ing federal funds.54 Congress later amended the act,5" broadening its
52. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). See, Comment, Toward Equal Rights for Handi-
capped Individuals: Judicial Enforcement of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 38
OHIO ST. L.J. 677 (1977).
53. "[Slection 504 was patterned after, and is almost identical to, the anti-dis-
crimination language of Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d-
1, relating to race, color, or national origin . . ." S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6390. In the 1978
Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2982, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979), § 504 states that the rights and procedures con-
tained in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI and VII, § 717 and § 706 (f) through
706 (k), are included in § 501, and § 504. In addition, legislation has been enacted to
amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to prohibit discrimination against the handi-
capped. See S.446, H.R. 373, and S.346 (9th Cong., 1979) in 3 M.D.L.R. 119, 123
(1979).
54. The Senate Report accompanying the 1973 Act shows § 504". . . proclaim-
ing a policy of nondiscrimination against otherwise qualified handicapped individuals
with respect to participation in or access to any program which is in receipt of Federal
financial assistance". S.Rep. No. 318, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1973] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2076, 2123. After the HEW Regulations for § 504 were
issued, Congress amended the section and added new subsections providing for attor-
neys fees, expert consultation on architectual barriers, and a council to review new
regulations. The Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabili-
ties Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (a), (b), & (c) (1976 & Supp. II
1979).
55. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706 (6) (1976) as amended by
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-651 (Nov. 20,
1974), 89 Stat. 2-3 (1974). Before this amendment, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
defined "handicapped individual" as:
Any individual who (A) has a physical or mental disability which for such indi-
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scope of eligibility by redefining "handicapped" to include one who:
A. Has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one
or more of such person's major life activities,
B. Has a record of such an impairment, or
C. Is regarded as having such an impairment."
The protection afforded this expanded class of handicapped individuals
is modified, to a certain degree, by the HEW interpretative regulations
pertaining to the Act."
The Rehabilitation Act does not specify enforcement procedures
since Congress intended HEW to promulgate regulations in this area.
Swift implementation of such regulations was anticipated." Yet, four
years passed before the Secretary of HEW, after considerable hesita-
tion,59 issued the regulations."
vidual constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment and (B) can
reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of employability from vocational re-
habilitation services provided pursuant to subchapters I and III of this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1970 & Supp. 11 1973). This definition in effect limited § 504 to
disabled persons capable of employment through vocational rehabilitation.
56. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706 (6) (1976).
57. The HEW Regulations implementing § 504 define "qualified handicapped
person", in the employment context, as ". . . a handicapped person who, with reason-
able accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job in question". 45
C.F.R. § 84.3 (k) (1) (1979). In contrast, regarding post secondary education, a "quali-
fied handicapped person" means a" . . . handicapped person #ho meets the academic
and technical standards requisite to admission or participation in the recipient's educa-
tion program or activity." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (k) (3) (1979). The Regulations use the
term "qualified handicapped person" and "otherwise qualified handicapped person"
synonymously. HEW considered that the omission of the word "otherwise" was neces-
sary in order to conform with the intention of the statute, because" . . . read literally,
otherwise qualified handicapped persons include persons who are qualified except for
their handicap, rather than in spite of their handicap. Under such a literal reading, a
blind person possessing all the qualifications for driving a bus except sight could be
said to be 'otherwise qualified' ". 45 C.F.R. § 84 App. A at 376 (1977).
58. S.Rep. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6373, 6390.
59. In April, 1976, President Gerald R. Ford ordered HEW to"... coordinate
the implementation of § 504. . . by all Federal departments and agencies. . . so that
consistent policies, practices, and procedures are adopted with respect to the enforce-
ment of § 504 . . . " Exec. Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. § 117 (1976). In Cherry v.
Mathews, 419 F.Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976), District Court Judge John Lewis Smith
14:1980 319 1
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Throughout the regulations, it is clear that emphasis is placed
upon evaluating handicapped individuals on the basis of their qualifica-
tions and not on their disabilities. In education, preadmission inquiries
into an applicant's handicap are prohibited. After admission, but
before enrollment, an institution may consider an applicant's disability
in order to determine what academic adjustments must be made to en-
sure full student participation."1 Academic requiremerits can be modi-
fied, if necessary, to ensure that they do not discriminate, or have the
effect of discriminating against a qualified handicapped student."
In Davis, the Supreme Court analyzed Section 504's language and
found that it neither compels schools to disregard a participant's handi-
cap nor requires them to modify their programs especially for the
handicapped. Section 504 demands only that schools not exclude "oth-
erwise qualified persons" solely on account of their disability. In es-
sence, Section 504 signifies that "mere possession of a handicap is not
a permissible ground for assuming an inability to function in a particu-
lar context." 3
The question of whether Section 504 allows an aggrieved handi-
capped person a private right of action was not answered by the court.
Justice Powell acknowledged the issue in a footnote, but declined to
ordered HEW to promulgate regulations implementing § 504 without undue delay.
Nevertheless, HEW Sec. Mathews refused to issue the final regulations until Congress
reviewed them. Judge Smith considered holding Mathews in contempt, but an appeal
of the order gave Mathews enough time to avoid issuing the regulations before the
inauguration of the Carter administration. Additional postponement provoked Handi-
cap Rights' organizations to stage demonstrations and occupy various federal offices in
an attempt to publicize the delay. See "Hire the Handicapped", NEWSWEEK, May 9,
1977 at 39.
60. In announcing the Regulations, Sec. Califano declared, "In sum, the regula-
tions issued today reflects my best judgment of how Congress intended that the broad
uncompromising statutory command of § 504 should be translated into specific rules
that vindicate the rights of handicapped citizens and that deal firmly, yet sensibly with
those recipients of federal funds who will be subjected to significant new require-
ments". Statement of Joseph A. Califano, Sec., Dept. HEW (Apr. 29, 1979).
61. 45 C.F.R. § 84.42 (b) (4) (1979).
62. 45 C.F.R. § 84.44 (a) and (d) (1979). Such modifications may include
changes in the length of time permitted for the completion of degree requirements,
substitution of specific courses required for the completion of degree requirements, and
the use of auxiliary educational aids, i.e., typewriters, tape recorders, and print
enlargers.
63. 99 S.Ct. at 2366.
1 320
Nova Law Journal 4:1980 1
318
Nova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol4/iss1/1
Southeastern Community College v. Davis
4:1980
address the problem in light of the court's disposition of the case, i.e.
finding Mrs. Davis not "otherwise qualified" and thus not entitled to
protection under the Act." It is interesting to note that although the
court meandered their way out of addressing this point, they still heard
Mrs. Davis' claim under Section 504.11 Eight circuits which have con-
sidered the issue have found a private right of action to exist.6"
Moreover, the Supreme Court reassessed the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals definition of an "otherwise qualified" handicapped person; a
definition which regarded a person as "otherwise qualified" if, regard-
less of their respective handicap, such person met the academic and
technical standards requisite for admission. The Supreme Court per-
ceived this to mean that one need not meet legitimate physical require-
ments in order to be adjudged "otherwise qualified." Justice Powell
64. 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2366 n.5.
65. Supra note 14, at 14.
66. Aggrieved individuals first secured a private right of action under § 504 in
Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977), wherein the court
enjoined local authorities from purchasing buses that were inaccessible to the physi-
cally handicapped. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Lau v. Nichols, 414
U.S. 563 (1973) and Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) to hold that 504 confers affirma-
tive rights on handicapped individuals and, in addition, a private right of action to
enforce these rights.
See NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3rd Cir. 1979) (minority
groups and handicapped rights associations were given a private right of action under §
504 to contest relocation of medical facility); Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3rd Cir.
1979) (mentally ill patient seeking state benefits in a private hospital has private right
of action under § 504); Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th
Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, (1979) (deaf LPN seeking RN degree has a private
right of action under § 504); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th
Cir. 1977) (mobility-handicapped individuals and association of disabled persons have
a private right of action under § 504 to enjoin public transportation system from
purchasing mass transit equipment that is inacessible to handicapped persons);
Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977) (students blind in one eye were
allowed to claim a private right of action to enjoin a denial of participation in contact
sports); Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977) (Per curiam) (mobility-handi-
capped persons have a private right of action under § 504 to bring suit for an accessible
bus transportation system); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3rd Cir. 1977)
(blind teacher seeking public school position conferred private right of action under §
504); Contra: Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 590 F2d 87 (4th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 2895 (1979) (RN with deteriorating eyesight, terminated
from nursing home position, denied a private right of action). See also Comment, To-
ward Equal Rights for Handicapped Individuals, supra, note 52.
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took exception to this view. He believed that the district court's inter-
pretation of "otherwise qualified", requiring disabled individuals to sat-
isfy all requirements in spite of their handicap, more accurately re-
flected the true statutory meaning.67 This position, Powell reasoned, is
supported by the HEW regulations which implement the Act. Such
regulations mandate that a handicapped student meet academic and
technical standards requisite for admission or participation. 8 If physi-
cal qualifications are essential to a particular program, "technical stan-
da'rds" for admission may encompass reasonable physical require-
ments. Thus, a qualified handicapped person would need to meet
academic, technical, and physical requirements.
Another issue under consideration by the Supreme Court con-
cerned the appellate court's ruling requiring the college to modify its
programs and provide auxillary aids to facilitate participation by the
handicapped. This requirement was held to be excessive. Justice Powell
observed, first of all, that despite program modifications, Mrs. Davis
would not likely benefit to the same degree as a nonhandicapped par-
ticipant. Moreover, any interpretation of the regulations requiring sub-
stantial adjustments beyond those necessary to eliminate discrimination
against "otherwise qualified" handicapped individuals, "would consti-
tute an unauthorized extension of the obligations imposed by that stat-
ute." 9 Secondly, Section 504 is silent as to matters of affirmative ac-
tion, in direct contrast to Sections 501 and 503, both of which contain
explicit language authorizing affirmative action.79 Therefore, the court
reasoned that Congress intended to limit affirmative action to certain
circumstances prescribed by the Act. HEW, through its regulations,
cannot create an obligation not otherwise provided for under Section
504. Even though an administrative agency's interpretation is to be
given some deference, "neither the language, purpose, nor history, of
Section 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative action obligation
on all recipients of federal funds. [Emphasis added]."'7
67. 99 S.Ct. at 2369.
68. See notes 61 and 62 and accompanying text, supra.
69. 99 S.Ct. at 2369.
70. See Note, Rehabilitating the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 58 B.U.L. Rev.
247, 252-54 (1978).
71. 99 S.Ct. at 2369. The Solicitor General of the United States, in an amicus
curiae brief for the respondent, cited congressional reports and statements by individ-
ual members of Congress during the 1978 amendm6nts debate, in support of the argu-
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The Supreme Court's decision, in the instant case, holding that the
college's actions were not in anywise discriminatory, was based on a
narrow interpretation of Section 504. The ramifications of such an in-
terpretation are far-reaching. Justice Powell contended that there
would be situations where modifications could be made accommodat-
ing the handicapped without imposing "undue financial and adminis-
trative burdens".72 Refusal to modify in those circumstances would be
considered unreasonable and discriminatory. However, in the present
case, such a refusal was not considered discriminatory, as Mrs. Davis
could not have fully participated on account of hearing impairment.
The court did not establish any guidelines in this regard, and only as-
serted that ". . . the line between illegal handicap discrimination and
lawful refusal to extend affirmative action will [not] always be clear. '73
Consequently, the handicap provision of Section 504 was determined
not to "limit the freedom of an educational institution to require rea-
sonable physical qualifications for admission to a clinical training
program."74
Davis is a major setback for both the Federal Government and the
Handicap Rights Organizations, whose efforts were instrumental in* en-
acting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Court's decision allowing
the consideration of physical admission requirements circumvents Sec-
tion 504's regulations prohibiting preadmission inquiry into an appli-
cant's handicap.75 If physical ability, such as hearing or sight, is consid-
ered an admission requirement, an applicant could be excluded at the
outset of the admission process, regardless of whether or not some aca-
demic adjustment could be made which would enable a student to ef-
fectively participate. For example, since law materials are printed and
not usually found in Braille, law schools could require sight as either a
technical or physical requirement, and exclude all blind applicants.
Clearly HEW intended to prohibit such preadmission handicap
ment that § 504 entails affirmative action. See United States of America, Amicus Cu-
riae Brief, Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979). Justice
Powell, however, asserted that since these statements were all made after the enact-
ment of the Rehabilitation Act, they were not proper expressions of legislatvie intent.
99 S.Ct. 2361, 2370 n.11.
72. 99 S.Ct. at 2370.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2371.
75. See note 60 and accompanying text, supra.
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inquiries.
Davis represents but another "handicap rights" decision founded
on considerations of safety and cost.78 The safety of both Mrs. Davis,
practicing as an RN and of any potential patients under her care, over-
shadowed the controversy of handicap discrimination." The court
opined that Mrs. Davis' handicap prevented her from safely rendering
adequate nursing services. Unfortunately, this decision ignores the con-
tributions made by many hearing-impaired persons performing safely
and effectively in society, such as doctors, nurses, and dentists.78 Ad-
vances in medical technology have enabled many hearing-impaired reg-
istered nurses and doctors to care for their patients without risk or
jeopardy. 79 Furthermore, the concern for handicapped workers' safety
has too often been a myth used by employers to reject qualified handi-
capped workers."0
Along these lines, federal courts have recognized that cost is not a
justification for denying equal education to handicapped children,8 1 nor
is it grounds for preventing public transportation for handicapped per-
sons."2 It seems illogical, then, to exclude a handicapped applicant from
professional education programs because of "undue financial
burdens".3
Powell's decision has greatly emasculated the opportunity for ad-
76. See, e.g., Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. at 638; S. Dubow, Liti-
gation for the Rights of the Handicapped People, 4 DePaul L.R. 943 (1978).
77. See 3 M.D.LR. 190 (1979).
78. The U.s. Civil Service Commission Report, Employment of Handicapped
Individuals Including Disabled Veterans in the Federal Government (Sept. 30, 1978),
found over 150 hearing-impaired nurses working for the Federal Government.
79. E.g., an electronic amplifying stethescope -to hear lung sounds; a
sphygomonometer to measure blood pressure; teletypewriters. See also Ridden, Davis,
and Brown, Science for Handicapped Students in Higher Education, American Associ-
ation for the Advancement of Science, (AAAS) pub. 78-R-2 (1978).
80. The myth that handicapped workers present additional safety hazards has
been disproven in practice. See Sears, The Able Disabled, CHEMTECH, 713-15, (Dec.
1974); Kalenik, Myths About Hiring the Physically Handicapped, 2 JOB SAFETY AND
HEALTH 9 (1974).
81. See Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of the District of Columbia, 348 F.Supp. 866
(D.D.C. 1972).
82. See Bartels v. Niernat, 427 F.Supp. 226 (E.D.Wisc. 1977); United Handicap
Fed'n v. Andre, supra, note 66.
83. 99 S.Ct. at 2370.
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Southeastern Community College v. Davis
vancement in professional schools by the nation's handicapped."
Southeastern Community College, assisted by numerous amici curiae,
was successful in diverting the court's attention away from the issue of
handicap discrimination by emphasizing the necessity of physical quali-
fications for admission. One amicus rashly asserted that sustaining the
appellate court would entail colleges admitting ". . . the profoundly
mentally retarded to graduate programs or the quadraplegic to forestry
programs."' Such an extremist view in all probability played a decisive
role in guiding the court to its decision.
A final point must be made regarding the Act's purported guaran-
tee of civil rights protections to the handicapped. The Supreme Court
seems to have underscored that purpose in its review of Mrs. Davis'
allegation of such discrimination. It appears that the court, in essence,
perceived Mrs. Davis' status as being akin to the "profoundly mentally
retarded [in graduate programs] or the quadraplegic [in forestry pro-
grams]." 6 This decision raises the question of whether a blind or deaf
individual is less of a citizen with fewer rights because of his or her
disability. Davis emphasizes the discrimination, demeaning practices,
and injustices that must be overcome by those Americans burdened
with mental or physical impairments.
Clyde Mabry Collins, Jr.
84. The language in Davis suggests that the holding is confined to professional
training programs having reasonable and essential physical requirements. Those being
unable to meet such physical prerequisites, despite their respective qualifications or
skills, would be foreclosed from pursuing professional careers.
85. The Association of American Colleges, Amicus Curiae Brief, at 7, South-
eastern Community College v. Davis, 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979).
86. Id.
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The Peer and the Precedent: A Review Essay of
Denning, L. The Discipline of Law
London: Butterworth's, 1979.
Reviewed by Michael L. Richmond*
"Stare decisis et non quieta movere." The sepuchral words roll from
the hidebound pages of Bouvier's, bearing the tradition of the throaty
chimes of Big Ben. No phrase better typifies the methodology of the
common law, no single group of words better represents the unbroken
skein of judicial reasoning binding us to an England yet to hear those
notes resonating across the Thames. The common law attorney, wher-
ever located, still feels the compulsion "to stand by the decision and
not move that which is settled." Yet the same revolutionary fervor
which caused the founding fathers "to dissolve the political bands"'
connecting the colonies with Mother England also found expression in
the treatment of precedent in the courts of the new nation. Certainly,
the drafters of the Declaration of Independence maintained a healthy
respect for the system of British jurisprudence. One of the grievances
against King George listed was his ". . . abolishing the free system of
English laws in a neighbouring province . . .,,2 However, the new
courts tended to shy away from this precedent, adopting it when appro-
priate, but feeling no compunctions in ignoring it.
Many reasons have been advanced for this action of the post-colo-
nial judges. Beveridge certainly makes a forceful case for Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall's lack of precedents in his opinions as resulting from
"the meagerness of his learning in the law." 3 Undeniably, law books
were not accorded the highest priority in cargo bound for the New
World. Still, as Beveridge continues, ". . . at a later period, when
precedents were more abundant and accessible, he [Marshall] still ig-
nored them."'
* Assistant Professor of Law, Nova Law Center, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. A.B.,
Hamilton College, J.D., Duke University, M.S.L.S., University of North Carolina.
1. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 1 Stat. 1 (1776).
2. Id. at 2.
3. II A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 178 (1916).
4. Id. at 179.
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Certainly the practice of the greatest of the early Chief Justices
contributed to what became a very lax view of adherence to precedent.
Another factor may have been the total inapplicability of English pre-
cedent to the new Constitution. "In constitutional law stare decisis has
been applied with much less rigor than in other fields of law, on the
theoretical ground that it is the Constitution which is the basic stan-
dard and not the previous decisions of the Court."5 Whatever the rea-
son, our courts interpreting the Constitution have not felt constrained
to abide by their own decisions (much less those of England) when the
tenor of society demanded otherwise. This willingness to accept change
(or, less charitably, this desire to individualize the law) reflects in vary-
ing degree in all other areas of the law as interpreted by United States
courts. The most prominent legal theorists of the country have earned
the collective term of "legal realists" in their advocation of relaxed
acceptance of precedent. Yet what began as a moderate relaxation has
today evolved into what some of our contemporaries view as a total
abnegation of established rules.
An American edition of Blackstone's COMMENTARIES presents an
interesting comparison of the English and American approaches.
Blackstone's test is imperative: "The doctrine of the law then is this:
that precedents and rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd or un-
just: for though their reason be not obvious at first view, yet we owe
such a deference to former times as not to suppose that they acted
wholly without consideration." ' The commentator's note, however, tells
us something different:
The rule that established precedents should be adhered to and followed,
although it is a general principle wherever the common-law is in force, is
not so rigidly observed as to prevent courts of appellate jurisdiction from
overruling previous decisions which are deemed to be erroneous and
unreasonable.'
5. C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 16-17 (1969).
See also A. MASON & W. BEANEY, THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE SOCIETY 22-24
(1959); W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 18
(1974).
6. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 36 (Chase's 4th
ed. 1925).
7. Id. at 36 n.2.
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Thus, the English and United States versions differ, perhaps only
slightly in test, but considerably in meaning. The development of this
change marshalls some of the greatest figures in contemporary juris-
prudence, marking perhaps the greatest break between English and
American legal theory. However, even before these theorists spoke,
precedential value was questioned. By the turn of the century, one his-
torian of the law noted:
Adherence to precedent is useful; but it no longer controls. It is no
longer a ground for decision that a question involved has been decided in
a certain way by another court or by the same court on a previous occa-
sion. Precedent is persuasive, but no longer decisive. .... I
Gray's criticism of strict adherence to precedent lay in the danger
of accepting as morally right a rule which exists simply because of its
venerability. Morality should govern tradition, rather than the reverse.
"The decision of a court may unite the character of a judicial prece-
dent with the character of an expression of wise thought or of sound
morals, but often these characters are separated." 9 Yet Gray did not go
so far as to demand rejection of precedent. His position instead re-
quired harmonizing past decisions with contemporary policy, and using
the rationale and logic of past courts to solve current problems. "After
all, judicial precedents are only words, written in the past by some
judge, and it is only as currently interpreted that they have impact on
the community."' 10
Frank found reliance on precedent to be "illusory."" Indeed, his
criticism of the system of precedent goes to the very foundations them-
selves, questioning the worth of relying on imperfectly reported prior
cases. How, he asks, can later judges accurately determine the mental
processes by which their predecessors decided the disputes with which
they were faced? Judges do not report their entire thoughts and impres-
sions-indeed, they lack the training and capability to do so even if
they so desired. Thus, the entire system is suspect. Despite this, Frank
8. M. MORRIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
LAW 303 (1909).
9. JOHN CHIPMANLGRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 200 (2d ed.
1921).
10. T. BENDITT, LAW As RULE AND PRINCIPLE 7 (1978).
I. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 152 (1936).
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refuses to advocate desertion of the system. It still presents a perfectly
valid method ofodetermining disputes, for
[i]f we relinquish the assumption that law can be made mathemati-
cally certain, if we honestly recognize the judicial process as involving
unceasing adjustment and individualization, we may be able to reduce
the uncertainty which characterizes much of our present judicial output
to the extent that such uncertainty is undesirable. By abandoning an in-
fantile hope of absolute legal certainty we may augment the amount of
actual legal certainty."
Cardozo, too, felt unduly confined by precedent.
Battered and pelted, we grope for a principle of order that will compose
the jarring atoms, . . . for a rationalizing principle whereby precedents
that are outworn may be decenly discarded without affront to the senti-
ment that there shall be no breach of the legal order in the house of its
custodians. 3
His statement reflects the struggle of the "legal realists" to retain the
principles of law while accepting a flexible application of stare decisis.
Tritely, they did not want to send the cleansed jurisprudence down the
drain along with the bath water now befouled by the elimination of
stale precedent."'
Contemporary writers have'abandoned this moderate stance. They
recognize that to a great extent judges continue to seek at least gui-
dance and frequently control from prior cases. One commentator at-
tributes this to self-preservation, for judges who disregard precedent
frequently find their decisions reversed, while courts refusing to follow
their own cases will not themselves .be followed.15
For whatever reason, the new breed of computer devotees and
12. Id. at 159.
13. Address of Benjamin N. Cardozo to the New York State Bar Association in
New York City (Jan. 22, 1932), in SELECTED WRITINGS 8-9 (1947).
14. "The theme of the legal realists is not, then, that courts ought to disregard
established rules in the process of reaching decisions. The point which they wished to
emphasize is, rather, that the consideration of such rules ought not to be the decisive
method by which decisions are reached." W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 190
(1968).
15. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977).
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statisticians would throw over precedent and restructure the law along
more relevant lines. Destroy the building, they urge, when "the pillars,
main beams, or indeed any essential parts of the structure are rot-
ten.""6 We need only look to the causes for dissent on the Supreme
Court to see that the greatest fomenter of judicial disharmony is the
debate on adherence to precedent in the face of social need. 7 At the
very least, let us have frequent turnover in judicial precedent. Judicial
opinions and capital assets are analogous: "[a]s old precedents obso-
lesce, eventually ceasing to be a part of the usable stock of precedents,
new ones are added to the stock through litigation."' 8 Now is the time
for all good computers.to come to the aid of the law. 9
Fortunately, in this time of troubled theory, a new voice comes to
us-a voice that has been urging reforms in England, yet which returns
us to the moderate, sensible world of the legal realists. In a brilliant
volume that gives as much pleasure to read as it does in provoking
thought, an eminent British jurist advocates reshaping the law, but do-
ing so by continuing to use the theory behind cases of the past no
longer directly relevant to contemporary society."0 This call for change
in England sounds to Americans as a plea for a reasoned approach to
judicial decision-making: one which draws on the past yet seeks to ap-
ply it to present problems rather than to either reject it absolutely as
no longer relevant or to follow it slavishly as an inflexible dictate.
Lord Denning does not stand alone among British jurists and legal
thinkers, although advocates of easing the burden of precedent consti-
tute, at best, a minority. Among others, H.L.A. Hart strongly ques-
tions the propriety of unswerving adherence to prior cases, although
recognizing that to be accepted practice. Hart's "rule-scepticism" for
judicial precedent springs from three observations.
First, there is no single method of determining the rule for which a given
authoritative precedent is an authority. . . . Secondly, there is no au-
thoritative or uniquely correct formulation of any rule to be extracted
16. C. HYNEMAN, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL 230 (1964).
17. P. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT 7 (1969).
18. POSNER, supra note 15, at 420.
19. C. F. Sigler, A Cybernetic Model of the Judicial System, 41 TEMPLE L. Q.
398 (1968).
20. LORD DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW (1979) [hereinafter cited as
DENNING].
328
Nova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol4/iss1/1
332 Nova Law Journal 4:1980
from cases. .... Thirdly, .. courts deciding a later case may reach an
opposite decision to that in a precedent by narrowing the rule extracted
...[or] discard a restriction found in the rule as formulated from the
earlier case, on the ground that it is not required by any rule established
by statute or earlier precedent.2
Thus, whether because rules cannot be determined in a uniform man-
ner or with certainty, or because in practice the judiciary has 'ample
tools at its disposal to avoid the general principle, Hart questions the
wisdom of total obedience to precedent.
Denning, too, questions precedent on a purely theoretical basis.
He goes beyond this, however, to consider the effect of strict stare deci-
sis on practitioners and judges. For the attorney, it means: "He can
argue either way as you please." More significantly, to the judge it
means one of two things. The individual judge ". . . does not have to
think for himself or to decide for himself. It has already been decided
on the previous authority." For most judges, however, the result is
even more insidious:
Whilst ready to applaud the doctrine of precedent when it leads to a just
and fair result, they become restless under it when they are compelled by
it to do what is unjust or unfair. This restlessness leads them to various
expedients to get round a previous authority.22
Judges are thus tempted into the intellectual dishonesty of accepting a
rule of decision when it pleases them and, working under cover of the
rule (as Hart also noted), avoiding its effects-a mild form of hypoc-
risy which, although perhaps justified as a means to a laudable end,
nonetheless compromises the underlying rationale and ostensibly logi-
cal process of judicial reasoning.
Lord Denning's efforts to turn the tide have extended as far as his
stepping down from the House of Lords to accept a seat on the inferior
Court of Appeals. Realizing that dissent was futile in the Parliamen-
tary court, he elected to sit on a bench where his voice might be heard
more forcefully-where his influence could work greater good although
he would suffer a resulting loss of personal status. "In the Court of
Appeals it [dissent] is some good. On occasion a head-note there says:
21. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 131 (1961).
22. DENNING at 285.
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'Lord Denning dissenting.' "2
This same dedication to and love of the Law and desire to see it
improve and more accurately deal with contemporary problems reflects
throughout the pages of the book. The dedication and vitality of the
man impel the reader through his work, making it a pleasant as well as
an enlightening experience. For the joy Lord Denning experiences in
the law and transmits to his reader, this volume would be highly rec-
ommended to all attorneys and legal scholars. Yet it goes beyond this,
for we find a thoughtful, reasoned chronicle of cases in which prece-
dent's dictates led to decisions which were unquestionably morally
flawed. In these cases, Lord Denning would have overruled prior deci-
sions and thus permitted the law to mirror society's sense of propriety
and to grow in the process.
Unfortunately, Lord Denning bypassed an ideal opportunity to re-
spond to the well-reasoned criticism of Julius Stone. 4 Stone examined
the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Boys v. Chaplin,5 in which
Lord Denning, writing for the majority, did not follow a precedent
which he deemed erroneous. Stone viewed Denning's attempt to over-
rule the earlier case as exposing ". . . the potential of creative chaos
existing behind a fragile shell of orderly, settled precedent. '2 6 Rather
than overruling the case, Stone would have in some way distinguished
it, as Denning's fellow judges attempted to do.
This case, in short, illustrates well the unwillingness of judges to recog-
nize the rather inescapable import for the theory of binding precedent of
their own use of precedent. Most appellate judges apparently continue to
believe that stability with growth within the common law turns somehow
on whether the rule of the Young case should be formally abandoned.
Yet, by their actual techniques of handling legal issues, they constantly
demonstrate their own freedom to limit the scope within which prece-
dents are binding, so that the question of formal abandonment may be
23. Id. at 287.
24. Stone, A. Court of Appeal in Search of Itself, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1420
(1971).
25. Boys v. Chaplin, [1968] 2 Q.B. 1, afld [1969] 2 All E.R. 1085 (H.L.).
26. Stone, supra note 24 at 1441.
27. Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., [1944] K.B. 718 (C.A.). This case binds the
Court of Appeals to its own decisions, while creating a limited class of vague excep-
tions to the principle of strict adherence. See Stone, supra note 24 at 1420.
-- AA
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one that rarely need arise."8
Stone has long espoused the principle of strict adherence, yet has
tempered it by relying on the creativity of judges to find ways of avoid-
ing any harsh effects. 9 As has been noted, this places the judge in jeop-
ardy of creating forced exceptions to the general rule to avoid violating
a general principle which would lead to a harsh result. The jurist thus
must resolve the impossible dilema of whether the ends (maintaining
the stiff upper lip of precedent) justify the means (strained readings of
cases and a proliferation of hypertechnical exceptions). Although Lord
Denning addresses the issue generally throughout the book, he never
comes to grips with the criticism as it relates to Boys It is never men-
tioned-even in passing.
This small criticism aside, Lord Denning has produced a marvel-
ous work which should be read by all those who must work with prece-
dent and should be in any serious legal collection. He sounds the clar-
ion of change: in Great Britain, change which moves forward
creatively; in the United States, change which retrenches to a more
moderate, more meaningful position. At the same time, the force and
beauty of his prose add immeasurably to the strength of his argument.
Let it not be thought from this discourse that I am against the doctrine
of precedent. I am not. . . . All that I am against is its too rigid applica-
tion-a rigidity which insists that a bad precedent must necessarily be
followed. You must follow it certainly so as to reach your end. But you
must not let the path become too overgrown. You must cut out the dead
wood and trim off the side branches, else you will find yourself lost in
thickets and brambles. My plea is simply to keep the path to justice
clear of obstructions which impede it."°
28. Stone, supra note 24 at 1442 (footnote added).
29. E.g., J. STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 656 el seq. (1966);
J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 166 et seq. (1961).
30. DENNING at 314.
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Sirica, John J., To Set The Record Straight. W. W. N orton and Co.,
1979 pp. 394, $15.00
Reviewed by Ronald Benton Brown*
Judge John Sirica has presented his view of the Watergate affair and
his role in it in To SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT.' While the judge
would never be accused of being a great writer, his narrative is ex-
tremely interesting. It allows us to vicariously experience the two most
significant trials of the century and the monumental confrontation be-
tween the executive and judicial branches of the federal government
which resulted from the battle from the Watergate tapes. It also
reveals the author as a person caught in the pivotal position in this
confrontation. Judge Sirica's story may eliminate some of the doubts
about the conduct of the trials of the Watergate burglars and conspira-
tors and it does seem to successfully justify the sentences of those de-
fendants. It does little, however, to convince us that the integrity of our
legal system survived the Watergate crisis.
Judge Sirica describes himself as a regular trial judge, one of hun-
dreds of District Court Judges, in fact, "an obscure judge."' 2 Surpris-
ingly, he is thrust into a conflict with the President of the United
States, a man for whom Sirica practically brags that he had voted. But
he recognizes his duty; how he lives up to that duty is the heart of this
narrative. It is easy to identify with him and sympathize with his strug-
gle. Understandably, he admits to few errors in his handling of the
trials.
In the trial of the Watergate burglars, however, he reveals that he
suspected a coverup even before the trial started. Before becoming a
judge, he had been counsel for the Select Committee of the House of
Representatives on the Federal Communications Commission. There
he had encountered what he believed to be a coverup and resigned his
position, stating, "I don't want it on my conscience that anyone can
* B.S.M.E., 1970, Northeastern University; J.D., 1973, University of Connecti-
cut; L.L.M., 1976, Temple University; Associate Professor of Law, Nova University
Center for the Study of Law.
1. J. SIRICA, To SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT (1979). [hereinafter cited as
SIRICA.]
2. Id. at 143.
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say John Sirica, a resident of the District for many years, is a party to
a whitewash .... "I
This experience, Judge Sirica explains, prepared him to deal with
the attempted coverup in the Watergate case. There is something un-
settling about the trial judge admitting to such suspicions before the
trial. It sounds ominously reminiscent of the Captain in THE CAINE
MUTINY4 insisting that a duplicate key existed.
Judge Sirica admits to moments of anger, frustration, and to less
than ideal judicial demeanor, but reveals nothing substantial enough in
this account to lead the reader to conclude that the trials were improp-
erly handled. On the other hand, he does little to convince the reader
that they were properly conducted. There is, for example, the conspir-
acy trial which took place after Nixon had already resigned and been
pardoned. The defendants argued that Sirica should not hear the case
because of his participation in the earlier burglary trial and in the
Watergate tapes subpoena case. As the Chief Judge, he had the power
to decide the assignment of these cases. One must wonder if assign-
ment of the case to a different judge would not have contributed at
least to the appearance of fairness. Sirica's reasons, 1) that he was best
qualified to hear the case because he had already "supervised virtually
every aspect of the case"' and, 2) that people might think he avoided
the trial with "the big names"6 leave much to be desired.7
Again referring to the conspiracy trial, Judge Sirica admits that he
felt from the beginning that the defendants had no viable defense and,
therefore, based their hopes on provoking him into making an error.
"Wilson knew that my Italian temper was one of my main weaknesses.
3. Id. at 59.
4. H. WOUK, THE CAINE MUTINY (1954). The Captain there insisted that the
theft of the strawberries had been accomplished by the use of a duplicate key to the
food stores because he had discovered just such a duplicate key in investigating the
theft of food years earlier.
5. SIRICA, at 242.
6. Id.
7. See A.B.A. PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §1.7 The Func-
tion of a Trial Judge (1972), which requires that the trial judge should excuse himself
whenever he believes that "his impartiality can reasonably be questioned." Here Judge
Sirica did the opposite by assigning himself. He could easily have assigned another
judge to hear and avoided any question of impartiality.
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From the start he tried to use that weakness to his client's advantage." 8
Judge Sirica congratulates himself on having resisted these attempts,
but the picture of the trials which emerges falls short of the ideal.
Judge Sirica treats us to a number of interesting capsule portraits
of the personalities involved, particularly the lawyers. Alch was "a bit
theatrical and always seemed to be wearing heavy makeup."' Henry
Rothblatt was "flamboyant" with his toupe6 and thin moustache "that
almost seemed to be drawn onto his upper lip with a pencil."" Ben-
Veniste "despite his youth showed a lot of courtroom savvy."'" "Hun-
dley could always be counted on to get off a wisecrack.' ' 2 Frates had
"rugged good looks" and a "deep resonant voice that absolutely domi-
nated the courtroom."' Jill Volner was "quietly competent."' 4 Judge
Sirica reveals the demeanor of the lawyers and the defendants certainly
do make an impression upon the trial judge.
The sentencing of the defendants has been the object of many neg-
ative comments. Judge Sirica's nickname of "Maximum John" com-
bined with his use of provisional sentences 5 has led some to the conclu-
sion that the sentences were overly harsh. His response is clear and
convincing:
To be sure, I have always leaned towards stiffer sentences then some of
my colleagues on the District Court, especially for white collar crimes,
but the outcry about the provisional sentences always ignored two facts;
that they were provisional, and that they were required by the statute I
had used to put off final sentencing. 6
The saga of the subpoena for the Watergate tapes is the most
compelling part of this book. The discovery that the President has a
system to tape record conversations in the White House presented the
Senate Committee, the Watergate Special Prosecutor and the public
8. SIRICA, at 258.
9. Id. at 65.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 73.
12. Id. at 259.
13. Id. at 260.
14. Id. at 262.
15. 18 U.S.C. §4208(b) allows such sentencing.
16. SIRICA, at 119.
334
Nova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol4/iss1/1
338 Nova Law Journal 4:1980 1
with the means for verifying the testimony of those involved, particu-
larly John Dean. There was, unfortunately, one problem. The President
did not believe that these tapes could be subpoenaed.
Sirica, at this point, realized that he was involved in a contest of
strength between the judicial branch and the executive branch over the
claim that these tapes were protected by "Executive Privilege," and it
became clear to him that Nixon was counting on his appointees to the
Supreme Court for support in this claim. Judge Sirica concludes that
the constitutional crisis precipitated has been satisfactorily resolved.
"Despite efforts in our Executive branch to distort the truth, to fabri-
cate a set of facts that looked innocent, the court system served to set
the record straight." 7 But those who have read THE BRETHREN' 8 and
contemplated what might have happened had Nixon ultimately refused
to hand over the tapes may wonder at the accuracy of his assessment.
The grand juries which investigated the Watergate affair are de-
scribed by Judge Sirica as "courageous."' 9 They emerge from this
book as the unnoticed heroes of the entire conflict. They spent arduous
months investigating. They bofe the real burden in-the subpoena battle.
"Here was the Grand Jury made up of ordinary citizens from the Dis-
trict of Columbia, some of them poor people, telling the President of
the United States, the most powerful man in the world, to turn over
the tapes."2 0
On reaching the end of the text, one discovers an appendix which
includes short excerpts from the transcripts of the tapes made in the
White House. Unfortunately, these excerpts are too short to be partic-
ularly informative. Following these are Judge Sirica's opinion and or-
der that the subpoena issued to the President for the Watergate tapes
be obeyed;2' a copy of the opinion of the court of appeals in upholding
that decision;22 a copy of Judge Sirica's opinion on whether the Grand
Jury could release information to the House Judiciary Commiee;23 a
copy of the United States Supreme Court decision upholding the sub-
17. Id. at 301.
18. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979).
19. SIRICA, at 301.
20. Id. at 401.
21. In Re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973).
22. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
23. In Re Report and Recommendation of the June 5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370
F.2d 1219 (D.D.C. 1974).
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poena;u and finally, a copy of Judge Sirica's order on Liddy's motion
for reduction of sentence32 These opinions are not integrated into the
text. Why sixty pages of this book are devoted to reprinting opinions
which are readily available in any law library remains a mystery.
24. U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
25. U.S. v. Liddy, 397 F Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1975).
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